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THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION, 


a 

THE 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 


BY 


J.  D.  MORELL,  A.  M. 

AUTHOR   OF  "  THE   HISTORY   OF   MODERN  PHILOSOPHY,"  ETC. 


NEW-YORK: 
D.  APPLETON  &  COMPANY,   200  BROADWAY. 

PHILADELPHIA  : 

GEO.  S.  APPLETON,  164  CHESNUT-8T. 
M.DCCC.ZLIX. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Page 

ON    THE    FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN  MIND 35 

CHAPTER  II. 

ON    THE    DISTINCTION    BETWEEN    THE   LOGICAL   AND   THE   INTUITIONAL 

CONSCIOUSNESS 55 

CHAPTER  III. 

ON   THE   PECULIAR   ESSENCE   OF    RELIGION 82 

CHAPTER  IV. 

ON    THE   ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY 106 

CHAPTER  V. 

ON    REVELATION 127 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ON    INSPIRATION 147 

CHAPTER  VII. 

ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY 180 


2051555 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    VIII.  Page 

ON    THE    ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR   THEOLOGY 206 

CHAPTER  IX. 

ON   FELLOWSHIP 229 

CHAPTER  X. 

ON   CERTITUDE 259 

CHAPTER  XI. 

ON    THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF   THE    PAST 301 

CHAPTER  XII. 

ON   THE   RELATION   BETWEEN   PHILOSOPHY   AND   THEOLOGY  .   324 


PREFACE. 


IN  presenting  to  the  public  the  following  treatise  on  the 
"  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  some  few  preliminary  explanations 
are  needful.  First  of  all  it  may  be  right  to  acknowledge, 
that  the  design  of  it  grew  out  of  some  of  the  reviews,  which 
appeared  upon  a  former  work  of  the  author's,  entitled,  "  An 
Historical  and  Critical  View  of  the  Speculative  Philosophy 
of  Europe  in  the  Nineteenth  Century."  The  few  and 
almost  unavoidable  remarks  there  made  upon  the  relation 
between  Religion  and  Philosophy,  attracted,  on  the  part  of 
many  critics  and  reviewers,  a  very  disproportionate  share  of 
attention  :  while  the  different  ways  in  which  the  subject  was 
treated  by  them,  not  only  showed  a  vast  fluctuation  of  opinion 
among  themselves  upon  the  real  questions  involved,  bul 
proved  to  my  own  mind  most  decisively,  that,  in  the  majority 
of  eases,  no  clear  and  philosophical  views  whatever  existed, 
to  guide  the  opinions  of  our  popular  writers  upon  a  subject 
the  most  deeply  interesting,  and  the  most  widely  practical, 
of  any  that  could  possibly  engage  their  thoughts  and 
energies. 

2 
* 


10  PREFACE. 

~ 

To  specify  particular  instances  now  that  the  memory  and 
the  effect  of  them  have  alike  gone  by,  would  be  more  invi- 
dious than  useful.  I  may  simply  state  that  the  brief  notice 
written  by  Professor  Tholuck,  in  the  "  Litterarischer 
Anzeiger,"  and  which  alone  appeared  to  me  to  regard  the 
whole  subject  of  Religion  and  Philosophy  from  a  truly 
elevated  point  of  view,  prompted  me,  perhaps  more  than  any 
other  single  motive,  to  commence  a  discussion,  which  he 
distinctly  and  advisedly  declared  to  be  absolutely  necessary, 
ere  a  new  vigor  could  be  infused  into  the  religious  literature 
of  our  country.  To  write  a  little,  and  that  little  necessarily 
incomplete,  upon  a  question  that  rests  upon  the  very  primary 
and  most  fundamental  principles  of  human  knowledge,  I 
perceived,  could  not  fail  to  lay  open  my  sentiments  and  ex- 
pressions,  generally,  to  perpetual  misconstruction  :  I  deter- 
mined, therefore,  to  develop  the  subject  from  the  beginning, 
as  far  as  possible  in  a  connected  and  logical  form ;  and  the 
result  of  this  determination  is  the  volume  now  presented  to 
the  public. 

Should  any  one  look  in  these  pages  for  a  popular  and 
attractive  exposition  of  the  question,  I  fear  he  will  be  disap- 
pointed. For,  although  I  have  attempted  to  put  down  my 
thoughts  as  clearly  as  I  was  able,  yet  I  have  designedly 
treated  the  whole  matter  from  a  purely  philosophical  point 
of  view,  and  am  fully  aware  that  no  one,  who  is  from  the 
first  indisposed  to  accept  the  conclusions  deduced,  will  be 
likely  to  derive  much  conviction,  one  way  or  the  other,  from 
what  is  here  said,  unless  he  take  the  pains  to  proceed  step 
by  step,  and  realize  for  himself  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the 


PREFACE. 


whole  philosophy  upon  which  it  is  based.  To  those  who 
will  do  this  with  patient  and  unprejudiced  minds,  I  am  quite 
willing  to  leave  the  whole  argument  as  it  stands  ;  uncon- 
cerned whether  I  or  they  may  be  found  in  the  advance,  so 
long  as  truth  is  either  maintained  or  evolved  by  the  process. 
But,  for  the  sake  of  many  others,  who,  alas  !  are  more 
addicted  to  denounce  and  to  scorn  whatever  they  are  unac- 
customed to  hear,  than  to  search  into  its  evidences  with  a 

high-minded  and  unwearied  love  for  truth,  I  feel  constrained 

0    • 

to  make  a  few  observations,  grounded  upon  an  actual  expe- 
rience of  the  obstacles  with  which  such  discussions  as  these 
have  commonly  to  contend. 

1.  And,  first,  I  would  refer  to  a  remarkable  term  of 
reproach,  which  has  become  very  common  of  late  amongst 
certain  classes  in  our  country ;  1  mean,  that  which  stamps 
every  attempt  to  view  religion  by  the  light  of  a  higher  phi- 
losophy than  is  current  among  themselves  with  the  title  of 
Germanism.  This  very  convenient  epithet  —  convenient 
because  it  serves  well  to  hide  the  actual  ignorance  of  its 
employers  behind  an  imposing  but  absolutely  meaningless 
expression — requires  to  be  held  up  for  a  little  to  the  light, 
that  we  may  see  what  the  crime  really  is  which  it  essays  to 
condemn. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  not  by  any  means  obvious, 
at  least  to  the  uninitiated,  that  the  fact  of  a  thought,  a  notion, 
or  a  system  of  notions,  coming  from  Germany,  is  any 
evidence  against  their  truth  or  propriety.  Thought, 
assuredly,  is  universal.  We  never  ask,  as  honest  inquirers, 
where  a  principle  comes  from,  but  whether  it  be  true. 


12  PREFACE. 

Perhaps  there  is  no  part  of  the  world  which  has  not  con. 
tributed  its  share  to  the  whole  sum  of  human  knowledge  ; 
and,  certainly,  it  is  the  opinion  of  those  best  entitled  to  judge, 
that  the  soil  of  Germany  has  not  been  unfruitful  in  this 
respect.  If  the  term  Germanism  indicate  merely  a  pedantic 
and  un-English  phraseology,  which  some  writers  have  thought 
fit  to  run  into,  there  is  little  reason  in  applying  it  to  any 
peculiar  species  of  ideas,  still  less  in  saddling  our  neighbors 
across  the  Rhine  with  the  burden  of  our  own  follies  ;  but  if 
the  term  is  intended  to  indicate  any  distinctive  mode  of 
thinking,  then  it  would  be  instructive  for  us  to  have  this  mode 
clearly  expounded  instead  of  denounced.  Thus  expounded, 
all  might  soon  begin  to  comprehend  its  value,  or  its  worth- 
lessness ;  for  there  can  certainly  be  nothing  in  German 
thinking  which  is  inaccessible  to  the  laws  of  reasoning,  or 
rules  of  evidence  ;  and,  wherever  a  truth  or  a  lie  may 
spring  from,  it  is  no  less  a  truth,  and  no  more  a  lie,  when  it 
comes  to  us  from  one  direction  than  when  it  comes  to  us 
from  another. 

Perhaps,  however,  we  may  gain  some  idea  of  what  is 
meant  by  the  epithet  Germanism,  by  putting  it  by  the  side  of 
the  kindred  expression,  Neology — an  expression  which  has 
the  advantage  of  possessing  at  least  a  clear  etymological 
meaning.  The  term  Neology  can,  of  course,  be  fitly  applied 
to  any  conception  that  is  new,  be  it  what  it  may  ;  and  deeply 
enough  has  it  needed  all  the  elasticity  of  its  native  significa- 
tion. It  would  be  hard  to  say  what  phenomenon  of  German 
theological  or  philosophical  literature  has  not,  in  its  turn, 
borne  this  most  comprehensive  soubriquet.  If  it  be  asked, 


PREFACE.  13 

what  is  the  criticism  of  Semler  and  his  school  ? —  the 
approved  answer  is,  Neology.  What  is  the  moral  theology 
of  Kant  ?  Neology.  What  is  the  subjective  idealism  of 
Fichte,  or  the  absolute  idealism  of  Hegel  ?  Neology.  What 
is  the  mysticism  of.  Hamann  or  Baader — what  the  deep, 
earnest  spiritualism  of  Schleiermacher  ?  Neology.  What, 
in  fine,  is  the  theology  of  Neander,  of  Nitzsch,  of  Daub, 
De  Wette,  Rothe,  and  Hundeshagen  ?  All  alike,  Neology. 
And  if  we  had  now  the  deep  intuitional  theology  of  St.  John, 
or  the  broad  anti-ceremonial  spirit  of  St.  Paul  amongst  us, 

sure  I  am  that  they  might  too  justly  be  termed  Neology  also  ; 

I 
for   novel   indeed  would   be   the   contrast  with  which   the 

thoughts  of  such  minds  as  these  would  stand  out,  amongst 
all  the  miserable  strifes  we  are  now  used  to  witness  over  a 
thousand  paltry  prejudices  of  form  and  rubric,  of  denomina- 
tion and  party,  all  of  which  might  well  be  dispensed  with 
without  touching,  in  one  single  point,  the  great  essential 
features  of  Christianity  itself. 

As  a  distinctive  and  significant  expression,  the  term 
Neology,  as  also  that  of  Germanism,  has  become  absolutely 
without  any  other  meaning  than  that  of  pointing  out  some- 
thing which  is  new  to  us,  or  differs  from  our  own  system. 
Were  some  well-meaning,  narrow-minded  Lutheran  to  take 
the  works  of  Cudworth,  Jeremy  Taylor,  and  Henry  More, 
— were  he  to  add  those  of  Collins,  Chubb,  and  Shaftsbury, 
— were  he  next  to  point  out  the  Puritanical  theology  of  the 
old  Calvinistic  school, — were  he  then  to  come  down  to  more 
modern  times,  and  heap  together  Dr.  Pusey,  Sidney  Smith, 
Baptist  Noel,  Chalmers,  Carlisle,  Robert  Owen,  James  Mar- 


PREFACE. 


tineau,  and  Archbishop  Whateley,  and  stamp  all  these  with 
the  names  of  Anglicism  and  Neology,  he  would  not  be  one 
atom  more  unreasonable  in  his  procedure,  or  link  together 
phenomena  one  atom  more  heterogeneous,  than  is  perpetually 
done  by  those  who  throw  the  German  theologians  and  philoso- 
phical speculators  together  into  one  generalization,  and  charac- 
terize their  systems  by  one  single,  and  that  a  national,  epithet. 
That  Germany  has  given  rise  to  much  that  is  oppposed  to 
real  Christianity,  and  subversive  of  all  genuine  faith  in  God, 
is,  unhappily,  true :  but  it  has  not  been  at  all  more  fruitful 

in  schemes  of  Infidelity  than  our  own  country :  nor  has  it 

• 

encouraged  by  any  means  so  largely  as  we  have  the  grovel- 
ling spirit  of  a  utilitarian  and  materialistic  philosophy.  The 
only  difference  is,  that,  whilst  our  unbelievers  have  nurtured 
the  spirit  of  Infidelity  in  a  low,  vulgar,  and  unimposing  form, 
theirs  have  stormed  the  fortresses  of  the  faith  with  an  array 
of  learning,  and  a  mental  intensity,  to  which  we  can  make 
but  small  pretension.  But  it  should  not  be  forgotten,  that, 
where  learning  can  be  a  bane,  there  it  can  also  be  an  anti- 
dote ;  and  such  assuredly  it  has  been  in  Germany.  They 
who  are  unacquainted  with  the  literature,  the  criticism,  and 
the  Christian  philosophy  of  that  country,  can  easily  afford  to 
despise  it ;  but  I  can  soberly  say,  that,  amongst  all  those  who 
have  taken  the  pains  to  read,  mark,  learn,  and  inwardly 
digest  the  best  productions  of  the  German  mind,  I  never 
knew  one  (and  I  have  known  many),  who  did  not  esteem  the 
privilege  of  doing  so  amongst  the  greatest  he  had  ever 
enjoyed.  It  is  common  to  speak  particularly  of  the  mysti- 
cism of  the  German  theologians.  Such  an  opinion,  I  am  bold 


PREFACE.  15 

to  say,  is,  in  the  great  majority  of  instances,  only  accountable 
for  on  the  principle,  that  every  thing  appears  mystical  to  us 
before  we  comprehend  it.  But  if  there  are  any  number  of 
theologians  in  the  world  who  have  less  than  ordinary  title  to 
the  charge  of  mysticism,  that  number  is  to  be  found  amongst 
the  German  writers ;  for  they,  of  all  others,  have  been  the 
most  fruitful  in  historical  research,  in  keen-sighted  criticism, 
and  in  the  development  of  the  fixed  laws  of  our  spiritual 
nature. 

Whilst,  therefore,  those  who  earnestly  and  patiently  study 
the  literature  of  Germany  bear  testimony  to  its  depth,  its 
freshness,  its  compass,  and  its  clear-sightedness,  the  evidence 
is  surely  in  favor  of  its  high  value  to  those  who  can  use  it 
aright.  This  being  the  case,  we  can  in  future  only  afford  to 
regard  the  indiscriminate  condemnation  of  those  who  have 
not  investigated  the  subject  in  the  light  of  the  monk's  famous 
warning,  who,  at  the  revival  of  literature,  is  reported  to  have 
declaimed  against  the  study  of  Greek  and  Hebrew,  as  infalli- 
bly ending  in  each  admirer  becoming,  on  the  one  side  a  Pa- 
gan, or  on  the  other  side  a  Jew. 

My  purpose  in  making  these  remarks  about  German  lite- 
rature is,  not  at  all  to  offer  a  justification  or  apology  for  any 
use  of  it  I  have  thought  right  to  make  in  the  following  pages ; 
but  simply  to  deprecate  the  unmeaning  employment  of  an 
epithet  which  can  appeal  to  nothing  but  the  prejudices  of  the 
ignorant.  Very  few,  indeed,  if  any,  of  the  data  which  I 
have  assumed  are  peculiarly  German  in  their  character ; 
and  if  some  of  the  results  of  German  thought  and  analysis 
have  been  incorporated  into  my  own  views  and  opinions,  yet 


16  PREFACE. 

they  are  all  presented  as  deductions  from  the  data  primarily 
laid  down,  and  are  only  to  be  accepted  upon  such  evidence 
as  is  accessible  to  any  reflecting  mind. 

2.  Another  popular  charge  against  investigations  such  as 
are  contained  in  the  present  volume  is,  that  of  Rationalism, 
This  term,  like  those  above  mentioned,  is  perpetually  used 
without  any  definite  meaning  being  attached  to  it.  Many 
persons  seem  to  imagine  that  our  unquestionable  duty,  as 
sincere  Christians,  is,  to  accept  the  whole  traditionary  the- 
ology in  which  we  may  happen  to  be  educated,  without  any 
investigation  whatever;  and  that  we  become  guilty  of  Ra- 
tionalism the  moment  we  begin  to  ask  ourselves  for  a  reason 
of  the  hope  that  is  in  us,  beyond  a  certain  circle  of  approved 
and  acknowledged  evidences.  Yet  the  spirit  of  the  present 
age  is  such,  that  men  will  demand  a  reason  of  some  kind  for 
every  thing  which  is  offered  to  their  acceptance.  Even  those 
who  appeal  most  strenuously  to  the  dictates  of  authority,  are 
fain  to  show  cause  for  doing  so  ;  and  they  who  deny  that  a 
reason  is  ever  to  be  rendered  for  their  faith,  yet  are  not  proof 
against  the  weakness,  if  such  it  be,  of  proffering  their  own 
reasons  for  thinking  so.  The  age  of  blind  authority  is  hope- 
lessly past ;  intellectual  submission  has  no  chance  of  gaining 
votaries  now-a-days,  unless,  at  any  rate,  the  homage  is  paid 
to  their  faculties  of  showing  such  submission  to  be  something 
perfectly  reasonable. 

Now,  the  only  distinct  idea  which  I  am  able  to  attach  to 
the  term  Rationalism  is,  the  effort  to  reduce  the  whole  essence 
of  Christianity  to  a  logical  or  scientific  product,  and  the  denial 
of  there  being  any  thing  contained  in  it  beyond  the  facts 


PREFACE.  17 

which  actually  are,  or  which  can  be,  contained  in  a  con- 
nected series  of  propositions.  The  Rationalist  begins  by 
laying  down  his  definitions  in  approved  form ;  he  goes  on 
next  to  deduce  certain  conclusions  from  them ;  and  then  fol- 
lows up  his  train  of  reasoning,  step  by  step,  until  he  has 
brought  his  entire  faith  into  a  complete  logical  system.  This 
system,  according  to  his  view  of  it,  is  Christianity ;  the  pro- 
fession of  its  truth  is  the  profession  of  Christianity  ;  and  to 
believe  the  propositions  in  question,  is  to  be  a  Christian. 

For  myself,  I  am  far  from  having  any  sympathy  with 
Rationalism,  either  in  its  spirit  or  its  results.  To  me,  Chris- 
tianity, in  its  essence,  appears  a  deep  inward  life  of  the  soul, 
— a  life  which  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  any  scientific  ana- 
lysis, which  cannot  be  expressed  in  any  number  of  proposi- 
tions, but  which,  in  its  evidences,  in  its  conceptions,  in  its 
holy  impulses  and  anticipations,  lies  quite  beyond  the  region 
of  the  logical  understanding.  The  Divine  elements  of  Chris- 
tian truth  are  such  that,  to  my  mind,  they  need  no  other 
evidence  than  their  being  clearly  perceived ;  no  other  evi- 
dence, I  believe,  can  fully  reach  them.  They  cannot  be 
deduced  from  any  definitions ;  they  cannot  be  proved  by  any 
strictly  logical  process  ;  they  come  to  us  as  immediate  reve- 
lations from  God,  and  to  behold  them,  as  revealed,  is  at  once 
to  know  and  to  believe.  If  I  possess  the  Christian  life,  I  have 
the  witness  of  the  truth  within  me.  If  I  possess  it  not,  I  may, 
it  is  true,  possess  a  system  of  formal  doctrine  j  but  that  sys- 
tem, as  it  appears  to  the  logical  faculty,  has  much  about  the 
same  resemblance  to  Christianity  itself,  as  a  skeleton  has  to  a 
living  man. 

a* 


18  PREFACE. 

[strongly  suspect,  indeed,  that  the  charge  of  Rationalism, 
if  it  is  to  be  made  at  all,  is  really  more  justly  attributable  to 
the  very  persons  who  are  in  the  habit  of  thoughtlessly  fixing 
it  upon  their  fellow-Christians,  than  to  any  one  else.  Sure  I 
am,  that,  if  the  germs  of  religious  Rationalism  exist  any 
where  in  our  country, — if  there  are  principles  possessed  by 
any  party  which  involve  in  them  all  that  the  most  uncompro- 
mising Rationalist  could  demand,  those  germs  and  those  prin- 
ciples are  to  be  found  amongst  the  strenuous  assertors  of  the 
doctrine  of  private  judgment  in  its  intellectual  acceptation, 
although  that  doctrine  may  be  coupled  at  present  with  the 
most  perfect  orthodoxy  of  theological  opinion.  It  is  not  my 
intention  to  offer  here  the  evidence  of  what  I  now  affirm  ;  it 
will  be  found,  I  trust,  sufficiently  expounded  in  various  por- 
tions of  the  work  itself,  and  particularly  in  the  chapter  upon 
Certitude  in  the  domain  of  religious  truth.  I  merely  design 
by  these  few  remarks  to  repel,  in  the  outset,  the  charge  of 
Rationalism,  and  to  whisper  into  the  ears  of  those  most  likely, 
perhaps,  to  prefer  it,  the  admonition,  to  be  quite  sure  of  the 
soundness  of  their  own  principles,  and  to  see  to  it  that  they  do 
not  themselves  secretly  foster  in  their  own  bosom  the  viper, 
which  they  imagine  to  be  inserting  its  poison  only  into  the 
heart  of  others. 

3.  There  is  yet  a  third  expression  which  is  often  used  in 
opposition  to  the  employment  of  philosophical  analysis  in  the 
department  of  religion, — namely,  that  in  so  doing  we  are 
departing  from  the  simplicity  of  the  Gospel.  Now,  here,  let 
it  be  observed,  first  of  all,  that  there  is  a  great  difference 
between  religion,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion.  We  are 


PEEFACE.  19 

far  from  supposing  that  all  the  metaphysical  analyses  entered 
into  in  the  following  pages  are  in  any  sense  whatever  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  or  the  perfection  of  religion,  either  in  an 
individual  mind,  or  in  the  world  at  large.  The  more  simple 
a  thing  is  in  itself,  the  more  spontaneous  in  its  rise  and  activ- 
ity,— just  so  much  more  deep  and  recondite  is  the  process  by 
which  it  can  be  reflectively  realized  and  explained.  Nothing 
is  more  simple  and  natural  than  the  perception  of  the  external 
world  by  the  senses ;  and  yet  there  has  been  no  fact  in  the 
nature  and  operations  of  the  human  mind,  which  has  more 
taxed  the  analytic  powers  of  the  mental  philosopher  than 
this, — none  which  has  demanded  a  deeper  insight  into  the 
first  principles  of  human  knowledge.  A  very  complex  and 
peculiar  phenomenon  is  comparatively  easy  to  analyze  and 
account  for ;  it  is' the  simple,  native,  and  spontaneous  opera- 
tions of  the  mind  which  demand  all  our  powers  of  analysis, 
ere  they  can  be  reflectively  comprehended  and  philosophi- 
cally explained. 

So  it  is  with  respect  to  the  religious  nature  of  man.  The 
very  simplicity  of  its  operations  is  the  main  cause  of  the 
recondite  analysis,  which  must  be  employed  in  order  to  ren- 
der a  due  account  of  them  ;  so  that  we  are  rather  bearing 
testimony  to  the  simplicity  of  the  religious  life,  instead  of 
departing  from  it,  by  employing  the  most  subtle  metaphysical 
analysis  in  its  elucidation. 

There  are  some,  however,  who  may  probably  affirm  that 
we  are  here  departing  from  the  simplicity  of  the  Gospel,  not 
so  much  in  our  processes,  as  in  our  actual  results.  Now,  of 
all  the  set  phrases  which  roll  thoughtlessly  out  of  the  lips  of 


20  PREFACE. 

the  most  thoughtless  in  the  present  age,  I  do  not  believe  there 
is  any  one  more  delusive  than  this.     It  is  one  of  those  favor- 
ite positions  upon  which  a  self-assumed  infallibility  imagines 
itself  competent  to  plant  itself,  and  thence  to  repudiate  every 
religious  idea  upon  which  its  own  seal  of  authority  is  not  en- 
stamped.     Men  the  least  inured  to  habits  of  close  thinking, 
the  least  furnished  with  impressive  learning,  the  least  trained 
to  the  work  of  criticism,  the  least  prepared  to  look  beneath 
the  surface  of  words  and  the  traditions  of  a  party,  can  thus 
assume  a  direct  superiority  over  the   most   laborious  and 
earnest   investigators  of  truth,  by   claiming  to  possess  for 
themselves,  above  them  all,  the  simplicity  of  the  Gospel.     If 
any  one  could  prove,  in  his  own  case,  a  special  enlightenment 
from  heaven,  which  takes  the  place  of  all  human  effort ;  or 
if  any  one  could  show  that  he  is  the  subject  of  some  infallible 
guidance,  that  raises  him  above  the  level  of  those  who  have 
to  use  only  human  instruments  in  interpreting  the  revelations 
of  Christianity  ;  I,  for  one,  would  be  the  first  to  bow  in  silent 
submission  and  awe  to  his  authority  :  but  the  marks  of  such 
a  distinction  must  be  very  evident  in  the  intellect,  the  heart, 
the  life,  the  whole  personality  of  the  agent ;  and  the  simpli- 
city of  the  Gospel  must  be  at  least  as  manifest  in  his  whole 
spirit  as  it  claims  to  be  in  his  formal  doctrine. 

The  Simplicity  of  the  Gospel !  Alas  for  the  force  of  habit 
and  association  !  how  simple  to  every  one  appears  the  system 
of  truth  on  which  his  whole  mental  education  has  been  con- 
structed !*  There  is  not  a  man  on  the  face  of  this  earth,  for 

*  A  friend  who  has  been  in  the  East  lately  communicated  to  me  the 
following  anecdote: — "He  had   been  arguing  for   some  time  with  a 


PREFACE.  "21 

whom  a  narrow  education  has  marked  out  the  whole  cycle  of 
his  ideas,  who  does  not  think  his  system  of  truth  the  most 
divinely  simple  of  all,  and,  consequently,  look  upon  every 
other  as  encumbered  with  darkness,  sinuosity,  and  confusion. 
It  is  not  till  our  faith  is  shaken  in  mere  human  systems  of 
theology,  as  such,  that  we  begin  to  judge  of  this  matter  of 
simplicity  with  a  new  light  shed  upon  it. 

The  Simplicity  of  the  Gospel !  If  there  is  one  thing, 
which  1  can  affirm,  with  all  sincerity,  has  urged  me  forward, 
more  than  any  other,  in  every  investigation,  in  every  ana- 
lysis, in  every  religious  inquiry — it  is  the  consciousness  that 
the  simplicity  of  the  Gospel  is  a  thing  now  but  too  rarely  met 
with,  either  in  doctrine  or  in  practice,  and  the  longing  to 
realize  it  apart  from  the  traditions  of  eighteen  centuries,  and 
unencumbered  with  the  distorting  influences  of  party,  passion 
and  prejudice.  Deeply  as  I  am  convinced  that  every  great 
doctrine,  which  has  swayed  a  moral  influence  over  mankind, 
has  a  real  fundamental  truth  in  it ;  yet  I  am  far  from  seeing 
in  the  bare  intellectual  and  speculative  system  of  those  who 
talk  most  about  simplicity — (absorbing,  as  that  system  assur- 
edly has,  all  kinds  of  human  accretions,  from  the  philosophy 
of  the  Gnostics  down  to  that  of  the  latest  scholasticism,)  all 
the  simplicity  they  usually  attribute  to  it.  The  temptation 
by  a  literal  serpent  in  Paradise  ;  the  federal  union  of  all 

Mohammedan  upon  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  and  apparently  with 
some  success.  At  length,  the  Mohammedan,  after  listening  for  some 
time,  exclaimed, — '  I  tell  you  what  it  is,  Rajah,  you  Franks  are  very  clever 
people  :  God  has  given  you  the  power  to  make  ships,  and  houses,  and 
penknives,  and  do  a  great  many  wonderful  things  ;  but  he  has  granted 
to  us  what  he  has  denied  to  you — the  knowledge  of  the  true  religion.' " 


22  PREFACE. 

mankind  in  Adam ;  the  imputation  of  the  actual  guilt  of  our 
first  parents  to  ourselves ;  the  various  covenants  enumerated, 
as  formally  established  between  God  and  man  ;  the  Athana- 
sian  explanation^of  the  Trinity  ;  the  eternal  procession  of  the 
Son;  the  imputation  of  righteousness  ;  unconditional  election  ; 
the  moral  inability  of  man  placed  side  by  side  with  his  free 
agency  on  the  one  hand  and  his  eternal  condemnation  on  the 
other  ;  and  many  more  doctrines  which  it  is  needless  to  men- 
tion,— these,  however  stirring  and  awful  in  their  nature, 
cannot  certainly  be  regarded  as  forming  a  system  peculiarly 
characterized  by  its  simplicity. 

I  am  not  affirming  or  denying,  at  present,  the  truth  or 
untruth  of  any  one  of  them  ;  I  believe,  that,  stripped  of  their 
philosophical  perversions,  they  all  contain  a  moral  meaning, 
which  has  a  Divine  power  and  simplicity  in  it ;  but,  assuredly, 
it  appears  to  me  an  extraordinary  charge  to  bring  against 
any  one  who  seeks  to  unravel  the  cumbrous  theology  of  the 
scholastic  ages,  and  penetrate  into  the  simple  ideas  which 
have  lived  and  acted  by  a  most  wonderful  principle  of  vitality, 
through  all  the  stifling  influence  of  perpetual  human  incrus- 
tations,— that  he  is  departing,  by  so  doing,  from  the  Simplicity 
of  the  Gospel  of  Christ. 

The  expression,  however,  on  which  we  are  now  remark- 
ing may  be  employed  in  a  twofold  acceptation ;  it  may  refer, 
namely,  to  simplicity  in  doctrine,  or  to  simplicity  in  moral 
inculcation  and  practice.  In  neither  of  these  points  of  view 
am  I  disposed  to  yield  an  entire  monopoly  of  Christian  sim- 
plicity to  those  who  are  for  the  most  part  so  apt,  exclusively, 
to  claim  it.  Where,  I  ask,  are  we  to  look  for  simplicity  in 


PREFACE.  23 

doctrine?  Are  we  to  look  to  the  dogmatic  theology  of  sepa- 
rate communities,  or  are  we  to  look  to  the  broad  features  of 
Christian  truth  as  it  has  impressed  itself  upon  the  minds,  and 
fixed  itself  in  the  affections  of  the  truly  pious,  in  the  organic 
development  of  Christianity  throughout  every  age  ?  It  is  the 
eager  grasping  after  a  precise  logical  system  (infinitely  too 
precise  and  too  exactly  adapted  to  a  partial  and  peculiar 
mode  of  thought),  which  has,  in  fact,  stripped  our  Christian 
doctrine  of  all  its  simplicity  :  it  is  this  which  has  burdened  it 
with  the  philosophical  phrases,  the  logical  definitions,  the 
narrow,  partial,  and  mundane  views  we  have  so  often  to  con- 
tend with,  and  hidden  the  truth  of  God  under  the  scanty 
verbiage  of  a  denominational  technology.  And  yet,  strange 
to  say,  the  strict  adherents  to  all  the  most  pointed,  formal, 
and  technical  dogmas  are  constantly  exclaiming  against  the 
sin  and  the  folly  of  running  into  ABSTRACTIONS  :  as  though 
such  a  theology  as  I  describe  did  not  consist,  beyond  every 
other,  of  the  purest  abstractions  ;  or  as  though  the  logical 
sharpness  of  our  definitions  rendered  our  knowledge  an  atom 
more  concrete  than  it  was  before.  How  much  does  the  lesson 
need  yet  to  be  learned,  that  the  deep  stirrings  of  a  religious 
life  within  the  heart,  and  the  elevation  of  our  purest  moral 
sympathies  through  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  are  the  true  channels 
of  all  that  is  concrete  and  positive  in  religion,  while  theological 
propositions  (except  so  far  as  they  are  penetrated  by  such  a 
spiritual  life)  are  the  real  abstractions,  the  abuse  of  which 
we  have  most  to  fear.  We  can  pity  the  deluded  men  who 
substitute  the  superstitious  reverence  of  saints,  relics,  and 
images  for  the  veneration  and  the  heartfelt  worship  of  God ; 


24  PREFACE.  - 

we  do  not  suspect  that  at  the  same  moment,  and  within  our 
own  communities,  there  are  multitudes  who  are  practising  a 
substitution  equally  fatal  to  all  that  is  most  elevated  in  the 
Christian  life — the  substitution  of  terms,  phrases,  and  propo- 
sitions, for  the  vital  power  of  the  religion  of  Christ.  I  con- 
tend, therefore,  most  earnestly  for  this  position — that  the  sim- 
plicity of  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  free  from  philosophy  of  man, 
and  free  from  barren  abstractions,  is  to  be  looked  for,  not  in 
our  logical  systems  of  doctrine,  but  in  the  clear  elimination 
from  all  systems,  or  rather  from  the  religious  intuitions  of  all 
good  men,  of  the  vital  and  essential  elements  of  Christian 
faith  and  love,  hope  and  joy. 

If  we  pass  from  the  idea  of  simplicity  in  doctrine  to  sim- 
plicity in  the  Christian  life  and  practice,  here,  I  believe, 
similar  conclusions  to  those  above  stated  will  become  mani- 
fest. Simplicity  of  life  and  practice,  I  fear,  is  too  rarely  to 
be  found  amongst  those  most  deeply  engaged  in  the  party 
strifes  and  mere  denominational  agitations  of  the  day.  Cer- 
tain it  is,  as  those  well  know  who  are  much  involved  in  it, 
that  the  tendency  of  what  we  may  term  the  public  religious 
excitement  of  the  age  is  rather  to  destroy  simplicity  of  mind 
than  to  produce  it,  and  to  lead  us  insensibly  into  that  same 
diplomatic  habit  of  action  which  we  find  in  the  contentions  of 
political,  and  other  purely  secular  interests.  Christian  sim- 
plicity is  rather  to  be  looked  for  in  those  calm,  elevated, 
devotional,  philanthropic  minds,  amongst  all  parties,  who 
have  risen  above  the  prejudices  and  contentions  of  their 
times,  who  have  left  others  to  waste  their  heaven-gifted 
faculties  in  trifling  disputes  and  minor  differences,  and  with 


PREFACE. 


hearts  burning  at  once  with  love  to  God  and  man,  have 
devoted  themselves  to  the  highest  contemplation  of  the  Di- 
vine, and  to  the  most  pressing  wants  of  humanity  at  large. 

4.  And  this  leads  me  to  notice  yet  a  fourth  objection, 
which  is  not  unfrequently  urged  against  all  modern  excur- 
sions into  the  domain  of  Christian  theology  :  —  Of  what  utility, 
it  is  urged,  can  all  such  philosophizing  be  ?  We  have  the 
Gospel  in  our  hands  :  that  is  the  great  instrument  of  human 
salvation  :  every  thing  beside  is  powerless  and  vain.  Objec- 
tions like  this  are  humbling  to  contend  with,  inasmuch  as 
they  betray  a  want  of  reflection,  which  it  is  painful  to  meet 
with  amongst  men  of  influence  and  reputed  education.  If 
the  argument  above  mentioned  (which  I  have  often  heard 
most  strenuously  urged)  has  any  meaning,  it  implies  one  of 
two  things,  which  I  shall  successively  describe. 

First,  it  may  imply  that  the  distinct  intention  of  all  those 
against  whom  it  is  directed,  is  to  substitute  their  philosophical 
system  for  the  Gospel.  A  more  gratuituos  supposition  it 
were  impossible  to  make.  The  object  of  every  true  Chris- 
tian philosopher  is  not  in  any  way  to  supersede  the  Gospel, 
but  to  illustrate  and  apply  it  in  its  full  brightness  and  power. 
All  great  systems  of  philosophy  are  simply  methods  :  they 
do  not  give  us  the  material  of  truth,  they  only  teach  us  how 
to  realize  it  —  to  make  it  reflective  —  to  construct  it  into  a 
system.  The  bearing  of  all  true  philosophy  upon  religion, 
is  infinitely  far  from  Offering  any  substitute  for  the  divine 
revelations  of  Christ  to  the  world  ;  it  aims  rather  at  assisting 
us  to  gaze  with  greater  intensity,  and  less  commixture  of  a 
mere  human  element,  upon  the  truth  itself.  Much  has  been 


26  PREFACE. 

said  about  transcendentalism,  (a  thing  the  meaning  of  which 
is  seldom  very  clearly  defined,)  as  though  it  brought  to  us 
any  new  truth  or  another  Gospel.  It  might  as  well  be  said 
that  Whateley's  logic  brings  us  another  Gospel.  The  one  is 
no  more  a  system  of  belief  than  the  other.  What  is  the 
critical  philosophy  of  Kant  but  a  method  ?  What  is  the 
philosophical  system  of  Jacobi,  of  Hegel,  of  Schleiermacher, 
but  in  each  case  a  method  ?  Nothing  is  more  common 
amongst  those  who  renounce  the  idea  of  having  aught  to  do 
with  these  different  philosophies,  than  the  elevation  of  the 
Baconian  system  as  the  true  method  to  be  followed  in  all 
theological  inquiry.  What,  then,  if  we  had  raised  the 
outcry,  that  these  philosophical  divines  were  substituting 
Baconianism  for  the  Gospel !  How  should  we  have  been 
overwhelmed  with  charges  of  absurdity !  But  yet  I  am 
prepared  to  maintain,  that  there  would  be  no  greater 
absurdity  in  such  a  charge,  than  there  actually  is  in  almost 
all  the  denunciations  we"  now  hear  against  the  study  of 
philosophy,  and  its  employment  in  theological  research. 
True,  it  might  be  rejoined  ;  but  see  to  what  frightful  results 
these  philosophical  systems  are  leading !  To  which  I  reply, 
that  any  thing,  even  the  very  best,  may  be  abused  :  that  there 
have  been  men  ready  to  turn  the  grace  of  God  into  licen- 
tiousness ;  and  that,  if  those  who  shudder  at  the  bare  idea 
of  transcendentalism  are  fain  to  show  its  affiliation  with  all 
kinds  of  atheistical  and  pantheistical  notions,  it  is  just  as  easy 
to  show  how,  by  a  like  affiliation  and  abuse,  the  empiricism 
of  Bacon  is  chargeable  with  all  kinds  of  materialistic  and 
equally  atheistical  results. 


PREFACE.  27 

Let  us  pass  on,  however,  to  the  other  point  above  referred 
to.  The  objection,  that  we  have  the  Gospel,  and  that  this  is 
enough,  if  it  do  not  imply  that  philosophy  is  intended  to  be 
a  substitute  for  Christianity,  can  only  serve  to  express  on  the 
part  of  its  advocates  some  idea  of  this  sort.  We  of  this 
present  age  possess  Christianity  in  its  full  intensity :  we 
comprehend  it  at  length  in  its  height  and  its  depth :  human 
thought  can  now  penetrate  no  further  into  its  truths  :  human 
investigation  can  throw  no  more  light  upon  them.  Such, 
then,  being  the  case,  what  is  the  use  of  any  further  endeavors 
to  transcend  what  has  already  attained  the  ne  plus  ultra  of 
completeness  and  perfection  ? 

Were  this,  we  reply,  really  the  case,  mankind  might  of 
course  give  up  all  further  investigation  into  the  domain  of 
religious  truth,  and  content  themselves  with  this  ultimatum ; 
but  we  trust  there  are  very  few  intelligent  and  earnest 
readers,  who  do  not  clearly  enough  comprehend  the  differ- 
ence between  truth  as  it  exists  unchangeably  to  the  mind  of 
God,  and  truth  as  it  enters  into  the  various  systems  of  human 
thought  and  opinion.  It  does  not  follow  that,  because  God 
in  his  mercy  has  given  us  the  divine  germs  and  principles  of 
religious  truth  in  the  Gospel,  therefore  we  know  every  thing 
that  is  to  be  known,  and  have  realized  to  ourselves  all  that 
can  be  realized  about  it ;  and  sad  it  is  when  men  so  far 
forget  themselves,  or  suffer  themselves  to  be  so  far  deluded, 
as  to  make  their  own  peculiar  system  identical  with  the 
Gospel  of  the  blessed  God  in  its  divine  breadth,  depth,  and 
intensity. 

VVhat    renders,   moreover,  such    an   objection   as  I   am 


28  PREFACE. 

cansidering  the  more  striking  and  the  more  painful  to 
encounter,  is  the  fact,  which  few  deeply  religious  minds  will 
be  inclined  to  dispute,  that,  if  there  be  one  thing  more  want- 
ing in  the  present  age  than  another,  it  is  a  high  ideal  of  the 
Christian  life  in  its  combined  experimental  and  practical 
bearings.  Of  Christian  profession,  indeed,  there  is  abun- 
dance ;  and  to  those  who  think  "  a  decided  profession  "  of 
Christianity  the  great  consummation  to  be  aimed  at,  the 
above  remark  may  appear  very  superfluous.  But  is  it  not 
manifest  to  any  reflecting  mind,  that  the  profession  of  Chris- 
tianity could  not  possibly  be  made  of  any  account,  except  in 
times  and  under  circumstances  in  which  there  is  nothing 
very  high  or  distinctive  in  its  practice  ?  The  proper  pro- 
fession of  Christianity  is  its  practice  ;  and  were  that  practice 
based  upon  an  elevated  ideal  of  Christian  duty,  the  inquiry 
as  to  a  man's  profession  would  be  as  much  out  of  place  as  an 
inquiry  respecting  a  Howard,  whether  he  professed  u  love  for 
humanity,  and  a  desire  to  promote  human  happiness. 

It  is,  in  fact,  a  high  practical  ideal  of  the  real  nature 
and  purity  of  the  Christian  life  which,  amidst  all  the  pro- 
fession of  the  present  age,  is  most  deeply  wanting.  Scruples 
there  are  in  abundance,  if  they  constituted  practical  Chris- 
tianity;  cases  of  conscience  enough,  if  they  indicated  a  high 
perception  of  moral  duty;  formal  and  precise  regulations 
in  superfluity  respecting  the  intercourse  of  professors  with 
the  world,  if  they  were  of  any  avail  to  insure  the  purity  of 
the  Christian  life  ;  but,  with  all  this,  where  is  the  community 
of  professed  Christians,  who  would  stand  out  in  clear  moral 
relief  above  the  rest  of  mankind,  were  not  their  separation 


PREFACE.  29 

marked  off  by  customs,  habits,  usages,  and  professions,  which 
form  no  essential  part  of  Christianity  at  all  ?  Do  not  all  good 
men  feel  that  the  separation  between  the  Church  and  the 
world,  as  it  now  for  the  most  part  exists,  is  a  thing  purely 
artificial,  and  that  (leaving  out  of  course  the  worthless  of 
mankind)  we  seldom  look  for  any  higher  principles  of  action 
or  duty  in  the  one  than  we  do  in  the  other  ?  The  very 
eagerness  which  is  manifest  to  make  that  separation  clearer 
by  habits  and  rules,  perfectly  non-essential,  is  the  most 
certain  proof  that  the  really  essential  distinction  is  not  great 
enough  to  dispense  with  some  other  line  of  demarcation. 

I  am  not  intending,  by  these  remarks,  to  say  that  Chris- 
tianity is  a  dead  letter  in  this  our  country :  far  from  it ;  but 
I  mean,  that  we  look  in  vain  for  a  very  high  ideal  of  it 
amongst  any  Christian  community.  Often  there  is  much 
earnest,  sincere,  unassuming  piety  in  the  world,  where  the 
"  professors,"  perhaps,  would  deny  its  very  existence ;  and 
often  there  is  none  at  all,  where  the  very  perfection  of  Chris- 
tianity is  arrogated.  Much  of  the  Christian  element  pervades 
all  earnest  and  sober-thinking  men  of  our  day,  whatever  they 
may  profess ;  but  as  for  fixing  our  eye  upon  any  one  point, 
and  saying — Here  is  the  truth  in  its  fulness  and  its  perfection, 
both  as  a  theory  and  a  practice, — such  happiness,  I  fear,  it 
is  not  for  us  in  the  present  age  to  aspire  after.  Individuals 
there  are,  and  ever  have  been,  in  whom  a  very  high  ideal  of 
the  Christian  life  has  been  realized  ;  but  the  very  wonder 
and  admiration  with  which  they  are  regarded,  proves  the 
depressed  standard  of  those  around  them ;  while  their 
existence,  equally,  amongst  all  parties,  shows  how  little  the 


30  PREFACE. 

true  elevation  of  the  Christian  character  depends  upon  those 
points,  about  which  the  different  portions  of  the  Church  are 
mainly  contending. 

The  conclusion  which  it  concerns  us,  then,  to  draw  from 
the  above  remarks  is  this, — that  the  existing  state  of  Chris- 
tianity amongst  those  who  profess  it  does  not  warrant  the 
objection,  that  all  further  advance  in  the  development  of  the 
perception  we  possess,  of  its  nature  and  application,  is  im- 
practicable, or  unnecessary.  If  we  have  the  perfect  con- 
ception of  Christianity,  we  are  making  a  lamentably  imper- 
fect application  of  it ;  for  the  world,  alas !  is  to  a  very  small 
extent  under  its  power ;  if  we  have  not  the  perfect  concep- 
tion of  it,  then  every  attempt  to  regard  it  from  a  more  lofty 
moral  point  of  view  should  be  welcomed  as  a  real  and  earn- 
est attempt  for  the  highest  welfare  of  mankind. 

5.  There  is  only  one  other  point  to  which  I  would  allude ; 
and  that  is,  the  objection  which  some  persons  may  make  to 
investigations  such  as  the  following  on  the  ground  of  their 
being  premature.  For  myself,  I  cannot  think  that  what  is 
seen  and  felt  to  be  true  can  ever  be  premature.  That  there 
is  a  great  evil  in  rashly  unsettling  the  faith  of  any  one,  with- 
out pointing  him  to  a  principle  of  faith  still  higher,  I  readily 
admit.  But  I  cannot  see  that  in  stripping  away  mere  logi- 
cal accretions  from  the  vital  germs  of  primitive  Christianity, 
there  is  any  real  danger  of  shaking  the  faith  of  any  truly 
confiding  mind,  however  much  it  may  shake  the  dogmatical 
systems  of  many  who  look  to  the  form  more  than  they  look  to 
the  essence  of  their  religion. 

On  the  other  hand,  is  there  no  danger  from  the  practice — 


PREFACE.  31 

which  I  must  term  as  demoralizing  as  it  is  antichristian — of 
keeping  up  an  outward  respect  for  theological  sentiments 
when  they  have  been  inwardly  abjured  ?  That  there  are 
some  opinions  officially  professed,  and  others  tacitly  held, 
even  by  many  of  the  public  teachers  of  religion,  the  former 
of  which  they  virtually  reject,  and  the  latter  of  which  they 
never  make  manifest  in  their  open  ministrations,  is  a  fact 
which  most  observing  persons  will  be  ready  enough  to 
admit ;  and  to  me  it  has  ever  appeared,  that  the  habit 
thus  formed  of  regarding  certain  things  as  premature,  and 
concealing  them  carefully  from  the  ears  of  the  multitude,  is 
a  proceeding  calculated  beyond  almost  all  others  to  destroy 
moral  earnestness  and  self-respect  in  the  teacher,  and  to 
shtke  all  spontaneous  confidence  in  the  hearers.  Better 
even  to  incur  the  charge  of  rashness  from  the  few,  than  to 
lose  our  credit  for  the  most  unbending  honesty  in  the  minds 
of  the  many. 

But  the  charge  of  prematureness,  perchance,  may  be 
brought,  if  not  against  the  sentiments  themselves,  yet  against 
the  preparedness  of  the  author  to  venture  upon  the  stream  of 
theological  speculation.  This  objection  it  is  not  for  me  to 
deal  with  ;  nor  is  it  one  from  which  I  am  at  all  anxious  to 
free  myself.  The  views  I  have  maintained  I  wish  to  be 
discussed  simply  and  solely  upon  their  own  evidence ;  and 
if  the  immaturity  of  the  mind  of  the  writer  be  any  reason 
for  distrusting  them,  they  will  only  have  the  advantage  of 
so  much  the  severer  scrutiny — a  scrutiny  which  cannot  fail, 
whatever  else  be  the  result,  of  subserving  the  real  interests 
of  truth.  I  would  say,  indeed,  quite  openly,  once  for  all, 


32  PREFACE. 

that  I  have  no  peculiar  system  I  feel  myself  bound  to  main- 
tain,— no  human  dogmas  I  design  to  espouse,  as  points 
which  I  am  pledged  to  defend.  What  I  have  written  I 
wrote  from  the  firmest  conviction  of  its  embodying  truth,  so 
far  as  I  had  as  yet  realized  it;  and  the  same  freedom  of 
thought  which  conducted  me  to  these,  will,  I  trust,  ever  be 
ready  to  conduct  to  any  other  conclusions  which  can  be 
shown  to  rest  as  firmly  upon  the  real  evidences  to  which  all 
such  questions  must  finally  appeal. 

Lest  any,  however,  should  suppose  that  I  am  rushing 
hastily  and  unpreparedly  into  the  region  of  theological  in- 
quiry, I  may  be  allowed  to  add,  that,  while  philosophy  has 
been  the  highest  recreation,  theology  has  ever  been  the  se- 
rious business  of  my  whole  life.  To  the  study  of  this  Sbi- 
ence  I  gave  my  earliest  thoughts  :  under  the  guidance  of 
one  who  is  recognized  by  all  parties  as  standing  amongst  the 
leading  theologians  of  our  age,  I  pursued  it  through  many 
succeeding  years ;  and  if  I  have  found  any  intense  pleasure, 
or  felt  any  deep  interest  in  philosophy  at  large,  it  has  been 
derived,  mainly,  from  the  consciousness  of  its  high  impor- 
tance, as  bearing  upon  the  vastest  moral  and  religious  inter- 
ests of  mankind. 

Moreover,  I  have  not  drawn  the  conclusions  now  set 
forth,  irrespective  of  the  support  of  other  minds,  and  the 
weight  of  grave  authority.  For  without  mentioning  many 
of  the  professed  theologians  of  Germany,  whose  names  ap- 
pear amongst  the  most  learned  and  devoted  men  of  their  age, 
I  know  not  that  I  have  asserted  a  single  result,  the  germs 
and  principles  of  which  are  not  patent  in  the  writings  of 


PREFACE.  33     . 

various  of  the  most  eminent  theologians  of  the  Church  of 
England,  or  of  other  orthodox  communities. 

To  many  of  the  philosophical  thinkers,  likewise,  of  this 
and  other  countries,  I  feel  myself  greatly  indebted ;  not  so 
much,  indeed,  for  any  direct  assistance  they  have  afforded 
me  in  analyzing  the  subject  in  hand,  as  for  the  part  they 
have  contributed  in  the  gradual  development  of  the  whole 
mode  of  thinking  which  is  here  employed.     If  there  be  one 
mind,  however,  whose  personality  may  have  impressed  itself 
more  than  any  other  upon  my  own,  in  tracing  out  the  whole 
course  of  the  following  treatise,  it  is  assuredly  that  of  the 
revered  Schleiermacher  ;  indeed,  the  analysis  of  the  idea  of 
religion  and  its  reference  to  the  absolute  feeling  of  depend- 
ence, is  taken  substantially  out  of  the  introduction  to  his 
great  work,  the  "  Glaubenslehre."     That  God  would  send 
such  a  mind,  and  such  a  heart,  to  shed  their  influence  upon 
ourselves,  and  guide  us  from  the  barren  region  of  mere  logi- 
cal forms,  into  the  hallowed  paths  of  a  divine  life,  is  the  best 
wish  I  can  breathe  for  the  true  welfare  of  every  religious 
community  in  our  land.* 

*  Little  as  is  the  progress  which  the  lofty  spiritual  principles  of 
Schleiermacher  have  openly  made  in  this  country,  yet  there  are  very 
significant  indications  of  their  gradual  development.  I  would  p"articu- 
larly  call  attention  to  the  "  Biblical  Review,"  as  taking  frequently  an 
eminently  broad  and  philosophical  ground  in  discussing  the  nature  of 
Religion  and  the  basis  of  Christian  Theology. 

* 

Hampstead,  Jan.  1,  1849. 


THE 


PHILOSOPHY    OF   RELIGION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ON    THE    FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND. 

WHATEVER  may  be  the  religion  proper  to  man,  its  real 
nature,  and  its  possible  intensity,  must  depend  upon  the  con- 
stitution of  the  human  mind.  If  the  human  faculties  were 
of  a  lower  order  than  they  really  are,  it  is  obvious  that  our 
religious  consciousness  could  never  reach  the  standard  to 
which  it  now  rightly  aspires.  The  reason  of  this  becomes 
manifest,  when  we  consider  that  under  such  circumstances 
"the  real  objects  of  religious  worship  could  not  be  in  the  same 
sense  accessible  to  us ;  and  that,  as  a  natural  consequence 
of  this,  the  emotions  arising  from  their  contemplation  must 
be  proportionably  modified  and  diminished.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  possessed  a  combination  of  faculties  of  an  order 
superior  to  those  which  the  human  mind  now  enjoys,  then 
our  enlarged  powers  of  thought  and  feeling,  and  the  widened 
range  of  our  actual  experience,  would  naturally  elevate  our 
whole  religious  being,  when  once  awakened,  to  a  propor- 
tionally higher  degree  of  development.  Accordingly,  since 
the  whole  aspect  of  our  religious  experiences  must  depend 


36  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

upon  the  natural  capacities  with  which  we  have  been  en- 
dowed, our  first  object  in  discussing  the  philosophy  of  religion 
must  be  to  make  some  inquiry  into  the  powers  and  faculties 
of  the  human  mind. 

Now,  first,  whenever  we  speak  of  the  mind,  or  use  the 
expression,  "myself,"  what  is  it,  we  would  ask,  that  we 
really  intend  to  designate  ?  What  is  it  in  which  the  mind  of 
man  essentially  consists  ?  Evidently  it  does  not  essentially 
consist  in  any  bodily  organization,  for  this  is  mere  machinery 
with  which  the  pure  idea  of  self — that  which  moves  and 
directs  the  organized  frame — can  have  no  proper  identity. 
As  evidently,  it  cannot  consist  in  the  whole  apparatus  of  our 
sensational  nature ;  for  this  implies  merely  the  system  of 
means  and  influences,  by  which  the  outward  world  acts  upon 
us,  and  by  no  means  indicates  the  real  man  himself,  to  whom 
these  influences  appeal.  Sensations  are  experienced  by  the 
mind  ;  but  I  can  never  say  that  the  whole  sum  of  my  sensa- 
tions is  the  mind,  or  constitutes  what  I  mean  by  the  word 
"self."  Neither,  lastly,  can  the  real  man  be  the  complex 
of  our  thoughts,  ideas,  or  conceptions.  These  indicate  sim- 
ply the  existence  of  logical  forms,  intellectual  laws,  or  per- 
ceptive faculties,  which  are  essentially  the  same  in  all  minds ; 
they  do  not  express  the  real  concrete  individual  man  ;  they 
do  not  involve  the  element,  which  makes  each  human  being 
entirely  distinct  from  the  whole  mass  of  humanity  around 
him  ;  in  a  word,  they  do  not  constitute  our  personality. 

By  this  process  of  analysis  we  find  at  length  that  the  cen- 
tral point  of  our  consciousness — that  which  makes  each  man 
what  he  is  in  distinction  from  every  other  man — that  which 
expresses  the  real  concrete  essence  of  the  mind,  apart  from 
its  regulative  laws  and  formal  processes,  is  the  will.  Will 
expresses  power,  spontaneity,  the  capacity  of  acting  inde- 
pendently, and  for  ourselves.  If  this  spontaneity  be  with- 
drawn, our  life  sinks  down  at  once  into  a  mere  link  in  that 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  37 

mighty  chain  of  cause  and  effect  by  which  all  the  operations 
of  nature  are  carried  on  from  the  commencement  to  the  end 
of  time.  Without  will  man  would  flow  back  from  the  eleva- 
tion he  now  assumes,  to  the  level  of  impersonal  nature, — in 
a  word,  we  should  then  be  things,  and  not  men  at  all.  Sponta- 
neity, personality,  will,  self,  these  then,  and  all  similar  words, 
express  as  nearly  as  possible  the  essential  nature  or  principle 
of  the  human  mind.  We  do  not  say,  indeed,  that  we  can  com- 
prehend the  very  essence  of  the  soul  itself,  apart  from  all  its 
determinations ;  but  that,  by  deep  reflection  upon  our  inmost 
consciousness,  we  can  comprehend  the  essence  of  the  soul  in 
connection  with  its  operations ;  that  we  can  trace  it  through 
all  its  changes  as  a  power  or  pure  activity ;  and  that  in  this 
spontaneous  activity  alone  our  real  personality  consists.  If, 
therefore,  in  our  subsequent  classification  of  the  faculties  of 
the  mind  little  appears  to  be  said  about  the  will,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  we  assume  the  activity  it  denotes,  as  the  es- 
sential basis  of  our  whole  mental  being,  and  suppose  it  con- 
sequently to  underlie  all  our  mental  operations. 

Such,  then,  being  the  deafest  idea  we  can  form  of  the 
essence  of  the  mind,  we  must  next  proceed  to  the  more  im- 
portant task  of  analyzing  its  various  determinations  or  modes 
of  operation.  These  determinations  regarded  individually  are 
endlessly  diversified,  each  moment  presenting  in  succession 
new  phenomena.  In  enumerating  the  faculties,  however, 
what  we  have  in  view  is  to  make  a  careful  classification  of 
the  individual  states  of  consciousness ;  to  let  their  minor  and 
unessential  variations  disappear ;  to  neglect,  for  the  moment, 
the  external  objects  to  which  they  stand  related  ;  and  thus  to 
seize  upon  the  great  fundamental  and  subjective  forms  of  our 
mental  activity. 

The  first  and  broadest  distinction  which  we  can  make  in 
classifying  these  internal  operations  is  that  which  separates 
our  mental  phenomena  into  two  classes — those  relating  to  the 


38  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

acquisition  of  knowledge  on  the  one  side,  and  those  sub- 
serving impulse  and  activity  on  the  other.  We  may  term 
the  operations  of  the  former  kind  intellectual ;  those  of  the 
latter  kind  emotional.  Remembering,  then,  that  the  power 
of  the  will  runs  through  the  whole,  we  may  regard  these  two 
classes  as  exhausting  the  entire  sum  of  our  mental  pheno- 
mena. 

Between  the  intellectual  and  the  emotional  activity,  how- 
ever, there  always  subsists  a  direct  correspondency.  Just  on 
the  same  principle  as  we  saw,  that  a  higher  development  of 
our  whole  intellectual  capacity  would  imply  a  possibly  higher 
development  of  the  religious  nature  ;  so  also  in  every  suc- 
ceeding stage  to  which  the  consciousness,  intellectually  speak- 
ing, attains,  there  is  always  associated  with  such  an  advance- 
ment a  proportionally  higher  order  of  emotion.  Our  intel- 
lectual and  our  emotional  life,  in  fact,  run  parallel  with  one 
another,  and  develope  themselves  correlatively ;  so  that  we 
may  draw  out  a  table  of  the  successive  stages  of  human  con- 
sciousness in  the  following  manner : — 

MIND 

commencing  in 
MERE  FEELING  ^undeveloped  unity) 

evinces  a 
TWOFOLD  ACTIVITY. 

A 

f  "N 

i.  H. 

Intellectual.  Emotional. 

1st  Stage.  The  Sensational 

consciousness  (to  which  correspond)  The  Instincts. 
2d  Stage.  The  Perceptive  • 

consciousness  "  Animal  Passions. 

3d  Stage.  The  Logical 

consciousness  "  Relational  Emotions. 

4th  Stage.  The  Intuitional 

consciousness  "  ./Esthetic,  moral,  and 

religious  Emotions, 
meeting  in 

V, J 

V 
FAITH — (highest  or  developed  Unity.) 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  39 

To  expound  and  develope  this  scheme  (which  is  the  main 
object  of  the  present  chapter),  let  us  direct  our  attention  first 
of  all  to  the  dim,  indefinable  state  of  consciousness,  from 
which  our  whole  subsequent  mental  history  takes  its  rise, 
and  which  we  have  designated  bare  Feeling.  Such  an 
indefinable  ground,  we  conceive,  exists,  historically  speak- 
ing, at  the  base  of  our  mental  development.  That  whole 
confused  complex  of  man's  sensational,  instinctive,  and  na- 
scent intellectual  life,  which  appears  to  characterize  the 
earliest  infancy,  before  any  actual  distinction  can  be  drawn 
between  the  efforts  of  intelligence  and  emotion,  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  primitive  unity,  in  the  cloudy  region  of  which 
our  whole  after  development  finds  its  commencement.  It  is 
the  root,  hidden  under  the  soil,  and  away  from  the  eye  of 
consciousness,  out  of  which  the  tree  of  spiritual  life  secretly 
germinates. 

Having  thus  barely  indicated  the  primitive  unity,  the 
state  of  undefined  feeling,  from  which  we  take  our  start 
along  the  pathway  of  mental  development,  we  may  proceed 
to  consider  the  lowest  stage  of  consciousness,  in  which  the 
distinction  between  our  intellectual  and  emotional  life  can 
be  discerned ;  and  that  is,  the  sensational  consciousness. 
The  sensational  consciousness  (viewed  entirely  apart  from 
any  other  mental  phenomena),  is  that  in  which  the  mind, 
while  impressed  from  outward  and  material  causes,  yet  is 
occupied  simply  and  solely  with  its  own  inward  or  subjec- 
tive impressions.  As  we  are  now  constituted,  we  possess  a 
material  organism,  which  has  a  direct  and  mysterious  con- 
nection with  the  sensitive  mind.  The  affections  of  this 
organism  produce  mental  feelings  ;  and  it  is  the  attention  of 
the  mind  directed  to  these  feelings,  simply  as  feelings,  that 
we  denominate  sensation.* 

*  It  is  not  strictly  correct  to  say  that  a  sensation  is  the  bare  feeling 
produced  by  the  presence  of  an  external  object,  and  consequently  a 


40  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

If  we  could  by  any  means  transport  ourselves  into  the 
mind  of  an  infant  before  the  perceptive  consciousness  is 
awakened,  we  should  find  it  in  a  state  of  absolute  isolation 
from  every  thing  else  in  the  world  around  it.  It  has  as  yet 
no  conception  of  the  existence  of  any  thing  beyond  itself. 
Whatever  objects  may  be  presented  to  the  eye,  the  ear,  or 
the  touch,  they  are  treated  simply  as  subjective  feelings, 
without  the  mind's  possessing  any  consciousness  of  them  as 
objects  at  all.  Every  child,  therefore,  at  birth,  is  literally  a 
little  Idealist — spontaneously  and  necessarily  so.  To  it  the 
inward  world  is  every  tiling,  and  the  outward  world  is  nothing. "f 

Under  the  influence  of  our  life-long  experience,  we  do 
not  find  it  easy  to  separate  any  sensation  we  experience 
from  its  external  cause.  The  moment  the  feeling  is  expe- 
rienced, and  the  mind  directed  to  it,  the  power  of  association 
irresistibly  calls  up  the  object  from  which  it  arises.  The 
only  case,  perhaps,  in  which  we  experience  any  thing  analo- 
gous to  what  we  have  described  as  being  the  state  of  the 
infant  mind,  occurs  sometimes  amongst  the  phenomena  of 
dreaming.  If  we  are  suffering  from  any  bodily  pain,  and 
fall  asleep  during  the  endurance  of  it,  we  often  lose  sight 
entirely  of  the  cause  of  the  pain,  but  still  remain  conscious 
of  a  restless  and  unhappy  state  of  mind,  which  seems  to  have 
no  connection  whatever  with  the  external  world,  or  with  our 
own  bodily  organization.  Such  a  dream  is  the  waking  state 

passive  process.  The  external  object  affects  only  our  organism — it  is 
the  mind  directing  its  attention  to  these  organic  affections,  in  which 
sensation  really  consists.  See  Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  881.  Also  Aristotle 
de  Anima,  1.  iii.  c.  8,  sec.  2. 

t  In  animals,  whose  lives  are  throughout  more  instinctive  than  is 
that  of  man,  the  perceptive  consciousness  seems  to  be  awakened 
synchronously  with  the  sensational.  If  it  be  asserted  that  this  is  the 
case  with  man  also,  yet  still  it  is  quite  possible  to  separate  the  two 
states  by  analysis,  though  they  may  never  have  been  separated  de  facto. 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  41 

of  infancy.  All  the  impressions  of  sense,  when  they  reach 
the  mind,  appear  simply  as  the  spontaneous  changes  of  that 
mind  itself.  As  far  as  the  world  is  concerned,  infancy  is  a 
sleep. 

Against  this  view  of  the  infant  mind,  an  exception  might 
be  taken,  from  the  fact  that  there  are  certain  acts  performed, 
such  as  sucking,  swallowing,  &c.,  which  seem  to  indicate 
some  consciousness  of  an  objective  reality.  This  leads  us 
to  consider  the  state  of  consciousness  parallel  with  sensation, 
on  the  practical  or  emotional  side  of  our  scheme.  As  sen- 
sation is  the  first  waking  up  of  the  intellectual,  so  is  instinct 
the  primary  movement  of  the  practical  life.  In  sensation 
and  instinct,  the  whole  being,  intellectual  and  practical,  is  as 
yet  concentrated.  But  be  it  remarked,  that,  just  as  in  sen- 
sation, there  is,  up  to  this  point  of  our  consciousness,  no  re- 
ference whatever  to  the  external  world  as  a  cause  ;  so  also 
in  instinct,  there  is  a  blind  obedience  to  a  certain  impulse,  but 
no  necessary  conception  that  the  effect  of  this  impulse  is  ex- 
erted upon  any  thing  out  of  and  distinct  from  the  mind  itself. 
Accordingly,  the  primary  state  of  man  is  a  purely  ideal 
state  ;  if  the  infant  could  then  be  a  philosopher,  it  would 
agree  with  Fichte,  that  it  constitutes  of  itself  the  whole  uni- 
verse, and  that  every  phenomenon  it  beholds  is  the  creation 
of  its  own  subjective  nature. 

This  sleep  of  the  soul,  however,  does  not  long  continue. 
The  shades  of  the  night,  from  which  it  comes,  gradually  dis- 
perse ;  and  as  they  disperse,  it  begins  to  arouse  itself  to  the 
distinct  consciousness  of  the  outward  world.  We  may  com- 
pare this  process  to  that  dozing  state  in  which  we  sometimes 
lie  for  a  time,  ere  we  are  fully  awake,  speculating  as  to  where 
we  are,  and  what  are  the  objects  around  us.  Or  we  might 
better  liken  it,  perhaps,  to  the  recovery  from  a  swoon,  in 
which  we  often  attempt  for  some  time  to  account  for  the 
strange  position  and  circumstances  in  which  we  find  our- 
3* 


42  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

selves.  Such  a  waking,  only  more  gradual  in  the  process, 
is  the  transition  of  the  mind  from  the  sensational  to  the  per- 
ceptive consciousness — from  the  first  to  the  second  stage  of 
our  mental  development.  • 

Perception  indicates  the  state  of  consciousness  in  which 
the  mind,  getting  beyond  itself,  attributes  the  impressions  it 
experiences  to  the  existence  of  external  things.  We  often 
see  this  process  manifesting  itself  in  the  child,  as  it  advances 
beyond  the  first  few  months  of  its  helplessness.  A  sight  or  a 
sound,  which  at  first  produced  simply  an  involuntary  start, 
now  awakens  a  smile  or  a  look  of  recognition.  The  mind  is 
evidently  struggling  out  of  itself ;  it  begins  to  throw  itself  into 
the  objects  around,  and  to  live  in  the  world  of  outward  reali- 
ties. Here,  then,  we  see  a  state  of  consciousness  gradually 
effected,  which  is  diametrically  opposite  to  the  foregoing.  In 
the  former  case,  the  subject  existed  alone  and  for  itself;  now, 
on  the  contrary,  it  fixes  its  contemplation  so  earnestly  upon 
the  outward  reality,  that  every  thing  of  a  subjective  nature 
disappears. 

The  real  nature  of  the  sensational  and  of  the  perceptive 
consciousness  can,  therefore,  now  be  best  appreciated  together. 
The  organism  with  which  we  are  endowed  is  in  some  way 
affected  from  without.  The  attention  of  the  mind,  as  an 
active  and  intelligent  principle,  is  drawn  towards  this  affec- 
tion, and  a  certain  state  of  consciousness  succeeds.  If,  on 
the  one  hand,  we  regard  the  organism  as  belonging  to  self — 
as  being,  as  it  were,  included  in  it,  and  contemplate  the 
affection  it  undergoes  as  an  affection  of  the  subject,  the  result 
is  a  sensation.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  regard  the  organism 
as  a  material  structure,  out  of  or  beyond  the  subject,  having 
the  varied  qualities  of  form,  extension,  &c. — qualities  entirely 
distinct  from  Mind,  or  the  Me,  then  perception  is  the  result. 
In  the  one  case,  there  is  implied  a  direct,  although  sponta- 
neous and  unreflective,  consciousness  of  mind,  or  of  the  unit 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  43 

termed  self ;  in  the  other  case,  there  is  a  similar  conscious- 
ness of  matter  and  its  properties.  The  two  processes  both 
find  their  field  of  observation  in  the  organization  with  which 
we  are  furnished  ;  but  they  stand  to  each  other  as  opposite 
poles  in  relation  to  their  respective  subjective  and  objective 
tendencies.  Pure  sensation  is  wholly  subjective — pure  per- 
ception is  wholly  objective.  And  with  reference  to  that 
mixed  state  of  consciousness  by  which  the  greater  part  of  our 
life  is  characterized,  we  observe  this  law  to  hold  good — that 
the  strength  of  the  sensation  is  proportional  to  the  weakness 
of  the  perception,  and  the  clearness  of  the  perception  propor- 
tional to  the  dimness  of  the  sensation.  In  other  words,  the 
more  we  think  of  the  affection,  the  less  we  think  of  the  object ; 
and  the  more  we  are  absorbed  in  the  object,  the  less  regard 
we  pay  to  the  affection  itself.* 

The  great  use,  as  well  as  peculiarity,  then,  of  the  per- 
ceptive consciousness,  is  to  bring  the  subject  and  the  object 
face  to  face  with  each  other,  through  the  medium  of  the 
bodily  organism.  Were  we  obliged  to  infer  the  existence  of 
an  objective  reality  from  our  own  mental  affections ;  were 
our  belief  in  such  reality  a  notion,  idea,  or  conclusion,  which 
we  arrive  at  by  means  of  our  logical  understanding,  then, 
indeed,  we  could  never  escape  the  subtle  arguments  of  the 
skeptic.  All  our  knowledge  of  the  outward  world  being,  on 
that  principle,  supposed  to  come  through  subjective  and 
logical  processes,  we  could  never  find  a  valid  passage  from 
these  abstractions  into  the  concrete  reality,  and  must  at  once 
renounce  all  pretensions  to  philosophize  on  the  question. 
But  in  perception,  the  qualities  of  matter  are  seen  by  us 
directly  and  intuitively.  The  connection  between  the  organ- 
ism and  the  mind  is  of  such  a  nature,  that  quality,  quantity, 

*  For  a  more  complete  account  of  the  Philosophy  of  Sensation  and 
Perception,  see  "  Hamilton's  Reid,"  Note  D*. 


44  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

and  their  developments,  such  as  space,  time,  figure,  degree — 
in  a  word,  all  the  primary  qualities  of  matter,  are  perceived 
by  us,  not  as  inferences  from  certain  subjective  states,  but  as 
the  real  determinations  of  objects  altogether  apart  from  our- 
selves, and  comprehended  by  a  direct  intuition. 

This  state  of  the  intellectual  consciousness,  accordingly, 
should  now  lead  us  to  a  corresponding  state  of  the  emotional. 
As  there  is  a  faculty  which  brings  us  into  direct  contact  with 
things,  as  outward  objects,  so  there  must  be  a  form  of  emo- 
tion, which  has  its  origin  entirely  in  the  perception  of  such 
objects ;  in  other  words,  there  must  be  a  practical  energy 
corresponding  to  this  perceptive  intelligence.  Now,  precisely 
of  this  nature  are  those  which  we  term  the  animal  passions. 
The  lower  animals  possess  the  faculties  of  sensation  and  per- 
ception in  an  equally  high,  and  often  in  a  much  higher 
degree,  than  ourselves  ;  and  as  we  found  in  instinct  the  state 
of  emotive  consciousness  answering  to  the  former,  so  now  we 
recognize,  in  the  passions  to  which  the  animal  tribes  are  sub- 
ject, the  emotive  consciousness  answering  to  the  latter. 
Mankind  show  these  passions  as  distinctly  developed  as  do 
the  lower  animals  themselves.  The  emotions  which  arise  on 
the  mere  perception  of  certain  objects,  such  as  those  which 
relate  to  sensual  enjoyment,  or  those  referring  to  the  preser- 
vation of  animal  life,  are  identical  in  the  man  and  in  the 
brute ;  they  present  in  either  case  a  development  of  the 
emotive,  collateral  with  the  intellectual  consciousness,  in  its 
combined  sensational  and  perceptive  stages. 

Having  thus  rapidly  explained  the  twofold  process  of  sen- 
sation and  perception,  with  the  allied  emotional  feelings,  we 
come  next  to  the  third  step  in  the  development  of  the  human 
mind,  and  that  is,  the  logical  consciousness,  usually  compre- 
hended under  the  term  understanding.  Perception,  as  we 
just  saw,  designates  the  direct  and  immediate  cognizance  of 
an  objective  reality — of  a  thing.  As  such,  it  of  course  im- 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  45 


plies  that  we  'possess  some  kind  of  comprehension  of  the 
primary  qualities  of  all  bodies — that  we  grasp  intuitively  the 
main  attributes  of  the  material  world.  In  this  case,  how- 
ever, our  cognizance  of  these  attributes  is  spontaneous,  unre- 
flective,  and  confused  ;  we  comprehend  the  object  presented 
to  us  simply  as  a  whole,  but  we  do  not  analyze  it :  that  is,  we 
do  not  separate  its  attributes  from  its  essence,  and  contem- 
plate them  apart,  numbering  up  the  qualities  it  exhibits,,  and 
making  them  into  abstract  ideas.  In  fact,  perception,  in  the 
same  manner  as  sensation,  simply  implies  the  consciousness 
of  the  moment ;  it  does  not  involve  the  existence  of  a  fixed 
notion,  idea,  conception,  or  of  any  thing,  in  brief,  out  of 
which  a  body  of  experience  can  be  formed,  or  definite  know- 
ledge be  constructed.  The  mere  perception,  for  example,  of 
a  house,  a  stone,  or  a  tree,  would  only  imply  the  momentary 
consciousness  we  should  experience,  in  knowing  intuitively 
the  presence  of  such  a  concrete  object  apart  from  ourselves — 
it  would  by  no  means  imply  the  abstract  idea  which  those 
words  now  designate,  and  in  which  sense  alone  they  may  be 
regarded  as  forming  some  of  the  elements  of  our  accumulated 
experience. 

The  logical  consciousness,  then,  or,  as  we  have  before 
termed  it,  the  understanding,  performs  a  most  weighty  part 
in  the  development  of  the  human  mind  ;  for  it  is  this  which 
gives  us  clear  and  reflective  conceptions  of  things,  which 
enables  us  to  generalize  the  particular  objects  around  us,  in 
a  word,  which  performs  the  threefold  process  of  simple  ap- 
prehension, judgment,  and  reasoning. 

It  may  be  as  well,  in  explaining  this  stage  of  our  con- 
sciousness, to  take  a  brief  inventory  of  the  different  subordi- 
nate mental  processes  which  it  involves,  and  in  which  its 
activity  consists.  First  of  all,  the  momentary  state  of  con- 
sciousness experienced  in  the  perception  of  an  object,  must 
be  retained,  so  that  we  may  compare  it  with  any  others  which 


46  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

may  subsequently  arise, — this  thread  of  connection  running 
through  the  different  points  of  our  consciousness,  and  uniting 
them  in  one  indissoluble  chain,  is  memory.  If  we  retain  the 
perceptive  consciousness  of  any  given  moment,  so  as  to  con- 
template it  afterwards  by  itself,  we  usually  term  the  process 
conception.  If  the  process  be  carried  out  to  any  extent,  so  as 
to  include  and  interweave  other  elements,  then  we  term  it 
imagination.  Again,  when  we  compare  our  conceptions,  and 
classify  them  for  convenience,  according  to  any  given  points 
of  resemblance  they  possess  in  common,  we  perform  the 
double  process,  first  of  abstraction,  and  then  of  generaliza- 
tion. To  these  might  be  added,  as  more  purely  logical  pro- 
cesses, definition,  division,  judgment,  and,  lastly,  reasoning, 
both  in  the  deductive  and  the  inductive  form. 

The  understanding,  then,  in  these  its  various  developments, 
evidently  performs  the  chief  office  in  the  whole  course  of  our 
every  day  life.  It  has  to  do  entirely  with  the  attributes  of 
things,  separating,  scrutinizing,  classifying  them,  and  adapt- 
ing them,  by  the  aid  of  judgment  and  reasoning,  to  all  the 
purposes  of  human  existence.  This  cognizance  of  attributes 
is  the  main  thing  in  every  object  of  a  practical  nature.  The 
builder,  e.  g.,  cares  nothing  about  the  organic  structure  or 
essential  nature  of  the  materials  he  employs :  he  has  simply 
to  do  with  their  qualities,  whether  they  be  hard  or  soft,  flexi- 
ble or  inflexible,  durable  or  perishable,  &c.  The  chemist, 
again,  classifies  his  drugs  according  to  their  medical  influence 
on  the  human  system,  or  some  other  principle  equally  ob- 
jective, The  naturalist  classifies  plants  and  animals  accord- 
ing to  certain  visible  properties.  The  schoolmaster  classifies 
his  boys  as  good  or  bad,  clever  or  stupid,  obedient  or  disobe- 
dient. In  a  word,  the  great  business  of  human  life,  practi- 
cally speaking,  is  to  find  out  the  different  properties  of  things 
aright,  and  then  apply  them  to  their  proper  uses.  The  per- 
fection of  this  process  is  finally  seen  in  the  formation  and 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  47 

use  of  language,  which  turns  almost  entirely  upon  the  obser- 
vation of  actions,  attributes,  and  relations. 

And  yet  this  logical  consciousness,  although  it  is  the  great 
instrument  of  practical  life,  is  entirely  subjective  and  formal. 
The  material  with  which  it  has  to  do  is  wholly  given  in  sen- 
sation and  perception ;  all  that  it  furnishes  in  addition  to 
this  are  forms  of  thought,  general  notions,  categories,  and  in- 
ternal processes,  which  have  an  abstract  or  logical  value,  but 
which,  when  viewed  alone,  are  absolutely  void  of  all  "  con- 
tent" It  is  thus  that  the  purely  logical  mind,  though  dis- 
playing great  acuteness,  yet  is  ofttimes  involved  in  a  mere 
empty  play  upon  words,  forms,  and  definitions ;  making  end- 
less divisions,  and  setting  up  the  finest  distinctions,  while  the 
real  matter  of  truth  itself  either  escapes  out  of  these  abstract 
moulds,  or,  perchance,  was  never  in  them. 

Upon  the  same  level  with  the  logical  consciousness, 
intellectually  considered,  we  have  on  the  emotional  side  of 
our  nature  a  very  important  class  of  ejections.  These 
include  all  those  emotive  states  which  have  their  basis  in 
utilitarian  considerations.  The  domestic  affections,  so  far  as 
they  are  not  purely  pathological,  the  patriotic  affections,  the 
passion  of  avarice,  and  the  like,  in  brief,  those  emotions 
generally  which  depend,  not  upon  the  immediate  perception 
of  their  object,  but  upon  our  relations  in  human  life — all 
stand  upon  the  same  level  with  the  understanding,  and  are 
occasioned  by  conceptions,  which  the  understanding  furnishes 
to  us. 

Having  advanced  thus  far,  the  man  is  now  complete  for 
all  the  practical  necessities  of  his  outward  life.  First,  he 
has  senses,  which  place  him  in  immediate  connection  with 
the  phenomena  around  him.  Next,  he  has  the  wonderful 
power  of  going  forth,  as  it  were,  out  of  himself,  and  referring 
his  sensations  to  outward  realities  —  of  gazing  upon  an 
objective  as  well  as  a  subjective  world.  Thirdly,  he  has 


48  PHILOSOPHY    OF    KELIG1ON. 

the  faculty  of  separating  and  individualizing  the  properties 
of  external  things,  or  classifying  these  properties  for  his  own 
use,  of  forming  abstract  ideas,  and  expressing  them  by 
articulate  sounds  or  written  symbols.  Added  to  this,  the 
practical  life  has  all  along  kept  pace  with  the  intellectual. 
Instincts,  passions,  affections,  have  developed  themselves  in 
the  heart  just  in  proportion  as  notions  have  been  formed  in 
the  head.  Is  not  this,  then,  sufficient  ?  Is  not  the  man  now 
complete  ?  Is  any  thing  more  required  to  give  perfection  to 
his  mental  constitution  ?  Let  us  see. 

If  the  apparatus  of  faculties  we  have  now  indicated 
exhaust  the  whole  of  our  intellectual  and  emotive  nature,  it 
is  easy  for  us  to  mark  out  the  farthest  limits  of  human 
knowledge.  The  combined  process  of  sensation  and  per- 
ception on  this  theory  afford  the  entire  matter  of  it,  while 
the  understanding  supplies  the  form.  Human  knowledge, 
therefore,  estimated  by  this  standard,  must  be  limited  to  those 
provinces  in  which,  the  senses  having  afforded  material,  the 
logical  faculty  throws  that  material  into  the  form  of  notions 
or  ideas — ideas  which  again  are  made  the  basis  of  deductive 
or  inductive  reasoning.  Now  a  little  consideration  soon 
begins  to  reveal  to  us  the  working  of  another  state  of  con- 
sciousness higher  than  those  we  have  yet  mentioned — one 
which  takes  a  broader  sweep,  and  seeks  to  unravel  vaster 
problems.  This  higher  state  of  consciousness  constitutes  a 
kind  of  intellectual  sensibility, — an  immediate  intuition  of 
certain  objects,  which  are  in  no  respect  cognizable  simply 
by  the  senses  and  the  understanding.  The  faculty  of  which 
we  now  speak,  and  which  may  be  termed  pure  reason  or 
intuition,  holds  in  fact  a  similar  relation  to  the  understanding 
that  perception  holds  to  sensation.  As  sensation  reveals^oaly 
subjective  facts,  while  perception  involves  a  direct  intuition 
of  the  objective  world  around  us ;  so,  with  regard  to  higher 
truths  and  laws,  the  understanding  furnishes  merely  the 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  49 


subjective  forms,  in  which  they  may  be  logically  stated, 
while  intuition  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  actual  matter, 
or  reality  of  truth  itself. 

We  will  take,  as  an  example,  the  perception  of  beauty  in 
nature  or  art.  This  perception  arises  from  a  direct  sensi- 
bility of  our  whole  intellectual  and  emotional  nature.  No 
one  can  pretend  that  the  whole  region  of  the  beautiful  is  one, 
to  which  we  are  introduced  simply  by  logical  reasoning  upon 
the  intimations  of  the  senses.  Beyond  sensation,  and  beyond 
mere  understanding,  there  must  be  a  glimpse  of  something 
positive  and  real,  which  we  designate  beauty, — something 
which  appeals  to,  and  corresponds  with,  a  higher  state  of 
consciousness  than  any  of  the  foregoing, — something  which 
is  allied  to  a  loftier  region  of  truth,  and  leaves  in  the  soul  a 
longing  for  the  infinite. 

As  a  second  example,  let  us  take  the  perception  of  moral 
truth.  Some  men  may  reason  themselves  into  the  notion, 
that  goodness  is  identical  with  utility.  But  the  mass  of 
thinking  minds  in  all  countries,  the  testimony  of  the  common 
sense  of  mankind,  and  the  evidence  of  all  human  languages 
(which  are  exhibitions  of  man's  spontaneous  thinking),  all 
assign  a  separate  sphere  to  moral  truth,  and  appeal  to  a 
moral  consciousness,  as  the  direct  foundation  of  our  thoughts 
and  feelings  on  this  subject.  The  theories  of  utility  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  a  distinct  conscience  on  the  other,  offer  a 
very  fair  instance  of  the  nature  and  spirit  of  the  two  systems, 
the  one  of  which  breaks  oflf  the  human  consciousness 
abruptly  when  it  has  simply  attained  the  logical  stage  of 
activity,  the  other  of  which  carries  it  up  to  the  elevation  of 
pure  reason,  or  of  what  might  be  here  termed  moral 
intuition. 

Let  us  take  a  third  instance.  The  mind,  after  it  has 
gazed  for  a  while  upon  the  phenomena  of  the  world  around, 
begins  to  ponder  within  itself  such  thoughts  as  these.  What 


50  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

is  this  changing  scene,  which  men  call  nature  ?  What  then 
is  nature  ?  Of  what  primary  elements  do  all  things 
consist  ?  What  is  the  power  and  the  wisdom  through  which 
their  infinite  forms  of  beauty  spring  forth,  live,  decay,  and 
then  become  instiqpt  with  a  new  vitality  ?  In  these  questions 
we  again  discern  the  activity  of  a  higher  state  of  conscious- 
ness than  the  understanding  alone  presents.  The  under- 
standing looking  at  the  objects  presented  to  us,  through  the 
agency  of  perception,  abstracts  their  properties,  and  classifies 
them  ;  in  a  word,  it  separates  things  into  their  genera  and 
species,  and  there  leaves  them.  But  the  pure  reason,  instead 
of  separating  the  objects  of  nature,  and  classifying  them  into 
various  species,  seeks  rather  to  unite  them,  to  view  them  all 
together,  to  find  the  one  fundamental  essence  by  which  they 
are  upheld  ;  to  discover  the  great  presiding  principle  by 
which  they  are  maintained  in  unbroken  harmony.  The 
understanding  has  simply  to  do  with  separate  objects,  viewed 
in  their  specific  or  generic  character  •  the  higher  reason  has 
to  do  with  them  as  forming  parts  of  one  vast  totality,  of 
which  it  seeks  the  basis,  the  origin,  and  the  end.  With  the 
phenomena  of  the  human  mind  it  is  the  same.  The  under- 
standing merely  classifies  them ;  the  pure  reason  inquires 
into  the  nature  of  the  principle  from  which  they  spring,  and 
views  .the  human  mind  as  a  totality,  expressing  the  will  and 
purpose  of  its  great  archetype. 

These  two  efforts  of  the  reason  to  seek  the  nature  and 
origin,  both  of  the  universe  and  the  soul,  lead  naturally  and 
inevitably  to  the  conception  of  some  common  ground,  from 
which  they  are  both  derived.  The  soul  is  not  self-created, 
but  is  consciously  dependent  upon  some  higher  power. 
There  must  be  a  type  after  which  it  was  formed ;  a  self- 
existent  essence,  from  which  it  proceeded  ;  a  supreme  mind 
which  planned  and  created  my  mind.  So  also  with  regard 
to  nature.  If  the  universe  as  a  whole  shows  the  most  perfect 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND.  51 

harmony,  all  the  parts  thereof  symmetrically  adapted  to  each 
other,  all  proceeding  onwards  like  a  machine  infinitely  com- 
plicate, yet  never  clashing,  in  its  minutest  wheels  and  move- 
ments ;  there  must  be  some  mind  vaster  than  the  universe, 
one  which  can  take  it  all  in  at  a  single  glance,  one  which 
has  planned  its  harmony,  and  keeps  the  whole  system  from 
perturbation.  In  short,  if  there  be  dependent  existence,  there 
must  be  absolute  existence ;  if  there  be  temporal  and  finite 
beings,  there  must  be  an  Eternal  and  an  Infinite  One.  Thus 
the  power  of  intuition,  that  highest  elevation  of  the  human 
consciousness,  leads  us  at  length  into  the  world  of  eternal 
realities.  The  period  of  the  mind's  converse  with  mere  phe- 
nomena being  past,  it  rises  at  length  to  grasp  the  mystery  of 
existence,  and  the  problem  of  destiny. 

Putting  these  illustrations  together,  we  find  that  there  are 
at  least  three  spheres  of  thought,  to  which  the  human  con- 
sciousness attains,  and  which  all  lie  beyond  the  region  of 
mere  perception  and  mere  understanding ;  and  these  are  the 
Beautiful,  the  Good,  and  the  True.  Although  the  under- 
standing may  cast  the  material  which  reason  supplies  into  a 
logical  form  ;  yet  the  mind's  primary  and,  indeed,  its  sole 
access  to  it  is  derived  from  that  higher  intellectual  conscious- 
ness, which  transcends  the  limits  of  sensuous  phenomena, 
and  comes  into  direct  contact  with  these  nobler  spheres  of 
human  thought. 

The  emotional  states  which  correspond  with  these  different 
spheres  of  our  intellectual  activity,  are  very  clearly  defined. 
The  emotion  of  beauty  is  well  known  as  the  basis  of  all  the 
incentives  and  the  pleasure  which  we  experience  in  con- 
nection with  aesthetical  pursuits.  The  moral  emotions,  again, 
form  some  of  the  highest  enjoyments  of  human  life  ;  they 
shed  a  calmness,  a  satisfaction,  and  a  glow  over  the  soul,  that 
is  conscious  of  its  own  rectitude  ;  they  give  at  once  a  zest  to 
our  prosperity,  and  a  dignity  to  the  period  of  human  adver- 


52  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


sity.  Lastly,  the  religious  emotions,  which  spring  from  our 
contemplation  of  the  Infinite  Being,  in  the  plenitude  of  his 
divine  attributes,  are  the'most  powerful  of  all  the  principles 
to  which  our  nature  can  appeal.  Even  when  distorted  by 
superstition,  they  give  a  force  of  character  which  breaks 
down  all  minor  opposition ;  but  when  of  a  pure  and  elevated 
description,  and  united  with  a  high  moral  sensibility,  they 
lend  to  our  nature  a  power,  a  dignity,  and  a  glory,  which 
shows  its  alliance  with  the  divinity  here,  and  gives  the  clear- 
est intimations  of  its  exalted  destiny  hereafter. 

We  have  now  traced  the  development  of  the  human  con- 
sciousness up  to  its  greatest  elevation,  and  it  now  only 
remains  to  show  the  point  where  the  intellectual  and 
emotional  elements  blend  together  in  their  highest  unity. 
We  saw,  that  there  was  a  point  of  union  at  the  base  of  the 
series  of  developments  above,  described,  which  we  denomi- 
nated bare  feeling.  The  mind's  activity,  separating  itself 
from  that  point  into  its  two  different  phases,  the  intellectual 
and  the  emotional,  passes  successively  through  the  different 
stages  of  consciousness  we  have  indicated,  until  at  length 
they  again  unite  at  the  summit  of  our  spiritual  nature  in  one 
intense  focus.  This  highest  synthesis  we  term  Faith.  It 
should  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  term  faith,  as  used  in 
ordinary  language,  is  very  indefinite.  It  is  often  employed, 
for  example,  to  designate  the  final  conclusion  we  draw  from 
a  train  of  reasoning  ;  particularly  if  that  reasoning  be  of  a 
moral  and  not  a  demonstrative  kind.  The  sense,  however, 
in  which  we  now  employ  it  is  altogether  different  from  this. 
Faith  we  regard  to  be  the  highest  intellectual  sensibility.  It 
is  not  possible  to  say,  whether  it  resembles  most  an  intel- 
lectual or  an  emotional  state  of  consciousness ;  the  two  seem 
to  be  perfectly  blended  in  that  pure  spiritual  elevation,  where 
our  intellectual  gaze  upon  truth,  is  not  separable  from  the 
love  and  ecstasy  we  feel  in  the  contemplation  of  it.  "  He 


FACULTIES    OF    THE    HUMAN    MIND. 


thatloveth  not,"  says  the  Apostle  John,  "knoweth  not  God  ;" 
his  consciousness  has  not  reached  that  high  elevation,  where 
knowledge  and  love  are  inseparable,  and  in  the  light  of  which 
alone  we  can  know  God  aright. 

Coleridge  has  given  virtually  the  same  explanation  of  the 
nature  and  essence  of  faith.  "Faith,"  he  says,  "consists  in 
the  synthesis  of  the  reason  and  the  individual  will.  By  virtue 
of  the  latter,  therefore,  it  must  be  an  energy  ;  and,  inasmuch 
as  it  relates  to  the  whole  man,  it  must  be  exerted  in  each 
and  all  of  his  constituents  or  incidents,  faculties  and  tenden- 
cies;  it  must  be  a  total  not  a  partial,  a  continuous  not,  a 
desultory  or  occasional  energy.  And  by  virtue  of  the  former 
(that  is,  reason)  faith  must  be  a  light,  a  form  of  knowing,  a 
beholding  of  truth." 

Faith,  then,  when  perfected,  is  the  state  of  consciousness 
which  links  our  present  to  our  future  life.  The  denizens  of 
heaven  are  termed  indifferently  Cherubim  and  Seraphim ; 
spirits  that  are  replete  with  knowledge,  or  burn  with  love ; 
and,  as  we  have  just  seen,  it  is  the  cherubic  and  the  seraphic 
life  united,  which  expresses  the  perfect  state  of  man's  con- 
sciousness on  earth,  a  state  in  which  we  have  equally  a  per- 
ception and  a  love  of  the  beautiful,  the  good,  and  the  eternally 
true. 

We  have  now  finished  our  scheme  of  the  human  faculties, 
and  must  request  our  readers,  ere  they  proceed,  to  familiarize 
their  minds  as  much  as  possible  with  the  different  stages 
through  which  the  human  consciousness  ascends  to  its  highest 

O  o 

elevation,  and  the  inseparable  connection  existing  between  the 
successive  powers  of  the  understanding  and  emotions  of  the 
heart.  We  would  also  again  remind  them  that  the  activity 
of  the  will,  must  be  regarded  as  running  through  all  these 
different  phenomena;  and  that  as  there  is  involved  in  the 
spontaneous  operations  of  the  human  mind,  all  the  elements 
which  the  consciousness  at  all  contains,  it  must  not  be 


54  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

imagined  that  these  elements  have  to  be  reflectively  realized 
before  they  can  contribute  their  aid  to  our  mental  develop- 
ment. It  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  most  delicate  and  yet  im- 
portant of  all  psychological  analyses  to  show,  how  the  power  of 
the  will  operates  through  all  the  region  of  man's  spontaneous 
life,  and  to  prove  that  our  activity  is  equally  voluntary  and 
equally  moral  in  its  whole  aspect,  although  the  understanding 
may  not  have  brought  the  principles  on  which  we  act  into  the 
clear  light  of  reflective  truth.  Until  this  is  seen  and  com- 
prehended, the  spontaneity  of  man's  intuitional  consciousness 
is  apt  to  be  regarded  as  the  result  of  some  divine  necessity, 
instead  of  involving  all  the  elements  of  voluntary  and  moral 

action. 

• 

In  the  mass  of  mankind,  indeed,  the  elevation  of  faith  is 
frequently  attained  without  their  ever  becoming  reflectively 
conscious  of  any  development  at  all ;  while  the  number  of 
those  who  take  a  speculative  interest  in  these  questions,  will, 
in  all  probability,  be  always  very  inconsiderable. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ON    THE    DISTINCTION    BETWEEN    THE    LOGICAL    AND    THE 
INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

IN  the  foregoing  chapter  we  have  already  described  to 
some  extent  the  general  distinction  which  subsists  between 
the  logical  and  the  intuitional  faculty.  As,  however,  this 
subject  will  be  of  great  importance  in  the  whole  of  our  sub- 
sequent investigations,  we  have  thought  it  necessary  to  de- 
vote a  separate  chapter  to  its  fuller  elucidation. 

And  we  would  caution  every  reader,  in  the  outset, 
against  the  supposition  that  the  distinction  we  are  about  to 
develope  somewhat  at  large,  is  any  thing  at  all  novel  in  the 
history  of  mental  philosophy.  So  far  from  that,  it  is  almost 
as  universal  as  philosophy  itself,  lying  alike  patent  both  in 
ancient  and  modern  speculation.  Those,  it  is  true,  who 
have  adopted  extreme  sensational  principles,  who  have  de- 
nied the  validity  of  all  truth  beyond  the  limits  of  our  sensu- 
ous impressions,  and  advocated  a  gross  materialistic  skepti- 
cism, decide  naturally  enough  to  cancel  the  distinction  of 
which  we  now  treat.  But  in  cases  where  such  a  skepticism 
has  not  been  asserted,  and  the  validity  of  any  kind  of  truth 
beyond  the  direct  intimations  «f  sense  has  been  at  all  admit- 
ted, the  confusion  of  the  logical  and  the  higher  intuitional 
consciousness  in  man  has  either  resulted  from  entire  igno- 
rance of  the  real  history  of  philosophy,  or  from  a  great  de- 


56  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

ficiency  in  the  power  of  philosophical  thinking.  We  do  not 
mean,  of  course,  that  the  same  phraseology  has  been  always 
employed  to  express  the  different  states  of  consciousness  to 
which  we  refer  ;  but  we  mean  that  the  same  conceptions  on 
the  subject  are  almost  universally  to  be  recognized  through 
the  whole  region  of  metaphysical  literature  by  any  mind 
that  can  look  beneath  the  mere  forms  of  expression  to  the 
ideas  they  were  intended  to  embody.  Let  us  adduce  a  few 
out  of  the  numberless  examples  that  might  be  taken  from  the 
different  eras  of  man's  history. 

In  going  back  to  the  age  of  Pythagoras,  we  find  even 
thus  early,  a  broad  distinction  drawn  between  the  vovs  and 
the  (pgr)v ;  the  former  of  which  represented  that  higher  con- 
sciousness, by  which  we  are  made  conversant  with  axiomatic 
truth,  the  latter,  that  lower  state  of  consciousness  by  which 
we  reason  upon  facts  already  supplied.  The  Eleatics  re- 
cognized the  same  distinction  under  the  terms  nuntg  and  flo£«; 
the  faculty  by  which  we  gaze  upon  "  TO  ov  "  (the  eternal 
and  unchangeable  essence),  being  regarded  by  them  as 
something  altogether  different  from  that  by  which  we  are 
brought  merely  into  practical  contact  with  the  phenomenal 
world.  In  Heraclitus  the  same  two  forms  of  consciousness 
appear,  under  the  aspect  of  the  common  and  the  individual 
reason  ;  the  former  (£wos  Ao/o?)  being  the  criterion  of  abstract 
truth  generally,  the  latter  (itfta  qppoyjjo-i?)  being  simply  the 
basis  of  private,  and  those,  of  course,  often  erroneous  opinions. 

To  quote  the  philosophy  of  Plato  on  this  question,  must 
be  well-nigh  superfluous.  The  whole  of  its  power,  its  truth- 
fulness, its  sublimity,  results  from  a  more  than  ordinarily 
full  and  distinct  appreciation  of  the  higher  reason  (vov?,  Ao/oc,) 
as  that  element  in  our  nature  «by  which  we  are  brought  into 
direct  contact  with  truth,  in  its  purer  and  diviner  forms. 
The  testimony  of  Aristotle,  however,  is  more  important, 
when  we  consider  that  his  mind  was  far  more  of  the  logical- 


LOGICAL   AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  57 

character,  and  that  he  is  often  imagined  to  stand  directly 
opposed  to  Plato  upon  these  very  points.  This  latter  im- 
pression respecting  Aristotle,  I  think,  has  been  proved  en- 
tirely erroneous.  That  acute  thinker  certainly  did  not  fail 
to  see  that  all  reasoning  must  start  from  first  principles,  and 
that  the  discursive  or  logical  faculty  by  which  we  infer  one 
truth  from  another,  is  a  very  different  form  of  intelligence 
from  the  noetic  faculty,  by  which  we  have  an  intuitive  per- 
ception of  the  primary  elements  of  which  all  truth  consists.* 
In  no  era  of  speculation,  however,  did  the  distinction  in 
question  come  out  more  prominently  than  in  the  Alexandrian 
school.  The  writings  of  Plotinus  clearly  embody  the  whole 
controversy  on  the  immediacy  of  our  knowledge,  both  of  the 
external  world,  and  of  the  world  of  spiritual  truth.  The 
different  states  of  consciousness  to  which  we  attain,  accord- 
ing as  we  are  engaged  simply  with  representative  concep- 
tions, or  with  actual  realities,  form,  indeed,  no  inconsiderable 
element  in  all  the  chief  speculations  of  that  extraordinary 
thinker.  And  even  in  the  scholastic  ages,  when  the  discur- 
sive faculty  was  developed  to  an  unusual  degree  of  promi- 
nence, still  even  then  there  were  not  a  few  who  retained  a 
clear  conception  of  those  higher  processes  of  mind  by  which 
we  apprehend  necessary  truth,  as  that  primary  material  of 
our  knowledge  which  the  understanding  afterwards  shapes 
into  formal  axioms. 

The  history  of  modern  philosophy  is  a  running  comment 
upon  the  distinction  we  are  establishing.  The  "  Communes 
Notiones"  of  Lord  Herbert,  in  opposition  to  his  "Discursus;" 
the  "  Innate  Ideas"  of  Descartes,  (very  different  things  from 
those  which  Locke  undertook  to  refute,)  as  opposed  to  De- 
monstration ;  the  "  Knowledge  of  the  First  Degree,"  as 

*  For  a   considerable  number  of  passages  illustrating  Aristotle's 
views  on  this  point,  see  Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  771,  et  seq. 
4 


58  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

placed  by  Spinoza  in  opposition  to  "  Knowledge  of  the  Se- 
cond Degree  ;"  the  "Natural  Light,"  and  ''Instinct"  of  Leib- 
nitz, as  contradistinguished  from  his  logical  deductions — to 
say  nothing  of  the  views  of  the  English  Platonists,  which 
were  as  explicit  as  words  can  very  well  make  them  on  the 
same  .point, — all  these  furnish  us  with  a  clear  testimony 
from  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  in  favor  of  a 
twofold  intellectual  consciousness  in  man,  the  one  bearing  a 
logical,  the  other  an  intuitional  character.  Even  Locke 
himself  is  sometimes  betrayed  into  the  same  admission ;  the 
terms  "  common  sense,"  "  self  evidence,"  and  "  intuition,"  as 
occasionally  found  in  his  writings,  all  betokening  in  that 
great  thinker  the  consciousness  of  a  higher  faculty  than  the 
mere  discursive  understanding. 

To  come  down  to  more  modern  times.  Kant,  it  is  need- 
less to  say,  has  founded  upon  the  distinction  between  the 
"  Verstand,"  and  the  "Vernunft"  in  its  speculative  and 
practical  movements,  the  whole  framework  of  his  massive 
philosophical  system  ;  and  the  German  Idealists  have  never 
lost  sight  of  it  for  a  moment  throughout  all  their  labyrinthine 
speculations.  The  present  controversy,  in  fact,  between  the 
elder  and  the  younger  Hegelians,  in  reference  to  the  nature 
of  Christianity,  all  turns  upon  the  relative  predominance  of 
the  intuitional  or  logical  consciousness  in  the  development  of 
religious  truth ;  while  the  philosophy  of  the  school  of  Jacobi 
offers,  perhaps,  the  most  systematic  vindication  of  the  intui- 
tional, in  opposition  to  the  claims  of  the  logical  faculty,  which 
has  ever  been  published  to  the  world. 

Amongst  our  own  countrymen,  Reid  had  the  clearest  pos- 
sible perception  of  the  difference  between  the  two  mental 
processes  we  are  now  designating.  "  We  ascribe  to  reason," 
he  says,  "  two  offices,  or  two  degrees.  The  first  is  to  judge 
of  things  self-evident — (this  is  intellect,  vovg  :)  the  second  is 
to  draw  conclusions  that  are  not  self-evident  from  those  that 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  59 

are — (this  is  reasoning,  diavoia."*)  The  "  common  sense  " 
— the  "fundamental  principles  of  belief," — the  "primary 
laws  of  reason,"  &c.,  of  the  Scottish  school,  all  indicate,  in- 
deed, virtually  the  same  great  fact. 

In  the  writings  of  Coleridge  we  have  still  further  the 
same  two  classes  of  phenomena  described,  under  the  title  of 
the  understanding  and  the  reason.  There  are  some  who  with 
singular  ignorance  imagine  that  Coleridge  in  using  these 
words  was  attempting  to  naturalize  a  modern  German  dis- 
covery. The  fact  is,  that  he  was  only  adding  the  testimony 
of  his  own  inward  experience  to  that  of  almost  every  true 
philosopher  in  the  world  who  had  preceded  him. 

Lastly,  in  France,  the  principle  of  Eclecticism,  as  being 
an  appeal  to  the  common  and  spontaneous  thinking  of  man- 
kind ;  and  the  whole  of  the  historical  school,  building  as  it 
does  upon  the  idea  of  humanity  in  opposition  to  the  individual 
judgment,  are  both  different  phases,  in  which  these  two  classes 
of  thinkers  contemplate  the  same  great  fundamental  fact — 
namely,  that  above  the  region  of  logical  inference  there  is  a 
higher  faculty,  a  higher  appeal,  a  higher  elevation  of  the 
consciousness,  by  which  we  are  brought  into  immediate  con- 
tact with  the  fixed  truths  that  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  our 
reasonings.  The  last  instance  I  have  happened  to  see  of  the 
distinct  recognition  of  this  faculty,  is  in  the  sermon  of  the 
Bishop  of  Oxford,  preached  before  the  British  Association  in 
June,  1847.  "  The  spirit  of  man,"  he  remarked,  "  has 
gifts  greater  than  the  highest  powers  of  the  understanding. 
There  is  in  him,  dimmed  somewhat  though  it  be,  the  Divine 
power  of  intuition.  This  is  that  gift  of  genius  which  sees 
the  hidden  unity  after  the  discovery  of  which  all  true  philoso- 
phy is  striving.  For  there  is  behind  all  that  which  we  term 
nature,  one  true  severe  unity,  and  to  contemplate  this  amidst 

*  "  Intellectual  Powers."     Essay  vi.  chap.  ii. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


external  diversity,  is  the  especial  gift  of  this  higher  reason." 
These  are  only  a  few  of  the  testimonies,  which  the  history  of 
philosophy  presents.  Were  it  of  any  service  to  do  so,  we 
might  bring  forward  an  almost  innumerable  multitude  of 
witnesses,  who  in  various  forms,  and  from  different  points  of 
view,  have  come  to  this  same  virtual  conclusion — namely, 
that  there  is  one  state  of  our  intellectual  consciousness  by 
virtue  of  which  we  define  terms,  form  propositions,  construct 
reasonings,  and  perform  the  whole  office  that  we  usually  at- 
tribute to  a  mind  that  acts  logically ;  but  that  there  is  also 
another  state  of  our  intellectual  consciousness,  in  which  the 
material  of  truth  comes  to  us  as  though  by  a  rational  instinct 
— a  mental  sensibility — an  intuitive  power — a  "  communis 
sensus,"  traceable  over  the  whole  surface  of  civilized  huma- 
nity. These  two  classes  of  phenomena,  therefore,  which  we 
find  to  be  almost  universally  acknowledged  by  past  thinkers, 
we  have  denominated  the  logical  and  the  intuitional  conscious- 
ness ;  and  it  is  the  object  of  the  present  chapter  to  develope 
as  clearly  as  possible  the  real  distinction  between  them.  We 
shall  attempt  to  do  this  by  a  connected  series  of  observa- 
tions. 

I.  The  knowledge  we  obtain  by  the  logical  consciousness 
is  representative  and  indirect ;  while  that  which  we  obtain  by 
the  intuitional  consciousness  is  presentalive  and  immediate. 

The  main  points  in  the  question  of  the  mediacy  and  im- 
mediacy of  our  knowledge  have  been  gradually  brought  out 
with  the  utmost  distinctness  in  the  controversy,  which  has 
existed,  on  the  nature  of  perception.  It  was  long  taken  for 
granted,  that  our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  was  ob- 
tained through  the  medium  of  inward  conceptions,  or  repre- 
sentative ideas.  The  objects  around  us,  it  was  said,  affect 
our  sensuous  organs ;  these  affections  are  transmitted  to  the 
brain  ;  and  the  impression  made  upon  the  brain  is  in  some 
mysterious  manner  communicated  to  the  mind,  which  gains 


LOGICAL    AMD    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  61 

in  this  way  an  "  idea  "  of  the  objects  in  question.  Hume 
argued  with  irresistible  force,  that  on  these  principles  we 
could  have  no  certain  knowledge  of  the  external  world  at 
all ;  for  as  our  consciousness  has  here  to  do  only  with  the 
idea  or  mental  conception,  it  is  impossible  ever  to  conclude 
scientifically  that  the  inward  representation  is  in  any  way  a 
truthful  reflex  of  the  outward  reality,  or  that  there  is  any 
reality  at  all,  to  be  reflected.  Kant  attempted  to  save  the 
main  pillars  of  human  belief  by  pointing  out  a  twofold  ele- 
ment existing  in  perception, — by  showing,  namely,  that  our 
ideas  of  external  things  are  compounded  first  of  a  direct  in- 
tuition, which  furnishes  the  mailer  of  which  they  consist,  and 
then  of  a  constructive  faculty  which  furnishes  the  form. 

Fichte,  however,  neglecting  what  was  true  and  exposing 
what  was  weak  in  the  Kantian  philosophy,  completed  the 
subjective  theory.  Admit  that  our  knowledge  of  all  things 
around  us  consists  in  ideas,  and  we  can  never,  he  argued,  get 
out  of  the  subjective  circle  which  our  theory  draws  around 
us.  The  soul  here  becomes  as  it  were  an  intellectual  eye 
placed  in  the  centre  of  the  consciousness,  and  occupies  itself 
solely  with  the  phenomena  which  pass  across  it.  Whether 
these  phenomena  be  significant  of  any  external  reality  or 
not  we  cannot  tell ;  for  whatever  faculty  we  may  suppose 
capable  of  assuring  us  of  it,  still  this  very  faculty  merely 
indicates  a  subjective  process,  which  can  no  better  take  us 
out  of  ourselves  than  could  the  previous  conceptions. 

The  only  scientific  solution  of  these  difficulties,  is  sub- 
stantially that  which  was  first  proposed  by  Reid,  and  has 
since  been  more  fully  developed  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  It 
begins  by  denying  the  primary  position  of  the  ideal  system 
(a  position  to  which  almost  universal  assent  had  been  given 
from  the  age  of  Aristotle) ;  namely,  that  we  have  within  us, 
separately  and  distinctly,  any  such  things  as  the  ideas,  con- 
ceptions, or  representations  of  external  objects  at  all.  In 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


opposition  to  this,  it  affirms  that  our  knowledge  of  the  exter- 
nal world  is  direct,  preservative,  and  (ip  the  lower  use  of 
that  word)  intuitional ;  that  the  subject  stands  face  to  face 
with  the  object ;  that  the  objective  reality,  therefore,  is  not 
mirrored  to  us  through  any  kind  of  internal  representative 
process  ;  but  is  apprehended  at  once  by  the  direct  inter- 
course which  the  mind  enjoys  with  surrounding  nature,  by 
the  aid  of  its  material  organism.  Thus  the  scientific  basis 
of  our  knowledge,  even  of  the  external  world  itself,  has 
demanded  an  adequate  appreciation  of  the  difference  between 
that  which  comes  to  our  minds  by  direct  intuition,  or  pre- 
sentation, and  that  which  comes  only  mediately  by  an  in- 
tervening conception  or  idea.* 

I  have  been  somewhat  more  explicit  than  might  appear 
needful  upon  this  point,  because  the  perception  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  through  the  senses,  is  perfectly  analogous  to 
that  higher  intuition,  by  which  we  are  brought  into  contact 
with  what  we  may  term  super-sensual  truth.  And  not  only 
this,  but  the  skepticism  which  results  from  denying  the 
immediacy  of  our  perceptive  knowledge  in  regard  to  the 
outward  world  applies  with  exactly  the  same  force  against 
all  spiritual  truth,  when  the  higher  intuitional  consciousness 
is  lost  sight  of,  or  rejected. 

Of  mere  phenomena  we  can  gain  a  very  good  knowledge 
by  an  intermediate  or  logical  process.  We  can  have  their 
different  attributes  presented  to  us  as  abstract  ideas  ;  we  can 
put  those  attributes  together  one  by  one,  and  thus  form  a 
conception  of  the  whole  thing  as  a  phenomenon  ;  but  this 
cannot  be  done  with  regard  to  any  elementary  and  essential 
existence.  Of  substance,  for  example,  we  can  gain  no  con- 
ception by  a  logical  definition :  the  attempt  to  do  so  has,  in 
fact,  always  ended  in  the  denial  of  substance  altogether, 

*  See  Hamilton's  Reid.     Notes  and  Dissertations 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  03 

considered  as  an  objective  reality  ;  it  becomes  in  this  way 
simply  the  projected  shadow  of  our  own  faculties.  The  only 
refuge  against  this  logical  skepticism,  which  has  uniformly 
attached  itself  to  a  sensational  philosophy,*  is  in  the  im- 
mediacy of  our  higher  knowledge — in  the  fact  that  we  see 
and  feel  the  existence  of  a  substantial  reality  around  us, 
without  the  aid  of  any  logical  idea  or  definition,  by  which  it 
can  be  represented  or  conveyed. 

It  may  aid  the  comprehension  of  this  truth  if  we  append 
an  example.  Suppose  a  friend  wishes  to  describe  to  us  a 
house,  or  a  mountain,  which  we  have  never  seen.  He  can  do 
so  by  taking  its  attributes  (size,  shape,  color,  &c.,)  and  put- 
ting them  together,  so  as  to  form  a  picture  or  representation  of 
it.  This  process,  of  course,  is  a  purely  logical  one  ;  it  is  the 
combination  of  a  given  number  of  abstract  ideas,  and  gives 
rise  simply  to  a  representative  knowledge  of  the  thing  in 
question.  On  the  other  hand,  if  our  friend  wished  to  convey 
to  us  the  knowledge  of  a  primary  element ;  whether  of  one 
which  we  must  know  by  our  lower  or  sensuous  intuition,  as 
a  taste  or  a  feeling,  or  of  one  which  we  must  know  by  our 
higher  or  rational  intuition,  as  substance,  power,  beauty, 
infinity,  &c.,  here  he  would  find  all  his  logical  or  repre- 
sentative powers  at  fault.  Unless  we  ourselves  have  the 
intuition  presented  to  us  immediately,  we  can  never  compre- 
hend it ;  for  it  can  never  be  made  representative,  never  be 
known  through  a  logical  definition. 

The  case  is  precisely  the  same  with  regard  to  the  exist- 
ence of  an  absolute  Being — of  a  God.  If  any  one  imagine 
that  he  can  ever  attain  the  full  conception  of  the  Deity  by  a 
process  of  logical  definition  or  reasoning,  he  will  be  utterly 
disappointed  of  his  hope.  The  primary  conception  of  the 

*  See  Mill's  Analysis,  in  which  this  theory  of  "  Substance"  is  fully 
developed.  Vol.  i.  chap.  xi. 


64  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

infinite,  the  absolute,  the  self-existent,  is  altogether  undefina- 
ble, — and  consequently  those  minds  which  have  proceeded 
logically  in  their  inquiry  on  this  subject,  to  the  denial  of  all 
other  evidence,  have  always  concluded  that  we  have  no 
such  conception  at  all, — that  the  infinite  is  a  purely  negative 
idea, — that  it  results  simply  from  the  addition  of  an  indefinite 
number  of  finites.  And  yet  to  the  intuitional  consciousness 
there  is  no  idea  more  positive,  more  sure,  more  necessary 
than  this.  Reason  up  to  a  God,  and  the  best  you  can  do  is  to 
hypostatize  and  deify  the  final  product  of  your  own  faculties ; 
but  admit  the  reality  of  an  intellectual  intuition,  (as  the 
mass  of  mankind  virtually  do,)  and  the  absolute  stands 
before  us  in  all  its  living  reality. 

As  additional  illustration,  take  the  cases  of  aesthetical 
and  moral  truth.  Of  the  former  we  will  select  music  as  an 
example.  Could  any  reasoning,  any  number  of  ideas, 
definitions,  or  conceptions,  convey  to  the  mind  of  a  man  the 
beauty  of  harmony  ?  The  perception  of  beauty  in  music 
(which  is  by  no  means  a  sensuous  but  a  highly  intellectual 
process)  depends  upon  a  direct  sensibility.  Our  appreciation 
of  it  we  know  is  immediate, — presentative  ;  no  logic  could 
ever  convey  it,  none  could  reason  us  out  of  it.  In  this  point 
of  view,  accordingly,  music  is  purely  intuitional ;  reduce  it 
to  a  science  of  periods  and  intervals,  and  it  becomes  logical, 
— requiring  in  this  form  simply  an  ordinary  power  of  the 
understanding  to  comprehend  it. 

With  moral  truth  the  case  is  analogous.  You  may 
attempt  to  reduce  morals  to  a  logical  calculation,  by  intro- 
ducing the  theory  of  utility ;  but  you  can  never  in  this  way 
account  for  half  the  phenomena  of  the  case,  and  get  but  a 
sadly  distorted  ethical,  system  in  the  end.  Moral  truth,  like 
all  other  primary  elements  of  our  knowledge,  is  presentative  ; 
we  know  it  intuitively,  and  what  many  philosophers  have 
denominated  the  moral  sense  is  only  another  expression  for 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  65 

the  fact,  that  good  and  evil  are  not  logical  elements,  but  a 
part  of  that  fundamental  truth  which  is  known  to  us  at  once 
by  our  higher  consciousness. 

In  all  these  instances  we  see  that  the  primary  elements 
of  knowledge,  the  fundamental  realities  of  the  true,  the  beauti- 
ful, and  the  good,  all  alike  come  to  us  at  once  by  virtue  of  an 
intellectual  sensibility,  which  apprehends  them  spontaneous- 
ly and  intuitively,  just  as  in  our  perceptive  consciousness 
we  apprehend  the  outward  reality  of  things  around  us. 
Without  this  perceptive  consciousness  we  could  never  attain 
the  very  first  elements  of  physical  truth  ;  inasmuch  as  we 
could  never  comprehend  what  is  given  us  immediately  in 
perception,  by  any  description,  definition,  or  idea.  Yet 
once  given  as  elements,  we  can  reason  upon  them  logically, 
ahd  thus  create  what  is  properly  termed  physical  science. 
In  like  manner,  also,  we  comprehend  the  elements  of  all 
higher  truth,  whether  in  theology,  aesthetics,  or  morals ;  but, 
having  thus  got  access  to  them  by  our  intuitional  conscious- 
ness, then  at  length  we  can  reason  upon  them  by  the  un- 
derstanding, until  we  reduce  them  to  logical  or  scientific 
terms.*. 

II.  The  knowledge  we  obtain  by  the  logical  conscious- 
ness is  reflective  ;  that  which  we  obtain  by  the  intuitional 
consciousness  is  spontaneous.  The  spontaneous  and  reflective 
phases  of  our  mental  operations  have  been  brought  forward 
with  much  clearness  in  several  of  the  more  modern  systems  of 
philosophy ;  and  the  importance  of  distinguishing  them  is 
now  pretty  generally  acknowledged.  We  term  knowledge 
spontaneous,  when  we  acquire  it  by  the  natural  activity  of 
our  faculties,  without  taking  any  account,  or  being  at  all 

*  It  would  take  too  much  space  to  indicate  here  all  the  respective 
characteristics  of  presentative  and  representative  truth.  The  reader  is 
again  referred  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  edition  of  Reid,  Note  B,  for  a  fuller 

elucidation  of  it. 

4* 


66  PHIDOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

conscious  of  what  that  activity  really  is.  It  is  evidently 
quite  possible  for  a  man  to  live  and  think  and  act  throughout 
his  whole  career  on  earth,  without  once  consciously  turning 
the  eye  of  the  mind  inwards,  without  once  arresting  his 
trains  of  thought,  or  ever  becoming  distinctly  cognizant  of  a 
single  subjective  process.  Reflection  is  the  bending  back 
of  the  rnind  upon  itself;  so  that  we  may  render  account  of 
the  knowledge  we  have  been  acquiring  spontaneously,  and 
gain  a  clear  idea  of  its  development  and  its  validity.  Such 
is  the  broad  distinction  which  has  been  drawn  between  our 
spontaneous  and  reflective  life  generally  ;  and  there  is  evi- 
dently a  sense  in  which  all  the  faculties,  even  the  logical 
consciousness  itself,  may  be  regarded  as  having  a  sponta- 
neous movement  such  as  we  have  described — a  sense  in 
which  we  cast  our  knowledge  spontaneously  and  unrefleet- 
ively  into  a  logical  mould. 

There  is,  however,  a  somewhat  more  precise  and  scienti- 
fic acceptation  in  which  these  two  terms  are  frequently  em- 
ployed. We  term  a  man's  knowledge  spontaneous  when  it 
comes  naturally  to  him  without  his  knowing  how — flowing  in 
upon  his  mind,  as  it  were,  without  effort,  and  by  virtue  of  its 
peculiar  constitution.  On  the  other  hand,  we  term  a  man's 
knowledge  reflective  when  it  is  purely  scientific — that  is  to 
say,  when  it  is  gained  by  a  distinct  attention  to  rules  or  prin- 
ciples, and  developed  consecutively  from  them.  Thus  an 
uninstructed  man  with  a  natural  genius  for  music,  knows  it 
spontaneously  ;  if  he  learn  it  by  scientific  rules,  then  he 
knows  it  also  reflectively.  Again,  a  man  who  has  naturally 
a  deep  sense  of  religious  obligation  gives  us  an  example  of 
the  spontaneous  development  of  the  religious  life  ;  if  he  study 
theology  consecutively,  then  his  religious  life  becomes  not 
only  spontaneous,  but  also  reflective. 

Now  it  will  be  found,  upon  consideration,  that  the  pheno- 
mena of  spontaneity  and  reflectivity,  as  thus  explained,  are 


LOGICAL    AMD    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  67 

closely  connected  with  the  intuitional  and  logical  conscious- 
ness ;  that  they  depend  entirely  upon  our  knowledge  existing 
respectively  in  the  presentative,  or  the  representative  form. 

The  knowledge  that  comes  to  us  intuitionally  or  presen- 
tatively,  must  necessarily  be  spontaneous.  Just  as  our  per- 
ception of  the  external  world  is  a  spontaneous  process  when- 
ever the  object  without  comes  into  direct  contact  with  the 
subject  within ;  in  like  manner  also  does  our  intuitional  con- 
sciousness bring  us  spontaneously  into  sympathy  with  the  ele- 
ments of  higher  and  spiritual  truth.  On  this  ground  it  is, 
that  there  has  so  frequently  been  a  tendency  to  describe  the 
intuitional  faculty  by  the  name  of  an  intellectual,  a  moral, 
or  a  religious  sensibility  ;  conveying  in  every  case  the  notion 
that  there  is  an  immediate  contact  effected  between  the  ele- 
mental truth  in  question  and  the  intellectual  organ,  similar 
to  the  contact  which  takes  place  between  the  sensitive  appa- 
ratus and  the  outward  object,  in  the  process  of  perception. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  knowledge  which  comes  to  us  logically 
or  representatively,  must  evidently  be  reflective,  i.  e.,  ac- 
quired by  the  conscious  spirit  of  truth  upon  scientific  princi- 
ples. Science  is  created,  when  we  adopt  certain  terms  to 
signify  elementary  ideas — when  we  give  clear  definitions  of 
what  those  terms  are  to  include — when  we  form  propositions 
so  as  to  embody  the  knowledge  we  have  acquired — and  de- 
velope  the  subject  connectedly  into  a  clear  and  logical  system. 
This  whole  process  of  a  scientific  construction,  then,  we  re- 
peat, is  entirely  of  the  reflective  character.  So  long  as  we 
are  merely  gazing  upon  the  elementary  ideas  which  each 
science  involves,  we  are  acting  alike  spontaneously  and  intui- 
tionally ;  but  the  moment  we  begin  to  reduce  this  knowledge 
to  definitions,  and  to  mould  it  into  a  scientific  system,  that 
moment  we  pass  from  the  spontaneous  and  intuitional  to  the 
reflective  and  logical  phase  of  the  question. 

Moreover,  the  reflective  knowledge  resulting  from  this  is 


68  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

clearly  representative  ;  for  instead  of  the  concrete  truth  being 
presented  at  once  to  the  mind's  eye,  it  is  represented  to  us  by 
means  of  verbal  definitions  and  statements  ;  we  gaze,  in  fact, 
upon  the  mediating  conceptions  or  ideas,  not  upon  the  original 
or  essential  reality. 

III.  The  knowledge  we  obtain  by  the  intuitional  con- 
sciousness is  material,  that  which  we  gain  by  the  logical  con- 
sciousness is  formal. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  important  points  to  be  noticed  in 
the  whole  distinction  we  are  now  establishing.  The  division 
of  human  knowledge  into  the  matter  and  the  form,  is  one 
which  has  stood  its  ground  in  the  history  of  philosophy  through 
a  vast  number  of  centuries,  and  has  generally  indicated  an 
advanced  state  of  metaphysical  thinking,  in  proportion  as  it 
has  become  thoroughly  realized,  and  incorporated  into  the 
science  of  the  age.  In  this  particular  aspect  of  the  distinc- 
tion in  question,  as  in  those  we  have  already  considered,  the 
best  illustration  of  the  subject  we  can  present,  is  the  analo- 
gous case  of  our  sense-perceptions,  since  the  co-existence  of 
matter  and  form,  in  all  knowledge  depending  upon  the  expe- 
rience of  the  senses,  is  precisely  similar  to  their  co-existence 
in  knowledge  of  a  higher  and  more  general  description. 

It  is  frequently  supposed,  that  the  notions  we  possess  of 
external  objects  around  us,  are  simply  sensuous  impressions 
— that  the  logical  form  of  those  objects  is  conveyed  by  the 
senses  to  the  brain,  and  then  so  enstamped  on  the  mind  as  to 
leave  upon  it  an  idea,  which  can  be  afterwards  recalled  by 
the  aid  of  memory,  and  otherwise  made  the  ground  of  human 
experience.  Now,  this  popular  view  of  perception  is  the 
result  of  a  miserably  defective  analysis  of  the  whole  process. 
Perception,  viewed  alone,  indicates  simply  the  momentary 
consciousness  of  an  external  reality  standing  before  us  face 
to  face ;  but  it  gives  us  no  notion  which  we  can  define  and 
express  by  a  term.  To  do  this  is  the  office  of  the  understand. 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  69 

ing — the  logical  or  constructive  faculty,  which  seizes  upon 
the  concrete  material  that  is  given  immediately  in  perception, 
moulds  it  into  an  idea,  expresses  this  idea  by  a  word  or  a 
sign,  and  then  lays  it  up  in  the  memory,  as  it  were  a  hewn 
stone,  all  shaped  and  prepared  for  use,  whenever  it  may  be 
required,  either  for  ordinary  life,  or  for  constructing  a  sci- 
entific system.  Thus  every  notion  we  have  of  an  external 
object — as  a  house,  a  tree,  or  a  flower — is  compounded  of 
two  elements,  a  material  and  a  formal.  The  matter  is  fur- 
nished by  the  direct  sensational  intuition  of  a  concrete 
reality  ;  and  this  is  perception :  the  form  is  furnished  by  the 
logical  faculty,  which,  separating  the  attributes  of  the  object  • 
as  given  in  perception  from  the  essence,  constructs  a  notion 
or  idea,  which  can  be  clearly  defined  and  employed  as  a  fixed 
term  in  the  region  of  our  reflective  knowledge.  Thus  per- 
ception, indeed,  is  the  basis  of  our  experience ;  for  without 
it  no  objective  material  could  be  presented  to  us ;  but  the 
understanding  is  the  faculty  which  gives  to  our  perceptions 
a  definite  form,  and  enables  us  to  build  up  our  knowledge 
into  a  complete  body  of  experimental  truth. 

If  the  reader  has  now  succeeded  in  gaining  a  clear  con- 
ception of  the  twofold  element  of  all  experimental  truth, 
namely,  the  material  and  the  formal,  he  will  have  no  diffi- 
culty in  comprehending  this  same  distinction  in  connection 
with  truth  of  a  higher  order.  Just  as  in  all  our  conceptions 
of  material  things  there  is  the  matter  which  is  contributed  by 
one  faculty,  and  the  form  by  another,  so  in  all  the  higher 
sciences,  whether  they  be  mathematical,  moral,  theological, 
ontological,  or  aesthetic,  we  depend  entirely  upon  the  intui- 
tional consciousness  to  give  us  the  concrete  basis  of  them, 
and  upon  the  logical  consciousness  to  give  us  the  scientific 
form. 

The  mathematical  sciences,  for  example,  have  as  their 
essential  foundation  the  pure  conceptions  of  space  and  num- 


70  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

her ;  or,  if  they  be  of  the  mechanical  order,  the  conceptions 
of  power  and  motion.  Moral  science,  again,  is  based  upon 
the  fundamental  notions  of  good  and  evil  ;  sesthetical  science 
upon  that  of  beauty ;  theological  science  upon  the  concep- 
tion of  the  absolute — of  God.  Now,  these  primary  elements 
of  all  the  sciences  can  never  be  communicated  and  never 
learned  exegetically.  Unless  we  have  a  direct  consciousness 
of  them,  they  must  ever  remain  a  deep  mystery  to  us — just 
as  no  description  could  ever  give  to  a  blind  man  the  notion 
of  color,  or  to  a  man  who  has  no  organ  of  taste  the  idea  of 
bitter  or  salt.  We  do  not  deny  but  that  means  may  be  em- 
ployed to  awaken  the  consciousness  to  these  ideas,  but  still 
they  can  never  be  known  by  definition — never  communica- 
ted by  words  to  any  man  who  has  not  already  felt  them  in 
his  own  inward  experience.  Here,  then,  we  have  the  actual 
material  of  all  scientific  truth,  and  that  material,  it  is  evi- 
dent, must  be  presentative,  coming  to  us  by  the  immediate 
operation  of  our  intuitional  consciousness. 

Let  us  next  turn  to  the  consideration  of  the  form  which 
scientific  truth  necessarily  assumes.  The  bare  intuition  of 
the  elements  of  our  knowledge  does  not  by  any  means  con- 
stitute science.  To  do  this,  we  must  shape  our  direct  intu- 
itions into  notions,  which  may  represent  them  definitively ; 
these  notions  must  be  expressed  by  signs  ;  the  facts  con- 
nected with  them  by  propositions ;  and  thus  we  must  em- 
body the  whole  subject  in  a  united  chain  of  logical  deduc- 
tions. 

The  point,  however,  to  which  we  would  here  draw  es- 
pecial attention,  is  this — that  the  logical  statement  of  truth 
places  that  truth  before  us  not  really,  but  representatively. 
When  we  study  the  science  of  astronomy  by  means  of  our 
mathematical  definitions  and  diagrams,  we  are  not  gazing 
upon  the  actual  concrete  truth,  but  are  viewing  it  formally, 
as  represented  by  words  and  symbols.  When  \ve  construct 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL   CONSCIOUSNESS.  71 

a  regular  system  of  ethics,  we  are  not  viewing  moral  rela- 
tions directly,  since  they  can  only  be  viewed  directly  in  ac- 
tual life  ;  but  we  are  producing  a  logical  representation  of 
them.  When  we  develope  the  laws  of  harmony,  we  are  not 
then  directly  conscious  of  that  harmony,  as  we  are  when  it 
is  actually  produced  ;  but  we  are  describing  it  indirectly,  and 
gazing  upon  the  representation  which  our  logical  definitions 
place  before  us.  This,  then,  we  may  term  the  form  into 
which  the  understanding  throws  the  material,  which  intu- 
ition alone  can  originally  impart  to  us.  Thus  we  may  re- 
gard pure  intuition  as  one  extreme,  and  bare  formal  logic  as 
the  opposite.  Science  only  exists  when  the  two  are  united ; 
its  essential  nature  consisting  in  the  reduction  of  intuitional 
truth  into  a  logical,  secondary,  or  representational  form.* 

IV.  The  logical  consciousness  tends  to  separation  (analy- 
sis), the  intuitional  consciousness  tends  to  unity  (synthesis). 

Kant  long  ago  pointed  out  the  distinction  between  analy- 
tic and  synthetic  judgments,  and  saw  that  the  whole  validity 
of  metaphysical  science  rested  upon  the  answer  we  return 
to  the  question — How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possi- 
ble? He  saw  that  if  we  were  confined  merely  to  analytic 
judgments,  i.  e.,  if  all  we  had  to  do  was  to  declare  a  kind  of 
numerical  relationship  between  a  given  amount  of  subjects 
and  predicates,  (as  we  do  in  ordinary  logical  propositions,) 
there  could  be  no  room  for  extending  human  knowledge  be- 
yond our  formal  and  empirical  ideas. 

Now  the  real  distinction  between  analytic  and  synthetic 
judgments  is  this — that  the  former  are  judgments  which  arise 
from  the  activity  of  the  logical  consciousness,  the  latte^from 
that  of  the  intuitional  consciousness.  Thus,  when  I  say, 
"  every  triangle  has  three  sides,"  I  simply  analyze  the  term 

*  See  for  further  illustrations  of  this,  Schleiermacher's  Entwarf 
eines  Systemes  der  Sittenlehre.  Introduction. 


72  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

triangle,  and  utter  the  logical  proposition,  that  the  triangle 
necessarily  belongs  to  that  class  of  figures  which  is  bounded 
by  three  sides,  although  the  word  itself  only  expresses  the 
condition  of  its  having  three  angles.  Again,  when  I  say, 
"  the  whole  is  greater  than  a  part,"  here  we  have  another 
analytic  judgment  a  priori,  i.  e.,  there  is  a  numerical  relation 
declared  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate,  as  in  all 
purely  logical  propositions.  On  the  other  hand,  when  I  say 
every  quality  implies  a  substance,  I  declare  no  numerical 
relation  between  the  subject  and  predicate — I  utter  no  truth 
which  can  be  perceived  or  appreciated  by  the  logical  faculty  ; 
I  form,  on  the  contrary,  a  synthetic  judgment,  which  is 
grounded  solely  upon  my  intuitional  consciousness. 

Now  the  use  of  analysis  is  to  separate,  and  the  constant 
effort,  therefore,  of  the  analytic  faculty  (which  is,  in  fact, 
identical  with  the  logical)  is  to  distinguish,  and  to  divide  our 
knowledge  into  the  greatest  possible  number  of  definite  parts. 
The  more  perfect  and  acute  our  logical  genius  becomes,  the 
more  attributes  we  are  able  to  enumerate  as  belonging  to  all 
our  ideas,  and  the  finer  the  distinctions  we  draw, — just  so 
much  the  greater  is  the  number  of  parts  into  which  our 
knowledge  is  intersected.  On  the  contrary,  the  constant 
effort  of  the  intuitional  consciousness  is  to  grasp  the  highest 
unity.  Instead  of  gazing  upon  the  forms,  it  endeavors  to 
seize  upon  the  matter  of  our  knowledge.  Logical  distinc- 
tions, abstract  ideas,  phenomenal  attributes,  are  all  lost  sight 
of — it  stops  not  to  take  any  cognizance  of  them,  but  strives 
at  once  to  find  what  great  reality  there  is  which  lies  un- 
changed and  unchangeable  beneath  all  the  phenomena  around 
us.  Logic,  for  example,  will  enumerate  the  different  kinds 
of  beauty — intuition  gazes  upon  the  essence  of  beauty  itself. 
Logic  will  give  us  a  classification  of  virtues — intuition  alone 
perceives  the  absolute  good,  the  eternal  right.  Logic  will 
classify  all  external  objects  under  a  given  number  of  cate- 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  73 

gories — intuition  grasps  the  substance  which  lies  alike  at  the 
basis  of  all.  These  two  faculties  form  the  poles  of  all  our 
knowledge ;  the  one  gives  us  distinctions,  the  other  shows  the 
identity  of  things  apparently  diverse  ;  the  one  tends  to  a  per- 
petual separation  into  parts,  the  other  to  a  perpetual  unity,  in 
a  perfect  whole.  Between  these  two  oppositions  vibrate  all 
the  points  of  scientific  truth. 

V.  The  logical  consciousness  is  individual;  the  intui- 
tional consciousness  is  generic. 

We  come  here  to  another  of  the  more  important  and 
fruitful  points  in  the  distinction  we  are  now  drawing  between 
the  two  great  forms  of  intellection.  The  contest  has  been 
long  going  forward,  how  far  we  must  appeal  to  the  individual 
reason  as  the  basis  and  test  of  truth,  or  how  far  we  must 
make  our  appeal  to  the  common  consent  of  mankind.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  individual  reason 
must  be  the  final  appeal ;  for  in  whatever  way  truth  come  to 
us,  still  our  own  individual  faculties  must,  as  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  be  the  judge  of  its  evidences,  and  the  interpreter 
of  its  meaning.  It  matters  not  what  amount  of  truth  really 
exist  objectively  ;  to  us  it  is  nothing,  until  it  is  grasped  sub- 
jectively by  the  understanding.  Even  if  we  appeal  to  com- 
mon consent,  or  to  any  other  authority,  still  that  appeal  itself 
must  be  an  individual  judgment. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  argued  forcibly  enough 
that  the  individual  reason  is  altogether  untrustworthy,  for  it 
may,  and  often  does,  give  its  assent  to  the  very  grossest 
errors  and  delusions.  Beside  this,  it  is  urged,  the  individual 
reason  is  a  nonentity — a  mere  abstraction ;  for  every  man  is 
but  a  link  in  the  chain  of  humanity  ;  and  his  individualism, 
if  it  can  be  termed  so,  is  the  result  of  the  general  conscious- 
ness of  mankind  acting  upon  his  original  constitution. 
Hence  it  is  concluded  that  the  individual  reason  is  altogether 


74  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

untrustworthy,  but  that  the  reason  of  humanity,  the  common 
consent  of  the  race,  is  our  true  test,  our  last  appeal.* 

Now,  both  these  theories  have  truth  on  their  side,  although 
they  appear  to  stand  in  direct  opposition  to  each  other. 
The  ground  of  their  antagonism  arises  from  omitting  to  con- 
sider what  it  is  within  us  which  is  individual  in  its  character, 
and  what  that  is  generic,  or  belonging  to  the  race  of  mankind 
at  large.  We  all  feel  conscious  that  there  are  certain  points 
of  truth  respecting  which  we  can  appeal  to  our  own  individ- 
ual understanding  with  unerring  certainty.  No  amount  of 
contradiction,  for  example,  no  weight  of  opposing  testimony 
from  others,  could  ever  shake  our  belief  in  the  definitions  and 
deductions  of  mathematical  science,  or  the  conclusions  of  a 
purely  logical  syllogism.  On  the  other  hand,  we  are  equally 
conscious,  upon  due  consideration,  that  there  are  truths,  re- 
specting which  we  distrust  our  individual  judgment,  and 
gain  certainty  in  admitting  them,  only  from  the  concurring 
testimony  of  other  minds.  (Of  this  nature,  for  example,  are 
the  main  points  of  moral  and  religious  truth.)  Hence  it  ap- 
pears evident  that  there  is  within  us  both  an  individual  and 
a  generic  element,  and  that  answering  to  them  there  are 
truths  for  which  we  may  appeal  to  the  individual  reason,  and 
truths  for  which  we  must  appeal  to  the  testimony  of  mankind 
as  a  whole. 

The  ground  of  this  twofold  element  in  our  constitution, 
and  the  reconciliation  of  the  respective  claims  of  the  indi- 
vidual reason  and  the  common  sense  of  humanity,  is  easily 
explained,  when  we  take  into  account  the  distinction  which 
we  have  been  developing  between  the  logical  and  the  intui- 
tional consciousness.  It  will  be  readily  seen,  upon  a  little 
consideration,  that  the  logical  consciousness  is  stamped  with 
a  perfect  individualism,  the  intuitional  consciousness  with 

*  Vide  Pierre  Leroux  De  L'Humanite. 


LOGICAL    AND   INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  75 


an  equally  universal  or  generic  character.  The  logical 
consciousness,  as  we  have  shown,  is  formal ;  and  it  is  in 
those  branches  of  knowledge  which  turn  upon  formal  defini- 
tions, distinctions,  and  deductions  (such  as  mathematics  or 
logic),  that  we  feel  the  most  perfect  trust  in  the  certainty  of 
our  individual  conclusions.  The  understanding,  in  fact,  is 
framed  so  as  to  act  on  certain  principles,  which  we  may  term 
Jaws  of  thought  ;  and  whatever  knowledge  depends  upon  the 
simple  application  of  these  laws,  is  as  certain  and  infallible 
as  human  nature  can  possibly  make  it.  The  laws  of  thought 
(or,  in  other  words,  the  logical  understanding,)  present  a 
fixed  element  in  every  individual  man ;  so  that  the  testimony 
of  one  sound  mind  in  this  respect  is  as  good  as  a  thousand. 
Were  not  the  forms  of  reasoning,  indeed,  alike  for  all,  there 
could  be  no  longer  any  certain  communication  between  man 
and  man. 

The  intuitional  consciousness,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not 
formal,  but  material ;  and  in  gazing  upon  the  actual  elements 
of  knowledge,  our  perception  of  their  truth  in  all  its  fulness 
just  depends  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  intuitive  faculty  is 
awakened  and  matured.  The  science  of  music,  for  example, 
is  absolutely  the  same  for  every  human  understanding  ;  but 
the  real  perception  of  harmony,  upon  which  that  science 
depends  as  its  material  basis,  turns  entirely  upon  the  extent 
to  which  the  direct  sensibility  for  harmony  is  awakened. 
And  so  it  is  with  regard  to  every  other  subject  which 
involves  a  direct  element  of  supersensual  truth.  The 
intensity  with  which  we  realize  it  depends  upon  the  state  of 
our  intuitional  consciousness,  so  far  at  least  as  the  subject  in 
question  is  concerned.  Here  there  are  no  fixed  and  uniform 
laws  of  intellection,  as  in  the  logical  region,  but  a  progressive 
intensity  from  the  weakest  up  to  the  strongest  power  of 
spiritual  vision,  or  of  intellectual  sensibility. 

Such  then  being  the  case,  our  appeal  for  the  truthfulness 


76  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

of  our  direct  mental  intuitions  cannot  be  to  the  individual, 
but  to  mankind  at  large.  We  know  not  how  far  our  own 
individual  sensibility  may  be  awakened  ;  or  how  far.  if 
awakened,  it  may  be  imperfectly  purified,  so  as  to  see 
through  a  distorted  medium.  To  take  the  same  instance  as 
above,  our  confidence  in  the  real  excellence  and  beauty  of  a 
given  combination  of  musical  harmony  will  depend  not  only 
upon  its  pleasing  ourselves,  (for  there  may  be  conflicting 
associations  which  may  cause  it  to  produce  a  given  effect  in 
us  which  it  cannot  in  others,)  but  upon  its  appealing  to  the 
universal  sensibility  of  mankind.  This  is  the  real  test  of  its 
purity  and  its  beauty.  And  so  likewise  with  every  other 
point  of  knowledge  which  depends  upon  our  direct  intuitional 
consciousness.  Intuition  being  a  thing  not  formal,  but 
material — not  uniform,  but  varying — not  subject  to  rigid 
laws,  but  exposed  to  all  the  variations  of  association  and 
temperament ;  being  in  fact  the  function  of  humanity,  and 
not  of  the  individual  mind, — the  only  means  of  getting  at 
the  essential  elements  of  primary  intuitional  truth  is  to  grasp 
that  which  rests  on  the  common  sympathies  of  mankind  in 
its  historical  development,  after  all  individual  impurities 
and  idiosyncracies  have  been  entirely  stripped  away.  This 
brings  us  to  the  last  remark. — 

VI.  That  the  logical  consciousness  is  fixed,  through  all 
ages  ;  the  intuitional  consciousness  progressive. 

This  is  in  fact  a  direct  result  from  the  preceding  con- 
siderations. If  there  be  in  man  an  element  of  individualism,* 
that  is  to  say,  if  there  arejixed  laws  of  thought,  which  are 
virtually  the  same  in  every  man,  then  it  is  evident  that  these 

*  The  reader  must  be  careful  not  to  take  the  word  individualism 
here  as  implying  a  peculiarity  in  the  individual :  but  as  denoting  a 
principle  which  is  perfect  in  the  individual,  and  does  not  depend  on  the 
development  of  the  race. 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  77 

will  be  fixed  laws  also  for  every  age.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  a  "  sensus  communis"  which  can  be  realized  by 
gleaning  out  from  the  mass  of  conflicting  opinions  the 
deepest  experiences  of  mankind  ;  and  if  this  common  power 
of  intuition  be  really  the  function  of  humanity  as  a  whole  ; 
then  it  is  manifest,  that  as  mankind  on  the  whole  advances, 
and  marches  forward  to  its  destination,  this  generic  truth- 
organ  must  expand  proportionally. 

Now  if  the  Logical  consciousness  be  considered  in  relation 
to  history,  it  will  be  found  to  have  ever  retained  the  same 
form,  and  to  have  evinced  about  an  equal  intensity  in  every 
period.  The  laws  and  rules  of  formal  logic  are  exactly  the 
same  now  that  that  they  were  in  the  time  of  Aristotle ;  and 
the  application  of  them  to  any  class  of  facts  which  may  be 
known  to  each  age,  is  made  in  every  case  in  the  same 
manner,  and  much  about  to  the  same  degree.  Here  no 
progress  is  observable ;  the  diversity  of  logical  power  in 
different  ages  is  no  greater  than  what  may  be  found  among 
individuals  in  the  same  era.  But  if  we  turn  from  the 
logical  to  the  intuitional  consciousness,  here,  instead  of  a 
fixed  result,  we  find  a  perpetual  variation,  and,  regarding 
mankind  as  a  whole,  a  constant  progression.  In  one  country, 
for  instance,  we  find  the  musical  sensibility  greatly  in 
advance  ;  in  another,  the  perception  of  beauty  through  the 
eye  (as  was  the  case  antong  the  Greeks)  has  arrived  at  a 
high  degree  of  perfection ;  in  other  instances,  there  is  a 
peculiar  awakening  of  the  moral  or  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness ;  in  a  word,  whenever  we  find  our  direct  intuitions 
coming  into  operation,  there  we  find  a  kind  of  vital  develop- 
ment, not  confined  to  individual  minds,  but  flowing  generally 
through  the  consciousness  of  the  mass. 

In  this  intuitional  life,  moreover,  progress  is  as  essential 
as  in  every  other  kind  of  vitality.  Here  stagnation  indicates 
disease  and  decay ;  for  so  sure  as  man  was  created  for  an 


78  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

ultimate  end — so  sure  as  he  was  intended  to  arrive  at  ever 
higher  attainments  in  every  thing  g.reat  apd  good — must  his 
pathway  be  perpetually  upwards,  and  the  whole  sensibilities 
of  his  nature  come  more  and  more  into  harmony  with  the 
Divine  nature — with  the  life  of  God. 

In  realizing  the  distinction  we  have  now  portrayed 
between  the  two  great  modes  of  man's  intellectual  activity, 
we  must  caution  our  readers  not  to  confound  the  products 
of  the  intuitional  consciousness  with  the  fundamental  forms 
of  thought,  such  as  are  usually  described  in  a  table  of  the 
categories.  The  product  of  intuition  is  never  an  abstract, 
formal,  and  empty  notion  ;  it  is  precisely  the  reverse — 
namely,  a  direct  perception  of  some  actual  concrete  reality. 
By  means  of  the  logical  or  analytic  faculty,  we  never  see 
things  in  their  organic  unity  ;  we  merely  view  their  separate 
parts  abstractedly  considered,  and  seek  to  discover  the 
formal  consistency  which  runs  through  them.  By  intuition, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  view  truth  as  a  whole,  without  taking 
any  account  of  its  parts — without  noticing  the  forms  or 
categories  under  which  it  can  be  represented  to  us — without 
asking  after  the  logical  consistency  of  the  entire  phenomenon. 

An  objection,  perhaps,  here  arises,  that  if  intuition  be 
the  direct  presentation  of  truth  in  its  entire  concrete  reality, 
it  must  always  be  infallible  in  its  results.  This  objection 
leads  us  to  expound  the  connecttbn  of  the  intuitional  and 
logical  forms  of  intelligence  somewhat  more  closely.  Were 
our  intuitional  nature  absolutely  perfect,  then,  indeed,  its 
results  would  be  infallible.  If  we  imagine  our  minds  to  be 
perfectly  harmonized,  morally,  intellectually,  religiously, 
with  all  truth — if  we  can  imagine  them  without  any  discord 
of  the  interior  being,  to  stand  in  the  midst  of  a  universe  upon 
which  God  has  impressed  his  own  divine  ideas,  and  receive 
the  truth  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  consciousness,  just  as  the 
retina  receives  the  images  of  external  things — thru,  indeed, 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.        '        79 

we  should  comprehend  all  things  as  they  are  ;  and  the  mere 
manifestation  would  be  its  own  evidence  of  their  reality.  A 
mind  so  harmonized  with  nature  and  with  God,  would  per- 
ceive at  one  glance  the  processes  and  ends  of  all  things  ; 
just  as  Goethe,  without  the  labor  of  any  inductive  reasoning, 
saw  the  truth  of  the  metamorphosis  of  plants  ;  just  as  genius 
in  the  philosopher  grasps  the  hidden  analogies,  and  gives 
the  initiative  idea  upon  which  future  inductions  must  be 
grounded ;  just  as  a  high  spiritual  sensibility  feels  the 
reality  of  moral  and  religious  truth,  long  ere  it  is  verified  or 
logically  expounded. 

This  harmony  of  our  nature,  however,  has  been  dis- 
turbed ;  and  with  it  the  power  of  intuition  is  at  once 
diminished  and  rendered  uncertain.  The  reality  of  things, 
instead  of  picturing  itself,  as  it  were,  upon  the  calm  surface 
of  the  soul,  casts  its  reflection  upon  a  mind  disturbed  by 
evil,  by  passion,  by  prejudice,  by  a  thousand  other  in- 
fluences which  distort  the  image,  and  tend  to  efface  it  al- 
together. Hence,  in  proportion  to  the  inward  disorganiza- 
tion of  man's  moral  and  intellectual  being  as  a  whole,  will 
be  the  deficiency  and  divergency  of  his  intuitive  perceptions. 

Conscious  of  this  defect,  the  logical  faculty  comes  to  our 
aid.  Knowing,  as  we  do  too  well,  that  the  intuitions  we 
obtain  of  truth  in  its  concrete  unity  are  not  perfect,  we  seek 
to  restore  and  verify  that  truth  by  analysis,  i.  e.,  by  separa- 
ting it  into  its  parts,  viewing  each  of  those  parts  abstractedly 
by  itself,  and  finding  out  their  relative  consistency  so  as  to 
put  them  together  by  a  logical  and  reflective  construction, 
into  a  systematic  and  formal  whole.  Hence  the  impulse  to 
know  the  truth  aright  gives  perpetual  vitality  and  activity  to 
the  law  by  which  our  spontaneous  or  intuitional  life  passes 
over  into  the  logical  and  reflective.  Logical  reasoning  is 
the  result  of  human  imperfection  struggling  after  intellectual 
restoration.  In  the  defect  of  gazing  upon  truth  as  it  is,  by 


80  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

virtue  of  the  interior  harmony  of  our  whole  being  with  God, 
we  seek  a  substitute  by  applying  the  aids  of  analysis,  of 
formal  reasoning,  of  verification, — of  the  entire  logical  recon- 
struction of  our  whole  knowledge. 

Thus  the  very  rise  of  logical  analysis  implies  the  exist- 
ence of  intuition  ;  for  were  there  no  truth  dimly  perceived, 
there  would  be  no  impulse  to  restore  and  define  it ;  and  con- 
sequently, valuable  as  logical  processes  may  be,  they  cannot 
fill  the  place  or  perform  the  office  of  broad  and  vivid  per- 
ceptions. Hence  our  constant  effort  should  be,  if  we  would 
extend  our  knowledge  of  truth,  to  bring  our  nature  more  and 
more  into  mojjal  harmony  with  it ;  and  in  case  of  distrusting 
the  clearness  of  our  own  mental  eye,  we  should  appeal  to 
the  experience  of  others,  so  as  to  correct  the  imperfections 
or  distortions  of  our  individual  intuitions  by  the  conceptions 
of  their  perchance  more  highly  purified  minds.  More  espe- 
cially should  we  look  to  those  minds  whose  inward  harmony 
with  truth  has  become  perfected,  and  whose  power  of  spirit- 
ual vision  we  account  as  being  an  inspiration  from  the 
Almighty. 

The  connection  of  these  principles,  however,  with  the 
phenomena  of  genius,  of  inspiration,  of  religious  development, 
and  of  the  appeal  to  the  common  consciousness  of  mankind, 
we  must  reserve  until  they  are  taken  up  in  their  due  order. 
We  might  also  have  compared  the  views  here  given  with  the 
most  recent  and  profound  investigations  into  the  philosophy 
of  induction,  especially  with  those  maintained  by  Professor 
Whewell ;  but  this  we  shall  likewise  reserve  for  another 
place. 

We  have  simply  developed  what  appear  to  be  the  princi- 
pal points  of  distinction  between  our  logical  and  intuitional  fac- 
ulties. What  we  have  said,  we  have  said  very  briefly,  and 
much  remains  behind,  that  in  a  fuller  description  of  the  sub- 
ject might  well  find  a  place..  As  the  distinction  in  question  is 


LOGICAL    AND    INTUITIONAL    CONSCIOUSNESS.  81 

one  of  vital  importance,  not  only  in  comprehending  the  philo- 
sophy of  religion,  but  almost  all  the  intellectual  phenomena  of 
human  existence  likewise,  we  must  entreat  our  readers  to 
make  themselves  thoroughly  masters  of  the  subject,  by  test- 
ing it,  not  only  through  the  medium  of  the  illustrations  here 
offered,  but  through  the  personal  effort  of  their  own  minds. 
We  are  anxious  above  all  things  that  nothing  here  should  be 
taken  on  trust,  but  that  every  one  at  all  interested  in  the  con- 
clusions arrived  at  would  sift  them,  until  he  has  either  dis- 
covered their  error,  or  finds  that  his  convictions  are  drawn 
along  in  the  sequence. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ON    THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION. 

WE  have  now  laid  what  may  be  termed  the  philosophical 
groundwork  of  the  subject  before  us ;  that  is  to  say,  we  have 
given  a  brief  sketch  of  the  powers  and  faculties  of  the  human 
mind,  and  attempted  next  to  unfold  and  establish  the  dis- 
tinction between  those  two  great  forms  of  our  intellectual 
being,  upon  which  the  whole  discussion  respecting  the  sub- 
jective nature  of  religion  must  chiefly  turn.  With  the  points 
already  gained,  we  can  now  enter  with  some  advantage  upon 
the  fundamental  questions  involved  in  the  Philosophy  of  Re- 
ligion, properly  so  called  ;  and,  as  in  every  other  subject,  it 
is  the  office  of  a  true  analysis  to  separate  what  is  essential  to 
it  from  what  is  merely  accidental  or  adscititious,  so  here, 
likewise,  our  primary  object  must  be  to  discover  what  is  the 
peculiar  essence  of  Religion, 

Let  it  be  distinctly  understood  in  the  outset,  that  we  are 
speaking  of  religion  now  as  a  fact  or  phenomenon  in  human 
nature.  There  is  a  very  common,  but  a  very  loose  employ- 
ment of  the  term  religion,  in  which  it  is  made  to  designate 
the  outward  and  formal  principles  of  a  community,  quite 
independently  of  the  region  of  human  experience  ;  as  when 
we  speak  of  the  Protestant  religion,  the  religion  of  Moham- 
med, the  religions  of  India,  and  the  like.  The  mixing  up  of 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  83 

these  two  significations  in  a  philosophical  treatise,  cannot  fail 
to  give  rise  to  unnumbered  misunderstandings  ;  and  we  em- 
phatically repeat,  therefore,  that  in  our  present  use  of  the 
term,  we  are  not  intending  to  express  any  system  of  truth  or 
form  of  doctrine  whatever  ;  but  simply  an  inward  fact  of  the 
human  consciousness — a  fact,  too,  the  essential  nature  of 
which  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  us  to  discover. 

Universal  experience  assures  us  that  mankind  is  the  sub- 
ject of  an  inward  religious  life — or  of  a  peculiar  state  of  con- 
sciousness so  termed — which  impresses  itself  through  an 
infinite  variety  of  acts  and  forms  upon  the  outward  surface 
of  human  society.  The  temples  of  Heathenism,  the  mosque 
of  the  Mohammedan,  the  superstitions  of  the  ignorant,  the 
heavenly  aspirations  of  the  noble-minded,  all  alike  point  out 
a  consciousness  of  certain  spiritual  facts  and  duties,  which 
never  seem  to  be  entirely  obliterated  from  the  human  mind. 
A  little  consideration,  moreover,  shows  us,  that  there  is  some- 
thing peculiar  in  the  state  of  consciousness  designated  by  the 
term  religion,  which  is  not  contained  in  any  other  form  of 
inward  sentiment  or  activity.  Though  highly  elevating,  it 
differs  from  all  ordinary  enthusiasm  ;  though  intensely  stimu- 
lating, it  cannot  be  identified  with  any  of  the  common  im- 
pulses of  our  personal  or  social  life  ;  though  directing  and 
urging  often  to  the  highest  moral  action,  yet  it  stands  appa- 
rently quite  apart  from,  and  sometimes  even  in  contrast  with, 
the  moral  feelings ;  in  short,  it  has  an  element  of  its  own, 
which  throws  a  distinct  hue  over  every  thing  that  springs 
from  it  as  the  source.  Such,  then,  being  the  testimony  of 
daily  experience,  the  inquiry  naturally  follows,  what  is  the 
peculiar  essence  of  religion,  regarded  as  a  universal  pheno- 
menon of  human  nature  ?  What  is  the  precise  state  of  con- 
sciousness which  we  term,  in  contradistinction  from  every 
other,  the  religious  consciousness  ? 

The  first  point  to  be  settled  in  such  an  inquiry  is  this — 


84  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

whether  the  religious  element  in  man  is  something  communi- 
cated from  an  extrinsic  source,  or  whether  it  be  an  original 
element  of  his  nature  drawn  forth  and  modified,  as  the  case 
may  be,  by  outward  influences.  Those  who  are  accustomed 
only  to  view  mental  phenomena  in  their  actual,  without 
ascending  to  their  primitive  state,  and  who,  consequently, 
have  the  notion  of  religion  only  in  connection  with  a  distinc- 
tive system  of  doctrine  or  duty,  are  apt  to  look  upon  the  reli- 
gious element  in  man  as  being  altogether  adventitious.  A 
little  consideration,  we  apprehend,  is  sufficient  to  show  the 
fallacy  of  this  notion.  The  universality  of  the  tendency  to 
fear,  or  to  worship  the  spiritual,  in  some  form,  is  in  itself  a 
strong  proof  of  religion  (essentially  speaking)  being  an  origi- 
nal constituent  of  the  human  soul.  But,  apart  from  this, 
admitting  that  the  religious  life  is  first  awakened  by  means  of 
external  agencies,  admitting  that  it  manifests  itself  specifically, 
as  the  result  of  our  contact  either  with  direct  teaching,  or 
with  the  religious  life  as  existing  in  other  minds;  yet  still 
there  must  be  some  inward  faculty,  or  sensibility,  to  which 
these  outward  influences  appeal,  and  without  which  all  direct 
teaching,  and  all  the  power  of  example,  would  be  utterly 
inefficient.  As  we  could  never  be  taught  morality  without  a 
moral  sense  ;  as  all  moral  education,  on  the  contrary,  really 
consists  in  awakening  and  directing  what  is  already  poten- 
tially within  us ;  so  also  we  could  never  be  taught  religion 
by  any  external  appliances,  unless  there  were  some  inward 
susceptibility,  which  may  indeed  be  aroused  or  regulated  by 
discipline,  but  which  exists  as  a  primary  element  in  the  ori- 
ginal scheme  of  our  spiritual  nature.* 

*  This  has  been  so  often  and  so  clearly  insisted  upon  by  almost  all, 
who  have  investigated  the  subject  with  any  degree  of  philosophical 
acumen,  that  we  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  take  up  any  further  space 
in  the  illustration  of  it.  Nitzsch,  in  his  "  Christliche  Dogmatik,"  ex- 
presses himself  as  follows : — "  Obwohl  gesagt  werden  darf,  dass  der 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  85 

If,  then,  we  are  to  regard  the  religious  life  as  springing 
from  an  original  element  in  the  nature  of  man,  it  is  impor- 
tant next  to  inquire,  to  what  part  of  our  constitution  this  ori- 
ginal element  belongs  ?  If  the  reader  will  turn  back  to  our 
table  of  the  human  faculties,  as  given  in  the  first  chapter,  it 
will  be  seen,  that  there  are  just  three  great  and  fundamental 
forms  of  man's  inward  consciousness,  expressed  by  the  terms 
knowing,  willing,  feeling.  These  forms,  although  mingling 
up  in  every  possible  manner  with  each  other,  yet  are  found 
by  analysis  to  be  essentially  distinct.  The  mind  is  itself  a 
power,  or  pure  spontaneity  ;  and  this  spontaneous  activity, 
(in  which  its  personality  consists,)  mingles  up,  as  the  case 
may  be,  with  two  other  elements — that  of  intellection  on 
the  one  hand,  of  emotion  on  the  other.  Every  state  of 
consciousness  consists  in  some  way  of  these  elements ; 
and  every  simple  or  elementary  state  must  have  one  of  the 
three,  as  the  category  to  which  it  essentially  belongs.  If, 
then,  we  could  determine  to  which  of  these  generic  forms  of 
consciousness  religion,  subjectively  speaking,  belongs,  we 
should  have  made  some  definite  progress  towards  the  solution 
of  the  problem  before  us. 

Let  us  inquire,  then,  first — Whether  Religion  be  essen- 
tially any  form  of  knowing  ? 

The  earlier  and  Scholastic  Theologians  for  the  most  part 
answered  this  question  in  the  affirmative.  At  any  rate, 
as  they  had  no  idea  of  analyzing  the  phenomenon  into  its 
essence,  and  its  incidental  forms — as  they  regarded  religion 
more  in  the  light  of  something  adventitious,  derived  from  re- 
velation, or  instruction,  or  some  such  objective  source  ;  they 

• 

Mensch  durch  Wechselwirkung  des  Aiisseren,  und  Innern, — als  durch 
Erfahrung,  Offenbarung,  Lehre,  und  Uebcrlieferung  zur  Gotteserkenntniss 
erzogen  werde,  so  wJtre  doch  nichts  zu  erziehen,  und  zu  bilden  vorhanden, 
wenn  der  Erziehung  nicht  ein  Urspriinglicb.es  Gottesbewusstseyn  als 
wirksame  Anlage  vorausginge." 


86  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

naturally  placed  it  amongst  those  operations  of  the  mind, 
which  have  reference  to  the  perception  or  appreciation  of 
truth.  The  same  view,  with  certain  modifications,  has  been 
taken  by  most  of  the  Rationalistic  Theologians.  Though 
they  are  far  from  referring  religion  to  any  divine  or  superna- 
tural origin,  yet  they  commonly  place  its  essence  in  the 
power  we  have  of  knowing  God,  and  comprehending  his  attri- 
butes. Their  object  being  to  reduce  every  thing  to  rational 
or  logical  terms,  the  end  they  have  in  view  would  manifestly 
remain  unaccomplished,  so  long  as  the  primary  essence  of 
religion  itself  was  supposed  to  lie  without  the  region  of  the 
intellect. 

Some  of  these  theologians,  however,  regarding  both  feel- 
ing and  perception  (Gefuhl  and  Vorstellung)  as  a  lower  kind 
of  knowledge,  admit  that  there  may  be  a  lower  kind  of  reli- 
gion springing  from  them.  Hegel,  for  example,  argues,  that 
although  there  may  be  a  dim  and  indistinct  sense  of  Deity  in 
feeling,  and  although  there  may  be  a  somewhat  fuller  con- 
ception of  the  Divine  Being  by  a  direct  perception  or  mental 
representation  (Vorstellung),  yet  these  spontaneous  concep- 
tions can  neither  be  fixed  and  definite,  nor  ever  be  legiti- 
mately verified.  Such  a  result,  he  continues,  can  only  be 
obtained  by  logical  thinking  ;  for  thinking  alone  can  bring 
the  contents  of  the  human  consciousness  into  the  clear  light 
of  certitude  and  verified  truth.* 

Against  this  reasoning,  however,  we  may  urge, — that  we 
do  not  affirm  thinking,  and  that,  too,  of  a  strictly  logical 
kind,  to  be  unnecessary  or  useless  in  perfecting  our  religious 
nature ;  nay,  that  so  far  from  this,  every  faculty  we  possess 
may  contribute  to  it.  Each  power  or  susceptibility  of  the 
human  mind,  we  know,  is  rendered  more  complete  by  the  co- 
operation and  support  of  all  the  rest,  without  at  the  same 

*  See  Hegel's  Religions-Philosophic.     Vol.  I. 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  87 

time  giving  up  its  own  essential  character,  or  losing  that  cen- 
tral point  of  difference  which  separates  it  from  all  other 
mental  phenomena.  Admitting,  therefore,  that  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  logical  understanding  is  necessary  to  the  full  de- 
velopment of  the  inward  religious  life,  yet  there  may  be 
some  other  state  of  consciousness  in  which  it  essentially  con- 
sists, and  which  we  ought  to  understand  aright  in  order  to 
find  the  starting  point  of  our  whole  theory.  If  religion  can 
exist  at  all  without  the  co-operation  of  logical  thinking,  pro- 
perly so  called,  as  Hegel  in  a  subordinate  sense  admits,  then 
its  essential  germ  must  be  looked  for  in  some  other  region  of 
our  mental  constitution. 

That  this  conclusion  is  coincident  with  the  actual  facts  of 
the  case,  is  rendered  practically  evident  by  the  consideration, 
that  the  measure  of  our  knowledge,  even  on  Divine  things, 
can  never  be  taken  as  the  measure  of  our  religion.  Did 
religion  consist  essentially  in  knowledge,  then  it  must  exactly 
follow  the  developments  of  knowledge  in  the  human  mind ; 
so  far  at  least  as  our  knowledge  is  conversant  with  religious 
objects.  This  is,  however,  by  no  means  the  case.  Nothing 
is  more  evident  than  the  fact,  that  there  may  be  many  grada- 
tions of  religious  intensity  in  men,  whose  amount  of  know- 
ledge is  as  nearly  as  possible  identical ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  that  there  may  be  about  an  equal  manifestation  of  re- 
ligious intensity  where  the  degrees  of  knowledge  are  im- 
mensely at  variance.  All  this  tends  to  show  us,  that  although 
the  co-operation  of  knowledge  may  be  necessary  to  the  per- 
fection of  our  religious  life,  yea,  and  in  a  subordinate  sense, 
to  its  very  existence,  yet  there  is  some  phenomenon,  lying 
without  the  region  of  what  we  may  term  intellectual  activity, 
in  which  religion  is  really  cradled,  and  the  measure  of  which 
shall  exactly  determine  the  measure  of  our  piety  towards 
God.* 

*  See  Schleiermacher's  Dogmatik.     Chap.  I.,  sec.  1. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


Inferring,  then,  from  the  foregoing  considerations,  that 
religion  cannot  be  a  form  of  pure  intellection,  we  proceed  to 
inquire  next —  Whether  it  can  consist  essentially  in  action  ? 
The  superficial  and  degrading  idea  that  religion  consists  in 
the  mere  external  performance  of  certain  duties,  can  hardly 
merit  the  serious  attention  of  any  reflective  mind.  No  out- 
ward actions  can  possibly  answer  to  the  most  feeble  notion 
we  possess  of  real  piety  ;  for  we  invariably  look  beneath  the 
outward  phenomena  to  the  spiritual  life  within,  before  we 
pronounce  upon  the  religious  attributes  of  any  agent  what- 
ever. And  if  we  take  the  term  action  in  an  inward  and 
spiritual  sense,  yet  it  only  presents  to  us  the  aspect  of  a 
blind  and  indeterminate  energy,  until  it  is  regulated  and  di- 
rected by  some  specific  purpose  or  feeling.  Action,  then,  as 
action,  cannot  be  religious  ;  it  only  becomes  so  when  we 
show  that  it  springs  from  a  religious  impulse  or  emotion. 
The  measure  of  our  mere  activity,  whether  external  or  in- 
ternal, can  never  be  the  measure  of  our  religious  intensity ; 
it  is  activity  in  some  particular  form  which  alone  can  deter- 
mine it.  The  essence  of  religion,  accordingly,  cannot  con- 
sist in  the  activity  itself,  for  that  is  indifferent  to  the  question ; 
but  in  the  peculiar  element,  whatever  that  may  be,  which 
influences  our  activity  so  as  to  direct  it  towards  the  Infinite 
and  the  Divine.  Now  it  is  an  almost  universally  acknow- 
ledged axiom  in  psychology,  that  the  principles  of  action  (those 
which  give  aim  and  direction  to  all  our  energies)  are  the 
feelings  or  emotions,  which  on  that  account  have  been  fre- 
quently called  the  active,  in  opposition  to  the  intellectual 
powers.  We  may  conclude,  therefore,  even  by  the  rules  of 
the  disjunctive  syllogism,  that  the  essence  of  religion  belongs 
to  that  class  of  phenomena  which  we  term  emotional. 

This  conclusion,  we  find  upon  due  consideration,  is  borne 
out  by  the  very  same  kind  of  reasoning  by  which  the  other 
cases  were  rejected.  Neither  intelligence  nor  activity, 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  89 

viewed  alone,  can  become  the  measure  of  our  religion ;  but 
there  are  certain  forms  of  emotion  which  can  readily  become 
so.  If,  for  example,  we  could  find  some  determined  form  of 
emotion,  which  causes  all  our  thoughts,  desires,  actions — in 
a  word,  our  whole  interior  and  exterior  life  to  tend  upwards 
towards  God  as  their  great  centre  and  source,  we  should 
have  little  hesitation  in  saying  that  such  an  emotion  would 
precisely  measure  the  true  religious  intensity  of  our  being, 
and  little  hesitation  in  fixing  there  the  central  point — the 
veritable  essence  of  religion  itself. 

The  most  able  and  earnest  thinkers  of  modern  times, 
who  have  attempted  to  solve  the  problem  now  before  us, 
have  in  fact  almost  universally  considered  the  essential  ele- 
ment of  religion  to  consist  in  some  of  the  infinite  develop- 
ments of  feeling.  We  shall  adduce  two  of  them  as  examples. 
Jacobi,  who  was  one  of  the  first  to  see  the  full  worth  and 
signification  of  feeling  in  the  domain  of  philosophy,  defines 
religion  to  be  "  A  faith,  resting  upon  feeling,  in  the  reality 
of  the  supersensual  and  ideal."  The  other  author  to  whom 
we  refer  is  Schleiermacher,  than  whom  no  man  has  ever 
pursued  with  greater  penetration  of  mind  and  earnestness 
of  spirit  the  pathway  of  a  Divine  philosophy  ;  and  he  places 
the  essence  of  religion  in  the  absolute  feeling  of  dependence, 
and  of  a  conscious  relationship  to  God,  originating  immedi- 
ately from  it.*  All  our  former  considerations,  accordingly, 
as  well  as  the  great  weight  of  authority  amongst  the  best 
analysts,  lead  us  to  place  the  primitive  and  essential  element 
of  religion  in  the  region  of  human  emotion. 

The  term  emotion  is  altogether  generic.  If  religion  be 
essentially  speaking  an  emotion  of  the  mind,  then  it  must  be 
an  emotion  possessing  some  peculiar  and  distinctive  charac- 
ter. In  order  to  arrive  at  a  definition  of  religion,  we  must 

Dogmatik.     Chap.  I.,  sec.  4. 
5* 


90  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

specify  the  differentia  as  well  as  the  genus ;  that  is,  we 
must  not  only  identify  it  with  the  phenomena  called  emo- 
tional, but  we  must  point  out  the  specific  nature  of  the 
emotion  in  question. 

The  analysis  of  this  point  will  oblige  us  to  penetrate 
somewhat  deeper  than  we  have  yet  done  into  the  nature  of 
the  human  consciousness. 

By  all  who  have  made  the  fundamental  questions  of 
mental  philosophy  a  matter  of  close  investigation,  it  is  well 
understood  that  in  every  possible  state  of  the  human  con- 
sciousness there  are  two  elements  necessarily  involved — the 
subject  and  the  object.  Be  the  form  of  consciousness  what 
it  may,  yet  there  must  ever  be  self,  the  personal  percipient, 
on  the  one  side,  and  some  object  or  other  to  which  the  mind's 
attention  is  directed  standing  in  opposition.  Even  should 
our  attention  be  directed  to  purely  internal  and  mental  phe- 
nomena, still,  even  in  these  cases,  there  is  a  plain  distinction 
between  mind  as  subject  and  mind  as  object — between  the 
inward  subject  perceiving  and  the  inward  object  perceived. 

This  law  is  not  confined  to  any  particular  class  of  mental 
phenomena ;  it  is  equally  valid  in  every  possible  case. 
Every  form  of  intelligence  manifestly  supposes  it ;  for  there 
must  always  be  the  knowing  and  the  known,  the  thinking 
and  the  thought.  In  fact,  every  form  of  intelligence  involves 
the  attempt  to  bring  the  nature  and  attributes  of  some  object 
home  to  the  subject — self,  and  unite  them  in  the  harmony  of 
a  direct  consciousness.  On  the  contrary,  every  form  of 
action  implies  the  effort  to  impress  our  own  subjective  energy 
upon  some  outward  object.  Intelligence  seeks  to  bring 
every  thing  to  the  centre  of  self,  and  place  it  before  the  eye 
of  the  percipient — action  seeks  to  diffuse  the  energy  of  the 
subject  over  the  whole  or  some  portion  of  the  objective 
world. 

The  same  law  which   we  see  to  pervade  the  regions  of 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  91 

thought  and  action,  pervades  equally  the  region  of  emotion. 
Every  emotion  presupposes  a  mind  aroused  or  excited,  and  an 
object  arousing  and  exciting  it ;  and  on  examining  atten- 
tively the  phenomena  of  the  case,  we  find  that  there  is  a 
highly  fluctuating  proportion  between  the  energy  of  the  subject 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  influence  of  the  object  on  the  other. 
Wherever  the  energy  of  the  subject  predominates,  the 
emotion  is  one  of  freedom — wherever  the  influence  of  the 
object  predominates,  the  emotion  is  one  of  passive  suscepti- 
bility ;  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  of  dependence  upon  some- 
thing beyond  ourselves.  In  the  impetuous  passions,  in  the 
energetic  emotions,  in  those  strong  affections  which  concen- 
trate the  power  of  the  human  will  upon  the  attainment  of 
some  desired  end,  we  have  examples  of  emotion  in  which 
the  sense  of  freedom  is  uppermost ;  while  in  the  relation  of 
a  child  to  its  parent — of  a  subject  to  a  sovereign — and  in 
other  states  of  feeling  springing  from  similar  circumstances, 
we  see  examples  of  emotion  where  the  sense  of  dependence 
is  predominant. 

In  the  ordinary  flow  of  human  life,  our  emotions  are 
almost  always  various  combinations  of  these  two  generic 
feelings.  The  subject  and  object,  the  sense  of  freedom  and 
dependence,  vary  and  interchange  with  each  other.  There 
is  an  action  and  a  reaction  ever  going  on,  in  which  some- 
times the  subjective  side  appears  to  be  in  the  ascendency, 
sometimes  the  objective  ;  while  frequently  there  is  well-nigh 
a  balance  of  the  two  influences,  which  leaves  the  mind  in  a 
stale  of  calm  repose  between  them. 

There  are,  however,  two  particular  relations  of  the 
subject  and  the  object  in  the  region  of  emotion,  to  which 
especial  attention  needs  now  to  be  directed ;  and  these 
occur  when  the  influence  of  the  one  over  the  other  ap- 
proaches to  an  extreme  degree  in  its  own  direction.  These 
relations  can  only  be  rightly  understood  under  the  notion  of 


92  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

polarity.  In  proportion  as  the  subjective  pole  comes  into 
greater  ascendency,  the  objective  pole  diminishes  in  the 
intensity  of  its  influence,  and  vice  versa,  so  that  as  one 
approaches  the  limit  of  infinity  the  other  approaches  that  of 
zero.  There  are  periods  of  human  emotion  when  the  will 
— the  sense  of  freedom  —  seems  almost  omnipotent  ;  when 
human  nature  becomes  actively  and  determinately  selfish  in 
all  its  aims,  and  imperious  in  all  its  demands ;  when  man 
would,  if  he  were  able,  make  himself  a  God,  and  render  the 
personal  subject  absolute  over  every  thing  in  the  universe 
beside.  This  entire  self-deification,  however,  is  a  moral 
paradox,  which  man  has  too  much  conscious  weakness  to 
imagine,  except  under  a  momentary  state  of  infatuated 
delusion.  In  other  words,  the  absolute  sense  of  freedom  is 
to  a  human  being  impossible  ;  God  alone  can  possess  it ;  for 
in  him  only  the  absoluteness  of  the  subject  can  become  con- 
sciously realized. 

With  regard  to  the  sense  of  dependence,  however,  the 
case  is  far  otherwise.  Although  man,  while  in  the  midst  of 
finite  objects,  always  feels  himself  to  a  certain  extent  inde- 
pendent and  free ;  yet  in  the  presence  of  that  which  is  self- 
existent,  infinite  and  eternal,  he  may  feel  the  sense  of  freedom 
utterly  pass  away  and  become  absorbed  in  the  sense  of 
absolute  dependence.  Accordingly,  while  an  absolute  sense 
of  freedom  is  to  a  finite  creature  impossible,  yet  an  absolute 
sense  of  dependence  is  strictly  in  accordance  with  man's 
being  and  relations  in  the  universe.  Let  the  relation  of 
subject  and  object  in  the  economy  of  our  emotions  become 
such  that  the  whole  independent  energy  of  the  former  merges 
into  the  latter  as  its  prime  cause  and  present  sustainer  ;  let 
the  subject  become  as  nothing — not,  indeed,  from  its  intrinsic 
insignificance  or  incapacity  of  moral  action,  but  by  virtue  of 
the  infinity  of  the  object  to  which  it  stands  consciously  opposed ; 


THE    PECULIAR   ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  93 

and   the  feeling  of  dependence  must  become  absolute  ;  for 
all  finite  power  is  as  nothing  in  relation  to  the  Infinite. 

The  absolute  feeling  of  dependence,  then,  arises,  accord- 
ing to  the  foregoing  remarks,  in  connection  with  that  state  of 
the  emotional  consciousness  in  which  our  subjective  self 
stands  opposed  to  an  absolute  object ;  and  what  object  is  or 
can  be  absolute  but  the  Infinite  Being  himself — God — the 
self-existent,  self-dependent,  and  eternal  ?  Such  a  feeling 
of  dependence,  therefore,  as  we  have  described,  involves  in 
it  virtually  the  sense  of  Deity  ;  it  expresses  a  moment  of  the 
consciousness  in  which  we  have  transcended  all  finite  exist- 
ences, and  have  reached  the  conception  of  what  is  absolute 
— a  moment  in  which  we  have  come  to  the  farthermost  verge 
of  secondary  causes,  and  stand  in  view  of  the  great  first 
cause,  the  eternal  power — a  moment  in  which  we  think  not 
of  the  subordinate  ends  of  human  life,  but  place  ourselves  in 
relation  to  that  great  end  for  which  all  things  were  made, 
and  towards  which  all  things  are  tending. 

These  considerations  give  us  a  safe  clue  to  the  solution  of 
the  problem  we  have  now  before  us, — to  determine,  namely, 
the  precise  mode  of  feeling  in  which  religion  essentially  con- 
sists. Let  us  recapitulate  the  steps  and  draw  the  conclu- 
sions. Every  state  of  consciousness  involves  in  it  the  oppo- 
sition of  subject  and  object :  in  the  emotions,  the  predomi- 
nance of  the  subject  gives  a  sense  of  freedom,  the  predomi- 
nance of  the  object  a  sense  of  dependence.  On  the  side  of 
freedom,  our  feelings  cannot  reach  the  infinite,  for  the  sub- 
ject, self,  is  always  circumscribed.  On  the  side  of  depend- 
ence, however,  we  can  reach  the  sphere  of  infinity ;  for  the 
moment  our  consciousness  attains  that  elevation  in  which  our 
finite  self  becomes  nothing  in  the  presence  of  infinity,  eter- 
nity, and  omnipotence,  the  accompanying  state  of  emotion  is 
one  which  involves  an  absolute  object ;  and  such  an  emotion 
must  be  equivalent  to  a  sense  of  Deity.  Hence  we  infer  that 


94  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  essential  germ  of  the  religious  life  is  concentrated  in  the 
absolute  feeling  of  dependence — a  feeling  which  implies  no- 
thing abject,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  high  and  hallowed  sense 
of  our  being  inseparably  related  to  Deity — of  our  being  parts 
of  his  great  plan — of  our  being  held  up  in  his  vast  embrace 
—of  our  being  formed  for  some  specific  destiny,  which,  even 
amidst  the  subordinate  and  finite  pursuits  of  life,  must  ever 
be  kept  in  view  as  the  goal  of  our  whole  being. 

In  describing  this  absolute  sense  of  dependence,  as  con- 
taining the  essential  element  of  religion,  we  do  not  mean 
that  this  alone,  without  the  co-operation  of  the  other  faculties, 
would  give  rise  to  the  religious  life.  To  do  this  there  must 
be  intelligence — there  must  be  activity — there  must  be,  in 
short,  all  the  other  elements  of  human  nature.  But  what 
we  mean  is  this — that  the  sense  of  dependence  accompanying 
all  our  mental  operations  gives  them  the  peculiar  hue  of 
piety.  Thinking  alone  cannot  be  religious ;  but  thinking, 
accompanied  by  a  sense  of  dependence  on  the  infinite  reason 
is  religious  thought.  Activity  alone  cannot  be  religious ; 
but  activity  carried  on  under  a  sense  of  absolute  dependence 
upon  infinite  power  is  religious  action.  In  a  word,  it  is  this 
peculiar  mode  of  feeling  pervading  all  our  powers,  faculties, 
and  inward  phenomena,  which  gives  them  a  religious  charac- 
ter ;  so  that  we  may  correctly  say  that  the  essence  of  reli- 
gion lies  exactly  here. 

The  absolute  sense  of  dependence,  unaccompanied  by 
the  other  elements  of  human  nature,  would  give  the  analogue 
to  religion  as  seen  in  man,  but  not,  humanly  speaking,  reli- 
gion itself.  The  faithful  dog  often  exhibits  perfect  depend- 
ence on  his  master ;  and  we  may  say  by  way  of  comparison, 
that  man  is  the  dog's  deity — that  his  perfect  confidence  in 
man  is  the  dog's  religion  ;  but  here  the  feeling  of  depend- 
ence cannot  be  religion  in  the  human  sense  ;  because  it  is 
not  developed  in  a  human  mind.  The  child  exhibits  perfect 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  95 

dependence  on  the  parent,  and  that  is  the  infant's  religion — 
a  quality  which  was  even  denominated  "pietas"  by  the 
Romans.  But  it  is  when  the  earthly  parent  is  known  not  to 
be  absolute,  and  the  heavenly  parent  alone  occupies  this 
place  in  the  opening  consciousness  of  the  child,  that  the  piety 
of  parental  confidence  becomes  piety  properly  so  called — 
piety  towards  God. 

The  ignorant  heathen  makes  his  idol  the  absolute  power ; 
and  trusts  implicitly  to  it.  Such  an  absolute  dependence 
upon  a  fetish  or  an  image,  as  far  as  it  is  a  genuine  experience, 
is  essentially  religion  ;  but  it  is  religion  in  a  degraded  form  ;  it 
is  the  holy  confidence  which  we  have  to  render  to  God  alone, 
concentrated  upon  some  insentient,  perhaps  upon  some  dis- 
gusting object.  All  this  tends  to  show  us,  that  while  the  reli- 
gious capacity,  or  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence,  be- 
longs to  man  as  man — while  we  may  say  that  it  is  a  univer- 
sal and  necessary  element  in  our  nature — yet  religion  as 
unfolded  into  a  life,  a  life  of  elevated  piety,  belongs  only  to  a 
more  mature  condition  of  human  development.  There  may 
be  an  absolute  sense  of  dependence  experienced  in  connection 
with  a  very  low  condition  of  the  intellectual  and  moral 
nature ;  which  is  only  saying  that  there  may  be  a  very  im- 
perfect and  degraded  form  of  religion,  as  well  as  a  high  and 
holy  one.  The  purity,  the  excellence,  the  real  elevation  of 
the  religious  life,  will  depend  mainly  upon  the  intuition  we 
have  of  the  absolute  object  on  which  we  depend,  and  towards 
which  all  our  thoughts,  energies,  and  hopes  are  directed. 

This  leads  us  to  the  last  point  we  have  to  elucidate  in 
determining  the  nature  of  religion.  We  have  already  shown 
that  it  belongs  to  the  class  of  mental  phenomena  termed  emo- 
tional— and  that  the  specific  nature  of  the  emotion  is  one  in- 
volving a  sense  of  absolute  dependence.  We  have  now  to 
determine  the  grounds  on  which  the  absolute  sense  of  depend- 
ence should  give  rise,  as  we  find  that  it  does,  to  so  many  dif- 


96  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

ferent  modes  of  religious  development  in  man,  and  to  show 
what  are  the  conditions  under  which  it  produces  a  pure  and 
elevated  form  of  the  religious  life. 

To  throw  some  light  upon  these  points,  let  it  be  observed, 
that  the  sense  of  dependence  may  attach  itself  to  the  objects 
discernible  by  any  one  of  the  different  forms  of  the  human 
consciousness ;  and  according  to  what  these  objects  are,  will 
give  rise  to  a  very  different  development  of  the  religious  life. 
In  fact  it  seems  probable  that  we  may  find  in  this  principle  a 
clue  to  the  interpretation  of  the  different  kinds  of  religion 
which  have  severally  appeared  in  the  history  of  mankind. 

The  lowest  stage  of  the  human  consciousness  is  that 
which  is  conversant  simply  with  sensations  and  instincts. 
The  only  religious  feeling  which  could  attach  itself  to  such  a 
sphere  of  mental  activity,  is  a  dim  and  undefined  sense  of 
dependence,  such  as  we  see  in  the  confidence  and  repose  of 
the  infant  upon  parental  care  and  tenderness.  Such  an  in- 
stinctive confidence  we  may  regard  as  the  first  bud  of  feeling, 
out  of  which  the  religious  emotions  gradually  germinate. 
We  should,  indeed,  hardly  call  it  religious,  but  simply  say 
that  such  a  feeling  in  the  babe  is  the  analogue  of  religious 
trust  in  the  man. 

The  perceptive  consciousness,  to  which  we  next  advance, 
is  that  in  which  the  mind  entirely  absorbs  itself  in  the  con- 
templation of  outward  objects.  It  may  be  regarded,  there- 
fore, as  a  state  of  mind  in  which  external  nature  exerts  the 
predominant  influence  over  the  whole  man.  An  absolute 
feeling  of  dependence  upon  nature  will  clearly  give  rise  to  a 
form  of  religious  consciousness  in  which  man  will  idolize 
visible  objects  or  phenomena,  and  concentrate  upon  them 
his  highest  confidence.  In  the  most  degraded  condition  of 
human  life,  the  mind,  not  elevated  enough  to  feel  the  beauty 
of  nature  at  large,  merely  grovels  amidst  individual  objects; 
and  as  it  has  no  sense  of  any  thing  higher  than  these,  the 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  97 

trust  natural  to  man  in  all  states  of  his  being  clings  to  such 
objects  as  though  they  had  a  mysterious  power  over  his 
whole  destiny.  Such  is  fetishism,  the  very  lowest  form  of 
religious  feeling  that  develops  itself  in  actual  worship. 

As  the  mind  rises  above  the  influence  of  individual 
objects,  and  converses  more  widely  with  nature,  then  the 
elements  themselves — the  principles  out  of  which  all  things 
are  formed, — are  regarded  as  the  primitive  and  absolute 
powers.  Hence  the  worship  of  the  earth,  of  the  winds,  of 
fire,  of  light— of  all  the  more  sublime  objects  which  strike 
the  senses.  And  as  the  reflective  faculties  become  suffi- 
ciently awakened  to  imagine  the  existence  of  invisible 
powers,  which  act  in  and  through  the  elements  of  nature, 
gradually  the  mountains  and  plains,  the  ocean,  and  the 
heavens,  become  peopled  with  a  whole  hierarchy  of  deities, 
upon  which  all  the  arrangements  of  human  life  are  supposed 
dependent.  Of  this  kind  is  the  religion  which  springs  from 
the  predominance  of  the  perceptive  faculty ;  and  history 
itself  shows  us,  that  so  long  as  man  converses  mainly  with 
nature,  such  results  as  I  have  described  are  uniformly  pro- 
duced. 

We  come  next  to  the  logical  consciousness  ;  and  have 
now  to  inquire  what  development  of  the  religious  life  will 
answer  to  the  predominance  of  this  form  of  our  mental 
activity.  The  peculiarity  of  the  logical  consciousness,  as  we 
have  abundantly  shown,  is  this — that  the  knowledge  with 
which  it  is  conversant  is  mediate  and  representative,  instead 
of  being,  like  that  of  perception  and  intuition,  immediate  and 
presentative ;  that  it  is  abstract,  while  the  latter  is  concrete. 

Accordingly,  the  religion  which  answers  to  this  state  of 
the  intellectual  life  will  be  the  religion  which  attaches  itself 
to  abstract  ideas.  Let  us  explain  ourselves.  The  external 
objects  of  perception,  when  they  come  under  the  analysis  of 
the  logical  faculty,  are  transformed  from  concrete  realities 


98  PHILOSOPHY    OF    KELIGION. 

into  aggregations  of  qualities.  The  attributes  of  nature  thus 
become  abstracted  from  the  visible  order  of  things  around 
us ;  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  are  then  attributed  to 
these  metaphysical  conceptions ;  and  the  life  of  man  is  at 
length  regarded  as  being  dependent  upon  qualities  which, 
having  been  first  abstracted,  are  finally  personified  and 
worshipped. 

In  the  same  manner  are  human  attributes  also  seized 
upon,  by  a  similar  process  of  logical  analysis,  and  the  great 
and  bolder  qualities  of  mankind  referred  to  some  impersona- 
tion from  whom  they  were  imagined  to  emanate.  Thus,  in 
the  Greek  and  Roman  mythology,  we  find  the  constant 
deification  of  wisdom,  power,  love,  peace,  war,  and  other 
similar  abstract  ideas.  In  fact,  let  the  development  of  the 
human  consciousness  be  in  such  a  stage,  that  the  mere  de- 
pendence upon  external  objects  perceived  or  supposed  has 
passed  by,  and  the  clear  realization  of  abstract  ideas  or 
attributes  has  succeeded  ;  let  these  attributes  become,  as  it 
were,  the  moving  powers  both  of  nature  and  man ;  let  them 
finally  become  personified  by  the  activity  of  an  ever  fertile 
imagination ;  and  you  will  have  man's  sense  of  dependence 
— man's  religious  nature — throwing  itself,  as  it  were,  upon 
these  abstractions,  and  worshipping  them  as  its  gods. 

It  is  not,  however,  in  the  regions  of  polytheism  alone, 
that  the  religion  of  the  logical  consciousness  has  the  oppor- 
tunity of  developing  itself.  It  will  sometimes  gain  considera- 
ble predominance  even  in  the  purest  system  of  monotheistic 
worship.  Christianity  itself  is  too  often  reduced  to  a  system 
built  upon  mere  logical  terms ;  and  many  a  man  in  whom 
the  higher  intuitions  of  the  New  Testament  have  never  been 
awakened,  yet  confidently  frames  a  deity  for  himself  out  of 
the  abstract  ideas  of  omnipotence,  omniscience,  justice, 
mercy,  &c.,  and  bids  the  wants  of  his  religious  nature  to 
satisfy  themselves  at  the  shrine  of  this  inward  idol.  To 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  99 


many  the  term  idol  may  sound  harsh  as  applied  to  such 
conceptions ;  but  in  fact,  the  result  of  a  merely  logical  pro- 
cess can  be  nothing  else.  The  men  who  deal  so  freely  with 
mere  abstract  ideas,  and  have  no  higher  intuitions  of  the 
Infinite  and  the  Divine,  do,  in  truth,  but  create  an  imaginary 
idol  for  themselves  to  worship.  Just  according  to  the  tem- 
perament of  their  own  minds,  they  put  together  a  greater  or 
less  proportion,  and  a  superior  or  inferior  degree  of  benevo- 
lence, of  justice,  of  sternness,  of  omniscience,  &c.,  and  out  of 
these  logical  compounds  they  create  the  conception  of  a 
being,  which  subsequently  gives  a  coloring  to  their  whole 
religious  life.  No  two  men,  in  fact,  who  depend  upon  such 
logical  processes  for  their  conceptions  of  the  Divinity, 
worship  the  same  God ;  and  all  of  them,  alas !  worghip  a 
very  different  one  from  the  true  and  living  God,  who  reveals 
himself  not  to  the  understanding,  but  only  to  the  inward  faith 
of  the  human  soul.  We  repeat,  therefore,  that  to  compound 
a  deity  out  of  logical  abstractions,  and  then  to  set  up  this 
mental  representation  as  the  supreme  object  of  religious 
worship,  is  idolatry  of  a  most  subtle  and  often  pernicious 
kind.  What  matter  whether  we  make  a  representation  of 
wood  or  stone,  or  a  representation  of  empty  abstractions,  the 
one  is  no  more  the  Jiving  God  than  the  other ;  and  the  idolatry 
of  the  former  kind  is  hardly  less  deadening  to  the  pure  re- 
ligious sensibilities  of  our  nature  than  is  that  of  the  latter. 

That  the  asserted  impossibility  of  attaining  the  real  con- 
ception of  the  Divine  Being  by  logical  processes  is  correct, 
not  only  follows  from  the  analysis  we  have  before  given  of 
the  nature  of  this  faculty,  but  is  proved  experimentally  by 
the  professed  efforts  which  have  been  made  formally  to  de- 
duce the  Infinite  by  such  means.  From  Spinoza  downwards 
the  attempt  to  ground  a  natural  theology  upon  logic  alone  has 
ended  in  a  purely  pantheistic  or  an  equally  empty  result. 
Nor  is  that  result  unnatural.  Carry  out  the  principle  of 


100  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

constructing  your  notions  of  Deity  upon  abstract  ideas,  and 
God  becomes  synonymous  with  the  absolute  idea,  or  perhaps 
with  the  logical  process  of  developing  it,  as  we  see  in  certain 
of  the  prevailing  pantheisms  of  modern  Germany.  Hegelian- 
ism,  in  fact,  is  the  uttermost  effort  of  pure  logic  in  search  of 
the  Absolute  and  Divine.  It  has  shown  marvellously  what 
logic  can  do  ;  but  it  has  also  shown  what  it  cannot  ;  and  from 
the  culminating  point  to  which  that  philosophy  brought  the 
rationalistic  tendency,  the  unsatisfied  spirit  of  humanity  turns 
sympathetically  to  a  faith  that  is  higher  than  knowledge ; 
yea,  and  which  also  lies  at  the  very  basis  of  it  all. 

We  enter  now,  lastly,  the  sphere  of  the  intuitional  con- 
sciousness, and  wait  to  see  what  are  the  objects,  around 
which  the  religious  emotions  can  here  gather.  Intuition,  as 
we  saw  in  a  previous  chapter,  gives  us  the  material  which 
the  logical  faculty  works  and  moulds  into  a  reflective  or  sci- 
entificybrm.  Its  province  is  to  bring  us  into  immediate  con- 
tact with  concrete  truth,  to  strip  away  mere  minor  determi- 
nations, and  point  us  to  the  unity  of  all  things  in  their  real 
essential  nature.  The  great  spheres  to  which  our  intuitions 
are  directed,  are  those  of  the  beautiful,  the  good,  and  the  true, 
— and  corresponding  to  these  are  three  classes  of  emotions, 
the  aesthetical,  the  moral,  and  those  hitherto  unnamed  heavings 
of  the  spirit,  when  it  contemplates  the  awful  majesty  and 
immensity  of  Being — pure  eternal  Being. 

In  this  sphere  of  thought  and  feeling  we  see  at  once,  that 
the  sense  of  dependence  will  find  more  congenial  objects 
around  which  it  can  cling.  The  beautiful,  the  good,  the 
true,  are  indeed  but  three  different  pathways,  by  which  we 
strive  to  rise  upwards  to  the  Infinite.  Never  does  the  actual 
beauty  we  behold  reach  the  pure  ideal  for  which  we  long, 
never  do  the  virtues  and  perfections  of  earth  realize  the  moral 
purity  which  we  conceive  as  residing  in  the  centre  and  source 
of  all  goodness  ;  and,  in  our  loftier  moments  of  contemplation, 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  101 

we  seem  well  nigh  to  stand  upon  the  verge  of  infinity,  and 
gaze,  though  not  fixedly,  upon  the  Eternal  True — upon  Being, 
in  its  essence,  its  unity,  its  self-existent  eternity.  In  presence 
of  such  objects,  the  feeling  of  dependence  is  drawn  forth  into 
holy  and  tender  resignation.  To  give  ourselves  up  to  the 
love  of  the  beautiful,  the  good,  the  true — to  feel  ourselves 
shielded,  protected,  inspired,  and  encompassed  by  their  eter- 
nal laws,  this  is  the  first  development  of  religion  in  its  purer 
and  nobler  form. 

Within  the  region  of  ordinary  intuition,  however,  the  reli- 
gious feelings  have  scope  for  considerable  variations ;  each 
sphere  of  emotion  giving  rise  to  a  different  development  of 
them.  In  some  cases  the  aesthetic  emotions  may  predomi- 
nate, and  the  resulting  effect  upon  the  religious  affections  will 
be — a  tendency  towards  the  worship  of  the  beautiful.  The 
predominant  feature  of  this  state  may  be  termed  spiritual 
senlimentalism — a  state  in  which  the  religious  affections,  losing 
sight  to  a  great  extent  of  moral  ideas  and  purposes,  cluster 
around  certain  ideal  creations,  which  fancy  paints  to  the 
mind  in  forms  of  perfect  symmetry,  and  hues  of  unutterable 
beauty. 

In  other  instances  there  may  be  a  predominance  of  the 
moral  element.  When  this  is  the  case,  the  religious  affec- 
tions will  tend  to  inspire  a  dependence  upon  moral  law  and 
order  in  the  universe.  Such  a  religion  will  impart  firmness 
to  the  character,  and  activity  in  the  prosecution  of  practical 
duty ;  but  will  often  betray  a  great  want  of  tenderness  in 
feeling,  and  of  deep  sympathy  at  once  with  the  beautiful  and 
the  divine.  Finally,  when  the  intuitions  of  pure  being,  and 
the  corresponding  affections  predominate  over  the  sense  of 
ideal  beauty  and  moral  law,  the  religious  life  within  will 
tend  towards  Pantheism,  the  peculiarity  of  which  is  to  sink 
all  moral  relations  in  the  infinite  reality — to  make  "  TO  6v  " 
absorb  "  TO  aya&ov"  in  its  vast  abyss. 


102  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

If  the  reader  will  now  refer  for  a  moment  to  the  scheme 
we  have  given  of  the  human  faculties  in  the  first  chapter,  he 
will  see  that  there  is  an  .elevated  state  of  the  consciousness  in 
which  the  whole  energy  of  our  intuitional  faculty  is  concen- 
trated. There  is  a  moment  of  man's  inward  experience,  in 
which  the  higher  intuitions  seem  to  merge  into  a  state  of  deep 
emotion,  and  in  which,  on  the  other  hand,  the  higher  emotions 
merge  into  a  state  of  deep  and  immediate  gazing  upon  truth  ; 
in  a  word,  there  is  a  state  in  which  all  our  intuitions,  and  the 
emotions  corresponding,  blend  in  one  common  unity,  and 
realize  the  phenomenon  of  that  pure  and  holy  faith  which 
seems  to  be  the  immediate  contact  of  the  finite  with  the  infi- 
nite— the  calm  repose  of  the  soul  of  man  upon  the  eternal 
God.  It  is  not  infinite  being,  infinite  beauty,  or  infinite  good- 
ness, upon  which  we  here  gaze — it  is  upon  all  concentrated 
in  the  personality  of  one  divine  mind — a  conception  which 
brings  together  as  into  a  focus  the  whole  energy  of  the  intel- 
lect, the  emotions,  and  the  will. 

Here,  then,  let  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  come 
into  full  activity,  and  there  is  at  length  clear  before  us  the 
Absolute  Being,  on  whom  we  may  depend.  Religion,  link- 
ed together  with  such  a  faith,  becomes  the  very  highest  and 
noblest  form  of  human  emotion,  an  emotion  which  gathers 
up  all  the  powers  and  all  the  activities  of  the  human  mind, 
and  directs  them  in  singleness  of  purpose  towards  infinite 
ends,  infinite  duties,  and  an  infinite  existence.  Here  the 
religious  affections  find  their  native  home,  leaving  all  the 
other  stages  far  behind  them.  Here  the  absolute  sense  of 
dependence  discovers  that  after  which  it  had  long  been 
yearning.  Here  the  whole  man  is  led  to  yield  himself  to 
the  omnipotent  will  and  eternal  service  of  that  Being  from 
whose  creative  energy  all  things  proceeded,  and  who  is,  and 
must  ever  be,  the  one  infinite  end  into  which  all  finite  ends 
eternally  flow. 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  103 

We  have  thus  developed  two  conclusions,  each  of  them 
highly  important  towards  the  full  comprehension  of  the 
nature  of  religion.  We  have  shown  first,  that  the  germ  of 
religion  lies  in  feeling^ — and  that  the  absolute  feeling  of  de- 
pendence, And  then,  secondly,  we  have  shown  that  the 
absolute  feeling  of  dependence,  seeking  its  object  through  all 
the  different  stages  of  the  human  consciousness,  is  driven 
onwards  from  one  resting  place  to  another,  until,  in  the  re- 
gion of  faith,  it  finds  the  absolute  Being,  of  which  it  had 
ever  dreamed,  to  whose  existence  it  had  ever  tacitly  pointed, 
and  united  to  which,  it  gives  the  highest  and  the  purest  in- 
tensity to  all  the  activities  of  the  human  mind.  Respecting 
the  agencies  by  which  the  religious  consciousness  may  be 
brought  into  this  its  highest  state  of  development,  we  have  as 
yet  said  nothing.  The  discussion  of  this  question,  however, 
gives  us  the  transition  point  from  the  subject  of  religion  gen- 
erally to  that  of  Christianity,  as  the  agent  of  its  purest  and 
divinest  form. 


POSTSCRIPT  TO  CHAPTER  m. 

The  history  of  the  development  of  the  idea  of  religion  is  very  inter- 
esting and  instructive.  With  regard  to  the  origin  of  the  word,  it 
appears  to  me  somewhat  difficult  to  decide  whether  we  are  to  de- 
rive it  from  religere  or  religare,  the  former  giving  the  idea  of  pon- 
dering, the  latter  the  idea  of  obligation.  Massurius  Sabinus  derives 
it  from  relinquere — meaning  separation  from  the  world. 

The  earlier  theologians  attached  rather  a  technical  and  dogmati- 
cal meaning  to  the  term  religion  than  a  philosophical  one ;  express- 
i  ng  by  it  the  mode  in  which  we  are  enabled  rightly  to  know  and  to 
worship  God.  The  writers  who  first  broke  in  upon  the  old  stereo- 
typed notions  of  dogmatic  Theology,  and  sought  new  definitions  of 
them,  were  the  earlier  Rationalists.  The  definitions  of  these  writers 
hold  up,  for  the  most  part,  the  intellectual  side  of  the  idea  of  religion 


104  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

to  the  almost  entire  exclusion  of  its  more  essential  elements.  Thus 
Amman  defines  it, — "  Conscientiae  vinculum,  quo  cogitando,  volendo 
et  agendo  numini  nos  obstrictos  sentimus,  i.  e.,  consensus  animi 
cum  voluntate  numinis  recte  cognit&."  The  definition  of  Weg- 
scheider  is  very  similar.  Bretschneider  terms  religion,  "  Glaube  an 
die  Realitat  der  Idee  der  Gottheit,  mit  angemessener  Gesinning  und 
Handlungsweise. " 

More  strictly  philosophical  definitions  than  these,  however,  are 
to  be  met  with  principally  in  the  German  writers,  from  the  time  of 
Spinoza  downwards.  Spinoza,  indeed,  by  affirming  religion  to  be 
the  conscious  absorption  of  the  phenomenal  in  the  absolute  by  pure 
intellectual  love,  gave  a  new  turn  to  philosophical  speculation  on 
this  subject,  the  fruits  of  which  appear  very  strikingly  in  later  times. 

Kant,  from  the  stoical  bent  of  his  mind,  gave  to  the  idea  of  re- 
ligion a  purely  moral  intensity ;  with  him  all  religion  becomes  obe- 
dience to  the  absolute  moral  law,  as  a  Divine  ordination.  Jacobi, 
on  the  other  hand,  who  introduced  the  element  of  feeling  into  the 
intellectual  philosophy  of  Germany,  was  probably  the  first  to  realize 
philosophically  that  idea  of  religion,  which  refers  its  essential  ele- 
ment to  this  part  of  our  constitution.  Of  the  philosophy  of  Jacobi 
that  of  Fries  was  an  immediate  ofiset ;  and  De  Wette,  who  repre- 
sents the  theological  side  of  this  philosophy,  has  viewed  religion 
as  that  deep  consciousness  of  the  Eternal  in  every  thing  around  us, 
which  manifests  itself  in  the  form  of  inspiration,  devotion,  rapture, 
&c.,  and  which  alone  is  able  to  unravel  all  the  contradictions  and 
perplexities  of  human  life.  In  the  same  spirit  as  this  we  have  seen 
Schleiermacher,  penetrating  still  deeper  into  the  essence  of  religion> 
and  realizing  its  nature,  philosophically  speaking,  as  we  think,  more 
accurately  than  any  one  had  done  before  him. 

Leaving  the  Geffthl-Philosophie,  and  following  the  purely  specu- 
lative side  of  the  question,  we  find  the  idea  of  religion  passing 
through  a  great  variety  of  logical  transformations ;  until  it  becomes 
sublimated  into  a  sheer  nonentity.  Fichte,  following  in  the  foot- 
steps of  Kant,  refers  religion  to  a  faith  in  the  moral  order  of  the 
universe.  Schelling  took  up  the  thread  of  speculation  where 
Spinoza  had  left  it,  and  elaborated  that  idea  of  religion  which  makes 
it  spring  from  an  immediate  intuition  of  the  union  of  the  finite  with 


THE    PECULIAR    ESSENCE    OF    RELIGION.  105 

the  infinite — God  becoming  self-conscious  in  human  history.  This 
led  the  way  for  the  speculations  of  Hegel,  who  supposes  religion, 
in  ks  proper  intensity,  to  consist  in  the  process  by  which  we  think 
ourselves  up,  logically  and  consecutively,  into  the  region  of  the 
universal.  Thus  religion  and  philosophy  become  one.  The  Hege- 
lian school  has  developed  this  fundamental  idea  into  many  definitions. 
Marheineke  gives  it  as  the  "  Aufnahme  der  menschlichen  Natur  in 
die  gottliche ;"  or,  "  Eingerucktsein  des  menschlichen  Denkens 
Gottes,  in  das  gottliche  Denkeri  Gottes." 

The  Pantheistic  side  of  this  view  has  been  still  further  drawn  out 
by  Strauss,  who  entirely  denies  the  existence  of  a  Divine  conscious- 
ness separate  from  the  human ;  while  Feuerbach  completes  the 
theory  by  proving  that,  this  being  the  case,  man  in  imagining  a 
Deity  is  only  deifying  his  own  nature,  and  in  worshipping  a  Deity  is 
only  worshipping  humanity.  To  him,  accordingly,  religion  is  "  Das 
Verhalten  des  Menschen  zu  sich  selbst  als  zu  einem  anderen  Wesen ;" 
while  the  whole  practical  bent  of  religion  is  "  Die  liebevolle  Hin- 
gabe  an  die  Menschheit ;"  an  instructive  example  truly  of  the  con- 
sequence of  resigning  one's  self  to  mere  logical  reasoning,  regardless 
of  our  direct  intuition  of  Divine  realities. 

For  a  more  complete  view  of  different  definitions,  see  "  Huttru 
Redivivus,"  Locus  i. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ON   THE   ESSENCE   OF   CHRISTIANITY. 

IN  the  foregoing  chapter  we  have  shown  that  religion,  essen- 
tially considered,  is  a  form  of  human  feeling  which  has  for 
its  great  characteristic  the  consciousness  of  absolute  depend- 
ence. We  have  seen,  moreover,  that  the  religious  life  as- 
sumes many  different  forms,  taking  for  the  most  part  its  pe- 
culiar hue  from  the  nature  of  the  object  towards  which  this 
feeling  of  dependence  is  attracted.  In  proportion,  therefore, 
as  the  object  becomes  purer,  higher,  and  holier,  it  naturally 
indicates  a  corresponding  elevation  in  the  whole  character  of 
the  religious  life  itself. 

Now,  the  existence  and  the  prevalence  of  different  kinds 
of  religion  are  great  historical  facts  in  human  experience. 
In  looking  over  the  surface  of  the  world  from  the  very  earli- 
est periods  of  time,  we  find  that  certain  great  phases  of  re- 
ligious sentiment  and  emotion  have  spread  widely  amongst 
different  nations,  and  developed  themselves  in  the  growth  of 
those  nations  from  age  to  age.  The  religions  of  Greece  and 
Rome,  for  example,  had  each  their  own  peculiar  elements 
of  thought  and  feeling ;  the  religions  of  India,  Persia,  and 
Thibet  have,  in  like  manner,  maintained  for  almost  unnum- 
bered centuries,  the  most  distinctive  modes  of  conceiving  and 
expressing  the  relation  between  the  finite  mind  and  the  infi- 
nite. The  Jew,  the  Mohammedan,  and  the  Christian,  all,  too, 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  107 

have  cherished  their  several  conceptions  respecting  the  one 
living  and  true  God,  and  the  dependence  of  humanity  upon 
his  infinite  will.  In  each  case,  there  is  a  peculiar  develop- 
ment of  the  religious  consciousness,  considered  as  a  univer- 
sal element  in  man's  spiritual  nature ;  in  each  case  a  pecu- 
liar mode,  in  which  the  sense  of  dependence  in  the  human 
mind  attaches  itself  to  the  invisible  world. 

In  passing,  therefore,  as  we  essay  to  do  in  the  present 
chapter,  from  the  subject  of  religion  generally,  to  the  con- 
sideration of  religion  in  some  distinctive  form,  as  a  fact  in 
human  history,  it  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  investigate  the 
subjective  process  by  which  a  religion,  historically  speaking, 
becomes  formed  and  established  in  the  consciousness  of  dif- 
ferent portions  of  mankind.  In  this  way  we  shall  be  better 
enabled  to  comprehend  what  is  the  specific  element  existing 
in  any  one  of  the  great  historical  forms  of  religious  life, 
apart  from  the  essence  of  religion  itself;  and  as  Christianity 
is  one  of  those  forms,  we  may  be  led  by  this  procedure  to 
perceive  what  it  is  that  distinguishes  it  specifically  as  a 
phase  of  man's  inward  self-consciousness,  from  all  the  rest. 
Let  it  be  observed,  first  of  all,  that  religion  resides  essen- 
tially in  the  emotive  part  of  our  nature ;  and  on  this  very 
ground  is  calculated  to  produce  a  feeling  of  sympathy  be- 
tween minds  similarly  affected.  Men  are  not  attracted  by 
any  secret  sympathy  towards  each  other  from  observing  a 
common  participation  in  the  laws  of  reasoning  ;  but  let  there 
be  any  common  emotion  impelling  them  inwardly,  and  we 
immediately  find  an  invisible  tie  which  binds  them  together, 
as  though  by  some  strong  magnetic  influence. 

If  this  be  true  of  all  the  emotions,  especially  is  it  true  of 
those  which  are  developed  upon  the  sphere  of  the  intuitional 
consciousness  ;  which  are  more  powerfully  attractive,  just  in 
proportion  as  they  are  more  elevated  and  refined  in  character 
than  all  the  rest.  No  one  can  long  resist  that  gush  of  sym- 


108  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

pathy,  which  arises  in  the  mind  of  all  good  men  when  they 
perceive  in  a  fellow-creature  the  same  glow  of  pure  enjoy- 
ment which  they  have  themselves  experienced  in  the  deep 
and  holy  intuition  of  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good. 

Moreover,  when  to  these  elevated  emotions  the  religious 
sentiment  is  added ;  when  the  feeling  of  an  unqualified  de- 
pendence on  God  joins  its  peculiar  influence,  and  infuses  into 
all  the  other  emotions  a  sense  of  resignation  to  the  will  and 
purposes  of  an  infinite  being ;  then,  indeed,  the  bands  of 
secret  sympathy  become  almost  incalculably  strong  and 
attractive.  Of  all  the  inward  influences,  in  fact,  which  we 
can  conceive  to  operate  upon  the  human  spirit,  there  are 
none  which  we  can  imagine  more  adapted  to  draw  men  to 
each  other,  and  bring  them  into  close  and  almost  mysterious 
communion,  than  is  a  high  organic  development  of  the  reli- 
gious life. 

Now  it  is  evident,  that  amongst  any  people  living  under 
the  same  heavens,  with  the  same  scenes  of  nature  around 
them,  with  the  same  habits  of  life  and  modes  of  education, 
with  the  same  national  traditions,  and  perchance  the  same 
privileges  arising  from  the  special  arrangements  and  gifts  of 
Providence,  there  will  be  a  predisposition  in  the  minds  of  all 
towards  the  inward  development  of  some  particular  phase  of 
religious  sentiment.  This  tendency  must  inevitably  operate 
to  produce  sympathy  amongst  those  who  are  most  powerfully 
affected  by  it ;  and  this  sympathy,  striving  to  find  an  out- 
ward expression,  will  soon  give  rise  to  a  visible  fellowship. 
Hence  the  generic  and  attractive  character  which  the  reli- 
gious emotions  so  peculiarly  possess,  and  possess  perhaps 
above  every  other,  forms  the  primary  basis  of  all  religious 
fellowship  amongst  mankind. 

Such  a  fellowship,  again,  when  once  created,  reacts  in 
its  turn  upon  the  religious  intuitions  and  sentiments ;  for 
the  close  and  confidential  intercourse  it  supposes  amongst 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  109 

different  minds,  tends  gradually  to  equalize  them,  to  reduce 
the  great  spiritual  idea  under  which  they  have  been  moulded 
into  fellowship,  to  a  uniform  expression,  to  bring  the  religious 
consciousness  of  all  up  to  the  same  level,  and  thus  to  give 
unity  to  its  outward  development.  Here,  accordingly,  we 
see  the  subjective  part  of  the  process,  by  which  a  determin- 
ate religion  raises  itself  in  the  history  of  human  experience. 
The  outward  or  providential  circumstances  of  a  people  give 
some  peculiar  bias  to  the  religious  faculty ;  the  emotions  to 
which  that  faculty  gives  rise,  attract  men  together  by  an 
inward  sympathy,  so  as  to  originate  religious  fellowships; 
the  intercourse  which  fellowships  produce,  gradually  wears 
down  individual  peculiarities,  and  equalizes  the  whole  ex- 
pression of  the  religious  life.  This  expression,  in  fine,  when 
it  has  become  widely  extended,  and  embodied  in  outward 
institutions,  forms  what  we  term  a  distinctive  religion  in  the 
world. 

Now  from  this  subjective  mode  of  viewing  the  question, 
we  can  advance  with  some  advantage  to  the  task  of  deter- 
mining in  what  the  essential  element  of  any  distinctive  phase 
of  religion  consists.  Religion  itself,  as  we  have  seen,  under 
whatever  form,  supposes  the  conscious  existence  of  an  abso- 
lute feeling  of  dependence  ;  when  this  emotion  takes  exten- 
sively any  peculiar  type,  it  always  indicates  some  deep  and 
general  awakening  of  the  religious  nature  amongst  those  who 
possess  it — a  development  of  some  particular  conception  of 
man's  relation  to,  and  dependence  upon,  the  Infinite  Being — 
a  state  of  self-consciousness,  in  respect  to  the  Divinity,  which 
has  worked  powerfully  from  mind  to  mind  until  it  assumes 
a  definite  expression,  it  may  be  in  language,  or  in  certain 
peculiar  modes  of  worship.  To  fix,  therefore,  the  essential 
characteristic  of  any  historical  form  of  religion,  we  must  look 
attentively  at  the  outward  phenomena  it  originates,  as  being 
the  index  to  the  precise  state  of  self-consciousness,  which  it 


110  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

more  tacitly  involves.  The  rites  and  ceremonies,  the  forms 
of  worship,  the  expressions  of  adoration,  of  propitiation,  of 
prayer,  or  of  praise,  the  actions  performed  under  these  im- 
pulses, all  will  be  certain  indications  of  some  particular  state 
of  the  inward  religious  emotions ;  and  it  is  only  when  we 
have  examined  all  these  phenomena  carefully,  and  compared 
one  with  the  other,  that  we  begin  to  see  their  internal  con- 
sistency and  grasp  at  the  general  idea  which  lies  at  the  basis 
of  the  whole. 

Now,  Christianity  is  a  religion,  and  as  such  must  consist 
essentially,  like  all  other  religions,  in  a  certain  attitude  of 
man's  whole  spiritual  nature  in  relation  to  God.  We  wish  it 
distinctly  to  be  understood,  that  we  are  regarding  the  whole 
matter  just  now,  purely  in  its  subjective  point  of  view.  It  is 
not  at  all  a  question  with  us  at  present, — what  are  the  out- 
ward provisions  which  Christianity  involves ;  or  what  means 
have  been  employed  to  bring  the  human  soul  into  a  certain 
attitude  of  dependence  upon  God.  The  simple  problem  is  to 
discover,  what  that  attitude  really  proves  itself  to  be ;  or 
otherwise,  what  is  the  distinguishing  feature  of  man's  reli- 
gious nature,  when  it  has  come  properly  under  the  Christian 
influence.  This,  it  is  evident,  will  be  the  only  real  determi- 
nation of  the  question  in  hand ;  it  is  the  only  mode  in  which 
we  can  assign  the  true  nature  of  Christianity,  relatively  to  all 
other  religions  in  the  world,  and  show  wherein  its  essential 
and  distinguishing  feature  consists. 

It  were  very  easy,  in  discussing  the  essence  of  Christian- 
ity, to  adduce  the  prominent  facts  connected  with  its  establish- 
ment in  the  world,  and  equally  easy  to  give  a  sketch  of  what 
are  esteemed  to  be  its  main  doctrines ;  but  it  is  evident  that 
neither  of  these  would  offer  a  solution  of  the  question  before 
us.  Those  facts,  on  the  one  hand,  only  indicate  the  outward 
means  by  which  the  Christian  consciousness  has  been  awak- 
ened in  human  nature  at  large  ;  while  the  doctrines,  on  the 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  Ill 

other  hand,  are  simply  a  formal  or  logical  expression  of  the 
elements  of  truth,  which  that  consciousness,  when  awakened, 
involves.  Neither  the  facts  nor  the  doctrines  viewed  alone 
are  capable  of  showing  the  essential  features  of  the  Christian 
life ;  they  are  not  strictly  commensurable  with  our  inward 
experience ;  they  cannot  be  the  indices  by  which  we  com- 
pare Christianity,  as  an  attitude  of  man's  spiritual  nature 
towards  God,  with  other  forms  or  phases  of  religion  in  the 
world.  What  we  require  to  do  now,  is  to  see  how  the  Chris- 
tian consciousness,  with  all  its  distinctive  attributes,  has  de- 
veloped itself  (through  Divine  agencies)  out  of  the  broader 
religious  feelings  of  humanity ;  to  point  out  what  these  dis- 
tinctive attributes  really  are  ;  and  thus  to  discover  the  essen- 
tial points  in  which  Christianity,  as  a  form  of  our  religious 
nature,  differs  from  every  other  determination  which  that  na- 
ture has  successively  assumed.  Regarded  in  this  subjective 
point  of  view,  Christianity  can  be  compared  with  all  the  re- 
ligions of  mankind.  We  can  trace  the  comparative  devel- 
opment of  the  sense  of  dependence  in  each,  and,  as  the  result 
of  such  a  comparison,  can  assign  at  length  what  it  is  in  which 
the  real  life  of  Christianity,  as  a  religious  experience,  essen- 
tially consists.* 

To  prepare  the  way  for  this  conclusion,  let  us  trace 
briefly  the  inward  process  by  which  the  Christian  conscious- 
ness developed  itself  immediately  out  of  the  religious  life  of 
the  age  in  which  it  arose.  We  pass  by  all  the  external 
agencies — all  the  wonderful  and  miraculous  scenes  which 
history  records  as  connected  with  the  introduction  of  Chris- 

*  This  view  of  the  subject  has  been  most  admirably  worked  out  by 
Professor  Maurice,  in  a  course  of  Lectures  entitled  "  Christ  the  Desire 
of  all  Nations."  To  those  who  would  see  the  subjective  elements  of 
Christianity  placed  side  by  side  with  those  of  all  the  other  great  prevail- 
ing systems  of  religion,  we  cannot  recommend  any  work  so  excellently 
adapted  to  the  purpose  as  this. 


112  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

tianity  into  the  world.  Whatever  extraordinary  means  were 
used  for  this  purpose,  yet  it  is  evident  that  the  development 
of  the  real  elements  of  Christian  experience,  and  the  organ- 
ization of  the  Christian  life,  as  a  great  and  widely-extended 
historical  fact  in  the  mind  and  consciousness  of  humanity, 
must  have  taken  place  inwardly,  according  to  the  universal 
laws  of  the  religious  emotions.  Nay  further,  whatever 
special  and  extraordinary  spiritual  influences  we  suppose  to 
have  been  exerted,  whether  through  the  truth  or  apart  from 
it,  yet  we  ever  regard  even  these  as  operating  in  consistency 
with  the  natural  elements  of  the  human  mind,  and  the 
ordinary  activities  of  man's  higher  spiritual  nature. 

Hence  it  will  not  excite  our  wonder  to  find  that  Chris- 
tianity, like  all  other  religions,  was  organized  into  a  distinct 
spiritual  life,  and  developed  as  such  in  the  world,  through 
the  medium  of  human  fellowship.  The  apostles  themselves 
drank  deep  from  the  fountain-head  of  Christian  truth — from 
the  words,  the  spirit,  the  life  of  Christ.  Their  own  spiritual 
nature  being  aroused  by  the  teaching  and  promised  Spirit  of 
the  Saviour,  they  next  imparted  the  sublime  ideas  thus  com- 
municated to  others  around  them,  employing  for  this  purpose 
most  commonly  the  language  and  the  analogies  of  Judaism. 
A  fellowship  of  true  believers  was  soon  formed  by  the 
sympathy  and  attraction  of  like  religious  emotions ;  the  dis- 
ciples thus  united  "spake  often  one  with  another;"  they 
communicated  their  mutual  impressions ;  the  Spirit  of  Truth 
worked  mightily  amongst  them ;  and  the  result  was  a  dis- 
tinctive religion — a  definite  and  historical  form  of  spiritual 
experience,  which  unfolded  itself  in  the  common  conscious- 
ness of  the  apostolic  Church. 

That  this  was  the  real  process  by  which  Christianity 
realized  itself  in  the  spiritual  life  of  the  age,  is  evident  from 
the  whole  history  of  its  origin  and  establishment  in  the  world. 
Christ  left  not  his  Gospel  upon  earth  all  formed,  and  stated 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  113 

in  words  and  propositions.  He  left  behind  him  simply  the 
living  seeds  of  great  moral  and  spiritual  ideas  in  the  minds 
of  his  followers,  with  the  promise  of  his  Spirit  to  cherish 
them  into  their  proper  growth  and  mature  fruits.  Neither 
was  it  immediately  after  the  resurrection  of  the  Saviour  that 
Christianity,  as  a  moral  phenomenon  in  human  life,  was 
completed.  So  far  from  that,  much  darkness,  much  doubt, 
and  many  dim  perceptions  of  Christian  truth  were  long 
observable  in  the  minds  of  the  Apostles  themselves,  as  well 
as  their  followers.  Often  did  they  meet  together ;  often  did 
they  deliberate  over  great  and  essential  points ;  often  did 
they  correct  each  other,  as  one  saw  his  brother  lingering  too 
much  amongst  Jewish  prejudices ;  often  did  they  pray  for 
Divine  light  and  guidance ;  and  it  was  not  until  years  of 
fellowship  had  been  enjoyed — until  the  common  conscious- 
ness had  become  awakened — until  the  Spirit  of  Truth  had 
moulded  their  hearts  and  minds  into  some  appreciable 
unity  of  thought  and  feeling,  that  Christianity  as  an  entire 
religious  system  appeared. 

This  process  which  I  have  described,  indeed,  was  neces- 
sary from  the  very  laws  and  constitution  of  the  religious 
emotions.  Even  if  Christ  had  spoken  his  whole  mind  and 
will  to  the  apostles,  that  would  not  have  constituted  a  religion, 
in  the  living  experience  of  mankind  ;  that  would  not  have 
been  Christianity  itself,  however  adapted  to  awaken  it. 
Christianity,  like  every  other  religion,  consists  essentially  in 
a  state  of  man's  inner  consciousness,  which  developes  itself 
into  a  system  of  thought  and  activity  only  in  a  community 
of  awakened  minds ;  and  it  was  inevitable,  therefore,  that 
such  a  state  of  consciousness  should  require  time,  and  inter- 
course, and  mutual  sympathy,  before  it  could  become  moulded 
into  a  decided  and  distinctive  form.  Apostolical  Christianity 
consisted  essentially  in  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  first 
great  Christian  community.  But  for  such  a  community,  the 
6* 


114  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

truths  and  principles  which  Christ  left  behind  him  in  the 
germ,  could  never  have  fructified  ;  but  for  such  a  com- 
munity, the  Christian  love  could  not  have  been  vitally 
developed  (for  love  can  only  exist  and  grow  in  society) ; 
but  for  such  a  community,  in  one  word,  there  could  have 
been  no  historical  realization,  and  consequently  no  living 
example  to  the  world  of  Christianity  at  all. 

Having  thus  developed,  in  the  foregoing  remarks,  the 
precise  nature  of  the  question,  to  which  the  present  chapter 
is  devoted  ;  having  shown  that  the  essential  nature  of  any 
distinctive  form  of  religion  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  direction 
it  gives  to  the  thoughts,  impulses,  and  emotions  of  a  united 
fellowship,  as  regards  their  views  of  the  dependence  of  the 
world  upon  God ;  we  have  next  to  inquire  what  great  and 
peculiar  feature  has  been  presented  in  the  whole  develop- 
ment of  Christianity  in  the  world,  which  distinguishes  it 
manifestly  from  every  other  form  of  the  religious  life. 

Before  we  proceed  to  offer  and  expound  our  own  defini- 
tion of  Christianity,  it  may  be  as  well  to  enumerate  a  few  of 
the  definitions  which  have  been  already  proposed  by  some  of 
the  most  eminent  Christian  philosophers.  The  following  is 
an  example  of  those  which  have  been  current  among  the 
rationalistic  theologians.  I  take  it  from  the  writings  of 
Klein,  one  of  the  best  of  those  authors.  He  denominates 
Christianity,  "  Modus  cognoscendi  et  colendi  Deum  per 
Christum  traditus."  This  definition,  it  is  evident,  is  merely 
formal ;  it  does  not  in  any  way  express  what  the  essential 
nature  of  the  knowledge  or  the  worship  really  is.  Hase 
gives  the  following  definition  :  "  Christianity  is  a  conviction 
that  the  completion  of  jhe  religious  life  has  appeared  histori- 
cally in  Christ,  and  that  our  own  life  approaches  this  com- 
pletion in  a  fellowship  inspired  by  his  Spirit."  This  defini- 
tion is  more  significant  than  the  last,  but  is  still  deficient  in 
subjective  intensity  ;  since  it  fails  to  point  out  in  what  par- 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  115 

ticular  manner  the  religious  life  involved  in  Christianity  dif- 
fers from  all  others.  Schleiermacher's  somewhat  remarkable 
definition  runs  as  follows : — "  Christianity  is  a  monotheistic 
belief,  belonging  to  the  practical  form  of  piety,  which  distin- 
guishes itself  essentially  from  all  others  by  the  fact,  that 
every  thing  in  it  is  referred  to  the  redemption  completed  by 
Jesus  of  Nazareth."  The  following  definition  of  Nitzsch  will 
probably  be  thought  far  more  simple : — "  Christianity  is  a 
mode  of  life  which  rests  upon  the  consciousness  of  the  re- 
demption of  the  world,  and  of  the  personal  Redeemer,  Jesus 
Christ." 

Now,  in  considering  attentively  these  two  last  definitions, 
it  is  evident  that  they  attempt  to  combine  in  one  view  both  a 
subjective  and  an  objective  element.  They  offer  some  ac- 
count, on  the  one  hand,  of  the  subjective  attitude  of  the  reli- 
gious emotions  involved  in  Christianity,  while  they  refer,  on 
the  other  hand,  to  those  great  outward  facts  and  phenomena 
with  which  these  emotions  stand  inseparably  connected  as 
their  cause.  To  make  the  statement  of  the  case  full  and 
complete,  it  appears  to  me  that  a  twofold  definition  is  abso- 
lutely needful ;  the  one  side  of  which  will  define  the  precise 
state  of  the  religious  emotions,  which  Christianity  indicates  ; 
the  other  side  of  which  will  define  the  exterior  conditions, 
under  which  such  a  state  is  superinduced.  In  both  cases 
alike  Christianity  will  be  a  form  of  human  experience  ;  but 
in  the  one  case  it  will  involve  the  consciousness  of  an  inward 
moral  relationship  towards  God,  in  the  latter  case  that  of  an 
outward  providential  relationship  to  certain  Divine  arrange- 
ments. These  two  states  of  consciousness  ought,  of  course, 
to  be  reciprocal ;  the  one  should  virtually  involve  the  other  ; 
so  that,  whichever  side  be  presented  to  our  contemplation,  the 
other  may  immediately  come  to  view.  Instead,  therefore,  of 
attempting  to  include  both  the  subjective  and  the  objective 
principle  of  Christianity  in  a  single  definition,  we  shall  offer 


116  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

two  definitions,  which  may  be  regarded  as  complements  of 
each  other. 

Taking  then  first  the  subjective  point  of  view,  and  waiving 
for  the  present  all  reference  to  any  outward  facts  or  pheno- 
mena, we  may  define  Christianity  as  "  that  form  of  religion 
in  which  we  are  conscious  of  absolute  dependence  and  perfect 
moral  freedom  being  harmonized  by  love  to  God." 

The  highest  state  of  human  nature  which  we  can  con- 
ceive to  exist  on  earth,  is  that  in  which  the  moral  element,  or 
the  principle  of  freedom,  and  the  religious  element,  or  the 
sense  of  dependence,  are  perfectly  balanced ;  so  that  each 
may  have  its  full  play  without  impeding  the  due  influence  of 
the  other.  This  state,  we  have  to  show,  is  that  in  which 
Christianity,  subjectively  speaking,  consists ;  a  state  which 
precisely  realizes  the  definition  as  stated  above. 

Now,  if  we  regard  the  mass  of  hamanity  as  having  be- 
come reduced  by  the  influence  of  evil  into  a  state  of  spiritual 
idolatry  and  moral  degradation,  such  as  that  described  by 
Paul  from  his  own  personal  experience,  in  the  first  chapter 
of  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  it  is  impossible  not  to  see  in  it 
at  once  a  total  disorganization  both  of  the  moral  and  religious 
nature ;  a  fearful  abuse  of  human  freedom  on  the  one  side, 
and  of  religious  obligation  on  the  other. 

The  sense  of  freedom  which  man  enjoys  was  intended  to 
be  regulated  by  conscience,  including  under  that  term  the  ab- 
solute law  of  right,  and  the  categoric  imperative  to  fulfil  it. 
Instead  of  this,  we  find  in  the  Heathen  world  at  once  a  viola- 
tion of  the  law,  and  a  resistance  to  the  imperative  : — "  They 
not  only  do  things,"  says  Paul,  "  worthy  of  death,  but  they 
take  pleasure  in  those  that  do  them."  With  reference  again 
to  the  religious  nature,  or  the  sense  of  dependence,  there  we 
find  them  "  changing  the  glory  of  the  incorruptible  God  into 
an  image, — changing  the  truth  into  a  lie,  and  worshipping  and 
serving  the  creature  more  than  the  Creator."  Immersed  in 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  117 

such  a  condition,  it  is  needless  to  say  man  needed  a  moral 
education  to  bring  his  powers,  dispositions,  and  affections  into 
a  right  and  normal  state. 

Supposing  now  a  child  to  be  in  a  state  of  hatred,  of  oppo- 
sition, and  of  revolt  against  the  will,  authority,  and  affection 
of  a  parent, — what  would  be  the  moral  process  by  which  he 
must  be  restored  to  a  right  state  of  thought  and  feeling  ?  The 
sense  of  obligation  being  lost,  the  spark  of  affection  quenched, 
there  being  not  only  an  opposition  to  parental  command,  but 
a  pleasure  in  that  opposition,  the  feeling  of  dependence  upon 
the  parent  being  coupled  with  hatred  and  misery,  what,  we 
ask,  would  necessarily  be  the  first  step  towards  the  moral  re- 
covery of  such  a  child  ?  The  appeal  to  duty  would  be  use- 
less, for  the  sense  of  duty  is  lost ;  the  appeal  to  affection  would 
be  vain,  for  the  spark  of  love  has  died  out ;  the  appeal  to  in- 
terest would  be  equally  fruitless,  for  happiness  only  seems 
possible  apart  from  the  parental  control.  Evidently  in  such 
a  case  the  child  must  be  constrained  to  feel  his  actual  depend- 
ence on  the  parent ;  he  must  learn  to  realize  by  stern  mea- 
sures the  necessity  of  parental  support,  and  to  feel  the  arm  of 
parental  power  ;  he  must  have  correction  coupled  with  kind- 
ness, and  awe  inspired  by  the  enforcement  of  duty.  When 
all  other  motives  are  closed  up,  the  rebellious  child  must  be 
forced  into  the  right  path,  as  the  first  step  to  his  discovery  of 
its  real  excellence  and  its  superior  happiness. 

Such,  accordingly,  was  the  method  which  God  employed 
to  break  down  the  opposition  of  mankind  against  himself ;  for 
human  discipline  is  the  same  in  principle  by  whomsoever  it 
maybe  applied,  and  the  true  moral  procedure  of  a  parent  can 
only  be  grounded  on  the  laws  of  human  nature,  and  of  moral 
truth  as  emanating  from  God.  The  religious  discipline  of  the 
Jewish  dispensation  was  to  a  great  extent  one  of  fear.  There 
were  the  commands  engraven  on  stone  and  enforced  by  pen- 
alty ;  there  were  the  constant  appeals  to  outward  reward 


118  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

and  punishment ;  there  were  the  curses  of  the  law  against 
the  disobedient : — all  this  mingled  at  the  same  time  with  ex- 
pressions of  Divine  favor  and  love,  in  order  thus  to  appeal  to 
all  the  different  springs  of  the  human  will,  as  they  should  be- 
come successively  awakened.  Here  the  moral  law  was 
sternly  enjoined  ;  the  sense  of  dependence  was  constrained  ; 
and  the  truth  was  manifested,  that  in  the  process  of  human 
recovery  "the  fear  of  the  Lord  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom." 

It  matters  little  to  the  moral  aspect  of  the  question,  whe- 
ther we  make  the  supernatural  element  in  Judaism  greater 
or  less ;  there  is  the  fact  impressed  undoubtedly  upon  the 
very  face  of  the  Jewish  records,  that  man  had  a  religion  of 
this  nature  ;  that  in  the  historical  development  of  Providence 
such  moral  and  spiritual  influences  were  actually  made  to 
bear  upon  him  ;  that  this  was  a  real  phase  of  moral  and  re- 
ligious consciousness,  through  which  a  portion  of  humanity 
passed,  and  that  portion,  moreover,  from  which,  historically, 
the  Christian  life  has  emanated. 

Here  in  fact  we  have  the  key  to  the  right  comprehension 
of  the  Old  Testament.  It  contains  a  description  of  the  re- 
ligious consciousness  as  it  was  in  the  ancient  Hebrew  world ; 
it  gives  us  a  picture  of  that  process  of  moral  discipline 
through  which  the  Christian  consciousness  was  at  length  de- 
veloped ;  and  never  should  we  forget,  in  reading  those  re- 
cords, that  we  are  carried  into  a  period  in  which  the  storms 
of  human  passion  were  being  quelled  by  fear  as  well  as  by 
love ;  and  that  consequently  the  whole  development  of  moral 
as  well  as  religious  truth  stands  upon  a  far  lower  sphere  than 
the  truth  which  has  been  developed  in  the  Christian  Church. 

The  termination  of  the  Jewish  economy  brought  the  sys- 
tem of  enforcement  and  restraint  to  a  close.  More  and  more 
clearly  did  it  become  evident  that  the  law  was  only  a  school- 
master to  exercise  a  wholesome  discipline  until  the  period  of 
voluntary  submission  to  the  Divine  will  should  arrive.  But 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  119 

submission  is  not  all :  the  mere  exercise  of  a  voluntary  de- 
pendence upon  God  is  not  alone  sufficient  to  produce  the  gen- 
uine elements  of  Christian  life.  There  may  be  a  voluntary 
absolute  dependence  which  arises  from  an  overwhelming 
sense  of  the  Divine  sovereignty  and  omniscience,  disconnect- 
ed with  the  perception  either  of  moral  requirements  in  God, 
or  of  moral  duty  in  man.  There  may  be,  in  a  word,  such  a 
thing  as  a  theistic  fatalism  in  which  the  human  will,  instead 
of  being  harmonized  with  the  religious  feelings,  is  absorbed 
and  annihilated  by  them.  This  form  of  monotheistic  religion 
has  developed  itself  chiefly  in  Mohammedanism,  the  religion 
of  fate — a  system  which  stands  above  Judaism  as  regards 
the  sense  of  resignation,  but  immeasurably  below  it  in  the 
lively  realization  of  moral  obligation  both  towards  God  and 
man.  Fatalism  aims,  indeed,  at  transcending  the  Hebrew 
standpoint,  but  it  does  so  only  at  the  expense  of  cancelling 
every  thing  which  has  a  moral  worth,  or  which  can  produce 
a  really  moral  effect  upon  mankind.  It  makes  obedience  to 
flow  from  absolute  necessity,  not  from  choice  or  from  love. 

We  may  therefore  now  perceive  what  is  the  purest  and 
highest  form  to  which  the  religious  consciousness  can  attain. 
It  is  that  in  which  absolute  resignation  to  God  is  realized, 
not  by  constraint  or  necessity,  but  by  a  perfectly  moralized 
and  enlightened  state  of  the  will.  The  more  a  man  is  free 
to  act  without  fear  or  restraint,  the  more  complete  is  he  as  a 
free  agent ;  and  the  more  a  man  does  every  thing  in  depend- 
ence upon  God,  so  much  the  more  of  the  religious  element 
he  evinces.  Let  these  two  elements,  then,  be  brought  into 
harmony  with  each  other ;  let  a  man  be  free  to  follow  out 
his  own  will,  and  let  that  will  ever  tend  towards  God  as  the 
great  centre  of  his  being,  of  his  hope,  and  of  his  joy, — and  no 
more  perfect  state  of  relationship  between  God  and  man  can 
be  conceived. 

Again,  as  the  springs  which  move  the  will  are  the  de- 


120  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

sires  or  affections  of  the  heart,  it  is  clear,  that  for  the  will  to 
be  active,  and  ever  active  in  this  particular  direction,  there 
must  be  some  great  affection  which  is  ever  impelling  it  up- 
wards ;  which  affection,  practically  speaking,  will  be  the 
middle  point  and  focus  of  the  religious  life.  This  ruling  af- 
fection is  love,  the  antagonist  of  fear;  and  consequently, 
when  love  is  perfect,  dependence  will  be  hallowed,  volun- 
tary obedience  will  be  delightful,  and  the  religious  conscious- 
ness will  be  complete. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  take  up  any  time  in  proving 
that  this  religious  consciousness  which  I  have  described  is 
veritably  the  Christian  consciousness.  Voluntary  obedience, 
freedom  from  all  mere  ceremonial  restraint,  holy  love,  living 
for  the  Infinite  and  the  Eternal — all  these  are  the  grand  cha- 
racteristics of  the  Christian  life,  and  have  been  developed 
only  under  the  Christian  idea.  All  the  facts  and  phenomena, 
all  the  sufferings  and  toils,  all  the  worship  and  the  outward 
life  of  the  early  Church  show,  that  these  were  the  great 
thoughts  and  impulses  under  which  they  lived  and  moved 
and  had  their  being.  The  sole  ground  on  which  any  doubt 
could  be  thrown  upon  this  conclusion,  is  the  fact,  that,  con- 
sidering the  number  of  centuries  through  which  Christianity 
has  existed,  and  the  immense  extent  over  which  it  has  spread, 
there  has  been,  comparatively  speaking,  so  little  of  this  sub- 
lime elevation  of  the  religious  consciousness  actually  real- 
ized. There  are  two  things,  however,  which  must  never  be 
forgotten  in  connection  with  this  subject ;  and  these  are, 
first,  that  every  thing  Avhich  has  borne  the  name  of  Chris- 
tianity is  not  really  so ;  and  secondly,  that  even  where  the 
genuine  Christian  consciousness  is  attained  to,  still  it  is  often 
very  dimly  developed,  and  much  disfigured  by  the  intermix- 
ture of  inferior  elements.  Few  men,  if  any,  have  ever  real- 
ized even  their  own  hopes  and  visions  of  the  Christian  life  ; 
and  while  the  world  is  progressing  to  that  state  in  which  we 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  121 

look  for  the  kingdom  of  peace  to  be  universally  established, 
we  must  be  content  with  the  struggles  of  humanity  after  that 
high  standard  which  Christianity  has  placed  before  us,  and 
rest  upon  the  hope  that  it  may  at  length  be  transferred  from 
a  mere  vision  to  a  living  realization. 

Christianity,  in  fact,  as  a  vital  principle,  has  not  yet  con- 
quered even  the  nations  which  are  called  by  its  name ;  nor 
has  yet  ceased  for  a  moment  to  struggle  against  those  infe- 
rior elements  which  really  exist  amongst  ourselves,  although 
they  have  a  local  habitation  and  a  name  only  with  the  Ma- 
hometan and  the  Jew.  The  Jewish  consciousness — the  re- 
ligion of  bondage  and  restraint,  is  largely  found  even  in  the 
Christian  Church  ;  and  never  does  the  slavery  of  formalism, 
never  does  the  maceration  of  the  ascetic,  never  does  the  striv- 
ing after  religious  faith,  simply  as  a  means  of  escaping  the 
pains  of  hell,  present  itself  to  our  view,  but  we  recognize  a 
state  of  feeling  which  falls  altogether  below  the  Christian  ele- 
vation, and  see  the  continued  necessity  of  the  apostolic  me- 
morial, "We  have  not  received  the  spirit  of  bondage  again 
to  fear,  but  the  spirit  of  adoption,  whereby  we  cry,  Abba, 
Father." 

Neither  is  the  great  feature  of  the  Mahometan  conscious- 
ness wanting,  as  an  element  in  the  religion  of  many  Chris- 
tians. There  are  not  a  few  in  whose  inward  imaginations 
and  feelings  the  sovereignty  of  God  predominates  so  greatly 
over  his  moral  attributes,  that  their  relation  to  him  becomes 
rather  the  fixed  connection  of  an  iron  fatalism,  than  the  affec- 
tionate dependence  of  a  child  adopted  and  beloved  by  its  fa- 
ther. Such  a  state  of  the  religious  consciousness  may  give  a 
sullen  and  abandoned  resignation,  but  it  is  infinitely  removed 
from  those  bands  of  love  by  which  the  Christian  mind  is 
bound  fast  in  voluntary  submission  to  the  Eternal  will. 

The  inflexible  and  determined  sternness  with  which  the 
extreme  Calvinist  goes  forth  to  the  task  of  Christian  duty,  has 


122  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

many  features  in  common  with  the  spirit  of  Islamism,  when  it 
wielded  the  sword  of  God,  as  an  eternally  elected  instrument 
of  accomplishing  his  decrees.  In  both,  indeed,  we  have  the 
strength  of  purpose  infused  from  a  deep  sense  of  the  Divine 
sovereignty ;  but  in  both  we  miss  more  or  less  that  blending 
of  freedom  with  resignation,  which  is  only  produced  by  the 
perfection  of  love. 

The  following  passage  from  Mr.  Maurice's  Lectures, 
above  referred  to,  beautifully  illustrates  the  sentiments  we 
have  developed  : — "  But  it  is  possible  for  Christians  to  take 
another  course,  if  it  be  another, — it  is  possible  for  them  ap- 
parently to  exalt  the  Judicial  or  Mahometan  side  of  Christi- 
anity, though  they  do  not  belong  to  the  family  of  Abraham, 
and  may  care  nothing  about  the  Arabian  Prophet.  In  prac- 
tice Christians  have  done  this,  when  they  have  attempted  to 
copy  Jewish  example  in  the  manner  of  propagating  their  faith ? 
really  copying  not  that  but  Mahometan  example ;  for  we  tru- 
ly copy  Jewish  example,  as  I  have  shown  you,  when  we  go 
forth  as  national  bodies  under  our  national  Sovereign  to  resist 
wrong  and  robbery,  and  to  maintain  the  position  which  God 
has  given  us ;  we  copy  Mahometan  example  when  we  attempt 
to  spread  the  principles  of  the  universal  family  which  is  based 
upon  the  love  of  God,  and  the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  and  the  gift 
of  the  spirit  of  meekness  and  charity,  by  any  other  methods 
than  those  of  love  and  sacrifice  and  meekness.  We  seem  to 
copy  Jewish  example,  we  really  copy  Mahometan  example, 
when  we  seek  for  any  visible  mortal  man  to  reign  over  the 
universal  family  ;  for  the  Jewish  King  reigned  not  over  the 
universe,  but  over  a  particular  nation  ;  and,  so  soon  as  a  uni- 
versal society  grew  out  of  the  national  one,  it  was  the  glorious 
proclamation,  that  an  unseen  King,  who  had  ascended  to  the 
right  hand  of  God,  was  its  only  Sovereign.  We  seem  to 
copy  Jewish  example,  we  really  copy  Mahometan  example, 
when  we  set  visible  and  outward  rewards  before  us,  as  the 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  123 

prizes  of  our  high  calling ;  for  though  the  Jew  lived  espe- 
cially to  assert  God's  dominion  over  the  earth,  and  to  rule  it 
and  subdue  it  for  him,  yet  the  reward  he  always  kept  in 
sight  was  that  he  might  know  him  who  exercised  righteous- 
ness and  judgment  in  the  earth,  that  he  might  wake  up  in  his 
likeness  and  be  satisfied  with  it.  In  like  manner  we  copy  the 
example  of  the  modern  Jew  and  of  the  Mahometan,  not  of  the 
ancient  Jew,  or  if  of  the  ancient  Jew,  only  of  the  formal 
heartless  Pharisee,  when  we  receive  the  Bible,  not  as  a 
record  of  actual  doings,  of  actual  intercourse  between  a  liv- 
ing Being  and  us  his  creatures  upon  earth,  but  only  as  a  col- 
lection of  notions  and  opinions  about  which  we  are  to  dispute 
and  tear  each  other  to  pieces.  Still  more  effectually  do  we 
assume  the  character  of  the  servant  of  the  prophet,  of  the  de- 
generate Israelite,  when  we  set  up  the  dry  confession  of 
God's  sovereignty  against  his  righteousness,  supposing  that 
his  acts  are  ever  acts  of  self-will ;  that  his  glory  is  ever  any 
thing  but  the  glory  of  purity  and  goodness  and  truth.  In  all 
these  ways  we  may  prove  that  there  is  indeed  a  very  near 
relation  between  our  belief  and  theirs ;  inasmuch  as  we  can 
hold  the  one  under  the  name  of  the  other." 

In  the  foregoing  remarks,  we  have  considered  the  sub- 
jective side  of  Christianity ;  showing  its  essential  nature  to 
consist  in  an  inward  state  of  consciousness  in  reference  to 
man's  relationship  with  God.  We  must  now  turn  briefly  to 
the  objective  side  of  the  question.  Here  our  definition,  in- 
stead of  pointing  to  the  internal  relationship  of  man  to  God, 
takes  into  account  the  outward  features  of  the  Divine  pur- 
pose in  the  restoration  of  mankind.  In  this  point  of  view  we 
may  define  Christianity  as  Tliat  religion  which  rests  upon  the 
consciousness  of  the  redemption  of  the  world  through  Jesus 
Christ,  Here  we  have  two  elements  involved,  both  of  which 
are  necessary  to  complete  the  conception  of  Christianity  ob- 


124  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

jectively  considered.  The  one  is  the  idea  of  redemption, 
the  other  is  that  of  a  personal  and  historical  Redeemer. 

The  redemption  of  the  world,  in  the  most  general  accep- 
tation of  the  term,  involves  the  notion  of  a  universal  change 
of  mankind  from  one,  and  that  an  evil  condition,  into  a  better 
and  holier  state.  What  may  be  the  nature  and  extent  of  this 
change  cannot  be  decided  in  a  general  definition,  but  must 
be  drawn  from  a  complete  survey  of  Christian  doctrine  and 
precept.  The  notion,  however,  of  some  such  a  universal 
change,  is  implied  in  the  very  barest  conception  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  a  Divine  appointment.  The  proclamation,  in- 
deed, of  a  new  and  spiritual  kingdom,  erected  by  express 
ordination  of  God,  forms  the  very  foundation  idea  of  the 
preaching  of  Christ,  and  the  teaching  of  his  apostles. 

Again,  this  universal  change  is  referred  to  the  agency 
of  an  historical  person,  and  is  not  in  any  way  regarded  as 
the  spontaneous  action  of  humanity  in  rectifying  itself. 
Neither  of  these  two  elements  then  can  be  dispensed  with  in 
an  objective  view  of  Christianity.  If  we  look  to  the  per- 
sonal Redeemer  alone,  and  omit  the  universal  redemption, 
regarding  Christianity  simply  as  a  form  of  religious  worship 
introduced  by  Jesus  Christ,  we  reduce  it  to  the  level  of  any 
other  system  of  worship  which  the  history  of  the  past  pre- 
sents. Christianity,  however,  in  its  nature,  does  not  admit 
this ;  it  claims  a  special  mission  from  the  one  only  God,  it 
embraces  all  mankind  in  its  scope  of  action,  it  promises  to 
merge  all  other  religions  into  itself,  and  to  bring  the  whole 
world  into  that  better  and  holier  state  which  the  term  re- 
demption implies.  Nor  will  it  satisfy  the  idea  of  Chris- 
tianity, if  we  include  in  it  the  redemption  of  the  world,  with- 
out the  historical  reference  to  a  personal  Redeemer.  For 
this  redemption  might  have  come  in  that  case  through  any 
system  of  agency  we  please ;  it  might  owe  one  feature  to 
one  person,  and  one  to  another  ;  in  fact,  we  should  reduce 


THE    ESSENCE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  125 

Christianity  then  from  a  unitary  system,  having  one  great 
central  point  of  consciousness,  to  the*  general  idea  of  hu- 
man progress  ;  which  would  altogether  fail  to  distinguish 
it  generically  from  other  attempts  at  the  amelioration  of 
mankind. 

The  two  great  and  essential  points,  accordingly,  here  are 
— the  exclusive-ness  of  Christianity,  as  the  sole  appointed 
means  of  human  recovery,  and  the  concentration  of  the 
agency  for  such  recovery  in  the  life  and  person  of  Christ, 
historically  considered.  With  regard  to  the  precise  nature 
of  the  change  effected,  there  may  be  higher  or  lower  views 
of  it,  according  to  the  intensity  of  the  religious  life  in  the 
believer ;  and,  in  reference  to  the  history  of  Christ,  the  ap- 
plication of  criticism  may  give  a  greater  or  a  smaller  mira- 
culous element  to  its  whole  conception.  Either  of  these  may 
considerably  affect  the  character  and  the  influence  of  the 
Christian  life,  but  they  cannot  deprive  it  of  its  essential  ele- 
ments. Where  there  is  a  deep  penetration  of  the  heart  with 
a  consciousness  of  sin  in  the  individual  and  in  the  world — 
where  there  is  a  spiritual  perception  of  the  necessity  and  the 
reality  of  the  recovery  to  holiness  and  joy  in  the  kingdom  of 
God  on  earth  and  in  heaven — when  the  prime  agency  of  this 
recovery  is  concentrated  in  Jesus  Christ,  as  a  special  admin- 
istrator of  Almighty  wisdom  and  love  for  this  purpose — 
there  the  objective  idea  of  Christianity  is  realized  in  its  great 
scheme,  although  it  may  yet  have  to  be  filled  up  into  its  fuller 
intensity. 

If  the  two  definitions  we  have  given  be  valid,  then,  as  we 
have  before  said,  they  ought  to  be  reciprocals  of  each  other. 
And  such,  by  the  common  consent  of  the  Christian  world, 
they  are.  Wherever  absolute  dependence  and  perfect  free- 
dom are  reconciled  by  love  to  God,  there  we  recognize  the 
redemption  which  has  been  completed  by  Christ;  and 
wherever  this  redemption  is  honestly  accepted  as  the  middle 


126  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

point  of  our  religious  life,  there  we  recognize  the  religion  of 
perfect  resignation,  perfect  freedom,  and  perfect  love.  There 
may  be  many  variations  in  detail,  many  degrees  of  clearness 
in  the  perception  of  Christian  ideas,  many  dogmatic  pecu- 
liarities occasioned  by  education,  by  temperament,  or  by 
other  circumstances;  bul,  in  the  two  definitions  we  have 
given,  the  essential  elements  of  Christianity  are  involved. 
He  whose  religious  life  is  grounded  upon  the  consciousness 
of  the  redemption  of  the  world,  and  consequently  of  himself 
through  Jesus  Christ,  and  who  exhibits  the  reality  of  this  life 
by  resignation  to  the  will  of  God,  joyous  freedom  in  serving 
him,  and  the  expansive  spirit  of  love — this  man,  be  his  minor 
peculiarities  what  they  may,  we  venture  to  denominate — A 
Christian. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ON     REVELATION. 

WE  have  now  discussed,  in  the  two  preceding  chapters,  the 
nature  of  religion,  as  an  element  in  man's  spiritual  constitu- 
tion, and  the  nature  of  Christianity,  as  the  highest  form  of 
the  religious  life.  Throughout  the  whole  of  these  discussions 
we  have  kept  strictly  within  the  subjective  sphere  of  obser- 
vation, and  occupied  ourselves  only  with  the  interior  phases 
of  man's  religious  consciousness.  We  have  said  nothing  as 
yet  respecting  the  process  by  which  such  phenomena  of 
man's  interior  being  are  produced,  nothing  respecting  the 
secret  link,  which  unites  them  with  any  outward  causality, 
nothing  respecting  the  laws  by  which  they  are  brought  into 
existence,  regulated,  and  finally  developed  to  their  full 
maturity. 

While,  therefore,  Christianity,  looked  at  from  this  sub- 
jective point  of  view,  is  rightly  described  as  a  specific  form 
of  man's  religious  nature,  yet,  when  regarded  in  relation  to 
the  method  by  which  it  is  communicated  to  the  human  mind, 
we  are  equally  correct  in  designating  it  as  "  A  Revelation 
from  God."  The  term  revelation  is  one  of  those  popular  ex- 
pressions, than  which  none  perhaps  is  more  perpetually  heard 
upon  the  lips  of  almost  all  classes  of  thinking  men ;  and  yet 
there  is  no  term  within  the  whole  range  of  religious  inquiry 
which  is  less  clearly  understood,  and  more  vaguely  employed 
— none,  therefore,  which  on  all  accounts  stands  in  greater 


123  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

need  of  a  rigid  analysis,  and  a  clear  elucidation.  To  fur- 
nish, therefore,  such  an  analysis,  and  such  an  elucidation, 
must  be  our  next  attempt  in  the  present  work. 

In  entering  upon  this  analysis,  we  must  follow  substan- 
tially the  same  course  as  that  which  has  been  adopted  in  the 
discussion  of  the  preceding  questions ;  that  is  to  say,  we 
must  attempt  to  grasp  the  generic  idea  conveyed  under  the 
notion  of  a  Divine  revelation,  and  lay  bare  what  is  essential 
to  the  conception  itself;  and  having  done  this,  to  follow  it  up 
into  its  more  distinctive  forms. 

In  discussing  the  nature  of  religion,  we  found  it  to  centre 
in  the  sense  of  absolute  dependence  ;  starting  from  that 
point,  we  traced  it  through  all  its  different  phases,  until  it 
attains  its  highest  and  purest  forms  in  the  Divine  experiences 
of  Christianity.  In  the  same  manner  we  shall  now  seek  to 
determine  what  is  the  essential  element  in  the  idea  of  a  re- 
velation from  God  ;  and  having  determined  this,  we  shall  be 
the  more  prepared  to  comprehend  the  specific  forms,  in  which 
such  revelations  have  been  made. 

The  idea  of  a  revelation  always  implies  a  process  by 
which  knowledge,  in  some  form  or  other,  is  communicated  to 
an  intelligent  being.  For  a  revelation  at  all  to  exist,  there 
must  be  an  intelligent  being,  on  the  one  hand,  adapted  to  re- 
ceive it ;  and  there  must  be,  on  the  other  hand,  a  process  by 
which  this  same  intelligent  being  becomes  cognizant  of  cer- 
tain facts  or  ideas.  Suppress  either  of  these  conditions,  and 
no  revelation  can  exist.  The  preaching  of  an  angel  would 
be  no  revelation  to  an  idiot ;  a  Bible  in  Chinese  would  offer 
none  to  a  European.  In  the  former  case  there  is  no  intelli- 
gence capable  of  receiving  the  ideas  conveyed  ;  in  the  latter 
case  the  process  of  conveyance  renders  the  whole  thing  prac- 
tically a  nonenity,  by  allowing  no  idea  whatever  to  reach  the 
mind.  We  may  say,  then,  in  few  words,  that  a  revelation 
always  indicates  a  mode  of  intelligence.  This  point  should 


ON    REVELATION.  129 


be  carefully  realized  in  the  outset,  since  we  are  almost  in- 
sensibly led,  in  many  instances,  to  interchange  the  idea  of  a 
revelation  with  the  object  revealed,  and  introduce,  ere  we 
are  aware,  great  confusion  into  the  whole  subject. 

If,  then,  a  revelation  necessarily  signifies  a  mode  of  intel- 
ligence, we  have  next  to  determine  what  mode  of  intelligence 
it  is,  which  the  term  revelation  implies.  Now  we  have 
already  seen  that  there  are  two  modes  of  intelligence  possi- 
ble to  man  in  his  present  state.  These  are  the  intuitional 
and  the  logical.  In  the  former  case  we  arrive  at  truth,  by 
a  direct  and  immediate  gazing  upon  it.  The  subject  stands 
immediately  in  presence  of  the  object  and  perceives  it ; 
hence  we  term  the  process  in  some  instances  perception,  as 
when  we  come  in  contact  with  the  external  world  through 
the  senses ;  and  sometimes  intuition,  as  when  we  have  a 
direct  knowledge,  through  the  interior  eye  of  consciousness, 
of  higher  and  more  spiritual  realities.  In  the  logical  mode 
of  intelligence,  on  the  contrary,  we  arrive  at  truth  mediately, 
either  by  some  calculation  or  inference  of  our  own,  or  by 
some  definition  or  explanation  from  the  lips  of  another.  Thus 
all  the  different  methods  of  analysis,  of  reasoning,  of  defini- 
tion, of  explication,  belong  to  the  province  of  the  logical 
consciousness,  and  imply  simply  the  proper  use  of  the  fixed 
laws  of  thought,  within  the  sphere  of  our  present  experience. 

These  two  modes  of  intelligence,  then,  are  the  only  two, 
adapted  to  the  present  state  of  the  human  mind.  To  ima- 
gine a  third  mode  is  a  psychological  impossibility.  In  every 
case  we  shall  find  that  our  knowledge  comes  to  us  either 
by  a  direct  perception,  or  by  some  logical  process  of  defining, 
or  of  reasoning — a  process,  sometimes  palpable,  and  some- 
times almost  too  subtle,  to  be  distinctly  traced.  Accordingly, 
if  revelation  be  a  mode  or  process  of  intelligence,  it  must  rank 
generically  under  one  of  the  two  processes  just  described. 
In  saying  this  we  do  not  put  any  negation  or  restriction  upon 
7 


130  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  Divine  wisdom,  power  or  goodness,  in  employing  speci- 
fic and  extraordinary  means  for  the  purpose  of  human  en- 
lightenment. All  we  mean  is  this — that  whatever  means  are 
employed,  they  must  be  always  adapted  to  the  essential 
modes  of  human  intelligence ;  and  that  the  process  of  in- 
telligence itself,  in  the  case  of  a  Divine  revelation,  must, 
as  far  as  the  exercise  of  our  own  minds  is  concerned,  be  in 
accordance  with  the  spiritual  constitution  which  God  has 
himself  given  us.  Any  other  supposition  would  imply  a 
miraculous  reconstruction  of  the  human  mind  as  a  condition 
to  its  receiving  the  knowledge  supposed  ;  so  that  the  revela- 
tion would  not  be  a  revelation  made  to  man,  but  to  a  being 
miraculously  raised  above  the  level  of  humanity. 

In  considering,  then,  under  which  of  the  two  great  gen- 
eric modes  of  intelligence,  we  have  to  class  the  particular 
case  involved  in  the  idea  of  a  revelation,  we  can  have  but 
little  hesitation  in  referring  it  at  once  to  the  category  of  intu- 
ition. The  idea  of  a  revelation  is  universally  considered  to 
imply  a  case  of  intelligence  in  which  something  is  presented 
directly  to  the  mind  of  the  subject ;  in  which  it  is  conveyed 
by  the  immediate  agency  of  God  himself;  in  which  our  own 
efforts  would  have  been  unavailing  to  attain  the  same  con- 
ceptions ;  in  which  the  truth  communicated  could  not  have 
been  drawn  by  inference  from  any  data  previously  known  ; 
and,  finally,  in  which  the  whole  result  is  one  lying  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  logical  understanding. 

Now,  all  these  particulars  exactly  agree  with  the  nature 
and  general  laws  of  intuition.  Let  us  consider  them  briefly 
in  detail. 

First.  Intuition,  in  like  manner  as  revelation,  implies  that 
the  object  of  intelligence  is  presented  directly  to  our  contem- 
plation. So  closely  does  intuition  resemble  our  idea  of  a 
revelation  in  this  respect,  that  we  may  see  the  strictest  ana- 
logy between  them,  even  in  that  lower  kind  of  intuition 


ON    REVELATION.  131 


which  we  term  "  perception  by  the  senses."  The  philosophy 
of  perception  has,  by  general  consent,  evolved  the  fact,  that 
our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is  immediate — that  it  is 
not  gathered  by  influence,  nor  mediated  by  any  inward  rep- 
resentation ;  but  that  it  is  a  case  in  which  the  subject  stands 
directly  in  face  of  the  outward  reality,  and  at  once  knows  it. 
We  may  say,  therefore,  without  doing  any  violence  to  the 
ordinary  usage  of  the  word,  that  our  knowledge  of  the  mate- 
rial universe  is  a  revelation.  Imagine  that  we  had  been 
present  at  the  moment  when  light  and  order  first  broke  in 
upon  primeval  chaos  ;  imagine  that  from  a  state  of  darkness 
we  saw  the  universe  spring  forth  into  harmony  and  beauty ; 
should  we  not  have  regarded  the  conceptions  which  streamed 
in  upon  our  minds  as  being,  in  the  strictest  sense,  a  Divine 
revelation  ?  But  what  was  a  revelation  to  the  minds  which 
first  witnessed  it,  must,  as  far  as  its  real  nature  and  mode  of 
communication  is  concerned,  be  always  a  revelation.  The 
fact  that  the  world  is  a  standing  reality  into  which  we  are 
born,  and  amidst  which  we  live,  does  not  alter  its  relation  in 
any  respect  to  the  human  reason,  as  being  a  Divine  mani- 
festation. Taking,  therefore,  the  generic  sense  of  the  term 
revelation,  we  may  say  with  perfect  truth,  that  the  universe 
is  a  revelation  to  the  human  mind — as  much  a  revelation  as 
is  every  thing  else  which  comes  home  to  our  consciousness  by 
a  direct  and  immediate  presentation. 

Secondly.  Intuition,  in  the  same  manner  as  revelation, 
implies,  that  the  knowledge  involved  in  it  is  presented  to  us 
immediately  by  God.  This  is  true  respecting  those  ordinary 
conceptions  which  we  are  apt  to  separate  altogether  from  the 
Divine  operations.  Are  not  the  forms  of  beauty,  and  the 
high  ideas  embodied  in  nature,  immediate  manifestations  of 
the  thoughts  of  God  to  the  human  mind  ?  To  see  and  ap- 
preciate these,  there  must  exist,  on  the  one  hand,  a  perfect 
adaptation  in  the  human  faculties  for  the  purpose  ;  and  there 


132  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

must  be,  on  the  other  hand,  the  direct  presentation  of  the  ob- 
jective reality  to  them.  If  either  be  wanting,  there  is  no 
Divine  manifestation  ;  the  conditions  of  its  possibility  are  not 
fulfilled.  Considering,  therefore,  this  mutual  adaptation  of 
the  human  faculties  and  the  external  world  to  each  other ; 
considering  that  there  must  be  the  exact  sensibility  which  is 
requisite  in  the  one,  and  the  due  presentation  of  the  ideas  of 
God  embodied  in  the  forms  and  developments  of  the  other, 
can  we  reject  the  inference,  that  the  process  by  which  we 
gaze  admiringly  upon  the  wonders  of  nature,  is  a  mode  of 
intelligence  that  implies,  in  its  generic  sense,  a  direct  revela- 
tion to  us  from  God  himself?  The  case  is  still  plainer  when 
we  turn  to  the  higher  spheres  of  intuition ;  for  what  other 
can  we  say,  in  reference  to  the  conceptions  we  enjoy  of  the 
true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good,  than  that  they  are  placed 
before  our  mental  vision  by  the  direct  agency  of  Him  who  is 
the  source  and  centre  of  all  truth  and  goodness  and  beauty. 
Thirdly.  Intuition,  in  the  same  manner  as  revelation, 
implies,  that  the  knowledge  involved  in  it  could  not  have 
been  gained  by  our  own  efforts.  There  are  many  truths 
which  we  arrive  at  distinctly  by  the  effort  of  our  own  facul- 
ties consciously  directed  towards  them.  Of  this  kind,  for 
example,  is  the  whole  region  of  knowledge  which  comes  to 
us  by  inference  from  some  other  data.  The  great  peculiarity, 
on  the  contrary,  of  that  portion  of  our  knowledge  which 
comes  through  the  process  of  intuition  is,  that  it  is  not  de- 
rived from  any  previous  knowledge  whatever — that  there  is 
no  inference  in  the  case — that  we  receive  it  immediately  as 
a  direct  manifestation  to  our  minds.  In  this  respect,  accord- 
ingly, there  is  a  perfect  identity  between  the  idea  of  revela- 
tion and  that  of  intuition.  In  the  one  case,  as  in  the  other, 
there  are  no  antecedent  data  to  which  the  knowledge  implied 
in  it  can  be  referred ;  in  both  instances  alike,  there  is  a  re- 


ON    REVELATION.  133 


ception  of  truth  without  the  intermediate  step  of  any  inferen- 
tial'process  whatever. 

Lastly.  As  a  corollary  from  the  foregoing  consideration, 
we  may  add,  that  intuition,  in  the  same  manner  as  revelation, 
implies  a  kind  of  knowledge  which,  in  its  origin,  lies  beyond 
the  region  of  the  understanding.  The  logical  understanding, 
as  we  have  fully  explained,  supplies  only  the  form  of  our 
notions,  or  infers  one  truth  from  another ;  in  no  case  does  it 
furnish  the  elementary  material,  out  of  which  our  knowledge 
is  primarily  drawn.  Accordingly,  every  truth  which  is 
brought  before  it,  and  on  which  it  operates  as  the  bare 
material  of  its  notions,  must  have  come  essentially  through 
some  intuitional  process  before  it  could  be  laid  hold  of  by  the 
understanding,  or  attain  a  reflective  form.  Hence,  if  it  be 
the  peculiarity  of  a  revelation,  that  it  brings  us  in  contact 
with  knowledge  which,  in  its  origin,  lies  altogether  beyond 
the  region  of  the  understanding,  the  same  thing  is  equally 
true  of  intuition  likewise  ;  and  thus  establishes,  quo  ad  hoc, 
the  clear  similarity  between  them. 

Any  branch  of  our  intuitional  consciousness  will  serve 
as  an  illustration  of  this  point.  Take  the  perception  of 
beauty.  The  logical  understanding  we  feel  has  nothing  to 
do  with  this  perception  in  its  elementary  form.  True  it  is, 
that  we  may  seek  to  reduce  the  sense  of  the  beautiful  to  a 
scientific  expression,  by  the  logical  process  of  definition ;  but 
the  perception  itself  is  the  result  of  an  original  sensibility — 
it  is  an  intuition,  and,  generically  speaking,  may  be  termed 
a  revelation.  So  it  is,  also,  with  the  elementary  conceptions 
of  moral  truth.  The  idea  of  the  good — the  eternal  law  of 
right, — cannot  be  inferred  ;  nor  can  it  even  be  grasped  sim- 
ply by  the  understanding.  It  may,  indeed,  be  thrown  by  it 
into  a  scientific  form ;  but  the  elemental  idea  comes  directly 
from  the  moral  sense ;  it  is  an  intuition  in  like  manner  as  is 
the  perception  of  beauty,  and  may  be  termed,  with  equal 


134  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

propriety,  a  revelation.  All  these. points,  accordingly,  which 
we  have  enumerated,  tend  to  show  us,  that  if  the  term  reve- 
lation imply,  generically,  a  form  of  intelligence,  it  must  be- 
long to  that  particular  mode  of  intellectual  activity  which  we 
assign  to  the  intuitional  consciousness. 

In  order  to  demonstrate,  however,  that  this  conclusion  is 
fully  correct,  we  ought  not  only  to  prove  a  series  of  resem- 
blances between  the  idea  of  revelation  and  that  of  intuition, 
but  we  ought  also  to  show,  that  the  whole  of  the  logical  pro- 
cesses of  the  human  mind  are  such,  that  the  idea  of  a  revela- 
tion is  altogether  incompatible  with  them — that  they  are  in 
no  sense  open  to  its  influence,  and  that  they  can  neither  be 
improved  or  assisted  by  it. 

All  our  logical  processes  of  mind — all  the  operations  of 
the  understanding,  take  place  in  accordance  with  the  most 
fixed  and  determinate  laws — those  which  are  usually  termed 
the  laws  of  thought.  Whatever  can  be  inferred  by  these 
laws,  whatever  derived  in  any  way  from  them,  must  be 
strictly  within  the  natural  capacity  of  the  human  mind  to 
attain.  If,  on  the  contrary,  there  be  any  thing  which  these 
laws  of  thought  are  naturally  unable  to  reach,  no  extraneous 
influence  whatever  could  give  them  the  power  of  reaching  it. 
The  laws  of  thought  are  immovable ;  to  alter  them  would 
be  to  subvert  the  whole  constitution  of  the  human  intellect. 
Whatever  is  once  within  their  reach,  is  always  so.  Cor- 
rect reasoning  could  never  be  subverted  by  revelation  itself; 
bad  reasoning  could  never  be  improved  by  it.  In  short,  we 
may  say,  that  the  logical  processes  are  legitimately  confined 
within  the  actual  region  of  our  present  experience  ;  for  we 
can  never  reason  about  objects  of  which  we  have  no  present 
idea,  never  investigate  truths  of  which  we  have  no  concep- 
tion, never  employ  our  understanding  upon  a  sphere  which 
lies  altogether  beyond  the  present  range  of  our  mental 
vision. 


ON    REVELATION.  135 


This  is  true  absolutely  with  respect  to  all  the  different 
processes  of  the  logical  consciousness,  whatever  they  may 
be.  Take,  for  example,  definition.  Definition,  it  is  evident, 
implies  some  previous  knowledge  of  the  thing  to  be  defined  ; 
neither  can  the  most  accurate  definition  convey  to  any  mind 
the  notion  of  a  reality,  of  which  it  has  never  had  any  kind  of 
personal  experience.  Where  no  such  experience  exists,  we 
can  only  attempt  to  convey  the  idea  in  question  by  com- 
paring it  with  some  other  experience  which  it  most  nearly 
resembles. 

Take  again  the  logical  process  termed  reasoning.  It  is 
supposed  by  many,  that  by  means  of  reasoning  we  can  ar- 
rive at  conceptions,  of  which  we  had  no  sort  of  previous  idea 
whatever.  This  supposition,  however,  it  is  almost  needless 
to  say,  will  not  bear  examination.  Whether  our  reasoning 
be  inductive  or  deductive,  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  is  al- 
ways virtually  involved  in  the  premises.  To  reason  at  all, 
we  must  have  certain  data,  and  must  also  employ  distinct 
and  intelligible  terms ;  but,  it  is  evident,  these  data  and 
these  terms  always  imply  an  amount  of  experience  in  the 
question,  without  which  all  our  reasoning  would  be  empty, 
and  beyond  which  our  conclusion  can  never  go.  Logical 
reasoning  alters  the  relations  of  our  ideas — it  never  trans- 
cends them.  It  makes  our  knowledge  more  distinct ;  it  does 
not  expand  the  horizon  of  our  mental  vision.  As  far  as  de- 
finition and  reasoning  are  concerned,  therefore,  they  have 
manifestly  no  community  whatever  with  the  process  of  intel- 
ligence which  we- term  revelation.  The  object  of  a  revela- 
tion is  to  bring  us  altogether  into  another  and  higher  region 
of  actual  experience,  to  increase  our  mental  vision,  to  give 
us  new  data  from  which  we  may  draw  new  inferences ;  and 
all  this  lies  quite  apart  from  the  activity  of  the  logical 
faculty. 

There  is,  however,  one  more  process  coming  within  the 


136  PHILOSOPHY   OF    RELIGION. 

province  of  the  logical  faculty,  which  might  appear  at  first 
sight  to  be  far  more  nearly  compatible  with  the  idea  of  a  re- 
velation, and  through  the  medium  of  which,  indeed,  many 
suppose  that  the  actual  revelations  of  God  to  man  have  been 
made.  The  process  to  which  I  refer  is  that  of  verbal  expo- 
sition. Could  not  a  revelation  from  God,  it  might  be  natu- 
rally urged,  consist  in  an  exposition  of  truth,  made  to  us  by 
the  lips  or  from  the  pen  of  an  inspired  messenger,  that  expo- 
sition coming  distinctly  under  the  idea  of  a  logical  explica- 
tion of  doctrines,  which  it  is  for  mankind  to  receive,  as  sent 
to  us  on  Divine  authority  ? 

Now  this  is  a  case  of  considerable  complexity,  and  one 
which  we  must  essay  as  clearly  as  possible  to  unravel. 
First  of  all,  then,  we  have  no  doubt  whatever  but  that  there 
have  been  agents  commissioned  by  God  to  bring  mankind  to 
a  proper  conception  of  Divine  Truth,  and  comprehension  of 
the  Divine  will.  But  now  let  us  look  a  little  more  closely 
into  their  real  mission,  and  consider  the  means  by  which 
alone  it  was  possible  for  them  to  fulfil  it. 

These  Divine  messengers,  we  will  suppose,  address  their 
fellow-men  in  the  words  and  phrases  they  are  accustomed  to 
hear,  and  seek  in  this  way  to  expound  to  them  the  truth  of 
God.  If  we  imagine  ourselves,  then,  to  be  the  listeners,  it 
is  needless  to  say,  that  so  long  as  they  treat  of  ideas  which 
lie  within  the  range  of  our  present  experience,  we  should  be 
well  able  at  once  to  comprehend  them,  and  to  judge  of  the 
grounds  on  which  they  urge  them  upon  our  attention.  But 
it  is  manifest  that  such  a  discourse  as  I  describe  could  in  no 
proper  sense  be  termed  a  revelation.  So  long  as  the  Divine 
teacher  keeps  within  the  range  of  our  present  intellectual 
experience,  he  might  indeed  throw  things  into  a  new  light, 
he  might  point  out  more  accurately  their  connection,  he 
might  show  us  at  once  their  importance  and  their  logical 
consistency  ;  but  all  this  would  not  amount  to  a  revelation, 


ON    REVELATION.  137 


it  would  give  us  no  immediate  manifestation  of  truth  from 
God,  it  would  offer  no  conceptions  lying  beyond  the  range  of 
our  present  data,  it  would  quite  fail  in  bringing  us  into  con- 
tact with  new  realities,  nor  would  it  at  all  extend  the  sweep 
of  our  mental  vision.  Mere  exposition  always  presupposes 
some  familiarity  with  the  subject  in  hand  ;  one  idea  has  al- 
ways, in  such  a  case,  to  be  explained  by  another ;  but  sup- 
posing there  to  be  an  entire  blindness  of  mind  upon  the  whole 
question,  then  it  is  manifest  that  all  mere  logical  definition 
and  explication  is  for  the  time  entirely  thrown  away. 

Illustrations  of  this  are  as  numerous  as  are  the  sciences, 
or  the  subjects  of  human  research.  Let  a  man,  for  exam- 
ple, totally  unacquainted  with  the  matter,  hear  another  con- 
verse with  the  greatest  clearness  about  differential  quantities 
in  physics  or  mathematics — how  much  of  the  explanation 
would  he  be  able  to  comprehend  ?  He  has  not  yet  the  expe- 
riences of  space,  number,  or  motion,  on  which  the  intelligi- 
bleness  of  the  whole  depends ;  and  in  want  of  these  the 
whole  of  the  explanations  offered  are  involved  in  the  darkest 
obscurity.  Take  up  any  other  subject,  such  as  biology, 
ethics,  or  metaphysics,  in  their  higher  and  more  recondite 
branches.  Explication  here  is  of  no  avail,  unless  the  mind 
first  realize  for  itself  and  reproduce  in  its  own  thinking,  the 
fundamental  conceptions  of  the  teacher.  What  is  true  of 
perceptive  teaching  in  the  case  of  the  infant,  is  true,  in  a 
modified  sense,  of  all  human  education,  to  the  most  advanced 
stage  of  intelligence.  You  must  in  every  instance  alike 
take  proper  means  to  awaken  the  power  of  vision  within, 
to  furnish  direct  experiences  to  the  mind,  in  brief,  to  give 
clear  intuitions  of  the  elements  of  truth,  before  you  can 
produce  any  effect  by  the  most  complete  process  of  defining 
or  explanation. 

Let  us  return,  then,  to  the  supposed  case  of  the  inspired 
teacher,  and  proceed  with  our  analysis  of  the  conditions  that 
7* 


138  PHILOSOPHY   OF    RELIGION. 

are  necessary  to  his  becoming  the  medium  of  a  revelation, 
properly  so  called.  We  have  seen,  that  if  he  always  kept 
within  the  region  of  our  present  experience,  there  would  be 
no  fresh  revelation  made  to  us  at  all :  but  now,  let  us  ima- 
gine him  to  transcend  the  present  sphere  of  our  mental  vi- 
sion ; — it  is  evident  from  what  I  have  just  said,  that  in  such 
a  case  we  should  be  by  no  means  in  a  condition  to  compre- 
hend his  meaning;  on  the  supposition,  of  course,  that  he  was 
to  confine  himself  to  mere  exposition.  The  only  way  in 
which  he  could  give  us  a  revelation  of  truth  hitherto  unreal- 
ized, would  be  by  becoming  the  agent  of  elevating  our  in- 
ward religious  consciousness  up  to  the  same  or  a  similar 
standard  as  his  own ;  which  is  the  same  thing  as  if  we  had 
said  that  all  revelation,  properly  so  called,  can  be  made  to 
us  primarily  only  in  the  form  of  religious  intuition. 

The  matters  on  which  Christianity  treats  (to  take  this 
now  as  our  example)  are  extremely  elevated,  and  very  far 
removed  from  the  ordinary  sphere  of  human  thought.  To  a 
man  utterly  ignorant  of  all  spiritual  conceptions,  and  alto- 
gether insensible  to  Divine  things,  the  mere  exposition  of  the 
truths  and  doctrines  of  Christianity  is  useless.  He  does  not 
grasp  them  at  all  in  their  proper  meaning  and  intensity  : 
ranging  as  they  do  beyond  the  sphere  of  his  present  experi- 
ence, the  very  terms  of  the  propositions  employed  awaken  no 
corresponding  idea  within  his  mind. 

Imagine  yourself,  by  definitions  and  explications  addressed 
to  the  understanding,  attempting  to  make  a  blind  man,  who 
had  never  gazed  upon  nature,  comprehend  the  exquisite 
beauties  in  form,  hue,  and  graceful  motion,  presented  to  the 
eye  by  a  summer's  landscape.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  all 
your  descriptions  would  fall  infinitely  short  of  the  actual 
reality — that  they  would  not  convey  the  hundredth  part  of 
what  one  minute's  gaze  upon  the  scene  would  spontaneously 
present — that  he  could  only  conceive,  indeed,  of  any  portion 


ON    REVELATION.  139 


of  it  by  analogies  taken  from  the  other  senses.  The  reason 
of  this  is,  that  he  knows  the  thing  only  formally,  by  logical 
exposition  ;  he  has  never  had  the  proper  experiences,  never 
the  direct  sense-perceptions,  which  are  absolutely  necessary 
to  a  full  realization  of  it. 

And  so  is  it,  mutatis  mutandis,  with  religious  truth.  You 
may  expound  and  define  and  argue  upon  the  high  themes 
which  Christianity  presents  to  the  contemplation ;  but  unless 
a  man  have  the  intuitions,  on  which  all  mere  verbal  exposi- 
tions must  be  grounded,  there  is  no  revelation  of  the  spiritual 
reality  to  his  mind,  and  there  can  be  no  clearer  perception  of 
the  actual  truth,  than  there  is  to  the  blind  man  of  the  vision 
of  beauty  which  lies  veiled  in  darkness  around  him. 

In  making  these  statements,  we  are  simply  putting  in  a 
more  definite  form  what  almost  all  classes  of  Christians  fully 
admit,  and  what  they  are  perpetually  asserting.  Is  it  not 
allowed  that  men  even  of  intellect  and  learning  may  read 
the  Bible  through  and  through  again,  and  yet  may  have  no 
spiritual  perception  of  the  realities  to  which  it  refers  ?  Do 
we  not  constantly  hear  it  asserted  that  Divine  truth  must  be 
spiritually  understood  ?  Nay,  does  not  St.  Paul  himself  tell 
us  that  the  things  of  the  Spirit  of  God  must  be  spiritually 
discerned  ?  And  what  does  all  this  amount  to,  but  that  there 
must  be  the  awakening  of  the  religious  consciousness  before 
the  truth  is  actually  revealed  to  us,  and  that  it  can  only  be 
revealed  to  us  at  all,  essentially  speaking,  in  the  form  of  reli- 
gious intuition.  The  severest  criticism,  the  hardest  study, 
the  most  patient  poring  over  the  propositions  in  which  the 
faith  of  Christians  is  embodied,  confessedly  do  not  alone  suf- 
fice to  give  to  any  one  a  single  perception  of  truth  in  its  spi- 
ritual intensity.  This  is,  in  fact,  nothing  but  saying  that  the 
logical  understanding  can  never  perform  for  us  the  part  of 
the  higher  or  intuitional  consciousness. 

If  we  consider  attentively  the  whole  process  by  which 


140  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Christianity  has  been  revealed  to  man,  we  shall  see  that  it 
has  been  carried  on  precisely  in  accordance  with  the  princi- 
ples above  stated.  The  aim  of  revelation  has  not  been  for- 
mally to  expound  a  system  of  doctrine  to  the  understanding, 
but  to  educate  the  mind  of  man  gradually  to  an  inward  ap- 
preciation of  the  truth  concerning  his  own  relation  to  God. 
Judaism  was  a  propaedeutic  to  Christianity ;  but  there  was 
no  formal  definition  of  any  one  spiritual  truth  in  the  whole  of 
that  economy.  The  purpose  of  it  was  to  school  the  mind  to 
spiritual  contemplation ;  to  awaken  the  religious  conscious- 
ness by  types  and  symbols,  and  other  perceptive  means,  to 
the  realization  of  certain  great  spiritual  ideas  ;  and  to  furnish 
words  and  analogies  in  which  the  truths  of  Christianity  could 
be  embodied  and  proclaimed  to  the  world. 

If  we 'pass  on  to  the  Christian  revelation  itself,  the  mode 
of  procedure  we  find  was  generically  the  same.  There  was 
no  formal  exposition  of  Christian  doctrine  in  the  whole  of 
the  discourses  of  the  Saviour.  His  life  and  teaching — his 
character — his  death  and  resurrection — all  appealed  to  the 
deeper  religious  nature  of  man  ;  they  were  adapted  to  awa- 
ken it  to  a  new  and  higher  activity  ;  instead  of  offering  a  mere 
explication  to  the  understanding,  they  were  intended  to  fur- 
nish altogether  new  experiences,  to  widen  the  sphere  of  our 
spiritual  insight,  to  embody  a  revelation  from  God. 

The  apostles  followed  in  the  same  course.  They  did 
not  start  from  Jerusalem  with  a  system  of  doctrine  to  pro- 
pound intellectually  to  the  world.  It  would  have  been  no 
revelation  to  the  world  if  they  had ;  for  with  his  moral  and 
spiritual  nature  sunk  down  into  insensibility  and  sin,  man 
would  have  had  no  real  spiritual  perception  associated  with 
the  very  terms  in  which  their  arguments  and  propositions 
must  have  been  couched.  The  apostles  went  forth  to  awa- 
ken man's  power  of  spiritual  intuition  ;  to  impress  upon  the 
world  the  great  conceptions  of  sin,  of  righteousness,  of  judg- 


ON    REVELATION.  141 


ment  to  come,  of  salvation,  of  purity,  and  of  heavenly  love. 
This  they  did  by  their  lives,  their  teaching,  their  spiritual 
intensity  in  action  and  suffering,  their  whole  testimony  to  the 
word,  the  person,  the  death,  and  the  resurrection  of  the 
Saviour.  In  the  case  of  St.  Paul  alone  do  we  find  any  ap- 
proach to  a  systematic  inculcation  of  truth  by  logical  expo- 
sition addressed  to  the  understanding ;  and  in  this  case  we 
must  remember  that  the  letters  he  wrote  were  intended  for 
those  who  were  already  Christians,  whose  religious  nature 
was  already  awakened,  who  had  already  enjoyed,  in  this 
awakening,  the  revelations  of  Christianity  properly  so  called. 
His  writings,  therefore,  were  designed  not  so  much  to  be  a 
revelation  of  truth,  as  a  further  explication  of  it.  Based 
upon  a  revelation  already  made,  they  were  adapted  simply 
to  bring  the  ideas  it  involved  into  a  more  explicit  and  some- 
what reflective  form,  and  thus  to  furnish  us  with  an  inspired 
authority  for  the  value"  of  systematic  theology  in  the  Church. 

Thus,  then,  we  see  that  in  the  whole  process  of  revelation 
the  wisdom  of  God  has  made  use  of  the  fixed  laws  and  the  na- 
tural processes  of  the  human  mind.  Knowing,  as  he  does,  far 
better  than  we  do  ourselves,  what  is  necessaiy  to  bring  man- 
kind to  a  due  appreciation  of  his  own  Divine  will,  he  has  in- 
stituted a  series  of  means  by  which  the  world  should  be  gra- 
dually awakened  to  a  sense  of  heavenly  and  eternal  reali- 
ties. In  this  awakening  all  revelation  essentially  consists  ; 
and  it  is  only  when  it  has  actually  taken  place  that  Chris- 
tian theology  is  possible. 

We  may  say,  therefore,  by  way  of  conclusion,  that  reve- 
lation is  a  process  of  the  intuitional  consciousness,  gazing 
upon  eternal  verities ;  while  theology  is  the  reflection  of  the 
understanding  upon  those  vital  intuitions,  so  as  to  reduce 
them  to  a  logical  and  scientific  expression. 

Having  thus  determined  the  essential  nature  of  revela- 
tion, and  identified  it  with  a  particular  form  of  intuition,  we 


142  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

shall,  in  conclusion,  draw  one  or  two  inferences  from  the 
subject  as  it  now  presents  itself  to  us. 

1.  We  learn,  that  the  development  of  our  religious  know- 
ledge follows  exactly  the  same  law  (so  far  as  purely  mental 
processes  are  concerned,)  as  do  all  the  other  branches  of  hu- 
man research.  To  those  who  have  studied  the  scientific  me- 
thods of  human  investigation,  as  developed  by  Professor 
Whewell  in  his  "  Philosophy  of  Induction,"  it  will  be  ob- 
vious that  there  are  two  spheres  of  mental  activity  always 
involved  in  the  search  after  truth.  There  must  be  the  ac- 
quisition of  clear  conceptions  on  the  one  side — there  must  be 
the  logical  processes  of  induction  or  deduction  on  the  other. 
In  the  former  of  these,  that  is,  in  our  conceptions,  the  whole 
extent  of  our  knowledge  on  any  particular  subject  is  im- 
plicitly involved.  It  is  these  which  mark  the  present  ex- 
tent of  our  actual  experience,  and  fix  the  boundaries  within 
which  logical  processes  can  be  valid  and  fruitful.  To  get  a 
definite  and  material  advance  in  our  knowledge  on  any  sub- 
ject, there  must  be  a  widening  and  a  clearing  of  our  con- 
ceptions themselves,  as  well  as  a  farther  application  of  induc- 
tive or  deductive  reasoning.  To  put  the  matter  into  other 
words,  we  are  indebted  to  the  power  of  intuition  to  furnish 
the  essential  basis  of  our  knowledge  upon  every  possible  sub- 
ject of  scientific  research  ;  and  it  is  only  as  the  power  of 
intuition  increases,  that  logical  appliances  can  be  of  any 
avail. 

Thus,  universally,  the  primary  data  of  all  branches, 
even  of  scientific  truth,  come  to  us  by  a  direct  and  intuitional 
process  ;  that  is,  using  the  word  in  its  broad  and  generic 
sense,  by  an  immediate  revelation  from  God.  The  mould- 
ing of  this  revelation  into  the  form  of  a  scientific  construc- 
tion, is  the  work  of  the  natural  understanding  operating  upon 
the  data  thus  furnished^  Exactly,  in  the  same  way,  does 
our  religious  knowledge  come  to  us  primarily,  by  a  direct 


ON    REVELATION.  143 


revelation  addressed  to  the  intuitional  faculty ;  while  the 
work  of  constructing  a  formal  theology  is  performed  by 
using  the  same  logical  aids  and  appliances  as  are  employed 
in  every  other  branch  of  science  whatever. 

2.  We  infer,  that  the  Bible  cannot,  in  strict  accuracy  of 
language,  be  termed  a  revelation,  since  a  revelation  always 
implies  an  actual  process  of  intelligence  in  a  living  mind  ; 
but  it  contains  the  records  in  which  those  minds  who  en- 
joyed the  preliminary  training,  or  the  first  brighter  revelation 
of  Christianity,  have  described  the  scenes  which  awakened 
their  own  religious  nature  to  new  life,  and  the  high  ideas 
and  aspirations  to  which  that  new  life  gave  origin.  The  ac- 
tual revelation  was  not  made  primarily  in  the  book,  but  in 
the  mind  of  the  writers ;  and  the  power  which  that  book 
possesses  of  conveying  a  revelation  to  us,  consists  in  its  aid- 
ing in  the  awakenment  and  elevation  of  our  religious  con- 
sciousness ;  in  its  presenting  to  us  a  mirror  of  the  history  of 
Christ ;  in  its  depicting  the  intense  religious  life  of  his  first 
followers ;  and  in  giving  us  the  letter  through  which  the  spi- 
rit of  truth  may  be  brought  home  in  vital  experience  to  the 
human  heart. 

Christianity  was  revealed  to  the  world  long  before  the 
New  Testament  was  written.  Those  for  whom  it  was  writ- 
ten had  been  already  awakened  to  its  great  realities  ;  so  that 
to  them  it  was  but  a  description  of  that  which  already  existed 
vitally  in  the  Church.  The  real  revelation,  in  a  word,  was 
made  to  their  own  hearts, — produced  there  by  the  agency  of 
Christ's  inspired  messengers ;  but  the  Word,  through  God's 
wisdom  and  mercy,  was  written  in  order  to  be  a  lasting  me- 
morial, throughout  all  ages,  of  the  life  and  teaching  of 
Christ ;  and  a  representation  of  the  first  mighty  influence  of 
Spirit  and  truth  upon  the  religious  consciousness  of  huma- 
nity. The  Bible,  be  it  remembered,  came  forth  from  the 
minds  of  the  writers ;  and  it  can  only  contain,  in  a  verbal 


144  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


statement,  what  already  existed   there    as   a  living  experi- 
ence. 

3.  We  remark,  that  the  difference  between  revelation, 
considered  in  that  broad  generic  sense  in  which  it  can  be 
identified  with  the  whole  procedure  of  the  intuitional  faculty, 
and  viewed  in  that  specific  sense  in  which  it  applies  to  Chris- 
tian truth, — lies  not  at  all  in  the  subjective  processes  of  the 
human  mind,  but  in  the  special  means  employed  -by  God  to 
superinduce  the  highest  spiritual  intuitions  at  some  particular 
period  of  the  world.  Intuition  is  at  all  times,  subjectively, 
the  same  in  its  essential  character,  whatever  be  the  concrete 
reality  upon  which  we  gaze :  hence  the  whole  peculiarity,  in 
the  case  of  the  Christian  revelation,  centres  in  those  Divine 
arrangements,  through  the  medium  of  which  the  loftiest  and 
purest  conceptions  of  truth  were  brought  before  the  imme- 
diate consciousness  of  the  apostles,  and,  through  them,  of  the 
whole  age ;  at  a  time,  too,  when,  in  other  respects,  the  most 
universal  demoralization  abounded  on  every  side. 

In  reducing  the  idea  of  revelation,  therefore,  to  the  general 
category  of  intuition,  we  are  not  by  any  means  intending  to 
thrust  away  out  of  view  the  Divine  agencies  which  were  em- 
ployed in  introducing  the  Christian  revelation  specifically  into 
the  world.  Our  object  has  rather  been  to  analyze  what  is 
included  in  the  very  conception  of  revelation  itself,  and  to 
infer  from  thence  what  part  of  the  process,  through  which 
the  Christian  consciousness  was  first  awakened  in  the  depths 
of  man's  nature,  was  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
the  human  spirit,  and  what  part  of  it  depended  upon  specific 
and  Divine  arrangements.  The  act  of  revelation  itself  we 
have  found  is  always  a  case  of  pure  intuition  dimly  mediated, 
and  so  far  the  process  is  altogether  in  accordance  with  the 
spiritual  laws  of  man's  nature  ;  but  the  arrangements  through 
which  these  particular  objects  were  presented  to  the  eye  of 
the  soul  at  that  particular  time,  and  the  agencies  by  which 
its  power  of  vision  was  strengthened  first  of  all  to  behold 


ON    REVELATION.  145 


them, — these  we  cannot  but  attribute  to  a  Divine  plan,  alto- 
gether distinct  from  the  general  scheme  of  Providence  as  re- 
gards human  development.  "On  this  principle  alone  can  we 
account  for  the  outburst  of  heavenly  light  from  the  gross 
darkness  and  moral  disorganization  both  of  the  Jewish  and 
the  heathen  world. 

The  state  of  mind,  then,  which  we  suppose  to  exist  as 
consequent  upon  these  special  and  Divine  arrangements — a 
state  in  which  there  is  involved  an  extraordinary  and  mira- 
culous elevation  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  certain  cho- 
sen individuals,  for  the  express  illumination  of  humanity  at 
large, — this  is  what  we  designate  by  the  term  inspiration. 
Accordingly,  this  term,  as  including  in  it  all  that  is  specific 
and  peculiar  in  the  Christian  revelation,  will  demand  a  sepa- 
rate consideration  in  our  next  chapter. 


POSTSCRIPT  TO  CHAPTER  V. 

The  history  of  the  Idea  of  revelation  presents  in  its  various  defini- 
tions a  great  intermingling  of  the  natural  and  supernatural  elements. 
In  the  earlier  and  apostolic  periods  the  terms  qavigovv  and  OTTO- 
xalvTiTtiv  were  used  very  generally  in  reference  to  any  kind  of 
Divine  manifestation.  Thus  Paul  uses  them  (Rom.  i.  19)  in  refer- 
ence to  the  revelation  of  the  universe  to  the  heathen  :  To 
tov  &tov  (pavfQov  tanv  tv  aviou;'  o  6fo<;  yctQ  avroii; 
It  was  Augustine  who  first  brought  the  notion,  through  the  great 
logical  tendency  of  his  mind,  into  a  more  defined  and  determinate 
form.  Since  that  time  the  distinction  between  a  natural  and,  a  super- 
natural revelation  has  been  more  or  less  current  in  all  theological 
disquisitions. 

The  introduction  of  a  more  profound  philosophical  analysis  in 
modern  times,  has  again  pointed  to  the  fundamental  element  as  being 
generically  the  same  in  all  revelation  of  whatever  kind;  but  just  in 
proportion  as  the  subjective  processes  have  been  made  more  promi- 
nent on  the  one  side,  or  the  objective  occasions  of  them  on  the 


146  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

• 

other,  has  the  idea  of  revelation  presented  a  greater  or  a  less  degree 
of  the  supernatural,  as  necessarily  attaching  to  it.  Klein  gives  the 
following  view  of  the  question : — Revelation,  he  considers,  is  of  two 
kinds — universal  and  special.  Universal  revelation  is,  first,  outward, 
i.  e.,  given  to  us  through  external  nature,  or  the  providential  circum- 
stances of  nations ;  and  secondly,  inward,  made  to  us  by  the  light  of 
pure  reason.  Again,  special  revelation  is,  first,  immediate  or  super- 
natural, as  shown  outwardly  by  such  events  as  the  giving  of  the 
law  on  Mount  Sinai,  or  inwardly  by  direct  mental  illumination  of 
inspired  men ;  and  secondly,  mediate  or  natural,  as  shown  outwardly 
by  the  Divine  direction  of  outward  circumstances,  and  inwardly  by 
the  gift  of  extraordinary  talents. 

This  classification  may  be  quite  correct  and  useful,  but  it  does  not 
at  all  aid  us  in  the  philosophical  comprehension  of  the  subject.  Of 
more  purely  philosophical  definitions  we  shall  present  the  following 
to  the  consideration  of  those  who  may  be  interested  in  the  ques- 
tion:— 

TWESTEN. — "  Die  Aeusserung  der  gottlichen  Gnade.  zum  Heile 
der  gefallenen  Menschen  in  ihrer  ursprunglichen  Wirkung  auf  die 
menschliche  Erkenntniss."  FISCHER. — "Reale  Einwerkung  des 
gOttlicheu  Wesens,  auf  das  intelligible  Wesen  der  Natur-causalitaten, 
wodurch  ihr  Wesen  und  ihre  Krafte  eigentlich  afficirt  gesteigert 
wohl  auch  theilweise  umgewandelt  werden."  DE  WETTE. — "  Der 
Glaube  an  Offenbarung  est  einestheiles  nichts  als  die  Anerkennung 
der  vmbedingten  Wahrheit,  oder  des  ZusammentrefFens  einer 
Erscheinung  mit  dem  Urbild  der  Vernunft ;  andertheils  die  Anerken- 
nung der  unbedingten  Freiheit  in  Hinsicht  des  Ursprungs." 
BOCKSHAMMER. — "  Die  natiirliche  fortwahrende  Gemeinschaft  des 
menschlichen  Geistes  mit  dem  Gottlichen." 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ON     INSPIRATION. 

<  IT  will  be  seen  by  the  attentive  reader,  that  we  are  proceed- 
ing in  the  present  discussion  from  the  subjective  towards 
the  more  objective  phenomena  connected  with  the  philosophy 
of  religion.  In  the  preceding  chapter,  we  made  our  first 
transition  from  what  was  purely  of  a  subjective  character, 
that  is,  from  the  region  of  man's  inward  religious  experience, 
to  the  more  objective  side  of  the  question.  Revelation,  we 
saw,  includes  in  its  very  idea  both  elements  combined :  it  is 
a  form  of  intelligence  in  which  the  subject  comes  imme- 
diately in  contact  with  the  object,  and  contemplates  it  in  its 
concrete  unity. 

We  have  now  to  proceed  one  step  further  in  the  same 
objective  direction.  If  Revelation,  generically  considered, 
involves  an  immediate  intuition  of  Divine  realities,  then  the 
Christian  revelation,  as  one  specific  case  of  intuition,  involves 
a  perception  of  truths  so  great,  so  sublime,  so  elevated  above 
the  natural  region  of  human' contemplation,  that  their  pre- 
sentation can  only  be  accounted  for  by  the  supposition  of 
special  arrangements  for  the  purpose.  All  revelation,  as 
we  showed,  implies  two  conditions ;  it  implies,  namely,  an 
intelligible  object  presented,  and  a  given  power  of  recipiency 
in  the  subject ;  and  in  popular  language,  when  speaking  of 
the  manifestation  of  Christianity  to  the  world,  we  confine 
the  term  revelation  to  the  former  of  these  conditions,  and 
appropriate  the  word  inspiration  to  designate  the  latter. 


148  PHILOSOPHY   OF    RELIGION. 

According  to  this  convenient  distinction,  therefore,  we 
may  say,  that  revelation,  in  the  Christian  sense,  indicates 
that  act  of  Divine  power  by  which  God  presents  the  realities 
of  the  spiritual  world  immediately  to  the  human  mind  ; 
while  inspiration  denotes  that  especial  influence  wrought 
upon  the  faculties  of  the  subject,  by  virtue  of  which  he  is 
able  to  grasp  these  realities  in  their  perfect  fulness  and 
integrity.  God  made  a  revelation  of  himself  to  the  world 
in  Jesus  Christ ;  but  it  was  the  inspiration  of  the  apostles 
which  enabled  them  clearly  to  discern  it.  Here,  of  course, 
the  objective  arrangements  and  the  subjective  influences  per- 
fectly blend  in  the  production  of  the  whole  result ;  so  that 
whether  we  speak  of  revelation  or  of  inspiration,  we  are,  in 
fact,  merely  looking  at  two  different  sides  of  that  same  great 
act  of  Divine  beneficence  and  mercy,  by  which  the  truths 
of  Christianity  have  been  brought  home  to  the  human  con- 
sciousness. 

Revelation  and  inspiration,  then,  indicate  one  united  pro- 
cess, the  result  of  which  upon  the  human  mind  is,  to  produce 
a  state  of  spiritual  intuition,  whose  phenomena  are  so  ex- 
traordinary, that  we  at  once  separate  the  agency  by  which 
they  are  produced  from  any  of  the  ordinary  principles  of 
human  development.  And  yet  this  agency  is  applied  in 
perfect  consistency  with  the  laws  and  natural  operations  of 
our  spiritual  nature.  Inspiration  does  not  imply  any  thing 
generically  new  in  the  actual  processes  of  the  human  mind ; 
it  does  not  involve  any  form  of  intelligence  essentially  dif- 
ferent from  what  we  already  possess ;  it  indicates  rather  the 
elevation  of  the  religious  consciousness,  and  with  it,  of  course, 
the  power  of  spiritual  vision,  to  a  degree  of  intensity  peculiar 
to  the  individuals  thus  highly  favored  by  God.  We  must 
regard  the  whole  process  of  inspiration,  accordingly,  as 
being  in  no  sense  mechanical,  but  purely  dynamical :  involv- 
ing, not  a  novel  and  supernatural  faculty,  but  a  faculty, 


ON    INSPIRATION.  149 


already  enjoyed,  elevated  supernalurally  to  an  extraordinary 
power  and  susceptibility ;  indicating,  in  fact,  an  inward 
nature  so  perfectly  harmonized  to  the  Divine,  so  freed  from 
the  distorting  influences  of  prejudice,  passion,  and  sin,  so 
simply  recipient  of  the  Divine  ideas  circumambient  around 
it,  so  responsive  in  all  its  strings  to  the  breath  of  heaven, — 
that  truth  leaves  an  impress  upon  it  which  answers  perfectly 
to  its  objective  reality.  This  being  the  theory  respecting 
the  nature  of  inspiration,  which  we  are  led  to  assume  from 
the  preceding  analysis,  we  shall  attempt  in  the  present 
chapter  to  develope  it  more  fully,  and  show  its  consistency 
with  the  whole  phenomena  of  the  case. 

In  order  to  do  this  the  more  satisfactorily,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary first  of  all  to  turn  our  attention  to  the  mechanical  view 
of  the  question,  and  point  out  some  of  the  difficulties  with 
which  it  is  encumbered.  There  are  various  modes  we  know  in 
which  the  mechanical  idea  of  inspiration  has  been  presented, 
and  various  grounds  on  which  its  accuracy  has  been  pleaded. 
For  example,  the  enjoyment  of  the  gift  of  inspiration  has 
been  very  frequently  blended  with  the  power  of  working  mi- 
racles ;  and  as  this  power  evidently  involves  some  capacity 
altogether  new  and  supernatural,  it  has  been  tacitly  assumed 
that  inspiration  presupposes  the  same  thing. 

Now,  it  is  not  our  purpose  at  present  to  discuss  the  nature 
of  miracles,  philosophically  considered,  nor-to  decide  precise- 
ly what  was  their  object  in  the  economy  of  Divine  Provi- 
dence :  all  we  have  to  show  is,  that  they  have  nothing  imme- 
diately to  do  with  inspiration  ;  that  miraculous  powers,  on 
the  one  side,  are  no  positive  proof  of  their  agent  being  in- 
spired ;  that  inspiration,  on  the  other  side,  is  admitted  to 
exist  where  no  miraculous  powers  have  been  granted.  For 
the  proof  of  this,  let  us  turn  first  to  the  Old  Testament,  and 
see  how  the  case  stands  there. 

We  find  mentioned  in  the  history  of  the  Jewish  dispensa- 
tion, not  a  few  who  had  a  Divine  commission  to  perform  cer- 


150  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

tain  actions,  and  were  even  intrusted  with  miraculous 
powers,  who,  nevertheless,  were  by  no  means  in-such-wise 
the  subjects  of  inspiration  as  to  fit  them  for  being  infallible 
teachers.  Take  the  single  case  of  Aaron,  who,  at  the  very 
time  that  he  was  occupying  an  important  post  in  the  He- 
brew  economy  by  express  commission  from  God,  and  was 
intrusted,  as  occasion  required,  with  miraculous  power,  yet 
did  not  hesitate  to  lead  the  people  astray  by  assisting  them 
in  the  exercise  of  the  grossest  idolatry.  The  other  fact,  how- 
ever, to  which  we  referred,  is  still  more  to  our  present  pur- 
pose— the  fact,  namely,  that  many  who  are  universally 
acknowledged  as  inspired  men,  were  never  known  to  be 
possessed  of  any  miraculous  credentials.  Such,  for  example, 
was  the  case  with  the  authors  of  the  historical  books  of 
the  Old  Testament :  such  was  the  case  with  David  and 
Solomon  ;  such  was  the  case  with  Ezra,  Nehemiah,  and 
some  of  the  later  prophets.  Miraculous  powers  they  had 
none, — but  they  have  ever  been  regarded  as  inspired  men, 
whom  God  raised  up  and  prepared  to  be  the  expositors  of  his 
will  to  the  people. 

The  same  remarks  equally  hold  good  with  regard  to  those 
who  were  the  prominent  agents  in  the  first  establishment  of 
Christianity  in  the  world.  Many  there  were,  the  recipients 
of  supernatural  gifts  in  those  ages,  whose  teaching  has  never 
been  regarded  as  infallibk  or  inspired  :  while  of  the  actual 
writers  of  the  New  Testament,  some,  at  least,  were  never 
known  to  possess  or  exercise  any  kind  of  miraculous  power 
whatever.  On  a  general  consideration  of  the  whole  case, 
therefore,  it  appears,  that  the  one  gift  was  not  necessarily 
connected  with  the  other ;  that  miracles,  while  they  evinced 
a  Divine  commission,  did  not  prove  the  infallibility  of  the 
agent  as  a  teacher  ;  that  they  were,  in  fact,  separate  arrange- 
ments of  Providence,  each  having  its  own  purpose  to  per- 
form, and  each  requiring  a  special  capacity  to  perform  them. 
The  one  demanded  an  extraordinary  physical  power — the 


ON    INSPIRATION.  151 

other  a  mental  and  moral  enlightenment ;  and  so  little  are 
these  two  qualities  regarded  in  the  Bible  as  vouchers  for  each 
other,  that  the  former  is  often  described  as  being  exercised 
by  evil  men,  and  even  by  Satan  himself.  We  have  no  rea- 
son, therefore  (for  this  is  our  main  conclusion),  to  identify 
inspiration  with  the  mechanical  influence  granted  to  the 
agents  of  miraculous  powers. 

Another  aspect  in  which  the  mechanical  theory  has  been 
regarded,  is  that  which  supposes  a  special  dictation  of  the 
actual  words  inscribed  on  the  sacred  page,  distinct  from  the 
religious  enlightenment  of  the  writer.  This  theory  of  verbal 
dictation  has  been  so  generally  abandoned  by  the  thoughtful 
in  the  present  day,  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  recapitulate  here 
the  innumerable  objections  which  crowd  upon  us  as  we  pro- 
ceed to  deal  with  the  details  of  manuscripts,  various  readings, 
translations,  and  the  gradual  formation  of  the  Canon  during 
the  two  first  centuries  of  the  Christian  era.  We  shall  mere- 
ly state  four  considerations,  which  may  be  further  thought 
out  by  the  reader  who  wishes  to  inquire  candidly  into  the 
question. 

First.  There  is  no  positive  evidence  of  such  a  verbal 
dictation  having  been  granted.  The  supposition  of  its  exis- 
tence would  demand  a  twofold  kind  of  inspiration,  each  kind 
entirely  distinct  from  the  other.  The  apostles,  it  is  admitted, 
were  inspired  to  preach  and  to  teach  orally  ;  but  we  have  the 
most  positive  evidence  that  this  commission  did  not  extend  to 
their  very  words.  Often  they  were  involved  in  minor  mis- 
conceptions ;  and  sometimes  they  taught  specific  notions  in- 
consistent with  a  pure  spiritual  Christianity,  as  Peter  did 
when  he  was  chided  by  Paul.  The  verbal  scheme,  therefore, 
demands  the  admission  of  one  kind  of  inspiration  having  been 
given  to  the  apostles  as  men,  thinkers,  moral  agents,  and 
preachers,  and  another  kind  having  been  granted  them  as 
writers.  We  do  not  at  present  deny  that  this  was  the  case  ; 
we  merely  ask,  where  is  the  positive  evidence  of  it  ?  has 


152  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

such  a  specific  mode  of  inspiration  over  and  above  the  general 
commission  they  received  as  apostles  ever  existed,  except  in 
the  imagination  of  theological  speculators  ?  To  us  it  ap- 
pears that  the  evidence  is  entirely  theoretical,  and  that  it  has 
never  yet  been  maintained  on  positive  or  historical  grounds. 

Secondly.  The  theory  in  question  is  rendered  highly 
improbable,  from  the  fact  that  we  find  a  distinctive  style 
maintained  by  each  separate  author.  We  do  not  affirm  that 
this  alone  is  decisive  of  the  question,  but  we  mean  that  it  is 
a  highly  improbable  and  even  extravagant  supposition,  with- 
out the  most  positive  proof  of  it  being  offered,  that  each 
writer  should  manifest  his  own  modes  of  thought,  his  own 
temperament  of  mind,  his  own  educational  influences,  his  own 
peculiar  phraseology ;  and  yet,  notwithstanding  this,  every 
word  should  have  been  dictated  to  him  by  the  Holy  Spirit. 

Thirdly.  The  theory  in  question  tends  to  diminish  our 
view  of  the  moral  and  religious  qualifications  of  the  writers, 
by  elevating  the  mere  mechanical  influence  into  absolute  su- 
premacy. In  proportion  as  we  possess  a  higher  idea  of  the 
spiritual  enlightenment  of  the  apostles,  in  that  proportion  we 
feel  that  there  was  less  need  of  any  such  verbal  dictation  as 
we  are  now  considering.  The  writers  of  the  Bible,  on  this 
theory,  might  have  been  mere  tools  or  instruments — their 
minds  need  not  have  been  inspired  at  all ;  on  the  contrary,  if 
they  were  fitted  as  holy  and  inspired  men  to  comprehend  and 
propagate  Christianity,  they  were  also  fitted  to  describe  it 
either  in  oral  or  in  written  symbols. 

Fourthly.  The  positive  evidence  against  this  theory — 
evidence  which  to  a  thoughtful  mind  amounts  to  a  moral  de- 
monstration— lies  here  :  that  even  if  we  suppose  the  letter  of 
the  Scripture  to  have  been  actually  dictated,  yet  that  alone 
would  never  have  served  as  a  revelation  of  Christianity  to 
mankind,  or  obviated  the  necessity  of  an  appeal  from  the 
letter  to  the  spirit  of  the  whole  system.  A  revelation,  we 
have  shown,  necessarily  implies  a  direct  intuition  of  Divine 


ON    INSPIRATION.  153 


things.  The  revelation  of  Christianity  was  made  to  man  by 
a  continued  and  specially  designed  process  of  influences  and 
agencies.  The  types  of  Judaism,  the  person  and  history  of 
the  Saviour,  the  effusion  of  the  Spirit,  the  life,  labors,  and 
teaching  of  the  apostles, — all  these  conspired  to  reveal  Chris- 
tianity to  the  human  mind.  The  penning  of  the  sacred  re- 
cords was  indeed  one  out  of  the  many  efforts  they  made  to 
unfold  the  will  of  God  to  man ;  but  these  records,  without 
the  moral  and  spiritual -life  awakened  in  the  souls  of  the  con- 
verts, would  have  conveyed  but  dim  and  imperfect  notions  of 
the  truth  itself.  And  so  it  is  now, — the  letter  of  the  Scrip- 
ture has  to  be  illuminated  by  the  Spirit  of  Truth  before  it  af- 
fords to  any  one  a  full  manifestation  of  Christianity  in  its  es- 
sence and  its  power  ;  while  in  proportion  to  the  varied  spir- 
itual condition  of  the  reader,  the  conceptions  attached  to  the 
mere  words  are  almost  infinitely  diversified. 

The  reason  why  many  have  been  so  anxious  to  represent 
the  letter  of  the  Bible  as  inspired  is,  that  there  may  be  a 
faced  standard  for  truth  in  the  world.    'They  do  not  consider 
that  the  letter  can  never  serve  as  a  standard  for  the  spirit  of 
Christianity — that  the  two  are  altogether  incommensurable — 
that  the  letter  alone,  in  fact,  never  has  secured  the  unity  of 
the  Church — but   that  the   unity  we  so  much  yearn  after 
comes  only  through  the  development  of  the  religious  life. 
This  being  the  case,  where  is  the  value  or  the  reasonableness 
of  laying  so  great  a  stress  upon  the  letter,  when  after  all  we 
must  be  brought,  on  any  hypothesis,  to  one  and  the  same 
conclusion,  namely,  that  the  Spirit  of  Truth,  interpreted  by 
Divine  aid,  and  perceived  through  the  awakened  religious 
consciousness  of  true   believers,  is  the   real   and   essential 
revelation — the   sole   basis  of  Christian  unity — the   appeal 
to  which  we  all  in  the  end  practically  repair  ?    Whether  the 
words  be  dictated  or  not,  there  is,  therefore,  exactly  the  same 
necessity  for  another  and  spiritual  appeal ;  which  is,  in  fact, 
8 


154  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

nothing  but  affirming,  in  the  spirit  of  our  whole  previous 
analysis,  that  as  all  revelation  must  be  made  to  the  intui- 
tional faculty,  mere  material  and  logical  appliances,  whether 
in  the  form  of  writing  or  speaking,  can  only  avail  as  means 
towards  the  realization  of  the  great  end  implied  in  the  idea 
of  a  revelation  from  God. 

Instead,  then,  of  maintaining  a  strained  verbal  theory  of 
inspiration,  which  fails  of  the  very  purpose  for  which  it  was 
constructed,  how  much  more  consistent  is  it  to  look  upon  the 
word,  as  the  natural  and  spontaneous  expression  of  that  Di- 
vine life  which  the  inspired  apostles  received  immediately 
from  God.  So  far  from  destroying  the  canonical  authority 
of  the  sacred  writings  by  these  principles,  we  are  in  fact 
establishing  it  upon  a  much  firmer  foundation ;  for  the  rule 
of  faith  and  practice  in  the  Scripture  becomes  far  more  tan- 
gible and  positive  when  we  look  to  the  spirit  of  its  doctrines 
and  precepts,  than  when  we  look  to  the  letter  merely  ;  and 
far  better  is  it  when  we  attempt  from  the  New  Testament  to 
realize  those  first  living  conceptions  of  Christianity,  which 
came  fresh  from » the  Divine  life  and  spirit  of  the  Saviour, 
than  when  we  are  weighing  definitions,  reconciling  clauses, 
and  building  our  views  upon  syntactical  constructions. 

A  third  form  in  which  the  mechanical  idea  of  inspiration 
has  been  upheld,  is  that  which  asserts  a  distinct  commission 
in  respect  to  the  authorship  of  each  one  of  the  sacred  books 
now  constituting  the  Canon  of  Scripture.  Of  the  authenticity 
of  most  of  the  Scripture  records,  no  one,  we  conceive,  can 
entertain  a  reasonable  doubt.  The  internal  and  external 
evidences,  as  well  as  the  severest  criticism  of  ages  and  cen- 
turies, alike  demonstrate  that  these  writings  are  genuine — 
that  they  were  written  under  the  circumstances  they  profess 
to  have  been ;  that  they  contain  the  most  earnest  thoughts  of 
the  authors ;  in  fine,  that  they  are  the  veritable  result  of  a 
Divine  inspiration.  The  question  however  still  comes,  ad- 


ON    INSPIRATION.  155 


mitting  them  to  be  genuine,  and  admitting  them  to  be  in- 
spired,— what  did  the  authors  themselves  in  good  faith  mean 
to  include  under  the  notion  of  inspiration  ?  Did  they  claim 
for  themselves  any  distinct  commission  to  pen  the  works  in 
question  ?  was  such  a  commission  at  the  time  awarded  to 
them  ?  or  was  not  the  whole  of  the  inspiration  attaching  to 
them  rather  viewed  as  resulting  simply  from  the  extraordi- 
nary intuitions  of  Divine  truth  which  they  had  received,  and 
which  they  were  here  impelled  by  a  deep  sense  of  their  infi- 
nite value  to  depict  ? 

The  idea  is  entertained  by  many  that  a  distinct  commis- 
sion to  write  was  in  every  instance  given  to  the  sacred  pen- 
men by  God  ;  that  each  book  came  forth  with  a  specific  im- 
press of  Deity  upon  it ;  and  that  the  whole  of  the  Canon  of 
Scripture  was  gradually  completed  by  so  many  distinct  and 
decisive  acts  of  Divine  ordination.  Now  the  evidence  of  this 
opinion  we  regard  as  totally  defective,  and  can  only  ascribe 
its  growth  and  progress  in  the  Church  to  the  influence  of  a 
low  and  mechanical  view  of  the  whole  question  of  inspiration 
itself. 

Let  any  one  look  through  the  whole  of  the  books  compos- 
ing the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  and  consider  how  many 
can  lay  claim  to  any  distinct  commission, — and  consequently, 
how  their  inspiration  can  be  at  all  defended  if  it  be  made  to 
rest  upon  this  condition.  That  Moses  had  a  Divine  commis- 
sion to  institute  the  Jewish  theocracy,  and  to  give  both  the 
moral  and  ceremonial  law  to  the  people,  we  do  not  doubt. 
But  that  does  not  prove  any  Divine  commission  to  write  the 
whole  of  the  Pentateuch  as  we  now  have  it.  In  fact,  it  is 
quite  certain  that  Moses  did  not  write  the  whole  of  it  at  all. 
There  is,  at  least,  a  probability  that  the  history  of  the  crea- 
tion was  compiled  from  earlier  documents  or  traditions  ;  and 
as  to  the  conclusion  of  this  record,  we  well  know  that  Moses 
could  not  possibly  have  penned  the  account  of  his  own  death 


156  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

and  burial.  Added  to  this,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that 
"  the  book  of  the  law,"  as  occasionally  referred  to  in  Jewish 
history,  was  at  all  identical  with  the  Pentateuch  as  a  whole, 
which  the  best  critics,  in  fact,  have  generally  concurred  in 
referring  to  a  much  later  date.  We  do  not  by  these  remarks 
throw  the  slightest  shade  upon  the  inspired  source  of  the 
Pentateuch  ; — no  book  of  Scripture,  perhaps,  has  greater  in- 
ternal arguments  to  vindicate  it.  All  we  mean  is,  that  the 
inspiration  here  involved  did  not  spring  from  any  outward 
commission  to  write  that  particular  book  ;  but  only  from  the 
Divine  light  which  was  granted  to  the  age,  and  to  the  mind 
of  the  author — a  gift  which  he  was  left  to  make  use  of  as 
necessity  or  propriety  might  suggest. 

If  we  pass  on  to  the  books  of  Joshua,  Judges,  Ruth, 
Samuel,  Kings,  and  Chronicles, — where,  in  any  one  of  these 
cases,  can  we  discover  any  specific  Divine  ordination  that 
they  should  be  written  at  all  ?  So  far  from  finding  this,  the 
very  authors  are  totally  unknown :  and  all  that  we  can  say 
is,  that  they  were  universally  received,  both  as  veracious 
histories,  and  as  containing  correct  religious  sentiments,  by 
the  Jewish  people.  In  like  manner  the  date  and  the  author 
of  the  Book  of  Job  are  highly  problematical :  it  certainly 
seems  attributable,  however,  to  some  writer  living  on  the 
borders  of  Arabia,  at  or  after  the  time  of  Solomon  ;  but  we 
are  quite  at  a  loss  to  assign  any  other  reason  for  its  being  re- 
ceived into  the  Jewish  canon  except  the  extraordinary  reli- 
gious value  of  its  contents. 

If  we  look,  again,  to  the  Psalms, — respecting  the  author- 
ship of  many  of  them  we  are  altogether  in  ignorance  ;  and 
those  which  are  undoubtedly  to  be  ascribed  to  David,  were 
evidently  intended  as  sacred  hymns  and  odes,  some  of  them 
written  for  the  Temple  service,  and  others  the  natural  out- 
pourings of  a  mind  at  once  devotional  and  poetic.  We  can- 
not find  in  any  case  that  they  were  written  by  express  com- 


ON    INSPIRATION.  157 


mission  ;  all  we  can  say  is,  that  they  embodied  the  religious 
consciousness,  or,  if  the  term  be  preferred,  the  state  of  inspi- 
ration to  which  the  mind  of  the  writer  was  elevated. 

With  regard  to  the  prophetic  writings,  these  certainly  oc- 
cupy a  much  higher  position  than  the  historical  books,  inas- 
much as  we  learn  that  the  authors  actually  received  a  pro- 
phetic commission  to  declare  the  counsels  of  God  to  the 
people  ;  but  this  does  not  necessarily  involve  any  distinct 
and  separate  commission  to  write  the  books  in  question, — nor 
have  we  any  reason  to  regard  their  writings  as  inspired  in 
any  other  sense  than  as  being  the  rescript  of  their  inward 
prophetic  consciousness.  In  this  way  the  unitary  conception 
we  have  given  of  inspiration,  as  regards  the  whole  of  the  Old 
Testament,  is  fully  preserved. 

Passing  from  the  Old  Testament  to  the  New,  the  same 
entire  absence  of  any  distinct  commission  given  to  the 
writers  of  the  several  books  (with  the  exception,  perhaps,  of 
the  Apocalypse  of  John),  presents  itself.  Mark  and  Luke 
were  not  apostles  ;  and  the  latter  of  them  distinctly  professes 
to  write  from  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses,  and  to  claim  the 
confidence  of  Theophilus,  for  whom  his  two  treatises  were 
composed,  on  this  particular  ground. 

Matthew  and  John  wrote  their  accounts  somewhat  far  in 
the  first  century,  when  the  increase  of  the  Christian  con- 
verts naturally  suggested  the  necessity  of  some  such  state- 
ments, at  once  for  their  information  and  for  their  spiritual 
requirements  generally.  Finally,  Paul,  as  we  know,  wrote 
his  letters  as  the  state  of  particular  churches  seemed  to  call 
for  them  ;  but  in  no  case  do  we  find  a  special  commission  at- 
tached to  any  of  these  or  of  the  other  epistles  of  the  New 
Testament. 

Added  to  this,  the  light  which  history  sheds  upon  the 
early  period  of  the  Christian  Church  shows  us  that  the  writ- 
ings which  now  compose  the  New  Testament  Canon,  were 


158  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

not  at  all  regarded  as  express  messages  to  them  from 
independently  of  the  conviction  they  had  of  the  high  integrity 
and  spiritual  development  of  the  minds  of  the  writers.  They 
received  them  just  as  they  received  the  oral  teachings  of  the 
apostles  and  evangelists  ;  they  read  them  in  the  churches  to 
supply  the  place  of  their  personal  instructions ;  and  there  is 
abundant  evidence  that  many  other  writings  beside  those 
which  now  form  the  New  Testament  were  read  with  a  simi- 
lar reverence,  and  for  a  similar  edification.* 

It  was  only  gradually,  as  the  pressure  of  heresy  compell- 
ed it,  that  a  certain  number  of  writings  were  agreed  upon  by 
general  consent  as  being  purely  apostolic,  and  designated 
by  the  term  homologoumena,  or  agreed  upon.  Bu*  that  much 
contention  existed  as  to  which  should  be  acknowledged  ca- 
nonical, and  which  not,  is  seen  from  the  fact  that  a  number 
of  the  writings  now  received  were  long  termed  "  antilego- 
mena,"  or ^ contested;  and  that  the  third  century  had  well 
nigh  completed  its  course  before  the  present  Canon  was  fixed 
by  universal  consent.  All  this  shows  us  that  it  was  not  any 
distinct  commission  attached  to  the  composition  of  certain 
books  or  documents  which  imparted  a  Divine  authority  to 
the  apostles'  writings,  but  that  they  were  selected  and  ap- 
proved by  the  Church  itself  as  being  veritable  productions 
of  men  "  who  spake  as  they  were  moved  by  the  Holy 
Ghost" — men  who  were  not  inspired  in  order  to  write  any 
precise  documents,  but  who  wrote  such  documents,  amongst 
other  labors,  by  virtue  of  their  being  inspired. 

The  conclusion  which  we  necessarily  draw  from  these 
considerations  is,  that  the  canonicity  of  the  New  Testament 
Scriptures  was  decided  upon,  solely  on  the  ground  of  their 
presenting  to  the  whole  Church  clear  statements  of  apostoli- 

*  See  Olshausen's  "  Proof  of  the  Genuineness  of  the  Writings  of  the 
New  Testament,"  chap.  I. 


ON    INSPIRATION.  159 


cal  Christianity.  The  idea  of  their  being  written  by  any 
special  command  of  God  or  verbal  dictation  of  the  Spirit, 
was  an  idea  altogether  foreign  to  the  primitive  Churches. 
They  knew  that  Christ  was  in  himself  a  Divine  revelation  ; 
they  knew  that  the  apostles  had  been  with  him  in  his  minis- 
try ;  they  knew  that  their  hearts  had  been  warmed  with  his 
truth,  that  their  whole  religious  nature  had  been  elevated  to 
intense  spirituality  of  thinking  and  feeling  by  the  possession 
of  his  Spirit,  and  that  this  same  Spirit  was  poured  out  with- 
out measure  upon  the  Church.  Here  it  was  they  took  their 
stand  ;  and  in  these  facts  they  saw  the  reality  of  the  apostolic 
inspiration  ;  upon  these  realities  they  reposed  their  faith,  ere 
ever  the  sacred  books  were  penned ;  and  when  they  were 
penned  they  regarded  them  as  valid  representations  of  the 
living  truth  which  had  already  enlightened  the  Church,  and 
as  such  alone  pronounced  upon  their  canonical  and  truly 
apostolic  character. 

We  have  thus  attempted  to  show  that  the  proper  idea  of 
inspiration,  as  applied  to  the  Holy  Scriptures,  does  not  include 
either  miraculous  powers,  verbal  dictation,  or  any  distinct 
commission  from  God ;  we  have  only  to  recur,  therefore,  to 
the  definition  already  proposed,  which  regards  inspiration  as 
consisting  in  the  impartation  of  clear  intuitions  of  moral  and 
spiritual  truth  to  the  mind  by  extraordinary  means.  Accord- 
ing to  this  view  of  the  case,  inspiration,  a*  an  internal  phe- 
nomenon, is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  natural  laws  of  the 
human  mind — it  is  a  higher  potency  of  a  certain  form  of  con- 
sciousness, which  every  man  to  some  degree  possesses.  The 
supernatural  element  consists  in  the  extraordinary  influences 
employed  to  create  these  lofty  intuitions,  to  bring  the  mind  of 
the  subject  into  a  perfect  harmony  with  truth,  and  that,  too, 
at  a  time  when  under  ordinary  circumstances  such  a  state 
could  not  possibly  have  been  enjoyed.  The  personal  expe- 
rience of  the  life,  preaching,  character,  sufferings,  death,  and 


160  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

resurrection  of  Christ,  together  with  the  remarkable  effusion 
of  spiritual  influence  which  followed  his  ascension,  were  as- 
suredly most  extraordinary  instrumentalities,  wonderfully 
adapted,  morever,  to  work  upon  the  minds  of  the  apostles, 
and  raise  them  to  a  state  of  spiritual  perception  and  sensi- 
bility, such  as  has  never  been  fully  realized  at  any  other 
period  in  the  world's  history.  It  was  these  minds,  thus  pre- 
pared, who  first  founded  and  instructed  the  Church  ;  and  the 
New  Testament  Scriptures  were  written  long  after  Chris- 
tianity had  established  itself,  and  after  thousands  had  been 
brought  under  its  power,  in  order  to  represent,  and  so  far  as 
possible  to  retain,  the  bright  impressions  of  apostolic  men, 
after  they  should  have  passed  away  to  their  eternal  rest. 

In  confirmation  of  this  view  respecting  the  nature  of  in- 
spiration, we  offer  the  following  remarks : — 

1.  That  it  alone  gives  full  consistency  to  the  progressive 
character  of  the  Scripture  morality.  Had  we  observed  in 
the  Bible  only  a  regular  development  of  certain  religious 
truths  and  doctrines  which  were  at  first  merely  hinted  at, 
but  gradually  evolved  into  their  full  spiritual  import,  we 
could  easily  have  accounted  for  all  this,  even  on  the  scheme 
of  verbal  inspiration  itself.  We  should  have  seen  in  it  the 
wisdom  and  condescension  of  God  adapting  truth  to  the 
weaker  states-  of  the  human  intellect ;  and  such  wisdom,  in 
fact,  we  do  see  in  the  whole  of  the  typical  character  of  the 
Jewish  dispensation.  But  when  we  come  to  moral  laws, 
conceptions,  and  principles,  there  we  must  look  for  an  entire 
absence  of  all  impurity  and  imperfection  in  every  thing  which 
comes  from  the  immediate  dictation  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  It 
certainly  would  involve  an  idea  highly  revolting  to  our  best 
moral  and  religious  sensibilities,  to  suppose  that  an  impure 
or  imperfect  morality — one  frequently  at  variance  with  Chris- 
tian principles — could  at  any  time  have  come  directly  and 
verbally  to  us  from  the  lips  of  a  holy  God.  And  yet  such 


ON    INSPIRATION.  161 

an  imperfect  morality  is  plainly  discernible  throughout  the 
period  of  the  Old  Testament  dispensation,  and  frequently 
embodied,  too,  in  the  Old  Testament  Scriptures.  The  fierce 
spirit  of  warfare,  the  law  of  retaliation,  the  hatred  of  ene- 
mies, the  curses  and  imprecations  poured  upon  the  wicked, 
the  practice  of  polygamy,  the  frequent  indifference  to  decep- 
tion to  compass  any  desirable  purposes,  the  existence  of  slavery, 
the  play,  generally  speaking,  given  to  the  stronger  passions  of 
our  nature, — all  these  bespeak  a  tone  of  moral  feeling  far 
below  that  which  Christianity  has  unfolded.  These  things, 
it  is  said,  may  be  explained  as  being  permitted  by  God  for  a 
time,  on  account  of  the  weakness  of  human  nature,  or,  as 
our  Saviour  expressed  it  on  one  occasion,  "  on  account  of 
the  hardness  of  their  hearts."  But  surely  it  is  one  thing  to 
suppose  that  God  would  tolerate  these  things,  just  as  he  tole- 
rates sin  in  his  creatures,  while  the  struggle  against  evil  is 
going  on,  and  quite  another  thing  to  have  them  either  justi- 
fied or  spoken  of  as  matters  of  moral  indifference,  in  words 
dictated  immediately  by  the  Holy  Spirit. 

These  moral  phenomena,  however,  which,  on  the  ordinary 
hypothesis  concerning  the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament, 
are,  to  say  the  least,  in  the  highest  degree  strange  and  per- 
plexing, all  appear  perfectly  natural,  and  even  necessary,  in 
connection  with  the  views  we  have  taken.  We  regard  the 
Jewish  economy  as  a  Divine  and  miraculous  dispensation ; 
we  see  in  it  God  interposing  to  rescue  the  world  from  idola- 
try and  crime  ;  we  see  him  selecting  a  peculiar  people  to  be 
the  repository  of  truth  and  the  instrument  of  his  gracious 
purposes  ;  we  see  him  propounding  to  them  a  moral  and  a 
ceremonial  law,  hedging  them  in  with  institutions,  to  keep 
them  distinct  from  the  heathen  nations,  and  impressing  upon 
them  by  means  of  prophets,  to  whom  were  granted  special 
intuitions  of  spiritual  truth,  the  great  fundamental  ideas  of 
man's  religion  as  a  sinner  and  a  penitent.  From  all  this 
8* 


162  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

naturally  resulted  a  course  of  moral  education.  God,  who 
had  chosen  his  people  for  himself  and  given  them  laws,  was 
ever  with  them :  his  providence,  his  communion  with  the 
prophets,  his  Spirit  reflecting  heavenly  light  from  the  symbols 
and  sacrifices  of  their  faith — all  cherished  in  the  minds  of 
the  more  thoughtful  and  pious  a  religious  life,  which  mani- 
fested itself  in  the  struggle  against  evil,  in  the  resistance  of 
human  passion,  in  the  spread  of  clearer  intuitions  of  Divine 
things,  in  the  realization  of  a  purer  morality  and  a  purer 
worship.  In  the  Old  Testament  we  have  this  life  unfolded 
to  us  both  collectively,  in  the  history  of  the  nation,  and  in- 
dividually, in  the  devout  utterances  of  holy  men.  We  see 
their  religious  consciousness,  as  it  were,  dissected  and  por- 
trayed : — there  are  its  excellencies  and  its  defects ;  there  its 
struggles  with  evil,  and  its  aspirations  after  truth  ;  there  the 
course  of  its  development  from  age  to  age  ;  there,  in  a  word, 
the  spirit  of  humanity,  on  its  pathway  to  Christian  light  and 
love.  If  the  Jewish  dispensation  was  Divine,  if  God  com- 
muned in  secret  with  the  nation,  if  his  Spirit  was  in  the 
Church,  then  the  writings  which  embody  this  religious  state 
are  inspired, — inspired,  however,  not  as  being  penned  under 
any  specific  commission  from  heaven,  but  as  being  the  pro- 
ductions of  those  who  were  enlightened  by  special  influences, 
and  as  being  universally  received  by  the  Jews  as  the  purest 
representations  both  of  their  national  and  their  individual 
religious  vitality.  In  such  representations  of  course  we 
could  not  expect  to  see  described  a  higher  religion  or  a  more 
perfect  morality  than  actually  existed  in  those  times  ;  hence, 
accordingly,  the  imperfections  both  in  moral  and  religious 
ideas  which  are  mixed  up  more  or  less  with  all  their  sacred 
writings. 

II.  The  view  we  have  taken  of  the  nature  of  inspiration 
is  the  only  one  which  gives  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the 
minor  discrepancies  to  be  found  in  the  sacred  writings.  As 


ON    INSPIRATION.  163 


we  are  attempting  here  merely  to  state  principles,  with  as 
much  brevity  as  possible,  and  not  to  enter  at  large  into  de- 
tails, we  cannot  pretend  to  discuss  and  demonstrate  the  par- 
ticular cases  of  discrepancy  to  which  reference  is  now  made, 
but  shall  base  our  remarks  upon  those  which  are  pretty  gen- 
erally acknowledged  by  all  parties. 

Under  this  head  we  may  refer  to  the  acknowledged  dis- 
crepancies between  some  of  the  Scriptural  statements  and 
scientific  truth.  The  account  of  the  creation,  for  example, 
as  given  in  the  Book  of  Genesis,  is  by  no  means  easily  recon- 
cilable (viewed  as  a  scientific  account}  with  the  most  palpable 
facts  of  geology.  We  do  not  doubt,  but  that  ingenuity  may 
smooth  down  one  expression,  and  give  a  broad  meaning  to 
another,  and  after  all  may  bring  out  a  tolerable  case  of  con- 
sistency ;  but  still  it  is  impossible  to  say,  that  as  a  scientific 
view  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  the  book  of  Genesis  would 
convey  at  all  the  same  impression  to  the  mind  of  any  ordinary 
reader,  as  do  the  results  of  geological  research.  As  a  moral 
account  of  it,  there  it  stands  palpable  and  plain  ; — there  is 
God,  the  infinite  agent ;  there  is  his  power,  creating  and 
fashioning  the  whole  of  the  realm  of  nature ;  there  is  his 
Spirit,  breathing  on  the  void  and  making  it  pregnant ;  there 
is  man,  created  holy  and  happy ;  there  is  sin,  marring  his 
bliss,  and  the  earth  becoming  cursed  through  the  commission 
of  evil.  All  this  is  clear  enough ;  and  is  it  not  far  better, 
more  satisfactory,  more  devout,  to  recognize  a  Divine  inspira- 
tion in  the  theistic  and  other  religious  conceptions  of  the 
mind  by  which  these  early  records  were  penned,  than  to  be 
ever  striving  after  a  scientific  accuracy,  which  at  best  must 
be  very  dim  and  imperfect  ?  Admit  that  scientific  explana- 
tions, in  order  to  be  at  all  intelligible  to  the  early  ages,  must 
have  been  couched  in  the  language  of  the  times ;  yet  it  is  not 
very  reverent  to  suppose  the  Spirit  of  God  to  dictate  expla- 
nations of  natural  phenomena,  which  must  be  positively 


164  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

worthless  as  scientific  statements,  until  they  are  expounded 
over  again  by  human  research.  Let  us  but  regard  inspira- 
tion, however,  as  being  essentially  a  development  of  living 
intuitions  of  moral  and  spiritual  truth, — let  us  view  the  Old 
Testament  as  representing  this  state  of  mind,  and  we  are  by 
no  means  disconcerted  by  all  the  scientific  doubts  which  may 
be  thrown  on  the  words  of  Scripture.  Nay,  we  see  that  im- 
perfection on  these  matters  was  inevitable  ;  and  yet,  with  all 
these  imperfections,  we  cast  the  whole  matter  before  the  skep- 
tic, and  we  defy  him  to  throw  the  least  shade  over  the  internal 
evidences  we  have  that  every  element  for  which  the  Bible  is 
of  any  value  to  us,  is  Divine. 

We  remark  again  in  some  parts  of  the  Bible  discrepan- 
cies in  the  statement  of  facts. 

The  four  narratives  of  the  life  and  history  of  Christ  give 
us  a  favorable  opportunity  of  testing  this  particular  case. 
Regarded  as  so  many  representations  of  the  Divinest  charac- 
ter which  ever  appeared  in  human  flesh,  these  four  Gospels 
stand  before  us  in  all  their  sublime  unity  and  simplicity. 
No  such  conception  was  ever  before  developed — no  such  ideal 
character  ever  entered  into  the  creations  of  poetry — no  such 
Divine  perfection,  combined  with  human  sympathy,  has  else- 
where appeared,  which  bears  the  slightest  comparison  with 
these  united  statements  of  the  evangelic  historians.  There 
we  see  their  unity,  their  inspiration,  their  moral  power,  their 
heavenly  mission.  What  need  we  further  ?  Does  it  make 
any  difference  whether  a  woman  anointed  the  head  of  Jesus 
in  the  house  of  Simon  or  of  Lazarus  ?  Does  it  signify 
whether  Christ  raised  a  dead  man  to  life  coming  in  or  going 
out  of  such  a  town  or  city  ?  Does  the  imperfect  recollection 
or  misstatement  of  a  mere  indifferent  incident  make  any  dif- 
ference in  the  Divinity  of  the  religious  ideas  embodied  in  the 
narrative  ? 

Allow  as  many  of  such  minor  discrepancies  as  you  please, 


ON    INSPIRATION.  165 


it  proves  the  honesty  of  the  writers  more  than  it  detracts  from 
the  Divinity  of  the  history ;  and  admitting  the  inspiration  of 
those  writers  to  be  what  we  have  stated,  we  gain  all  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  one,  without  suffering  the  slightest  shade  to  ob- 
scure our  faith  from  the  other.  Surely  they  must  have  but 
a  feeble  conception  of  what  these  wondrous  narratives  really 
are,  who  feel  that  any  verbal  differences  can  obscure  a  single 
ray  of  the  Divine  light  which  flashes  from  them  at  every 
page. 

Once  more,  we  may  refer  to  discrepancies  in  reasoning, 
in  definition,  and  in  other  purely  formal  and  logical  pro- 
cesses. By  those  who  have  most  closely  analyzed  the  trains 
of  thought  which  we  have  in  the  apostolic  writings,  and  es- 
pecially those  of  St.  Paul,  it  is  well  understood  how  great 
the  difficulty  often  is  to  reconcile  particular  definitions,  and 
passing  arguments,  with  logical  order  and  consistency.  To 
some  it  might,  doubtless,  seem  very  irreverent  to  speak  of 
errors  in  reasoning  as  occurring  in  the  sacred  writings ;  but 
the  irreverence,  if  there  be  any,  really  lies  on  the  part  of 
those  who  deny  their  possibility.  We  have  already  shown 
that  to  speak  of  logic,  as  such,  being  inspired,  is  a  sheer  ab- 
surdity. The  process  either  of  defining  or  of  reasoning  re- 
quires simply  the  employment  of  the  formal  laws  of  thought, 
the  accuracy  of  which  can  be  in  no  way  affected  by  any 
amount  of  inspiration  whatever.  Reasoning  always  implies 
the  appeal  which  one  mind  makes  to  another  upon  data  com- 
mon to  both,  and  presupposes  that  the  process  is  one  equally 
rational  and  patent  to  the  comprehension  of  each  of  the  par- 
ties. To  aver  that  such  processes  of  reasoning  are  infallible 
or  inspired,  or  any  thing  else,  indeed,  except  processes  of 
reasoning  based  upon  the  common  principles  of  our  intellec- 
tual nature,  either  implies  a  practical  deception  in  apparently 
appealing  to  reason  while  the  whole  matter  is  really  one  of 
authority  ;  or,  at  any  rate,  indicates  that  these  logical  pro- 


166  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

cesses,  to  which  any  sound,  reasoning  mind  is  perfectly  com- 
petent, were  constrained  by  a  supernatural  influence,  so  that 
they  should  have  one  ground  of  accuracy  in  appearance,  and 
another,  de  facto,  in  the  Divine  constraint.  In  brief,  in 
whatever  way  we  suppose  the  fact  of  inspiration  to  apply  to 
the  formal  understanding  or  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  reason- 
ing, we  involve  ourselves  in  difficulties  and  absurdities  for 
which  there  is  no  compensation  whatever  in  the  value  of  the 
theory  itself.  Where  inspiration  is  of  inestimable  importance, 
and  even  of  supreme  necessity,  there  let  us  recognize  its  sub- 
lime influence ;  but  where  it  can  neither  give  any  certitude, 
nor  guard  against  any  errors  which  an  accurate  thinker  could 
not  detect  for  himself,  it  is  merely  trifling  with  the  Divine 
gifts  to  extend  their  influence  into  these  regions  of  our  mental 
activity. 

Accordingly,  if  we  must,  at  any  rate,  admit,  that  in  ques- 
tions of  formal  reasoning  inspired  men  were  left  to  the  na- 
tural working  of  their  own  faculties,  we  find  no  difficulty 
whatever  in  accounting  for  any  logical  incompleteness  they 
may  evince  in  the  conduct  of  any  regular  piece  of  argumen- 
tation ;  nor  should  we,  on  the  very  same  principles,  even  ex- 
pect them  to  exhibit  a  uniform  perfection  in  defining  their 
ideas,  in  linking  them  together  with  logical  propriety,  or  in 
preserving  a  perfect  formal  consistency  through  all  their 
parts.  To  suppose  that  we  should  gain  the  slightest  advan- 
tage, even  were  all  this  logical  propriety  to  be  observed,  im- 
plies an  entire  misapprehension  of  what  a  revelation  really 
is,  and  of  what  is  the  sole  method  by  which  it  is  possible  to 
construct  a  valid  theology.  An  actual  revelation  can  only 
be  made  to  the  intuitional  faculty,  and  a  valid  theology  can 
only  be  constructed  by  giving  a  formal  expression  to  the  in- 
tuitions thus  granted. 

What,  therefore,  if  Paul  had  never  studied  Aristotle  ; 
what  if  Peter,  and  James,  and  John  were  unskilled  in  the 


ON    INSPIRATION.  167 


categories  and  all  the  mysteries  of  the  syllogism,  does  that 
render  their  deep  intuitions  of  spiritual  things  of  less  avail  ? 
Admit  those  intuitions  to  be  pure,  holy,  divine,  and  they  were 
sure  to  manifest  themselves  in  such  a  way  as  to  come  home 
to  the  hearts  and  consciences  of  mankind  ;  neither  is  their 
excellence,  their  authority,  or  their  power,  at  all  marred  by 
the  fact,  that  the  logical  understanding  was  left  to  the  opera- 
tion of  its  own  laws,  and  sometimes  exhibited  those  imperfec- 
tions to  which  all  men  are  more  or  less  liable.  We  know 
well  that  Peter  reasoned  very  perversely  about  the  circum- 
cision, and  that  Paul  at  once  vanquished  him  in  argument, 
and  reproved  him  for  his  error ;  and  thus  universally  we 
find,  that  while  the  deeper  nature  of  these  inspired  teachers 
was  brought  into  wonderful  harmony  with  Divine  truth,  and 
their  spiritual  vision  vastly  enlarged,  yet  they  were  left  in 
all  the  lower  and  formal  processes  of  the  understanding  to 
work  their  way  onwards  by  the  aid  rendered  to  them  by  the 
natural  laws  of  logic  and  the  principles  of  common  sense. 

To  sum  up  these  remarks  upon  discrepancies,  we  should 
say,  that  all  such  matters  of  verbiage,  of  memory,  of  mere 
judgment,  of  logic, — have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  in- 
spiration, or  prove  any  thing  respecting  the  canonicity  of  a 
book,  one  way  or  the  other.  Inspiration,  we  repeat,  depends 
upon  the  clearness,  force,  and  accuracy  of  man's  religious 
intuitions.  Where  these  are  of  that  extraordinary  character 
which  appeared  in  the  men  who  lived  with  Christ  upon  earth, 
and  received  a  double  portion  of  his  Spirit  as  apostles  and 
martyrs  for  the  truth,  there  we  see  the  unquestionable  evi- 
dence of  a  real  inspiration ;  and  the  writings  emanating 
from  such  men,  when  acknowledged  by  the  universal  Church, 
become  essentially  canonical,  as  being  valid  exhibitions  of 
apostolical  Christianity  in  its  spirit  and  its  power. 

III.  This  leads  us  to  another  remark,  namely,  that  the 
theory  of  inspiration,  we  maintain,  alone  explains  the  forma- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


tion  of  the  canon  of  Scripture,  and  the  facts  connected  with 
it. 

With  regard  to  the  Old  Testament  canon,  very  little  can 
be  said.  Here  the  facts  are  almost  all  negative.  We  can  easily 
enumerate  what  we  do  not  know  of  its  formation,  but  it  is 
very  hard  to  say  what  we  do.  With  few  exceptions,  there  is 
not  an  entire  book  in  the  whole  of  the  Old  Testament,  with 
respect  to  which  we  can  determine,  with  complete  accuracy, 
who  was  the  author, — when  it  was  written, — at  what  time 
received  into  the  canon  of  Scripture, — and  on  what  especial 
grounds.  The  sum  and  substance  of  our  certain  knowledge 
(leaving  out  mere  Jewish  traditions)  is,  that  the  different 
books  were  collected  together  some  time  after  the  Babylonish 
captivity,  accepted  by  the  Jews  as  Divine  writings,  and  read, 
accordingly,  in  the  synagogues. 

Now,  under  such  circumstances  as  these,  how  are  we  to 
stand  forth  and  maintain  the  inspiration  of  the  Jewish  wri- 
tings on  the  hypothesis,  either  that  they  were  all  dictated  by 
the  Spirit  of  God,  or  written  by  express  commission  from 
Heaven  ?  Only  let  it  be  affirmed  in  the  outset,  that  either  of 
these  notions  is  necessary  to  complete  the  conditions  of  a 
truly  inspired  book,  and  what  chance  have  we  of  being  suc- 
cessful in  proving  the  inspiration  of  the  Old  Testament  agains 
the  aggressions  of  the  skeptic  ? 

The  fact  upon  which  many  lay  such  remarkable  stress, 
that  Christ  and  his  apostles  honored  the  Old  Testament,  is 
nothing  to  the  purpose,  as  far  as  the  nature  of  their  inspira- 
tion is  concerned.  They  honored  the  Divine  and  the  Eter- 
nal in  the  old  dispensation.  They  honored  the  men  who 
had  been  servants  and  prophets  of  the  Most  High.  They 
honored  the  writings  from  which  their  spirit  of  piety  and  of 
power  breathed  forth.  But  never  did  they  affirm  the  literal 
and  special  divinity  of  all  the  national  records  of  the  Jewish 
theocracy,  as  preserved  and  read  in  the  synagogues  of  that 
day. 


ON    INSPIRATION.  169 


And  why,  in  the  name  of  truth,  should  we  attempt  to  affix 
to  these  records  a  commission  and  an  authority  which 
they  never  claim  for  themselves  ?  Why  should  we  encom- 
pass the  notion  of  inspiration  with  conditions  which  we  can 
never  make  good  ?  Why  should  we  involve  ourselves  in  the 
obligation  of  defending  things  the  most  indefensible,  when, 
after  all,  we  get  no  advantage  by  it?  /  know  that  I  am 
speaking  the  conviction  of  many  learned  men  and  devout 
Christians,  when  I  say,  that  the  blind  determination  to  repre- 
sent every  portion  of  the  Old  Testament  as  being  alike  writ- 
ten entirely  under  the  guidance  of  God,  and  by  the  special 
direction  of  the  Spirit,  has  been  one  of  the  most  fearful  hin- 
derances  which  ever  stood  in  the  way  of  an  honest,  firm,  and 
rational  belief  in  the  reality  of  a  Divine  inspiration  at  all. 

The  moment,  however,  we  pass  from  this  mechanical  idea 
of  inspiration  to  that  living  idea  of  it  which  we  now  maintain, 
the  whole  aspect  of  the  matter  is  changed.  It  is  of  little 
consequence  for  us  now  to  know  who  were  the  authors  of  the 
works  in  question,  when  they  were  written,  or  when  received 
into  the  canon  of  Scripture.  There  they  stand  before  us,  their 
own  witnesses  to  the  truth.  The  wondrous  symbols  of  the 
ceremonial  law ;  the  miraculous  history  of  the  Jewish  peo- 
ple ;  the  whole  Divine  constitution  of  the  Jewish  theocracy ; 
the  sublime  devotion  of  the  Psalms ;  the  struggles  we  observe 
in  the  Book  of  Job  and  the  writings  of  Solomon,  to  prove  the 
mysteries  of  human  life  and  destiny  ;  the  prophetic  visions  of 
the  ancient  seers  ; — all  these  appear  surrounded  by  a  halo  of 
Divine  glory  which  nothing  can  obscure.  These  things,  be 
it  observed,  present  us  \viihfacts, — facts  in  the  religious  life 
of  a  people, — facts  in  the  progress  of  the  human  mind  to- 
wards a  loftier  view,  which  speak  aloud  for  themselves.  Who 
can  deny  them  ?  There  they  are,  actually  embodied  in  these 
ancient  records ;  all  speaking  of  an  unwearied  Providence, 
and  all  manifesting  the  special  purposes  of  Divine  love. 


170  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Herein  lies  their  inspiration :  in  this  sense,  and  in  this  alone, 
can  we  maintain  our  hold  on  the  Old  Testament  canon,  as  a 
spiritual  and  Divine  reality,  profitable  for  doctrine,  reproof, 
correction,  and  instruction  in  righteousness. 

If  we  pass  from  the  Canon  of  the  Old,  to  the  formation 
of  that  of  the  New  Testament,  we  get  at  once  into  a  region 
that  is  far  more  clearly  enlightened  by  the  veritable  facts  of 
history.  We  may  concentrate  the  most  significant  of  these 
facts  in  a  few  brief  sentences.  We  know  that  Christ  chose 
and  commissioned  twelve  apostles  to  proclaim  his  doctrine  to 
the  world ;  that  after  the  ascension  they  enjoyed  a  special 
outpouring  of  the  Spirit  for  the  purpose  on  the  day  of  Pen- 
tecost ;  that  this  special  impartation  of  the  Spirit,  however, 
while  it  gave  them  clear  intuitions  of  Divine  things,  did  not 
absolutely  preserve  them  from  all  error;  that  the  whole 
scheme  of  Christianity  dawned  in  fact  but  gradually  on 
their  minds ;  that  they  often  consulted  together  respecting 
sentiments  and  usages,  whether  they  were  to  be  maintained 
or  not ;  that  sometimes  the  minor  errors  of  one  were  coun- 
teracted by  the  influence  of  another ;  that  these  uncertainties 
in  the  logical  statement  of  doctrines,  however,  did  not  pre- 
vent their  deep  perception  of  Divine  realities  from  telling 
mightily  upon  the  world  ;  and  that  the  result  was  to  gather 
communities  together,  bound  to  each  other  in  the  common 
sympathy  they  felt  for  truth  and  love  to  God.  We  know 
still  further,  that  the  early  Churches  depended  entirely  upon 
the  living  teaching  of  the  apostles  and  those  instructed  by 
them,  for  their^irs*  conceptions  of  Christianity ;  that  as  oc- 
casions suggested,  some  of  the  apostles  and  first  evangelists, 
who  travelled  with  them,  wrote  down  their  accounts  of  the 
life  of  Christ,  as  eye-witnesses,  or  as  instructed  by  those 
who  were ;  that  as  the  wants  of  Churches  arose,  letters 
were  written  to  them  by  some  of  the  apostles,  in  order  to 
impart  knowledge,  comfort,  rebuke,  or  exhortation ;  that  in 


ON    INSPIRATION.  171 


the  course  of  the  first  and  second  century,  many  other  letters 
were  addressed  to  various  Churches  from  good  men  and 
pastors,  as  well  as  from  the  apostles  themselves,  all  of  which 
were  held  in  great  estimation,  and  frequently  read  in  the 
public  assemblies.  We  know,  moreover,  that  as  heresies 
and  false  doctrines  arose,  it  became  more  and  more  neces- 
sary to  bring  the  apostolic  doctrines  to  a  definite  statement ; 
that  for  this  purpose  there  grew  up  a  separation  of  all  the 
early  Christian  literature  into  a  class  of  books  which  were 
considered  decidedly  apostolical,  and  others  which  were  re- 
garded as  apocryphal ;  that  much  discussion  arose  as  to 
which  should  be  finally  adopted  as  belonging  to  the  former ; 
'  and  that  at  length,  about  the  end  of  the  second  century  or 
beginning  of  the  third,  the  whole  collection  we  now  possess 
was  made,  and  the  Canon  brought  into  its  present  form. 

Such  are  the  principal  facts  of  the  case.  What  may 
we  then  infer  from  them,  and  what  may  we  not  ?  Certainly 
we  cannot  infer  that  any  one  of  these  books  was  written  by 
an  express  commission  from  God.  We  cannot  infer  that 
they  are  verbally  inspired,  any  more  than  were  the  oral 
teachings  of  the  apostles.  We  cannot  infer  that  they  had 
any  greater  authority  attached  to  them  than  the  general 
authority  which  was  attached  to  the  apostolic  office.  We 
cannot  infer  that  they  were  regarded  by  the  early  Christians 
as  being  the  Word  of  God,  in  any  other  sense  than  as  being 
the  productions  of  those  who  lived  with  Christ,  were  wjt- 
n esses  of  his  history,  and  were  imbued  with  his  Spirit ;  as 
being,  in  a  word,  veritable  representations  of  a  religious  life 
which  they  had  derived  by  a  special  inspiration  from  heaven. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  can  infer  from  the  whole  history 
of  the  case,  that  the  selection  and  juxtaposition  of  the  New 
Testament  books  as  a  body  of  apostolic  teaching  was  left 
to  the  religious  sense,  the  Christian  zeal,  and  historical 
honesty  of  the  early  Churches ;  that  the  authority  claimed 


172  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

for  them  was  that  attaching  itself  generally  to  the  apostolic 
office  ;  thai  the  various  writings  are,  according  to  the  best  his- 
torical evidence,  perfectly  authentic ;  that  they  contain  a 
clear  representation  of  that  Divine  truth  with  which  the 
apostles  conquered  the  world ;  and  that,  as  such,  they  are 
inspired  in  the  highest  and  truest  sense.  If  it  be  said,  that 
the  providence  of  God  must  have  watched  over  the  composi- 
tion and  construction  of  a  canonical  book,  which  was  to 
have  so  vast  an  influence  on  the  destiny  of  the  world, — we 
are  quite  ready  to  admit  and  even  ourselves  to  assert  it. 
But  in  the  same  sense  Providence  watches  over  every  other 
event  which  bears  upon  the  welfare  of  man,  although  the 
execution  of  it  be  left  to  the  freedom  of  human  endeavor. 

And  what,  after  all,  need  we  in  the  Scriptures  more  than 
this  ?  Why  should  we  be  perpetually  craving  after  a  stiff, 
literal,  verbal  infallibility  ?  Christianity  consists  not  in  pro- 
positions— it  is  a  life  in  the  soul ;  its  laws  and  precepts  are 
not  engraven  on  stone,  they  can  only  be  engraven  on  the 
fleshy  tables  of  the  heart.  The  most  precise  words  could 
never  convey  a  clear  religious  conception  to  an  unawakened 
mind ;  no  logical  precision  of  language  and  definition,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  needed  in  order  to  awaken  up  intuitions  which 
convey  more  by  a  single  flash  of  the  inward  eye,  than  a 
whole  body  of  divinity  of  most  approved  order  and  arrange- 
ment could  ever  teach.  The  Divine  authority  of  the  New 
Testament,  in  this  view,  becomes  a  living  reality.  It  contains 
the  conceptions  of  men  who  lived  and  walked  with  Christ ; 
who  drank  at  the  fountain-head  of  truth ;  whose  religious 
consciousness  was  awakened  and  elevated  by  special  and  ex- 
traordinary agencies ;  who  must  be  regarded,  therefore,  as 
coming  nearer  to  the  mind  of  Christ  than  any  other  men  can 
do  to  the  end  of  time.  Hence  those  minds  possessed  a 
canonical  authority  for  the  succeeding  Church  :  they  give  us 
the  first  clear  impressions  from  the  Divine  Antitype ;  they 


ON    INSPIRATION. 


173 


appear  all  fresh  from  the  heavenly  mould  ;  and  our  highest 
wisdom  as  Christians  is,  first  to  get  our  minds  into  the  closest 
communion  with  them,  as  it  regards  the  real  elements  of 
Divine  truth,  and  then  to  develope  those  elements  by  all  the 
light  which  succeeding  ages  will  afford. 

We  have  thus  expounded  the  theory  of  inspiration  that 
naturally  results  from  the  philosophical  principles  we  had 
previously  established  with  regard  both  to  psychology  and 
revelation.  In  order,  moreover,  to  verify  this  theory,  we 
have  not  only  shown  its  consistency  with  the  facts  of  the  case, 
but  given  reasons  for  believing  that  those  facts  are  inexplica- 
ble on  any  other  principles.  In  conclusion,  we  shall  briefly 
point  to  the  analogy  which  the  phenomena  of  inspiration  bear 
to  the  higher  workings  of  human  genius — an  analogy  so 
close,  that  some  men  have  gone  so  far  as  to  identify  them  with 
one  another. 

So  far  as  inspiration  consists  in  an  exalted  state  of  man's 
intuitional  faculties,  there  is  undoubtedly  a  resemblance,  gene- 
rically  considered,  between  inspiration  in  the  Scriptural  sense, 
and  what  are  sometimes  denominated  the  inspirations  of 
genius.  Genius,  as  we  regard  it,  consists  in  the  possession 
of  a  remarkable  power  of  intuition  with  reference  to  some 
particular  object ;  a  power  which  arises  from  the  inward 
nature  of  a  man  being  brought  into  unusual  harmony  with 
that  object  in  its  reality  and  its  operations.  The  natural 
philosopher  manifests  his  genius,  not  by  his  power  of  analysis 
and  verification,  but  by  seizing  distant  analogies,  by  ascend- 
ing with  a  sudden  leap  to  general  conceptions,  by  embodying 
his  inward  ideas  in  some  theory  or  hypothesis  which  forms 
the  basis  and  gives  the  direction  to  inductive  investigation. 
It  is,  in  fact,  the  harmony  of  his  being  with  nature  in  her 
wondrous  operations,  which  enables  him  to  grasp  those  con- 
ceptions, on  the  accuracy  of  which  all  scientific  research  so 
much  depends ;  this  harmony  manifesting  itself  in  that  in- 


174  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

creased  power  of  intuition,  by  which  truth  is  seen  in  the  con- 
crete previous  to  its  being  verified  by  a  legitimate  induction. 
In  the  same  manner  does  the  poet  of  human  life  and  destiny, 
by  an  elevation  of  mind  above  the  influence  of  prevailing 
opinions,  and  a  deep  inward  sympathy  wi^i  human  existence 
in  its  nature  and  development,  unfold  in  spontaneous  flashes 
of  spiritual  light  the  most  secret  workings  of  the  mind  and 
heart  of  humanity.  Artistic  genius  is  generically  of  the 
same  order.  It  is  the  immediate  realization  of  an  ideal 
beauty  which  it  strives  to  express  in  an  outward  form. 

In  affirming  that  the  inspiration  of  the  ancient  seers  and 
the  chosen  apostles  was  analogous  with  these  phenomena, 
we  are  in  no  way  diminishing  its  heavenly  origin,  or  losing 
sight  of  the  supernatural  agency  by  which  it  was  produced. 
We  are  only  affirming  what  is  constantly  done  in  the  case  of 
outward  miracles  themselves — that  God  employs  natural 
means  whenever  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  in  order  to  accom- 
plish even  his  supernatural  purposes.  The  power  of  intui- 
tion in  its  pure  and  integral  state,  would  imply  a  direct  and 
complete  recipiency  of  truth  whenever  presented  to  the 
mind.  Let  there  be  a  due  purification  of  the  moral  nature, 
— a  perfect  harmony  of  the  spiritual  being  with  the  mind  of 
God, — a  removal  of  all  inward  disturbances  from  the  heart, 
and  what  is  to  prevent  or  disturb  this  immediate  intuition  of 
Divine  things  ?  And  what  do  we  require  in  inspiration  more 
than  this,  or  what  can  more  certainly  assure  us  of  its  hea- 
venly origin  ?  So  far  from  detracting  aught  from  its  reality 
or  its  authority,  the  whole  fact  now  becomes,  on  the  con- 
trary, replete  with  a  new  moral  interest.  Not  only  do  we 
now  comprehend  its  nature  ;  not  only  do  we  feel  its  real  sub- 
limity ;  not  only  does  it  rise  from  a  mere  mechanical  force 
to  a  phenomenon  instinct  with  spiritual  grandeur ; — but  we 
are  likewise  taught,  that  in  proportion  as  our  own  hearts  are 
purified,  and  our  own  nature  brought  into  harmony  with  truth. 


ON    INSPIRATION.  175 


we  may  ourselves  indefinitely  approach  the  same  elevation. 
"  Blessed  are  the  pure  in  heart,"  said  our  Saviour,  "  for 
they  shall  see  God." 

Would  that  the  whole  idea  of  inspiration  were  thus 
brought  as  a  moral  power  to  bear  upon  the  progress  of  the 
Christian  Church  ;  would  that  the  unity  of  the  Church  were 
placed,  not  in  the  deadness  of  the  letter,  but  in  the  higher 
realization  of  the  Spirit  of  the  truth.  Then,  at  length,  should 
we  see  the  dawn  of  a  brighter  day,  when  the  essence  would 
be  placed  before  the  symbol — the  living  before  the  dead — 
and  when  the  Gospel  would  come  to  us,  not  in  word  only, 
but  in  demonstration  of  the  Spirit  and  in  power. 


POSTSCRIPT  TO  CHAPTER  VI. 

In  the  palmy  days  of  the  Catholic  Church,  the  idea  of  inspiration 
in  its  most  mechanical  form  was  attached  to  the  Church  itself ;  and 
consequently  very  little  stress  was  laid  upon  the  inspiration  of  the 
Scriptures,  which  were  for  the  most  part  thrown  altogether  into  the 
background.  When,  however,  the  Reformers  threw  off  the  Papal 
yoke,  and  disowned  the  Church,  they  naturally  fell  back  upon  the 
plenary  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures,  as  their  most  powerful  appeal. 
Hence  the  Protestant  Church,  which  had  naturally  inherited  some- 
what of  the  mechanical  spirit  of  the  Papacy,  was  nurtured  in  those 
rigid  ideas  of  inspiration,  by  which  alone  it  was  able,  in  those  times, 
to  hold  up  an  antagonistic  authority  to  the  pretended  infallibility  of 
the  Papal  See.  The  professed  theologians  of  almost  all  the  Re- 
formed Churches  accordingly  developed  and  maintained  the  doctrine 
of  verbal  inspiration  with  great  tenacity.  Gerhard  and  the  Buxtorfs  - 
went  so  far  as  to  affirm  the  inspired  authority  even  of  the  vowel 
points, — an  opinion  which  was  even  confirmed  by  the  Helvetic  Con- 
fession of  1675.  The  notion  of  verbal  inspiration  was  not  only  held 
by  several  of  the  early  theologians  of  the  Lutheran  Church,  but  by 
many  more  of  the  writers  who  came  in  the  Calvinistic  branch  of  the 


17H  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Protestant  theology,  and  has  even  lingered  amongst  those  most  re- 
markable for  literal,  formal,  and  mechanical  views,  particularly  in 
Scotland,  do\vn  to  the  present  day. 

The  prevalence  of  these  extreme  mechanical  views,  however, 
began  to  diminish  very  sensibly  during  the  last  century.  Even 
Calixtus  and  Carpzovius  in  their  time  had  swerved  very  considera- 
bly from  this  theory,  and  confined  the  notion  of  inspiration  to  the 
idea  of  spiritual  assistance  and  direction  in  the  composition  of  the 
sacred  books, — an  assistance  which  made  the  authors  perfectly  cog- 
nizant of  the  truth  they  were  commissioned  to  write,  and  a  direction 
which  preserved  them  absolutely  from  all  error.  This  modified  view 
of  the  mechanical  theory  by  degrees  shaped  itself  into  the  opinions 
which  have  been  commonly  held  by  the  more  moderate  orthodox 
divines  of  this  country,  who  have  generally  parcelled  out  the  idea  of 
inspiration  into  three  or  four  subordinate  species,  such  as  the  inspi- 
ration of  suggestion,  of  direction,  of  superintendence,  &c.,  accord- 
ing to  the  religious  contents  of  the  different  books  of  the  Bible. 

So  far  back,  however,  as  the  age  of  Doderlein,  this  view  of  the 
question  began  to  appear  very  unsatisfactory ;  at  any  rate  "we  find 
that  admirable  theologian  hinting  at  another  principle, — that  namely, 
which  confines  the  notion  of  inspiration  to  the  religious  elements  of 
the  Bible.  He  says  (vol.  i.  p.  70),  "  Non  est  dubium.  quin  omnia 
capita  religionis  ad  spiritum  sanctum  referri  debeant :  atque  quum 
ejus  institutio  qualis  cumque  tandem  fuerit  (nam  modum  ejus  de- 
finire  difficillimum  videtur)  divina  esset,  divina  jure  habeantur.'' 
Augusti,  in  his  Institutes  (p.  89),  expresses  the  same  idea  still  more 
distinctly : — "  Schr&nkt  man  die  Theopneustie  zunslchst  auf  die 
fundamental  Glaubens-Artickeln  ein,  so  entgeht  man  den  Schwie- 
rigkeiten,  welche  sich  sonst  bei  der  einen  oder  andern  Erklarungsart 
darbieten."  So  also  Baumgarten,  and  so  also,  to  some  extent,  that 
admirable  scholar  and  theologian,  Dr.  J.  P.  Smith,  in  one  of  the 
notes  to  his  "  Scripture  Testimony  to  the  Messiah,"  a  note  which 
had  almost  brought  out  the  controversy  fairly  into  this  country,  but 
that  its  hour  was  not  yet  arrived. 

The  introduction  of  a  more  profound  method  of  philosophical 
thinking  into  Germany,  brought  with  it  a  more  thorough  analysis  of 
the  idea  of  inspiration,  as  a  phenomenon  presented  to  us  in  connec- 


ON    INSPIRATION.  177 


tion  with  the  teaching  of  the  apostles.  From  this  period  inspiration 
began  to  be  regarded  as  a  quality  of  the  minds  of  the  apostles,  and 
as  being  applicable  only  in  a  secondary  sense  to  their  writings, 
This  is  clearly  expressed  by  Bretschneider  : — "  Es  ist  zur  sicfiern 
Fortpflanzung  und  zum  Gebrauch  der  Offenbarung  nichts  weiter 
nothig  als  dass  der  Codex  der  Offenbarung  von  Mannern  geschrie- 
ben  sei,  welche  gdttlichen  Unterricht  aus  reiner  und  erster  Quelle, 
empfangen  hatten,  nicht  aber  dass  der  Codex  selbst  ein  Werk  Gottes 
sei."  To  find,  however,  the  most  profound  analysis  of  the  idea  of 
inspiration,  we  must  go  to  the  school  of  Schleiermacher,  a  school  so 
immeasurably  more  fertile  than  any  other  in  the  elucidation  of  the  deep- 
er elements  of  man's  spiritual  nature.  Schleiermacher  himself  puts 
the  subject  in  this  clear  and  striking  point  of  view  : — "  Die  einzel- 
nen  Bucher  des  neuen  Testaments  sind  von  dem  Heiligen  Geiste 
eingegeben,  und  die  Sammlung  derselben  ist  unter  Leitung  des 
Heiligen  Geistes  entstanden.  Die  eigentliche  apostolische  Einge- 
bung  ist  nicht  etwas  den  Neutestamentischen  Buchern  ausschlies- 
send  zukommendes ;  sondern  diese  participiren  nur  daran  und  die 
Eingebung  in  diesem  engern  Sinne,  wie  sie  durch  die  Reinheit  und 
Vollstandigkeit  der  apostolischen  Auffassung  des  Christenthums 
bedingt  ist,  erstreckt  sich  so  weit  als  die  von  dieser  ausgehende 
amtliche  Apostolische  Wirksamkeit."  Twesten,  the  successor  in 
the  chair  of  Schleiermacher  at  Berlin  says : — "  Inspiration  als 
Ableitung  der  Heiligen  Schrift  aus  gOttlicher  Causalitat,  hangt 
zusammen  mit  dem  allgemeinen  christlichen  Selbstbewusstsein,  das 
nur  urspriinglicher,  und  vollkommener  war  bei  den  ersten  Vermit- 
tlern  der  Offenbarung."  Nitzsch  in  like  manner  identifies  the  in- 
spiration which  attaches  to  the  writings  of  the  apostles  with  that 
which  attached  to  their  preaching ;  and  Tholuck,  in  his  "  Commen- 
tary on  the  Hebrews,"  expresses  himself  thus  : — "  Wir  nehmen  bei 
den  Apostlen  einen  religidsen  Takt  an,  welcher  sie  leitete  von  den 
Bildungselementen  ihrer  Zeit  und  ihres  Volks  nur  dasjenige 
beizubehalten,  was  den  Vortrag  der  Christlichen  Wahrheit  materiel 
in  Keiner  Weise  trubte,  anderes  aber  zurucktreten,  oder  ganz  fallen 
zu  lassen.  Man  wird  an  dem  Ausdrucke  religiosen  Takt  keinen 
Anstoss  nehmen ;  wir  bedienen  uns  ja  des  Ansdrucks  Takt,  auch 
auf  dem  Gebiete  der  Kunst  fur  die  empfundene,  aber  nicht  in  das 


178  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Bewusstsein  getretene  Regel."  Hase,  to  whom  I  am  chiefly  indebt- 
ed for  pointing  out  most  of  the  above  definitions,  sides  entirely  with 
this  school : — "  Weil  die  Offenbarung  nur  das  Religiose  betrifft,  so 
ist  in  dieser  Hinsicht  die  Lehre  der  Neukirchlichen  Dogmatiker 
aufzunehmen,  dass  sich  die  Inspiration  nur  auf  dieses  im  Weitesten 
Umfange  beziehe  ;  denn  Christus  ist  nicht  erchienen'allerlei  Kunst 
und  Wissenschaft  zu  lehren,  sondern  unsre  Seele  zu  retten." 

Indications  that  this  higher  and  far  more  impressive  view  of 
inspiration  is  making  some  progress  in  our  own  country  are  not 
wanting.  The  mental  struggles  of  John  Sterling  showed  how 
earnestly  he  desired  to  see  the  whole  subject  placed  upon  its  true 
foundation, — a  desire  which  was  fostered  by  the  influence  of  Cole- 
ridge, and  the  perusal  of  his  "  Confessions  of  an  Enquiring  Spirit." 
Equally,  too,  does  the  learned  biographer  of  Sterling  manifestly 
sympathize  in  the  same  desire : — "  We  have  seen,"  he  says,  (p. 
cxxx.),  "how  Sterling  grew  to  regard  an  intelligent  theory  of 
inspiration,  and  of  the  relation  between  the  Bible  and  the  faith 
which  it  conveys,  as  the  most  pressing  want  of  the  Church.  That 
it  is  a  most  pressing  one  is  indeed  certain,  and  such  it  has  long  been 
acknowledged  to  be,  by  those  who  meditate  on  theology."  As  a  com- 
mentary upon  these  words,  I  shall  merely  refer  to  a  note  presented 
to  us  in  another  place  by  the  same  author,  in  which  he  quotes  the 
following  passage  from  Akermann : — "  Theologians  have  not  un- 
frequently  been  guilty  of  gross  error  with  regard  to  the  biblical  idea 
of  inspiration,  from  looking  upon  it  as  mechanical  instead  of  dynam- 
ical. From  the  passages  cited  (Gen.  xli.  38 ;  Job  xxxii.  8 ;  Isa. 
xi.  2 ;  Matt.  x.  20 ;  Luke  ii.  40  ;  John  xiv.  17,  26  ;  Rom.  viii.  16  ; 
1  Cor.  ii.  10,  xii.  3;  Gal.  iv.  6;  2  Pet.  i.  21),  it  is  sufficiently  evi- 
dent that  the  Bible  speaks  of  the  working  of  the  Spirit  of  God  as 
dynamical.  Hence  theologians  ought  never  to  have  adopted  or  en- 
couraged the  crude  notion,  that  persons  under  inspiration  were  like 
so  many  drawers,  wherein  the  Holy  Ghost  put  such  and  such  things, 
which  they  then  took  out  as  something  ready  made,  and  laid  -before 
the  world ;  so  that  their  recipiency  with  reference  to  the  Spirit  in- 
spiring them  was  like  that  of  a  letter-box.  Whereas  inspiration, 
according  to  the  Bible,  is  to  be  viewed  as  a  vivifying  and  animating 
operation  on  the  spiritual  faculty  of  man,  by  which  its  energy  and 


ON    INSPIRATION.  179 


capacity  are  extraordinarily  heightened,  so  that  his  powers  of  inter- 
nal perception  discern  things  spread  out  before  them  clearly  and 
distinctly,  which  at  other  times  lay  beyond  his  range  of  vision,  and 
were  dark  and  hidden." — Hare's  "  Mission  of  the  Comforter."  Ap- 
pendix, p.  500. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

ON     CHRISTIAN     THEOLOGY. 

IN  the  whole  of  our  previous  discussions,  we  have  been  oc- 
cupied exclusively  with  phenomena  that  belong  to  the  intui- 
tional part  of  our  mental  constitution.  The  essential  ele- 
ments of  religion  in  general,  as  of  Christianity  in  particular, 
appertain  strictly  to  this  portion  of  our  nature,  and  may  be 
realized  in  all  their  varied  influence  without  the  co-operation 
of  any  purely  reflective  processes.  Revelation  and  inspira- 
tion, in  like  manner,  both  belong  to  the  region  of  intuition ; 
for  although  the  analysis  of  them  led  us  to  the  necessary  ad- 
mission of  certain  external  influences  and  special  providen- 
tial arrangements,  yet  we  have  viewed  even  these,  as  yet, 
only  as  they  effect  the  spontaneous  and  intuitional  phases  of 
our  whole  spiritual  nature. 

In  passing  on  to  the  subject  of  Christian  theology,  we  make 
an  entire  transition  from  the  intuitional  into  the  logical  sphere 
of  the  question.  We  have  now  no  longer  to  wind  our  way 
amongst  the  deep  and  almost  hidden  phenomena  of  feeling  ; 
but  we  come  out  at  once  into  the  clear  and  well-defined  re- 
gion of  logical  truth,  and  have  to  occupy  ourselves  with  the 
principles  on  which  it  is  possible  to  ground  a  formal  and 
scientific  statement  of  religious  doctrine. 

If,  therefore,  we  have  probed  accurately  the  relation  which 
exists  generally  between  the  intuitional  and  the  logical  con- 
sciousness in  human  nature,  we  shall  not  experience  much 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  181 

difficulty,  and  cannot  be  led  into  much  error,  by  applying 
our  results  to  the  subject  of  the  present  chapter,  i.  e.,  to  the 
relation  which  subsists  between  religion  and  theology.  . 

I.  We  shall  begin  this  investigation,  therefore,  by  inquir- 
ing into  the  precise  nature  of  theology,  as  distinguished  from 
religion. 

The  whole  amount  of  interest  which  man  is  capable  of 
feeling,  in  reference  either  to  religion  or  theology,  arises,  of 
course,  from  his  enjoying  some  immediate  perception  of  the 
objects  to  which  they  both  equally  relate.  Were  our  minds 
so  constituted  that  the  sphere  of  our  experience  did  not  at  all 
extend  into  the  province  of  spiritual  things,  there  would  be 
no  more  need  and  no  more  possibility  of  our  having  either  a 
religion  or  a  theology,  than  there  actually  is  in  the  case  of 
the  mere  animal  minds  around  us.  As,  to  a  mind  which  has 
no  perception  of  beauty  in  its  concrete  forms,  there  could  be 
no  sesthetical  emotions,  and  no  science  of  the  beautiful ;  as, 
to  a  mind  totally  destitute  of  moral  sensibility,  there  could 
be  no  moral  life  apparent  in  the  world,  and  no  idea  of  a  mo- 
ral philosophy  ; — just  so,  in  the  case  before  us,  the  primary 
condition  on  which  the  whole  question  of  religion  and  theo- 
logy arises  and  takes  its  place  amongst  the  subjects  of  hu- 
man feeling  and  human  interest  is,  the  possession  of  a  reli- 
gious sensibility  which  presents  the  fundamental  objects  in- 
volved in  all  religious  emotion  or  contemplation  to  our  imme- 
diate intuition.  In  few  words,  all  religion  and  all  theology 
have  their  origin  and  possibility  in  a  direct  and  inward  reve- 
lation. 

Were  this  power  of  religious  sensibility  absolutely  perfect ; 
were  the  intuitions  or  revelations  we  thus  enjoy  of  spiritual 
things  complete  ;  were  our  whole  interior  being  so  precisely 
harmonized  with  truth  itself,  that  we  needed  only  to  stand, 
as  it  were,  in  the  pathway  of  its  rays  and  receive  the  im- 
pression in  all  its  distinctness  and  brightness  within  us ; — 


182  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

then,  indeed,  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  any  other  men. 
tal  process  whatever  to  assure  ourselves  of  the  truth.  But 
this  perfect  state  of  the  intuitional  consciousness,  we  know, 
has  been  disturbed  ;  at  any  rate,  it  does  not  naturally  exist ; 
the  reflection  of  spiritual  truth  within  us  is  distorted  by  a 
thousand  causes ; — by  moral  evil,  by  education,  by  preju- 
dice, by  false  reasoning,  and  by  many  other  influences  we 
need  not  at  present  enumerate. 

Christianity,  it  is  true,  seeks  to  restore  this  power  of  spir- 
itual intuition  to  its  original  stale  ;  and  just  in  proportion  as 
it  purifies  the  soul,  elevates  the  mind,  and  brings  the  whole 
inward  man  into  sympathy  with  the  truth  as  it  exists  in  the 
mind  of  God,  does  it  really  accomplish  its  great  purpose. 
But  to  how  limited  an  extent  is  this  process  carried  in  the 
present  world  ;  what  darkness  and  doubt  still  hover  even 
over  the  really  Christianized  mind ;  how  many  prejudices 
insensibly  mingle  up  with  our  best  and  clearest  spiritual  in- 
tuitions ;  and  in  how  few  cases  can  we  say,  that  there  is 
even  an  approximate  harmony  realized  between  man's  own 
interior  being,  and  the  truth  of  God  in  its  objective  reality ! 
Hence,  accordingly,  the  origin,  and  hence  the  necessity,  of 
another,  and  that  a  logical  process,  to  give  greater  clearness 
and  distinctiveness  to  our  intuitions  ;  hence  the  impulse  we 
feel  to  convert  the  spontaneous  religious  life  into  the  reflec- 
tive ;  hence,  in  fine,  the  rise  of  a.  formal  theology. 

The  effort  of  theology,  it  will  be  seen  upon  reflection,  is 
always  to  give  a  definite  form  and  scientific  basis  to  our 
religious  life,  and  to  the  spiritual  truth  involved  in  it.  The 
religious  life,  entirely  consisting  as  it  does  in  emotion  and 
intuition,  presents  this  truth  to  the  mind  of  man  in  the  con- 
crete, and  as  a  whole.  Were  the  view  we  thus  obtain  per- 
fectly clear  and  uniform,  we  should  need  nothing  more.  But 
Divine  things,  alas !  are  reflected  upon  the  surface  of  our 
spiritual  nature  after  it  has  been  ruffled  by  distracting  pas- 


ON   CHRISTIAN   THEOLOGY.  183 

sions,  prejudices,  or  cares;  just  as,  when  the  bosom  of  a  lake 
is  fretted  by  the  wind  and  the  storm  ; — and  thus  the  Divine 
symmetry  of  the  objects  presented  is  broken  and  lost  to  our 
view.  It  is  then  that  the  logical  or  analytic  faculty  comes  to 
our  aid,  and  seeks  to  restore  to  us  the  harmonious  propor- 
tions of  truth ;  not,  indeed,  by  affording  an  immediate  glance 
at  the  concrete  whole,  but  by  separating  it  into  its  parts, 
comparing  one  portion  with  another,  and  thus  discovering,  if 
possible,  the  consistency  which  runs  through  them  all.  By 
intuition,  we  should  have  seen  the  objects  presented  to  us  at 
once  in  their  natural  and  concrete  unity  ;  by  logic,  we  now 
seek  to  construct  a  unity  by  a  mixed  analytic  and  synthetic 
process, — to  verify,  singly,  the  abstract  consistency  of  each 
part,  and  to  bring  our  entire  conceptions  of  the  truth  into  a 
logical  whole. 

Without  lengthening,  then,  our  description  of  the  nature 
of  Christian  theology,  as  distinguished  from  religion,  we  may 
say  in  general,  that,  as  the  one  is  connected  with  the  opera- 
tion of  the  intuitional  faculty,  and  the  other  with  that  of  the 
logical,  so  they  will  each  manifest  the  characteristics  pecu- 
liar to  these  respective  spheres  of  our  consciousness.  First  of 
all,  the  one  gives  us  presentative  knowledge,  the  other  repre- 
sentative; for  the  fresh  and  concrete  perceptions  we  obtain 
of  spiritual  things  in  the  vital  awakenment  of  our  religious 
nature  are,  in  fact,  direct  presentations  of  truth  to  the  in- 
ward eye ;  while  the  propositions  of  formal  theology  are  but 
the  best  representation  we  can  make  of  that  truth,  in  definite 
and  abstract  terms,  to  the  understanding. 

Religion,  again,  is  spontaneous  in  its  whole  character ; 
theology  is  reflective.  The  one  arises  unconsciously  when 
the  heart  is  touched  by  the  fire  from  heaven,  and  pictures 
out  before  us,  even  to  our  own  awe  and  astonishment,  the 
wonderful  revelations  of  God  to  man  ;  the  other  proceeds  re- 
flectively from  stage  to  stage,  and  gives  a  scientific  value 


184  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

to  every  thing  it  appropriates  as  it  moves  onward  in  its 
course. 

Thirdly.  Religion  has  a  material  value — theology  only 
&  formal.  But  for  the  intuitional  process  involved  in  the  for- 
mer, we  should  not  be  brought  into  contact  with  the  objective 
elements  of  Divine  truth  at  all ;  for  intuition  always  marks 
the  boundaries  of  our  actual  experience:  but  for  the  logical 
process  implied  in  the  latter,  we  should  never  be  able  to  mould 
these  elements  into  the  form  of  a  science  or  a  system. 

Fourthly.  Religion  gives  us  truth  in  its  unity,  and  tends 
to  inspire  unity  into  all  hearts  similarly  affected  by  it ;  the- 
ology separates  religious  truth  into  its  various  parts  by  the 
process  of  abstraction,  points  out  logical  distinctions,  and  is 
too  apt  to  produce  disagreement  where  the  religious  life  is  not 
powerful  enough  to  overbalance  its  critical  tendency. 

Finally.  Religion  bears  upon  it  a  generic  character, 
growing  up  in  the  moral  development  of  communities  and 
nations ;  while  theology,  formally  considered,  has  a  purely 
individual  character,  and  must  always  be  placed  entirely  at 
the  mercy  of  the  individual  judgment.  Our  religious  life  we 
receive,  for  the  most  part,  traditionally,  from  the  develop- 
ment of  Christian  consciousness  in  the  different  communities 
which  now  compose  the  visible  Church  :  and  the  very  fact  of 
its  continued  historical  existence,  as  of  its  moral  power  in  the 
world,  gives  it  an  authority  which  no  one  can  gainsay,  any 
more  than  we  can  deny  man's  distinctive  intuitions  of  the 
beautiful  or  the  good :  but  every  mind  can  criticise  a  theolo- 
gical system,  and  convict  it  of  illogical  processes,  wherever 
it  lies  open  to  scientific  objections. 

Such,  then,  are  the  distinctive  characteristics_of  religion 
and  theology.  The  one  appeals  to  the  deep  moral  and  spirit- 
ual instincts  of  the  human  heart ;  the  other  aims  at  gaining, 
and  even  forcing,  the  ascent  of  the  human  intellect.  The  one 
takes  us  at  once  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human  faculties, 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  185 

and  offers  to  us  perceptions  of  truth  such  as  we  never  could 
gain  by  any  formal  effort  of  our  own,  and  never  infer  from 
prior  data  ;  the  other  seeks  to  define  these  very  perceptions, 
to  make  them  reflective,  and  to  reduce  them  all  to  the  form 
of  the  logical  understanding.  Religion,  accordingly,  is  al- 
ways beyond, — theology,  as  such,  always  within  the  limits  of 
the  natural  reason. 

II.  We  have  to  show  the  conditions  necessary  to  the 
construction  of  Christian  theology. 

These  conditions  are  two,  of  which  the  first  and  main 
condition  is,  the  direct  inward  presentation  of  the  spiritual 
objects  involved  in  Christianity  to  the  mind.  These  objects 
were  presented  as  a  Divine  revelation  to  the  apostles ; — they 
were  presented  to  them  in  the  life,  history,  and  teaching  of 
Christ ;  they  were  presented  to  them  in  the  inspiration  by 
which  their  power  of  spiritual  intuition  was  perfected ;  they 
were  presented  to  them  in  the  organization  and  moral  life  of 
the  first  Christian  communities. 

Having  received  this  manifestation  of  Divine  realities 
themselves,  they  frequently  communicated  it  to  their  numer- 
ous converts — not,  indeed,  by  logical  explanation  (for  this 
would  have  been  impossible),  but  by  bringing  them  into  con- 
tact with  the  very  same  spiritual  influences  which  had 
awakened  and  renovated  their  own  religious  nature.  This 
communication  of  spiritual  truth,  indeed,  was  involved  in  the 
very  production  of  that  new  spiritual  life  which  so  remark- 
ably commenced  on  the  day  of  Pentecost.  But  for  such  an 
awakenment,  there  would  have  been  no  interest  in  the  subject ; 
the  world  would  have  gone  on  insensible  to  these  Divine 
realities  ;  on  the  contrary,  in  the  very  excitement  of  this  deep 
religious  feeling,  the  great  elements  of  the  Christian  revela- 
tion were  first  brought  home  to  the  popular  mind. 

Let  us  follow  for  a  little  in  our  imagination  the  con- 
tinued history  of  this  same  process.  Wherever  the  apostles 
9* 


186  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

went  they  awakened,  as  we  learn,  the  same  deep  emotions ; 
they  drew  forth  the  cry,  "  Men  and  brethren,  what  must  we 
do  to  be  saved  ;"  they  presented  the  great  fact,  that  Christ, 
crucified  and  arisen,  was  the  way,  the  truth,  and  the  life. 
Such  emotions  as  these  scenes  indicate  naturally  induced 
fellowship :  "  They  were  all  together  in  one  place ;" 
"  they  broke  bread  from  house  to  house  ;"  they  were  ce- 
mented in  religious  sympathy.  But  as  yet  there  was  no 
theology,  properly  so  called  ;  the  age  of  religious  excitement 
was  come,  not  yet  the  age  of  reflective  religious  contem- 
plation. 

This  leads  us,  accordingly,  to  the  second  condition  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  of  theology ;  and  that  is,  the  application  of 
consecutive  logical  thinking  to  the  intuitions  spontaneously 
involved  in  the  Christian  life.  This  takes  place  according  to 
that  fixed  law  of  our  nature  by  which  man  ever  seeks  to  de- 
fine and  complete  his  knowledge.  Conscious  that  our  intu- 
itions, however  vivid  and  exciting,  are  not  perfect ;  conscious 
that  there  is  an  indistinctness  about  them  which  needs  to  be 
cleared  up,  we  no  sooner  experience  a  period  of  calmness 
after  the  subsidence  of  the  first  overwhelming  emotions  of 
religious  awakenment,  than  we  begin  to  reflect  upon  the 
whole  phenomena  of  the  case,  and  to  verify  the  accuracy  of 
our  notions,  first  by  defining  them,  and  then  working  them 
up  into  a  regular  logical  construction.  As,  in  all  other 
branches,  knowledge  begins  in  wonder  (which  is  merely  say- 
ing that  it  begins  in  the  fresh,  living,  and  spontaneous  im- 
pressions of  truth  upon  an  awakened  consciousness),  so, 
eminently,  does  it  thus  commence  in  the  region  of  Christian 
theology.  The  very  enthusiasm  which  attends  its  birth, 
gives  the  stimulus  to  future  investigation  ;  and  the  mighty 
impulse  of  our  religious  intuitions  becomes  in  time  the  main- 
spring that  carries  on  the  working  of  the  law,  by  which  the 
spontaneous  life  of  Christianity  merges  into  the  reflective, — 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  187 

by  which  religion  passes  over  into  theology.  We  conclude, 
then,  that  the  essential  prerequisites  of  Christian  theology  are 
these  two, — a  religious  nature,  awakened  by  the  development 
of  the  Christian  life;  and  the  application  of  logical  reflection 
to  the  elements  of  Divine  truth,  which  that  life  spontaneously 
presents. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  remarked  by  some  with  surprise, 
that  in  enumerating  the  essential  conditions  of  Christian 
theology,  T  have  said  nothing  about  the  Bible :  if  I  have  suc- 
ceeded, however,  in  the  preceding  chapter  in  making  our 
view  of  the  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures  clear  and  valid, 
their  relation  to  Christian  theology  will  at  once  become  ap- 
parent. It  will  be  seen,  first  of  all,  that  the  existence  of  the 
Scriptures,  as  such,  was  not  essential  to  the  rise  and  mainte- 
nance of  Christian  theology  at  all.  Take  the  case  of  any  of 
the  very  early  Churches,  who  had  perhaps  heard,  or  perhaps 
had  not  heard  the  preaching  of  the  apostles,  but  who  certainly 
never  enjoyed  a  sight  of  their  writings.  These  Churches, 
assuredly,  could  enjoy  the  power  of  true  Christianity,  and 
could  have  possessed  a  valid  Christian  theology,  as  well  as 
we.  And  yet  there  were  no  Christian  Scriptures  in  the 
case :  there  could  be,  therefore,  no  poring  over  the  letter, 
— no  induction  of  passages, — no  verbal  criticism  whatever. 
There  could  be  simply  the  awakening  of  a  new  religious  life 
by  the  proclamation  of  human  sin  and  of  human  recovery  by 
Christ,  the  chosen  of  God  on  the  one  side,  and  their  own  at- 
tempts to  bring  such  religious  feelings  and  intuitions  into  a 
clear  reflective  statement  on  the  other. 

Now  the  Bible  stands  to  us  in  the  same  light  in  which  the 
agencies  that  brought  the  Christian  life  into  the  hearts  of 
these  early  disciples  stood  to  them.  We  want  to  know  of 
Christ — we  want  to  gaze  upon  his  moral  image — we  want  to 
live  through  the  scenes  of  his  history,  sufferings,  death,  and 
resurrection,  as  did  they :  and  whatever  means  could  bring 


188  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

these  things  vividly  and  authentically  before  our  minds,  and 
awaken  our  religious  emotions  by  the  spiritual  influences 
operating  through  them,  would  give  to  us  the  basis  of  a 
Christian  life  and  a  Christian  theology,  just  as  it  did  to  the 
multitudes,  who  never  saw  the  letter  of  the  Word. 

The  Scriptures  in  fact  become  to  us  now  of  such  supreme 
importance,  in  consequence  of  the  distance  at  which  we  live 
from  the  actual  scenes,  and  the  spiritual  life  which  they  de- 
pict. Of  these  things  they  are  our  only  authentic  narra- 
tives ;  they  were  selected  by  the  early  Church  as  being  at 
once  the  most  unquestionable  descriptions  of  Christ's  whole 
life,  by  those  who  were  eye  and  ear  witnesses ;  and  the 
most  distinctive  manifestation  of  the  spirit  of  the  apostolic 
preaching :  they  serve,  therefore,  as  a  touchstone  whereby 
to  compare  the  whole  complexion  of  our  own  religious  life 
with  that  of  the  apostles,  and  the  spiritual  features  of  our 
own  character  with  the  image,  mirrored  to  us  in  the  Word, 
of  the  Saviour  himself.  No  doubt  all  the  early  Churches 
would  have  prized  the  full  Canon  of  the  Scripture,  had  they 
possessed  it,  as  aids  to  their  own  spiritual  enlightenment ; 
but  to  us  their  value  is  just  so  much  the  greater  in  propor- 
tion to  our  want  of  any  other  authentic  source  through  which 
we  may  be  brought  into  contact  with  the  image  of  Christ, 
and  the  spirit  of  the  apostolic  mission. 

What  is  necessary  to  Christian  theology  is  an  historical 
knowledge  of  Christ  and  a  perception  of  the  spirit  and  mat- 
ter generally  of  the  apostolic  teaching;  for  without  these  we 
can  have  no  religious  life  in  the  distinctively  Christian  sense. 
To  whatever  extent,  then,  the  Bible  is  necessary  to  commu- 
nicate such  a  knowledge  and  such  a  perception,  it  is  neces- 
sary at  present  to  the  existence  of  Christian  theology  ;  (and 
when  we  consider  how  wonderfully  adapted  it  is  to  unfold 
the  spiritual  nature  of  man,  it  is  hard  to  assign  it  too  high  a 
place  ;)  but  it  will  be  seen  at  once  that  the  position  it  takes 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  189 

in  relation  to  theology  is  totally  different  from  that  which  is 
assigned  it  by  those  who  ground  their  theology,  professedly 
at  least,  upon  an  induction  of  individual  passages,  as  though 
each  passage,  independently  of  the  spirit  of  the  whole,  were,  of 
Divine  authority. 

Against  such  a  formal  use  of  the  letter  of  Scripture 
in  theology,  our  whole  view  of  inspiration  is  a  protest  and  an 
argument.  The  inspiration  of  the  apostles  was  vested  in  their 
intuitional  nature,  not  in  the  ordinary  and  logical  use  of  their 
faculties ;  and  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  see  the  truth 
as  they  did,  is  by  entering  into  the  spirit  of  their  life  and 
writings,  not  by  adhering  simply  to  words  or  expressions. 
Nay,  even  supposing  the  letter  had  been  verbally  imparted 
from  heaven,  yet  the  comprehension  of  it  must  still  depend 
upon  the  extent  to  which  our  whole  spiritual  nature  is  un- 
folded, so  as  to  enter  essentially  into  its  meaning  and  force. 
A  mere  induction  of  passages,  therefore,  grounded  on  the 
mere  logical  force  of  the  words,  could  give  us  no  fixed  result, 
simply  because  it  would  present  no  fixed  data ;  for  as  the  sub- 
jective part  of  the  process — that,  I  mean,  which  is  contributed 
by  the  intelligence  and  spiritual  comprehension  of  the  inquirer 
— varied,  so  would  also  the  meaning  and  intensity  of  the  sa- 
cred words  themselves  vary,  as  data  standing  in  connection 
with  his  own  peculiar  system  of  theological  truth.  Nay,  we 
may  put  the  question  in  yet  a  stronger  light ;  for  as  the  ac- 
tual material  of  our  knowledge  all  comes  through  direct  and 
intuitional  processes,  it  is  evident  that  a  man  bringing  simply 
the  formal  or  critical  faculty  to  the  work  of  constructing  a 
theology,  might  create  out  of  the  Scriptures  a  system  purely 
logical,  without  ever  perceiving  in  it  a  single  element  of  po- 
sitive truth.  Words,  propositions,  definitions,  &c.,  may  be 
the  representatives  of  living  ideas  to  those  minds  which  have 
personally  experienced  them,  but  to  others  they  are  only  lo- 
gical forms,  with  no  reality  in  them.  The  words  of  Scrip- 


190  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

ture,  to  give  us  a  valid  theology,  must  have  ideas  attached 
to  them,  which  ideas  can  never  be  made  matter  of  direct 
experience  by  any  kind  of  definition  whatever.  Theology 
must  have  a  matter  as  well  as  a  form ;  and  the  matter  of  it 
can  only  be  derived  from  the  revelation  of  truth  to  the  inward 
consciousness  as  a  living  experience.  All  these  considera- 
tions, therefore, — and  many  more  might  be  added, — bring 
us  alike  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  essential  prerequisites  of 
Christian  theology  are  the  spiritual  enlightenment  of  the 
mind,  and  logical  reflection  upon  the  intuitions,  which  it 
involves. 

There  is  only  one  other  point  which  here  requires  confir- 
mation, and  that  is,  the  validity  of  the  assertion  we  have 
made,  that  religion  is  always  the  basis  of  theology,  whereas 
it  is  very  widely  imagined  that  theology  comes  Jirst,  and  that 
religious  awakenment  is  consequent  upon  it.  The  difficulty 
here  experienced  arises  from  confounding  the  logical  and  the 
chronological  order  of  phenomena  in  the  human  mind.  Lo- 
gically, there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  the  spontaneous  life 
always  precedes  the  reflective.  Wherever  theology  exists, 
it  necessarily  supposes  a  prior  perception  of  the  spiritual 
ideas  which  are  formally  stated  in  it.  Without  the  impulse 
derived  from  religious  intuitions,  there  would  have  been  no 
more  disposition  to  create  theological  science,  than  there 
would  be  to  create  a  moral  science  without  any  perception  of 
moral  relations. 

Chronologically,  however,  the  case  may  be  reversed. 
Theology,  having  once  been  created^can  be  presented  didac- 
tically to  the  understanding  before  there  is  any  awakening 
of  the  religious  nature,  and  can  even  lead  the  mind  to  whom 
it  is  presented  to  such  an  interest  in  the  subject  as  may  issue 
in  his  spiritual  enlightenment.  It  should  be  remembered, 
then,  that  in  discussing  philosophically  the  relation  of  theology 
to  religion,  we  of  course  confine  ourselves  to  the  logical  view 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  191 

of  the  question ;  and  in  this  sense  the  order  of  phenomena,  as 
we  have  described  it,  is  uniformly  preserved.  Not  only  is 
this  conclusion  borne  out  by  the  analysis  of  the  faculties,  but 
it  is  equally  verified  by  history  itself.  In  the  primitive 
Church  we  clearly  trace  the  development  of  a  distinctive 
Christian  theology,  out  of  the  religious  life  of  those  wondrous 
times  ;  and  in  every  subsequent  instance  in  which  a  new 
form  of  theology  has  appeared,  as  in  the  time  of  the  Reforma- 
tion, it  has  always  sprung  out  of  the  deep  religious  excite- 
ment of  that  particular  age.  Mere  criticism  upon  a  given 
system  may  take  place  at  any  time  ;  but  it  is  only  when  the 
whole  spiritual  element  has  been  fused  by  the  intensity  of 
religious  fervor,  that  it  becomes  plastic  under  the  construc- 
tive power  of  the  logical  understanding,  and  can  be  moulded 
anew  into  a  distinct  and  living  form  of  Christian  theology. 

III.  We  come  next  to  consider  the  method  of  theology. 

There  are  few  subjects  on  which  there  exists  popularly 
so  much  confusion  of  thought  as  upon  this.  Growing  up  as 
we  do  within  certain  communities,  and  absorbing  quite  un- 
consciously the  ideas  professed  and  inculcated  by  them, 
there  is  nothing  more  difficult  than  to  separate  these  ideas 
from  the  essential  elements  of  Christianity  ;  to  view  them  as 
dogmas  humanly  constructed ;  and  to  trace  out  the  process 
by  which  they  have  been  formed.  Most  men  have  no  idea 
whatever  of  the  method  by  which  their  own  theology  has  ori- 
ginated, or  the  elements  which  it  really  contains.  Inherited 
traditionally  from  the  religious  thinking  of  the  past,  the  most 
fundamental  portion  of  it  is  viewed  rather  as  having  a  kind 
of  fixed  and  axiomatic  certainty  about  it,  as  though  it  were 
impossible  for  any  soundly  constituted  mind  to  view  the 
question  in  any  other  light,  or  for  the  Scriptures  to  bear  any 
other  meaning.  . 

The  consequence  is,  that  even  professed  theologians, 
whose  minds  have  not  been  trained  to  accurate  habits  of  ana- 


192  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

lysis,  are  deceived  both  as  to  the  method  which  has  been 
previously  followed,  and  as  to  the  method  which  they  are 
themselves  virtually  following  in  the  construction  of  their 
theology.  Leaving  the  main  body  of  the  edifice  untouched, 
they  propose  a  few  modifications,  and  carry  on  a  few  re- 
searches, simply  in  relation  to  some  of  the  details,  and  then 
fancy  that  the  method  they  employ  here  is  that  of  formal  the- 
ology as  a  whole,  tacitly  supposing  the  entire  superstructure 
to  have  been  erected  on  the  same  principles. 

It  has  been  a  very  extended  notion,  since  the  prevalence  of 
the  Baconian  method  in  scientific  research,  that  just  as  the 
facts  of  natural  science  lie  before  us  in  the  universe,  and 
have  to  be  generalized  and  systematized  by  the  process  of  in- 
duction, so  also  the  facts  of  theology  lying  before  us  in  the 
Bible  have  simply  to  be  moulded  into  a  logical  series,  in  or- 
der to  create  a  Christian  theology.  We  shall  not  stop  to  re- 
mark, at  present,  upon  the  wrong  use  of  the  word  "facl,"  as 
employed  in  reference  to  the  contents  of  the  Bible,  since  that 
will  come  before  us  more  fully  in  the  next  chapter ;  but  let- 
ting this  particular  point  stand  by,  we  would  simply  ask, 
Who  is  there  that  has  ever  constructed  a  theology  upon  these 
principles  ?  Take  any  case  whatever,  and  consider  whether 
the  theologian  you  suppose  has  not  received  a  given  amount 
of  mental  influence  from  those  who  have  preceded  him.  So 
closely  are  certain  habits  of  thinking,  certain  philosophical 
ideas,  certain  traditionary  views  of  human  life,  of  the  Deity, 
of  duty,  and  destiny, — yea,  certain  forms  of  thought  which 
are  applicable  to  all  subjects  whatever,  interwoven  with  our 
intellectual  being,  that  the  idea  of  stripping  away  these  integ- 
uments, and  looking  at  the  Scriptures  with  a  mind  perfectly 
cleared  of  all  influence  except  that  which  flows  from  their 
own  hallowed  pages,  is  a  state  of  man's  intellectual  being 
purely  imaginary. 

Let  it  be  remembered,  moreover,  that  what  we  have  to 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  193 

do  in  constructing  a  theology  is,  not  simply  to  be  directly  re- 
cipient of  Divine  ideas,  whether  they  flow  from  the  Scrip- 
tures or  elsewhere ;  but  to  mould  these  ideas  into  a  scientific 
form.  However  simply,  therefore,  we  might  receive  the  en- 
grafted Word  as  a  Divine  revelation,  yet  the  moment  we  be- 
gin to  act  the  part  of  theologians,  and  systematize  the  truth, 
that  moment  we  must  proceed  according  to  some  logical  plan 
or  scientific  organum  ;  and  this  organum,  we  know,  must  be 
the  result  of  some  human  system  of  philosophy,  or  to  say  the 
least,  of  some  philosophical  method.  Here,  accordingly,  is 
another  element  in  our  theological  construction  which  comes 
from  the  scientific  thinking  of  our  own,  or  of  some  previous 
age. 

Put  the  case,  in  fine,  in  any  point  of  view  in  which  it  is 
possible  to  be  thrown  ;  reduce  the  amount  of  extraneous  in- 
fluence in  the  theologian  to  a  minimum,  yet  when  he  comes 
to  the  Scriptures,  to  make  his  induction,  he  must  proceed  ac- 
cording to  certain  conceptions  even  in  his  very  classification  ; 
he  must  view  the  passages,  separately,  according  to  the  light 
of  his  own  religious  development ;  he  must  place  them  side 
by  side,  according  to  the  idea  he  has  respecting  the  truth 
they  are  supposed  to  convey.  The  history  of  Doctrines,  in 
fact,  confirms  and  establishes  what  we  have  shown  to  be  in- 
evitable, from  the  very  nature  of  the  case, — that  whether  men 
may  be  conscious  of  it  or  not,  they  must  and  they  do  use 
the  logical  instruments  of  their  times,  and  that  still  further 
they  can  never  avoid  viewing  the  questions  upon  which  these 
instruments  are  to  be  employed,  according  to  the  current 
conceptions  and  the  whole  religious  development  of  the  age. 

Having  placed,  then,  this  inductive  scheme  in  a  some- 
what clearer  light,  and  shown  that  no  one,  whatever  he  pro- 
fesses, really  acts  upon  it,  we  must  consider  the  claims  of 
another  and  very  opposite  method  of  theology — the  method,  I 
mean,  which  begins  with  the  definition  of  purely  intellectual 


194  PHILOSOPHY    OF   RELIGION. 

ideas,  and  builds  up  a  whole  system  consecutively  upon  them. 
This  method  was  virtually  that  of  the  latter  scholastic  writers, 
as  it  is  that  of  the  present  divines  of  the  Rationalistic  school. 
These  theologians  commence  ordinarily  with  the  most  abstract 
conceptions.  Out  of  these  abstractions  they  construct  the 
notion  of  a  Deity  ;  from  that  they  proceed  to  create  a  moral 
government,  next  they  infer  the  relation  of  mankind  to  this 
government  which  they  have  constructed,  and  finally  draw  out 
in  logical  succession  the  whole  system  of  Divine  arrangements 
and  of  human  duty  consequent  upon  their  primary  definitions. 
The  whole  is  unitedly  an  affair  of  the  logical  understanding  ; 
the  necessity  of  possessing  spiritual  life,  and  any  immediate 
intuitions  of  Divine  things  as  one  condition  of  a  true  theology, 
is  not  surmised  ;  and  thus  the  whole  essence  of  Christianity 
tends  to  become,  to  their  minds,  an  intellectual  chain  of  pro- 
positions, the  belief  of  which  forms  the  basis  of  their  Christian 
profession . 

Still,  even  here,  men  are  usually  more  reasonable  than 
their  theories.  Just  as  we  found  it  impossible  for  any  one  to 
ground  a  theology  on  a  mere  induction  of  passages  of  Scrip- 
ture, so  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  proceed  upon  the  purely 
abstract  measure  we  have  just  described.  However  strenu- 
ously men  may  appeal  to  the  logical  understanding  as  the 
basis  of  their  theology,  and  however  strongly  they  may  ap- 
peal to  the  definitions  they  employ,  yet  there  is  always  some 
under-current  of  spiritual  life,  or  experience,  out  of  which 
these  very  definitions  are  evolved ;  and  this  experience,  too, 
is  connected  in  no  slight  degree  with  the  moral  influence  of 
the  Scriptures,  and  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  age. 
Thus  we  are  reduced  to  the  conclusion  that  theology  is,  of 
necessity,  the  systematic  product  of  two  factors,  a  moral  or 
intuitional  on  the  one  hand,  a  critical  or  logical  on  the  other. 
The  one  is  a  revelation  brought  home  to  us  by  the  awaken- 
ment  of  a  new  and  Divine  spiritual  life,  whether  that  awaken- 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  195 

ment  arise  from  the  direct  influence  of  inspired  apostles,  or 
the  preaching  of  the  Gospel  by  men,  themselves  imbued  with 
its  spirit  and  power,  or  by  the  study  of  the  Word  of  God  ;  for 
these,  be  it  observed,  are  alike  spiritual  agencies  adapted  to 
quicken  and  develope  our  religious  nature,  and  bring  us  into 
contact  with  the  Divine  ideas,  which  form  the  experimental 
basis  of  Christian  theology.  The  other,  or  critical  factor, 
consists  of  the  best  logical  aids  and  appliances  which  the 
philosophy  of  the  age  can  present.  The  combination  of  these 
two  elements  will  al  ways  originate  a  theology  ;  the  one  giving 
the  matter,  the  other  supplying  the  form. 

In  brief,  the  true  Christian  theologian  must  be  regenerate, 
— the  vital  spirit  of  truth  must  have  penetrated  to  that 
inmost  shrine  of  the  soul,  that  centre  and  focus  of  his  spi- 
ritual being,  that  pure  and  essential  element  of  man's  higher 
nature,  which  is  immediately  connected  with  God,  which 
alone  holds  direct  intercourse  with  the  Divine  mind,  to  which 
all  the  other  faculties  stand  merely  in  the  relation  of  servants 
and  emissaries.  This  element  of  the  divinity  within  us  may 
be  repressed  and  obscured ;  its  light  may  be  extinguished, 
its  voice  silenced  ;  but  never  can  it  be  corrupted,  never 
essentially  perverted.  It  is  this  part  of  our  nature,  then, 
which  is  the  seat  of  the  life  of  God  in  the  soul  of  man  ;  it 
is  its  voice  which  reminds  us  of  our  absolute  dependence  on 
him,  and  its  influence  which  links  us  indissolubly  to  the 
Divinity.  Hence  it  is  alone  the  proper  organ  of  religion 
perceiving  its  real  nature,  and  supporting  its  Divine  claims 
upon  our  reverence  and  love. 

From  this  point  of  view  we  see  the  importance,  nay,  the 
necessity  of  spiritual  purification,  in  order  to  prepare  both 
the  emotional  and  the  intellectual  powers  for  the  service  of 
theology.  Reason  can  only  criticise  effectively  in  proportion 
as  it  acts  harmoniously  with  our  higher  and  spiritual  nature  ; 
without  this  harmony  it  acts  blindly,  running  into  bare 


196  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

negations,  wandering  amidst  barren  abstractions,  or  drawing 
perverse  inferences  from  false  and  insufficient  data.  If 
logical  reasoning  were  alone  sufficient  to  make  a  sound 
theologian,  then  Satan  would  be  amongst  the  best  theologians 
in  existence ;  but  he  will  signally  fail  in  this  operation,  if  it 
is  necessary  that  an  inward  and  progressive  experience  of 
spiritual  things  should  capacitate  the  reason  for  the  work  of 
constructing  a  true  theology — that  is,  for  describing  in  scien- 
tific terms  the  real  elements  of  our  higher  life.  To  do  this, 
it  is  evident,  there  must  be  not  only  the  keen  and  critical 
understanding,  but  there  must  be  also  the  purity  of  heart,  by 
which  alone  we  can  see  God — the  active  spirit  of  duty  by 
which  alone  we  can  know  of  his  doctrine — the  love  of  which 
it  is  said,  he  that  possesses  it  dwelleth  in  God,  and  God  in 
him. 

The  great  practical  points,  therefore,  to  be  ever  kept  in 
view,  as  necessary  to  the  theologian,  are  these  three ;  first, 
that  the  religious  life  be  pure  and  scriptural ;  secondly,  that 
the  logical  aids  employed  in  criticism  be  sound  and  philoso- 
phical ;  and,  thirdly,  that  there  be  a  due  equipoise  of  the  two 
elements,  in  bringing  out  finally  the  whole  result. 

With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  requisites,  the  training 
required  is  principally  of  a  moral  and  religious  character. 
To  insure  the  purity  and  adequacy  of  our  religious  intuitions, 
we  must  enter  primarily  into  the  spirit  of  the  Scriptures ; 
we  must  study  the  life  and  character  of  Christ ;  we  must 
attempt  to  realize  the  great  ideas  involved  in  the  apostolic 
mission.  Next  to  that  we  must  investigate  the  history  of  the 
Church,  trace  its  development,  and  see  the  great  religious 
impulses  under  which  the  best  and  holiest  men  have  lived 
and  acted.  Lastly,  we  must  ourselves  enter  into  the  prac- 
tical duties  of  the  Christian  life,  try  to  realize  in  ourselves 
its  spirit  and  its  elevation,  and  foster  the  whole  by  Christian 
activity,  by  fellowship,  by  self-renunciation,  and  by  com- 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.    "  197 

munion  with  God.  We  look  upon  a  theological  method  want- 
ing these  moral  influences,  as  defective  in  the  most  import- 
ant and  fundamental  conditions  of  fulness  and  efficiency. 

With  regard  to  the  second  requisite,  the  logical  aids  to 
be  employed  are  chiefly  definition,  induction,  deduction,  and 
verification.  In  a  scientific  construction,  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  begin  by  definitions  ;  and,  in  the  case  before 
us,  we  must  grasp  the  great  spiritual  or  moral  ideas  involved 
in  our  religious  life,  and  represent  them,  as  nearly  as  possi- 
ble, in  logical  propositions.  This  will  mark  out  the  limits  of 
our  experience.  Having  gone  thus  far  we  can  appeal  to 
facts — facts  of  history,  facts  relating  to  Christ  and  the  apos- 
tles, facts  relating  to  the  formation  and  growth  of  the  Christian 
Church,  facts  in  the  religious  life  of  our  own  and  every  age, 
— criticising  those  facts  by  the  laws  of  evidence,  and  the 
principles  of  logical  analysis,  and  merging  them  into  more 
general  facts  of  a  more  recondite  kind.  Having  proceeded 
so  far,  we  may  use  the  aid  of  deduction,  and  reason  down- 
wards from  the  principles  already  established,  to  the  less 
general  notions  implicitly  involved  in  them.  And,  finally, 
during  the  whole  course  of  our  logical  construction,  we  must 
verify  every  result,  by  an  appeal  to  human  experience, 
knowing  how  easily  we  may  be  led  on  in  the  ardor  of  rea- 
soning, to  results  which  are  entirely  incompatible  with  the 
laws  of  human  nature,  and  the  daily  phenomena  of  the  reli- 
gious life.  In  this  way  we  shall  originate  a  series  of  pro- 
positions, which  will  be  as  it  were  authoritative  expressions 
of  the  Christian  consciousness,  uttering  itself  articulately  in 
the  ears  of  humanity. 

Finally,  we  must  ever  seek  to  give  its  due  place  to  each 
of  the  factors'by  which  the  whole  result  is  brought  forward. 
A  too  exclusive  reliance  upon  the  moral  element  will  give  a 
theology  loose  and  disjointed,  possessing  perhaps  much  posi- 
tive and  intuitional  vitality,  but  a  very  small  critical  and 


198  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

scientific  value.  This  may  indeed  be  quite  sufficient  for 
moral  purposes — it  may  subdue  the  hearts,  as  did  the  preach- 
ing of  the  apostles,  of  multitudes  of  mankind  ;  but  it  cannot 
subserve  precisely  those  intellectual  objects  for  which  for- 
mal theology  is  chiefly  designed,  while  it  may  degenerate,  ere 
we  are  aware,  into  a  vague  mysticism,  and  sometimes  a  mis- 
chievous fanaticism. 

On  the  contrary,  the  predominance  of  the  critical  ele- 
ment will  give  a  negative  character  to  the  whole  result. 
Criticism  can  only  observe  distinctions,  draw  forth  inconsis- 
tencies, lop  off  excrescences,  and  seek  to  arrange  the  parts 
of  a  system  in  due  logical  order ;  never  can  it  take  in 
the  organic  unity  of  the  whole.  It  defines  and  clears  our 
ideas  indeed ;  but  when  too  exclusively  relied  upon,  it  does 
so  only  at  the  expense  of  narrowing  our  range  of  vision ;  it 
makes  our  knowledge  more  precise,  but  adds  no  material  to 
our  actual  experience.  Hence  a  theology  purely  critical 
will  become  hollow  and  formal ;  it  will  delight  in  abstrac- 
tions ;  it  will  please  the  understanding  by  its  subtlety  and 
its  symmetry;  but  instead  of  giving  nourishment  to  the 
spiritual  nature  of  man,  it  will  feed  him  with  dry  logical  for- 
mulas, which  utterly  fail  to  support  the  vigor  of  his  moral 
life. 

In  fine,  this  method  of  Christian  theology,  as  a  science, 
harmonizes  with  the  highest  ideas  which  have  been  formed 
of  the  real  process  of  all  scientific  researches.  Those  who 
are  most  fluent  in  elevating  the  merits  of  what  they  term 
Baconian  and  inductive  principles,  as  applied  to  theological 
inquiry,  have  commonly  very  little  idea  of  what  induction 
really  involves.  A  thorough  investigation  of  this  very  me- 
thod, with  the  works  of  Professor  Whewell  as  their  guide, 
would  show  them  that  the  classification  of  facts,  without  the 
proper  grasp  and  explication  of  the  conceptions  in  which  they 
are  to  be  grounded,  would  lead  to  a  very  unsatisfactory  result, 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  199 

even  in  any  case  of  ordinary  science.  Much  more  unsatis- 
factory would  it  be  in  the  case  of  a  science  where  the  intui- 
tional element  is  greater  than  in  any  other,  and  where  the 
moral  state  of  the  inquirer  is  above  all  things  of  supreme 
importance.  For  our  own  part,  we  look  upon  the  reflec- 
tive method  of  theology  above  described,  as  the  only  one 
which  at  all  harmonizes  with  the  philosophical  principles  on 
which  scientific  investigation  is  universally  grounded ;  and 
as  to  its  results,  while  the  moral  extreme  drives  us  into 
the  shades  of  mysticism,  and  the  critical  extreme  (although 
it  may  profess  to  ground  itself  upon  the  letter  of  the  Word), 
yet  employs  at  best  a  mere  rationalistic  process  of  inquiry, — 
here  we  have  a  theology  which,  based  primarily  upon  the 
living  consciousness  of  the  Church,  brings  its  whole  conclu- 
sions at  length  into  the  clearest  form  of  logical  and  scientific 
truth. 

IV.  We  come  to  notice  next  the  development  of  theo- 

logy-    • ,-  i 

An  inquiry  has  often  been  raised  with  regard  to  the  pro- 

gressiveness  of  theology  as  a  science,  and  different  conclu- 
sions have  been  formed,  according  to  the  view  which  is 
taken  of  the  whole  nature  and  method  of  theological  research. 
If  the  conclusions  to  which  we  have  already  arrived  be  cor- 
rect, we  shall  find  little  difficulty  in  determining  this  ques- 
tion, for  the  data  on  which  the  solution  depends  lie  already 
before  us. 

Theology,  we  have  seen,  is  the  product  of  two  factors — 
a  moral,  and  a  critical,  and  if  there  be  a  progressive  devel- 
opment of  either  of  these  factors  in  the  human  mind,  there 
must  also  be  a  development  in  the  whole  result. 

Now  in  looking  first  to  the  moral  side  of  the  question, 
we  have  only  to  consider  whether  there  be  such  a  thing  as  pro- 
gress in  our  spiritual  intuitions,  in  respect  either  to  their  na- 
ture or  intensity.  The  whole  character  of  the  intuitional 


200  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

consciousness,  as  well  as  the  voice  of  universal  experience, 
answers  this  inquiry  in  the  affirmative.  We  have  seen  in  a 
previous  chapter,  that  every  thing  of  an  intuitional  character 
not  only  unfolds  itself  more  and  more  in  the  individual,  but 
has  likewise  an  organic  vital  development  in  humanity  at 
large  ;  and  the  history  of  every  pious  mind,  as  well  as  the 
internal  history  of  the  whole  Church,  shows  us  that  this  is 
realized  in  the  actual  growth  of  the  religious  life. 

This  fact  indeed  arises  from  the  very  nature  of  intuition, 
as  a  direct  manifestation  of  truth.  In  the  case  of  the  apos- 
tles, the  spiritual  vision  was  as  nearly  as  possible  perfect ; 
so  purely  was  their  inward  nature  harmonized  to  the  truth 
of  God,  that  no  intervening  clouds  of  human  prejudice,  folly, 
or  actual  sin,  disturbed  the  gaze  with  which  they  could  look 
upon  it  in  its  concrete  unity.  But  it  was  not  possible  for 
the  apostles  to  communicate  the  same  strength  of  vision,  and 
the  same  interior  harmony  of  the  moral  nature  to  others ; 
for  that  would  have  been  the  same  thing  as  communicating 
their  very  inspiration.  All  they  could  do  was  to  arouse  the 
religious  feelings ;  to  direct  them  aright  to  their  proper  ob- 
jects; to  set  the  Christian  life  in  operation;  and  then  to 
leave  it,  under  the  promise  of  Divine  aid,  to  its  future  devel- 
opment. Hence  the  constant  struggle  of  our  spiritual  na- 
ture is  towards  this  very  state  of  spiritual  perfection  ;  and 
just  in  proportion  as  the  power  of  the  world  and  the  flesh 
becomes  less — in  proportion  as  the  storms  of  human  pas- 
sions cease  to  ruffle  the  surface  of  the  soul — in  proportion  as 
the  whole  nature  is  brought  more  into  harmony  with  truth 
and  with  God — will  there  be  a  clearer  reflection  within  us 
of  Divine  things. 

Aad  what  is  true  of  the  individual  is  equally  true  of  the 
whole  Church.  The  Church  is  a  living  unity  ;  it  has  a  spi- 
ritual vitality  of  its  own,  which  developes  organically  in  the 
world.  Every  age  brings  with  it  fresh  conceptions  of  Divine 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY. 


201 


realities,  as  the  mists  of  prejudice  which  intercepted  their 
view  are  cleared  away ;  and,  consequently,  as  the  data  of 
religious  thinking  given  in  the  increased  intensity  of  the  re- 
ligious life  expand,  in  that  proportion  will  there  be  room  for 
the  perpetual  development  of  theology  itself. 

The  progressiveness  of  theology,  however,  depends  not 
only  upon  the  purifying  of  the  spiritual  vision  by  the  closer 
harmonizing  of  our  moral  nature  with  God,  but  it  depends 
also  upon  the  nature  of  the  criticism  we  employ  in  construct- 
ing a  formal  science.  The  logical  organum  we  make  use  of 
in  our  inquiry,  depends  almost  wholly  upon  the  state  of  phi- 
losophy of  the  age  in  which  we  live.  The  early  theologians 
made  use  of  the  philosophy  of  Greece,  Egypt,  and  even 
Asia ; — from  the  time  of  Augustine  downwards,  the  writings 
of  Aristotle  furnished  the  main  instrument  of  all  theological 
criticism  ;  and  from  the  period  of  Bacon  down  to  the  present 
day  the  inductive  method  has  come  into  use  for  the  same 
purpose.  In  brief,  whatever  be  the  logical  methods  most  in 
vogue,  these  will  immediately  exert  their  influence  upon  the 
construction  of  a  systematic  theology  ;  and  those  who  vainly 
imagine  that  in  the  Baconian  idea  of  induction  they  have  a 
final  organum,  have  only  to  turn  their  eyes  to  Germany,  to 
assure  themselves  that,  with  a  profounder  philosophy  in  our 
hands,  we  shall  not  long  be  without  a  more  subtle  instrument 
of  analysis  to  carry  on  the  work  of  the  theologian  himself. 

Putting  together,  therefore,  the  generic  character  of 
our  intuitions  on  the  one  side,  and  the  rise  of  more  subtle 
philosophical  methods  on  the  other,  we  see  that  there  are 
sources  of  progressive  development  in  both  the  elements  out 
of  which  theology  is  constructed.  The  onjy  idea  we  would 
impress  upon  the  mind  of  every  reader  is,  that  development 
does  not  imply  any  organic  change  in  the  real  and  essential 
elements  of  Christian  truth.  Different  as  the  seed  in  its  first 
germination  may  be  in  all  appearance  from  the  perfect  plant, 
10 


202  PHILOSOPHY    OF   RELIGION. 

yet  the  latter  is  simply  the  unfolding  of  what  that  seed  at  first 
implicitly  contained.  And  so  is  it  with  the  development  of 
Christian  theology  in  the  world.  In  whatever  degree  the 
Christian  life  has  been  really  awakened,  there  must  have 
been  some  real  perception  of  Divine  truth  ;  and  to  whatever 
extent  logical  appliances  may  be  used,  yet  they  cannot  alter, 
but  only  mould  the  material  which  is  there  given.  The  in- 
crease of  spiritual  discernment,  and  the  more  subtle  analysis 
of  philosophical  methods,  do  but  tend  to  bring  the  truth  into  a 
fuller  realization  and  a  more  scientific  form.  Under  these 
influences  it  must  march  onward  in  its  course  until  it  ushers 
in  the  glorious  period  of  the  purified  Church,  and  the  pro- 
mised rest  of  a  regenerated  world. 

We  conclude  these  remarks  upon  the  progressive  principle 
in  theology,  by  the  following  words  of  an  eloquent  German 
writer : — 

"  Formal  Christian  dogmas,"  he  remarks,  "may  be  com- 
pared to  minerals  and  metals.  They  are  the  production  of 
that  original  fire,  which  had  so  great  a  part  in  the  formation 
of.  our  present  globe.  That  fire  has  smouldered  away  ;  metals 
and  stones  are  dead  and  cold  ;  of  the  process  which  produced 
them  common  and  superficial  minds  have  no  conception. 
Nothing  but  a  like  intense  heat  can  again  render  the  hardened 
substances  fluid,  and  separate  from  the  nobler  metal  the 
foreign  dross  which  has  become  mingled  with  it ;  yet  without 
this  they  are  dull  heavy  masses,  resisting  all  manufacture  by 
their  brittleness  or  obstinate  tenacity.  In  like  manner  have 
our  dogmas  arisen  from  similar  powerful  processes  of  that 
intense  fire  which  was  kindled  by  Christ  in  the  human  breast. 
Like  fluid,  substances,  they  pervaded  the  productive  ages 
both  of  early  Christianity  and  of  the  Reformation.  Flowing 
outwards  from  its  centre,  the  fluid  mass  formed  itself  more 
and  more  into  fixed  bodies,  yet  long  maintained  in  its  glowing 
state  its  warmth,  and  its  consequent  flexibility.  Only  when 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  203 

its  was  entirely  withdrawn  from  the  enlivening  operation  of 
the  primitive  fire,  did  the  dogmas  become  cold  and  dead. 
What,  then,  may  we  conclude  from  this  respecting  our  dog- 
mas 1  The  material  of  the  dogma  is  good  ;  but  this  genuine 
material,  during  the  period  of  its  fluid  state,  became  inter- 
mixed with  the  earthy  matter  of  the  age,  and  received  from 
the  masters  who  tried  upon  it  their  plastic  art,  a  form  which 
relates  to  the  past,  and  no  longer  answers  to  our  present 
wants.  It  is  the  office  of  theological  science  ever  to  labor 
upon  this  material,  purifying  and  forming  it ;  but  this  office 
can  only  succeed  when  the  dead  masses  are  again  brought  to 
a  state  of  warmth,  and  even  of  glowing  fluidity,  by  a  like 
intense  fire  within  the  human  breast ;  such  a  fire  can  only 
separate  the  impure  earths,  and  cast  them  out  as  worthless 
lava  :  only  the  fluid  or  plastic  state  can  afford  to  the  masters 
of  later  days  the  possibility  to  shape  the  masses  into  new 
forms  without  the  rough  strokes  of  the  smiting  hammer. 
Such  a  fire  is  for  our  theologians  the  very  first  condition  of  a 
genuine  criticism — a  fire  kindled  from  the  altar  of  the  holy 
and  righteous  God,  which  gleams  into  our  drowsy  con- 
sciences, burning  even  to  a  deep-felt  conviction  of  sin  ;  which 
is  nourished  by  the  continual  act  of  penitence  and  godly 
sorrow,  but  also  tempered  and  stilled  by  the  dew  of  heavenly 
love."  * 

V.  We  have  only  to  refer,  lastly,  to  the  proper  uses  of 
Christian  theology. 

These,  as  referring  rather  to  the  practical  than  to  the 
philosophical  and  speculative  side  of  the  question,  we  shall 
barely  mention,  and  leave  them  to  be  further  developed  by 
the  reader.  The  uses  of  Christian  theology  are — 

*  "  Der  deutsche  Protestantismus,"  p.  166.  One  oflhe  most  deeply 
interesting  and  suggestive  books  of  the  age  by  an  anonymous  German 
writer,  whom  I  have  found  to  be  Prof.  Hundeshagen,  of  Heidelberg. 


'204  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

1.  To  show  the  internal  consistency  of  religious  truth. 
Little  as  we  need  to  see  this  consistency  whilst  our  inmost 
souls  are  burning  with  a  deep  and  holy  enthusiasm,  yet  in 
the  ordinary  state  of  human  life,  beset  as  we  are  with  a  thou- 
sand repressive  influences,  it  is  highly  important  to  strengthen 
ourselves  with  every  kind  of  armor  against  skepticism  and 
indifference.     In  proportion  as  our  zeal  and  excitement  be- 
come cooler,  do  we  need  so  much  the  more  the  concurring 
testimony  of  reason  to  support  us  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Chris- 
tian life.     It  is  upon  this  we  fall  back,  when  the  fire  of  love 
burns  dim,  until  we  can  kindle  it  again  from  the  altar  of 
God.     Hence  the  importance  of  having  Christian  truth  pre- 
sented to  us  in  such  a  form,  that  we  may  see  its  harmony  with 
all  the  law  of  our  intellectual  being,  and  have  their  witness 
to  seal  its  truth  on  our  hearts. 

2.  Another  use  of  Christian  theology  is  to  repel  philoso- 
phical objections.     The  unbeliever  has  not  the  witness  within 
himself;  and  what  is  more,  he  would  fain  destroy  the  validity 
of  the  truths  of  Christianity  to  others,  by    affirming  their 
inconsistency  with  reason  or  with  one  another.     The  moral 
influences  of  the  religious  life  do  not  answer  these  objections, 
although  they  may  disarm  them  greatly  of  their  force.     To 
answer  them,  the  truth  conveyed  in  the  religious  life  must  be 
made  reflective  and  scientific ; — then,  indeed,  and  not  till  then, 
can  itself  be  maintained,  and  its  consistency  defended  upon 
the  grounds  of  the  philosophical  objector  himself. 

3.  A  third  use  of  Christian  theology  is  to  preserve  man- 
kind from  vague  enthusiasm.     A  strong  religious  excitement 
is  not  inconsistent  with  a  weak  judgment,  a  feeble  conscience, 
and  active  tendencies  to  folly,  and  even  sin.     Under  such 
circumstances,  the  power  of  the  emotions  will  sometimes 
overbalance  the  better  dictates  of  Christian  faith,  love,  and 
obedience,  so  as  to  impel  the  subject  of  them  into  something 
bordering  upon  fanaticism.     Against  this  evil,  religion  alone 


ON    CHRISTIAN    THEOLOGY.  205 

is  often  unable  to  struggle ;  it  needs  the  stronger  element  of 
calm  reason  to  curb  these  wandering  impulses,  and  bring 
them  into  due  subjection  to  duty  and  to  truth.  Here,  then, 
the  influence  of  theology  bears  upon  the  whole  case  ;  and  to 
its  power  is  it  mainly  owing  that  the  intense  incentives 
offered  by  Christianity  to  the  emotive  nature  of  man  have 
been  so  ordered  and  directed  as  to  keep  him  from  vague 
enthusiasm  in  his  belief,  and  an  unsober  fanaticism  in  his 
actions. 

4.  The  last  use  we  mention  to  which  theology  may  be 
applied,  is,  to  embody  our  religious  ideas  in  a  complete  and 
connected  system.  In  this  form  they  appeal  to  every  ele- 
ment in  the  nature  of  man.  The  moral  influence  they  exert 
upon  the  whole  spirit  is  coupled  with  the  power  of  their  ap- 
peal to  the  reason,  and  the  intellect  of  mankind  becomes 
satisfied  as  his  heart  becomes  softened  and  renewed. 

Such,  in  brief,  are  some  of  the  principal  uses  of  theology 
formally  considered.  With  these  we  close  our  present  ob- 
servations, reserving  what  yet  remains  upon  the  subject  to 
be  embodied  in  the  succeeding  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ON   THE   ANALYSIS   OF   POPULAR   THEOLOGY. 

THE  explanations  made  in  the  last  chapter  have  now  prepared 
us  to  analyze  the  substance  of  popular  theology,  and  to  point 
out  distinctly  the  elements  of  which  it  has  been  composed. 
The  importance  of  such  an  analysis  we  regard  as  being  in 
the  present  day  peculiarly  pressing ;  inasmuch  as  many 
minds  only  partially  informed  are  strongly  inclined,  when- 
ever they  see  any  portion  of  the  ordinary  faith  of  Christians 
plausibly  contested,  to  fancy  the  whole  equally  open  to  criti- 
cism, and  thus  to  involve  the  eternal  with  the  merely  evanes- 
cent and  temporary,  in  one  common  ruin.  In  an  age,  there- 
fore, like  this,  when  the  keenest  criticism  is  constantly  at 
work  to  lay  hold  of  every  inconsistency  in  the  popular  faith, 
we  feel  it  to  be  equally  necessary,  whether  we  would  con- 
front the  skeptic  or  console  the  believer,  to  show  what  we 
are  prepared  to  hold  with  a  loose  hand,  and  what  to  defend 
as  the  essential  elements  of  our  common  Christianity. 

First  of  all,  then,  let  us  look  to  the  popular  theology  of 
our  own  age  and  country  a*  a  whole.  We  find  existing 
amongst  different  communities  a  system  of  theoretical  doc- 
trine, which  defines  with  considerable  precision  the  truth 
they  regard  as  valid  and  Divine  respecting  the  relations 
which  the  Almighty  sustains  to  man  in  his  creation,  preser- 
vation, redemption,  and  final  salvation.  This  doctrine  having 


ANALYSIS   OF    POPULAR   THEOLOGY.  207 

been  gradually  brought  into  the  form  of  clear  and  logical 
statement,  now  presents  the  above  relations  to  us,  not  as 
though  they  were  spiritual  conceptions,  which  are  involved  in 
the  awakenment  and  illumination  of  our  religious  nature,  but 
rather  as  facts  which  can  be  presented  in  their  full  propor- 
tions to  the  understanding.  Hence  to  those  who,  from  want 
of  education,  or  of  mental  culture  generally,  are  totally  defi- 
cient in  the  critical  faculty,  the  most  natural  course  is,  to 
receive  the  traditionary  system  of  their  own  community  as  a 
complete  and  distinctive  statement  of  the  truth  itself  in  its 
exact  objective  import.  Where  the  cultivation  of  the  religious 
life,  indeed,  wisely  forms  the  most  prominent  feature  of  atten- 
tion, such  an  artificial  view  of  theoretical  doctrine  is  not  so 
strikingly  manifest  j  but  in  all  cases  where  the  inculcation  of 
a  definite  formal  theology  is  regarded  as  being  the  main  point 
that  has  to  be  secured  in  the  evangelization  of  mankind,  there 
the  whole  system  is  naturally  accepted  by  the  pliant  mass,  as 
literal  fact,  to  which  no  kind  of  criticism  is  at  all  accessible. 
Propositions,  indeed,  as  a  matter  of  course,  assume  the  form 
of  a  distinct  statement  of  fact ;  and  it  requires  some  little 
consideration  before  the  propositions  of  theology  are  seen  to 
be  the  expression,  not  immediately  of  an  objective  reality,  but 
of  an  inward  conception  as  to  what  that  reality  may  actu- 
ally be. 

Whilst,  however,  the  mass  of  uninstructed  minds  absorb  the 
theological  system,  in  which  they  are  educated  a*  a  whole, 
those  who  are  more  reflective  soon  detect  in  that  system  an 
element  of  mere  human  reasoning.  This  consciousness  is, 
for  the  most  part,  awakened  by  the  differences  of  opinion 
which  exist  around  them.  It  might  be  imagined,  perhaps, 
that  the  comparison  of  their  formal  theology  with  Holy 
Scripture,  as  its  acknowledged  source,  would  in  some  cases 
naturally  lead  to  such  a  result ;  but  seldom,  comparatively, 
is  this  the  case.  Where  a  given  system  of  theology  has  com- 


208  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

pletely  preoccupied  the  mind,  the  Scriptures  always  appear 
to  speak  in  exact  accordance  with  it ;  so  much  so,  indeed, 
that  the  system  is  regarded,  more  commonly  than  not,  as 
being  the  pure  reflection  into  human  phraseology,  of  the  dis- 
tinctive statements  of  inspired  truth.  When,  however,  a 
mind  once  gets  out  of  the  circle  of  its  own  traditionary  ideas ; 
when  it  finds  other  minds,  having  a  different  religious  con- 
sciousness awakened  in  them,  equally  earnest  with  their  own, 
and  equally  appealing  to  Scripture  proofs,  the  thought  soon 
begins  to  suggest  itself,  that  there  must  be  some  human  ele- 
ment which  gives  their  varied  directions  and  tendencies  to 
these  different  systems,  and  which  mingles  up  insensibly  with 
the  whole  mass  of  our  theological  faith.  So  general  has  this 
conviction  now  become  amongst  the  thoughtful  of  all  parties, 
that  there  is  a  disposition  every  where  apparent  to  tolerate 
various  theological  differences ;  to  acknowledge  all  within  a 
certain  boundary,  as  equally  entitled  to  the  Christian  name ; 
and  to  single  out  only  a  few  great  points,  which  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  theological  creed. 
Such  an  admission,  and  such  a  tolerance,  can  only  arise  from 
a  consciousness,  either  tacitly  or  openly  acknowledged,  that 
there  is  one  element  in  our  dogmatic  theology  which  is 
variable,  unessential,  merely  human,  and  another  element 
which  is  Divine,  indispensable,  eternal. 

The  conviction,  accordingly,  of  these  two  elements  being 
blended  in  our  whole  system  once  clearly  gained,  it  belongs 
to  a  still  higher  order  of  minds — to  men  more  thoroughly 
versed  in  logicalanalys  is  and  historical  research — to  sepa- 
rate the  Divine  from  the  human,  and  to  point  out  the  precise 
sources  in  the  history  of  theology  from  whence  the  latter  has 
been  derived.  For  this  purpose,  some  knowledge  of  the 
history  of  philosophy,  as  well  as  theology,  is  absolutely  re- 
quisite. Every  age  has  had  its  own  forms  and  habits  of 
thinking,  its  own  prevailing  ideas,  its  own  methods  of  research, 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  209 

its  own  peculiar  applications  of  logical  analysis ;  and  as 
these  all  enter  into  the  very  framework  of  our  mental  opera- 
lions,  it  is  inevitable  that  they  should  influence  the  whole 
process  by  which  the  theology  of  every  age  is  constructed. 
Hence  it  is  necessary  to  show  how  philosophical  ideas,  pre- 
vailing at  different  periods,  have  become,  as  it  were,  absorbed 
into  the  body  of  Christian  theology ;  how  these  ideas  have 
been  floated  down  the  stream  of  time ;  how  they  have 
passed  insensibly  over  from  one  system  or  from  one  commu- 
nity into  another;  and  how  they  influence  the  theological 
literature  of  the  age  in  which  we  are  ourselves  living. 

An  historical  and  critical  research  of  this  nature  will  suc- 
ceed in  separating  formal  theological  creeds,  such  as  are 
now  embodied-  in  catechisms,  articles  of  faith,  and  even 
more  extended  and  systematic  works,  into  two  main  elements 
— the  pure  scriptural  statements  on  the  one  side,  and  the 
logical  processes  by  which  these  statements  are  moulded 
into  scientific  form  on  the  other.  Added  to  this,  it  will  point 
out  the  precise  philosophical  doctrines  or  methods  of  research 
which  have  exerted  the  greatest  influence  upon  our  theolo- 
gical systems ;  it  will  lay  bare  the  notions  which,  flowing 
from  the  schools  of  Athens  or  Alexandria,  tinctured  the  pro- 
cesses of  human  thought  throughout  those  precise  periods  in 
which  Christian  theology  first  moulded  itself  into  its  more 
defined  forms  and  phraseology  :  and  finally,  it  will  show  how 
these  notions,  with  a  protean  versatility,  have  thrown  them- 
selves into  different  shapes,  embodied  themselves  in  various 
languages,  and  retained  their  hold  upon  the  human  mind 
long  after  they  were  supposed  to  be  buried  in  the  common 
sepulchre  of  past  opinions.* 

*  This  is  one  inestimable  service  which  Dr.  Hampden  has  rendered 
to  «ur  religious  literature  in  his  "  Bampton  Lectures."     The  learning, 
the  piety,  and  the  courage  with  which  he  has  maintained  his  unassail- 
10* 


210  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

The  view  of  theology,  accordingly,  which  is  derived 
from  such  an  analysis  as  I  now  describe,  is  the  following, 
— "  that  every  actual  system  of  doctrinal  belief  may  be 
separated  into  two  elements — the  scholastic  and  the  biblical. 
The  form,  the  phraseology,  the  whole  scientific  tone  come 
from  'the  schools;'  they  are  the  products  of  the  human 
understanding,  and  must  not  be  maintained  as  in  any  sense 
possessing  a  Divine  authority.  On  the  contrary,  the  plain, 
pure,  primitive,  spiritual  fact  comes  directly  from  the  Bible, 
in  which  we  have  presented,  not  formal  doctrines,  indeed, 
but  simply  information  respecting  the  merciful  dealings  of 
God  in  the  recovery  of  man." 

So  far  the  analysis  proceeds  with  perfect  historical  and 
critical  accuracy ;  but  on  looking  somewhat  closely  at  the 
element  which  is  expressed  under  the  term  "  scriptural  fact,'3 
we  find  that  it  needs  a  still  further  analysis,  since  the  idea 
there  conveyed,  so  far  from  being  simple,  manifestly  com- 
prehends other  and  still  simpler  ideas  under  it.  A  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  Bible,  e.  g.,  is  occupied  in  giving  us 
statements  of  historical  facts — of  events  which  actually  took 
place,  as  related  by  eye  and  ear  witnesses.  The  term  FACT, 
however,  is  also  frequently  applied  to  the  ideas  conveyed  to 
us  in  the  Scriptures  respecting  the  dealings  of  God  to  man. 
But  here  it  has  clearly  an  entirely  different  signification. 
These  are  not  facts  of  simple  history,  like  those  above  men- 
tioned ;  they  involve  moral  conceptions — conceptions,  more- 
over, which  cannot  reach  the  exact  objective  truth,  in  the 
same  sense  as  does  the  description  of  a  real  and  palpable 
event,  but  which  are  rather  accommodated  to  the  practical 
wants  of  our  own  spiritual  nature.  In  brief,  the  Scriptures, 

able  positions  against  the  attacks  of  the  really  ignorant  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  wilfully  blind  on  the  other,  will  one  day,  and  that  ere 
long,  be  acknowledged  with  gratitude  and  devout  admiration. 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  211 

while  they  embody  a  history  of  actual  events,  are  yet  mainly 
intended  to  awaken  our  religious  nature  to  the  direct  intuition 
of  spiritual  things.  On  the  one  hand,  then,  there  is  within 
them  an  element  of  historical  fact,  on  the  other,  an  element 
of  moral  significance)  :  the  former  consists  in  a  description 
of  events ;  the  latter  is  a  description,  direct  or  indirect,  of 
those  Divine  intuitions  which  revealed  to  the  minds  of  the 
writers  the  great  living  elements  of  Christian  truth. 

Now  it  is  out  of  the  historical  fact  and  the  spiritual  in- 
tuition combined,  that  logical  or  dogmatic  statements  are 
eliminated,  according  to  the  law  by  which  the  spontaneous 
or  intuitional  life  passes  over  into  the  reflective.  Hence,  if 
we  put  all  these  explanations  together,  we  shall  find  that 
Christian  theology  in  its  last  analysis  contains  within  it  three 
distinct  elements ;— first,  the  historical  fact;  secondly,  the 
moral  or  intuitional  perception  ;  and  thirdly,  the  logical  dis- 
tribution and  construction  of  the  whole  into  a  system  of  doc- 
trines. Our  attention,  therefore,  must  be  turned  for  a  little 
to  these  several  points  in  succession. 

We  turn  first  to  the  historical  element.  This,  as  I  have 
said,  is  simply  and  solely  a  question  of  external  fact;  it 
leads  us  to  consider  what  outward  and  palpable  events  have 
taken  place  in  connection  with  the  origin  of  Christianity,  and 
what  have  not.  The  great  fundamental  question  here  is, — 
Are  the  Scriptures,  historically  viewed,  a  fabrication  or  not  ? 
— do  they  relate  events  which  never  took  place  ;  or  can  they 
be  relied  on  with  the  same  confidence  as  the  most  authentic 
of  ancient  histories  ?  The  whole  voice  of  a  sound  and  valid 
criticism  answers  unhesitatingly,  that  there  is  no  fabrication 
in  the  case — that  the  phenomena  presented  are  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  it — that  if  any  thing 
can  be  relied  on  in  the  world,  as  being  free  from  conscious 
deception,  the  history  of  Christ  is  the  case  of  all  others  which 
claims  this  evidence  of  entire  integrity. 


212  PHIW)SOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

This  point,  then,  being  established  in  the  minds  of  all  up- 
right and  sound-thinking  men,  the  next  question  is, — Are 
these  accounts,  admitting  them  to  be  authentic,  open  to  cri- 
ticism as  to  their  proper  interpretation  ?  And  the  reply  we 
are  constrained  to  make  is,  that  assuredly  they  are  open  to 
it,  on  the  same  principles  as  every  thing  else  which  rests 
upon  historical  evidence.  But  then  criticism  must  be  reason' 
able  ;  it  must  admit  facts  which  are  proved  valid  by  all  the 
laws  of  evidence  ;  and  it  must  not  deny  phenomena  simply 
because  they  are  inconsistent  with  some  favorite  system  of 
philosophy,  or  so  explain  them  away  as  to  make  their  ap- 
pearance in  the  history  more  unaccountable  than  their  literal 
veracity. 

The  same  line  of  argument  must  be  applied  to  the 
scheme  which  gives  a  mythical  origin  to  the  facts  of  Scripture 
history.  In  every  case  of  this  nature,  it  has  to  be  consi- 
dered, whether  the  theory  presented  is  not  a  case  far  more 
strange  and  unaccountable  than  is  that  which  it  proposes  to 
explain.  In  brief,  the  historical  element  of  Christianity  has 
to  be  verified  by  all  the  aids  which  historical  criticism  can 
supply,  however  little  we  may  require  this  process  of  proof 
to  convince  us  of  the  veracity  of  those  moral  conceptions 
which  the  historical  facts  illustrate  or  embody.  We  do  not, 
of  course,  essay  now  to  prove  the  credibility  of  the  facts  of 
Scripture ;  we  merely  desire  to  point  out  what  we  mean  by 
the  historical  element  in  Christian  theology  ;  and  to  aver 
that  every  man,  be  his  dogmatical  creed  what  it  may,  who 
admits  that  the  facts  recorded  in  the  New  Testament  did  take 
place,  as  they  are  described  by  eye-witnesses,  is  a  believer 
as  much  as  any  man  can  le,  in  the  purely  historical  part  of 
our  Christian  faith. 

But  then  it  becomes  all  the  more  apparent  from  this  very 
view  of  the  case,  that  there  is  no  religious  element  at  all  in 
the  outward  fact  a*  such.  The  facts  of  Scripture  derive  their 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY. 


religious  importance  from  the  conceptions  united  to  them.  — 
from  the  feeling  that  they  had  a  certain  significancy  in  the 
plans  of  Divine  Providence.  The  fact,  for  example,  that  Je- 
sus Christ  came  into  the  world,  merely  expresses  historically 
the  statement,  that  a  human  being  so  named  appeared  at  a 
given  period,  and  performed  such  and  such  actions.  The 
religious  aspect  of  this  fact  depends  upon  the  conception,  that 
he  had  a  certain  relationship  to  the  Deity,  and  a  certain  mis- 
sion to  mankind,  a  conception  which  must  necessarily  em- 
body many  high  religious  ideas  and  intuitions. 

Take,  again,  the  great  and  wondrous  fact  of  the  death  of 
Christ.  As  a  fact  of  sense,  this  is  no  more  than  the  murder 
of  any  innocent  man  that  ever  livedj  to  satiate  the  passions 
of  a  lawless  multitude.  But  the  moment  we  view  this  fact 
as  part  of  a  providential  plan  for  the  salvation  of  the  world, 
we  attach  to  it  a  significancy  of  which  the  senses  can  know 
nothing  —  of  which  the  spiritual  nature  alone  can  judge. 
And  so  bring  all  the  outward  and  visible  facts  connected 
with  the  life,  death,  and  resurrection  of  Christ  to  a  focus,  yet 
if  we  sweep  away  all  power  of  moral  perception,  these  very 
facts,  so  great,  so  glorious,  so  Divine,  when  viewed  by  the 
light  of  that  elevated  Christian  consciousness  which  they 
themselves  contribute  to  awaken,  become  comparatively 
meaningless  and  ineffective.  In  every  case  alike  the  his- 
torical actuality  is  one  thing,  the  moral  significancy  is  quite 
another. 

This  leads  us  therefore,  secondly,  to  expound  more  fully 
what  we  mean  by  the  moral  element  in  Christian  theology. 
By  the  moral  element  we  mean  to  designate  every  thing  in 
the  Scriptures  which  appeals  at  once  to  the  moral  or  reli- 
gious nature  of  man,  and  tends  to  awaken  within  it  the 
Christian  life.  It  expresses,  in  fact,  the  whole  of  those  man- 
ifestations in  connection  with  the  life,  person,  and  teaching 
of  Christ,  which  revealed  to  the  apostles  themselves  the 


214  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Divine  conceptions  in  which  their  religious  vitality  was  all 
cradled,  together  with  the  representations  they  have  given 
us  in  their  own  lives  and  writings  of  apostolical  Christianity, 
in  its  spontaneous  and  most  practical  form. 

In  this  moral  or  intuitional  element,  accordingly,  we  may 
include  the  miracles  of  Christ,  viewed,  not  indeed  as  mere 
facts  appealing  to  the  senses,  but  as  revealing  to  the  inward 
perceptions  of  mankind  the  real  working  of  a  Divine  power 
in  nature,  and  the  connection  of  that  power  with  the  great 
Author  of  moral  truth, — the  God  of  the  human  affections. 
The  same  significancy  appears  in  the  actions  and  the  suffer- 
ings of  Christ,  all  of  which  embodied  in  a  living  form  the 
most  exalted  ideas  of  moral  grandeur  and  Divine  compas- 
sion ;  while  the  death,  resurrection,  and  ascension  of  the 
Saviour  awakened  new  perceptions  of  life  eternal,  conse- 
quent upon  a  participation  in  his  kingdom,  that  may  be  truly 
said  to  have  brought  immortality  itself  to  light  through  the 
Gospel. 

The  same  indications  of  a  new  and  Divine  experience, 
involving  the  perception  of  high  spiritual  realities,  appear  in 
the  labors,  the  voluntary  sufferings,  and  the  religious  writings 
of  the  Apostles.  These  all  present  to  us  moral  pheno- 
mena and  religious  conceptions  before  entirely  unknown  in 
the  history  of  mankind ;  and  connected  as  they  were  with 
the  deepest  stirring  of  their  spiritual  being,  as  by  an  inspira- 
tion from  heaven,  all  indicate  a  Divine  revelation  of  eternal 
truth  and  love,  proffered  in  mercy,  through  these  agencies,  to 
the  world. 

Now  what  we  wish  to  make  evident  to  our  readers  is 
this, — that  the  historical  and  the  moral  elements,  as  above 
described,  form  the  whole  of  what  is  essential  to  Christianity. 
Whether  we  look  to  the  subjective  side  or  to  the  objective — 
whether  we  consider  the  state  of  the  religious  emotions  them- 
selves which  Christianity  involves,  or  whether  we  look  to  the 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  215 

consciousness  of  redemption  through  a  personal  Redeemer, 
Jesus  Christ,  all  is  essentially  involved  in  the  historical  fact, 
and  the  spiritual  life  which  we  derive  from  the  Scriptures. 
This  conclusion,  indeed,  results  from  the  very  nature  of  reve- 
lation itself.  Revelation,  as  we  showed  in  a  former  chapter, 
is  necessarily  confined  to  direct  and  intuitional  processes ; 
with  logical  abstractions,  notions,  definitions,  and  reasonings, 
it  has  nothing  whatever  to  do.  Here,  then,  in  the  outward 
fact  and  the  spiritual  illumination  we  have  both  the  lower  and 
the  higher  intuitional  processes  brought  into  action  ;  and 
whatever  is  peculiar  or  essential  to  the  Christian  system  is 
revealed  to  us  through  these  two  distinctive  media.  The 
Scriptures  themselves  consist  almost  exclusively  of  facts  on 
the  one  hand,  and  concrete  representations  of  spiritual  ideas 
and  practical  duties  on  the  other.  Whatever  there  may  be 
beyond  this  of  an  abstract  and  logical  character,  is  but  the 
natural  operation  of  the  understanding  of  the  writers,  dis- 
tinct from  the  inspired  vision  they  possessed  of  Divine 
realities. 

With  regard  to  the  relation  subsisting  between  the  histori- 
cal fact  and  the  spiritual  idea,  they  are  to  be  regarded  as 
poles  or  complements  to  each  other.  To  disconnect  them 
would  be  to  mar  and  mutilate  the  whole  Divine  system.  The 
historical  facts  without  their  moral  meaning  would  be,  reli- 
giously speaking,  powerless  and  void  ;  the  spiritual  intuitions, 
if  not  brought  out  into  actual  realization,  would  remain  vague 
and  comparatively  uninfluential.  The  historical  needs  to  be 
penetrated  with  the  moral,  the  moral  to  be  actualized  by  the 
historical  ;  and  thus,  while  they  stand  apart  as  poles  to  each 
other,  there  is  a  mutual  interpenetration  of  the  two  elements, 
which  lends  the  proper  force  and  value  to  both. 

Thus,  evident  as  it  is  that  Christianity,  essentially  speak- 
ing, is  a  life  within  the  inner  consciousness  of  man,  and  evi- 
dent as  it  is  that  the  Almighty  might  have  forgiven  the  sin- 


216  PHILOSOPHY    OK    RELIGION. 

ner,  and  vindicated  his  law,  and  imparted  pure  affections  by 
the  mere  fiat  of  his  power  and  grace ; — yet  in  the  historical 
facts  connected  with  the  redemption  of  the  world, — in  the 
person  and  work  of  the  Messiah,  we  have  the  moral  agencies 
by  which  such  a  relation  to  God,  and  such  a  state  of  the  re- 
ligious affections,  can  be  realized  by  us  as  free  agents.  In 
the  person  and  work  of  Christ,  the  whole  of  Christianity  is 
implicitly  involved.  There  is  the  germ,  there  the  com- 
mencement of  its  whole  life,  its  whole  activity,  its  whole  his- 
tory. Sweep  away  the  perfection  we  see  actualized  in  him, 
and  there  is  no  point  in  the  world's  history  on  which  we 
could  fix  our  gaze  as  by  any  possibility  becoming  the  start- 
ing-point of  the  higher  life, — no  other  realization  of  Divine 
perfection  in  humanity, — no  other  example  of  the  Word 
made  flesh  and  dwelling  with  us.  We  need  to  have  the 
highest  conceptions  of  Divine  justice  and  mercy,  and  the 
highest  type  of  human  resignation  and  duty,  realized  in  an 
historical  fact,  such  as  we  can  ever  gaze  upon  with  wonder 
and  delight :  not  till  then  do  they  become  mighty  to  touch 
the  deepest  spring's  of  our  moral  being.  In  Christ,  accord- 
ingly, we  have  holiness,  rectitude,  love,  mercy,  reconcilia- 
tion, sacrifice,  and  life  from  the  dead,  all  embodied  in  an  his- 
torical and  concrete  reality — a  reality  to  which  the  former 
dispensations  looked  forward,  and  to  which  the  Christian 
consciousness  of  redeemed  humanity  has  ever  looked  back- 
ward as  to  the  embodiment  of  its  highest  and  purest  ideal. 
On  this  ground  it  is  we  lay  so  much  stress  upon  the  histori- 
cal element  of  the  New  Testament,  and  affirm,  that  true 
Christianity  necessarily  involves  a  belief  and  full  confidence 
in  the  personal  Messiah.  The  Christian  Church  itself,  in- 
deed, is  but  the  unfolding  of  his  personality  in  the  world — 
the  building  up  of  the  living  temple — the  growth  and  com- 
pletion of  the  mystical  body  of  Christ.  Every  individual 
Christian  realizes  this  for  himself  when  he  possesses  with 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY. 


Paul  the  consciousness,  "  I  live  —  yet  not  I,  but  Christ  liveth 
in  me." 

ThuSj  then,  in  the  historical  and  the  intuitional  ele- 
ments we  have  all  that  is  essential  to  a  real  living  Christian- 
ity ;  but  we  have  not  yet  what  is  essential  to  form  a  Chris- 
tian theology  :  for  this  purpose  we  must  add  the  logical,  or 
dogmatic,  element  to  the  other  two,  so  as  to  reduce  them  to 
formal  propositions.  Now,  the  propositions  of  dogmatic  the- 
ology, while  they  derive  their  actual  matter  or  idea  from  re- 
ligious intuition,  as  given  in  the  Christian  life,  yet  assume 
the/cm  of  objective  and  historical  fact.  In  this  way  they 
are  related  to  both  the  elements  above  described  —  related, 
that  is  to  say,  essentially  to  the  moral,  and  formally  to  the 
historical.  It  is  this  close  approximation  that  dogmatical 
propositions  make  in  their  outward  form  to  the  statements  of 
historical  truth,  which  has  given  rise  to  the  delusion,  that  they 
are  themselves  the  direct  expression  of  objective  facts  —  facts 
cognizable  at  once  either  by  the  senses  or  the  logical  under- 
standing. In  opposition  to  this,  we  shall  have  to  show  that  reli- 
gious dogmas  are  never  the  direct  expression  of  objective  facts, 
in  the  same  sense  as  historical  statements  are  ;  that  the  intui- 
tional faculty,  on  the  contrary,  alone  grasps  the  objective  re- 
ality of  spiritual  things  ;  while  the  dogmatic  proposition  ex- 
presses, as  nearly  as  may  be,  the  conception  we  form  by  vir- 
tue of  our  intuitions,  as  to  what  that  reality  is.  This  ex- 
plains what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  Bible  is  a  book 
of  religion,  and  not  of  theology  ,—  namely,  that  its  direct 
object  is  to  give  us  clear  conceptions  of  Divine  things,  to 
awaken  our  religious  consciousness  into  new  life,  and  pre- 
sent to  it  the  highest  objects  of  spiritual  contemplation  ;  not 
to  give  us  logical  statements,  which,  of  a  truth,  would  be  in 
themselves,  apart  from  our  intuitions,  no  revelations  at  all, 
and  the  very  import  of  which  to  us  would  still  depend  upon 
the  inward  enlightenment  of  our  moral  and  spiritual  nature. 


218  PHILOSOPHY    OF    EELIGION. 

This  conclusion  respecting  the  moral  or  intuitional  sub- 
stratum of  all  formal  theological  doctrines,  we  regard  as  being 
of  the  highest  importance  in  enabling  us  to  comprehend  the 
real  nature  and  elements  of  Christian  theology.  The  admis- 
sion is  now  pretty  generally  made,  that  a  theological  system 
a*  a  whole  cannot  be  taken  exclusively  from  the  Scriptures — 
that  it  cannot  be  entirely  an  immediate  expression  of  revealed 
fact — that  it  must  have  an  element  of  human  reason  in  it, 
and  present  us  with  some  partially  human  conception  of  the 
relations  subsisting  between  God  and  man.  But  when  we 
come  from  the  entire  system  to  particular  dogmas  (those  of 
which  the  very  system  itself  consists),  then  we  often  find  a 
resistance  of  the  same  inference  in  respect  to  them.  These 
individual  dogmas,  it  is  said,  do  not  express  any  inward  and 
peculiar  human  conception  respecting  man's  relation  to  the 
Divine  ;  but  they  are  direct  statements,  taken  at  first  hand 
out  of  the  words  of  Holy  Scripture,  and  presenting  the  pro- 
positional  truth  they  convey  directly  as  objective  fact  to  the 
logical  understanding.  Thus  an  imaginary  line  is  drawn 
within  the  region  of  dogmatic  theology,  on  the  one  side  of 
which  is  fallibility,  on  the  other  side  infallibility, — the  one 
portion  of  which  expresses  truth  according  to  our  inward 
conceptions,  the  other  portion  of  which  expresses  it  accord- 
ing to  the  conception  of  God,  or  rather  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in 
his  direct  revelation  to  man. 

This  imaginary  line,  then,  we  remove  entirely  away  from 
the  whole  province  of  formal  theology,  admitting  and  affirm- 
ing that  wherever  Divine  truth  is  expressed  in  a  logical  pro- 
position, it  is  the  conception  which  is  directly  expressed,  and 
the  objective  fact  only  mediately  through  the  conception. 
This  view  of  the  case,  indeed,  results  necessarily  from  the 
whole  of  our  reasonings  respecting  the  nature  of  revelation, 
and  of  the  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures.  If  a  revelation  can 
only  be  made  in  the  form  of  intuition,  and  if  the  inspiration 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR   THEOLOGY.  219 

of  the  apostles  consisted  in  the  intensity  of  their  spiritual 
vision,  then  it  can  only  be  the  intuitional  element  of  Chris- 
tian truth  to  which  a  real  Divinity  is  attached  ;  and  our  for- 
mal  theology,  however  closely  fashioned  to  the  words  of 
Scripture,  can  embody  only  as  much  of  this  Divine  revela- 
tion as  we  have  actually  realized  in  the  enlightenment  of  our 
spiritual  nature.  Every  Christian  dogma,  accordingly,  will 
be  the  direct  reflex  of  thisMnward  enlightenment;  nay,  what- 
ever more  it  may  express  to  others,  to  us  it  can  have  no  moral 
significancy*  beyond  the  range  of  our  actual  religious  expe- 
rience. 

Let  us  verify  this  conclusion  by  adducing  particular  ex- 
amples. The  Scriptures  assure  us  in  many  different  ways, 
that  there  is  a  God.  But  no  one  can  pretend  that  this  is  a 
fact,  in  the  same  sense  that  an  historical  statement  is.  In 
the  latter  case,  the  matter  of  the  statement  is  of  such  a  na- 
ture, that  it  can  be  at  once  comprehended  by  the  understand- 
ing ;  in  the  former  case,  it  is  only  accessible  by  the  moral  and 
spiritual  faculty,  i.  e.,  by  the  medium  of  intuition.  When 
I  make  the  affirmation,  therefore,  "  there  is  a  God,"  the  real 
meaning  of  the  proposition  depends  upon  the  inward  concep- 
tion I  attach  to  the  word  ;  neither  can  the  affirmation  express 
to  me,  or  to  any  one,  more  than  we  have  actually  realized  of  the 
Divine  nature.  Thus  the  power  of  intuition  grasps  as  nearly 
as  it  is  capable  the  objective  reality ;  and  then  the  formal 
proposition  expresses  articulately  the  inward  conception  thus 
originating,  whatever  may  be  its  complexion  or  peculiarity. 

On  this  ground  it  is  that  we  come  so  much  nearer  to  the 
truth  when  we  describe  spiritual  things  in  concrete  images, 
than  when  we  embody  them  in  merely  abstract  ideas,  the 
concrete  being  naturally  so  much  more  nearly  allied  to  the 
intuitional  faculty  than  the  abstract.  How  slender,  for  ex- 
ample, is  the  notion  we  can  form  of  God  from  the  most  ela- 
borate abstract  representations  of  the  Divine  nature  !  There 


220  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


is  something,  on  the  other  hand,  in  such  conceptions  as  that 
of  Job  pleading  his  cause  before  God,  purifying  himself  from 
the  charges  of  his  accusers,  arraigning  even  the  Divine  ac- 
tions and  purposes  before  the  bar  of  Eternal  Right,  contend- 
ing with  the  Almighty  till  his  ways  become  clear,  and  his 
judgments  are  seen  to  be  holy  ; — there  is  something,  I  repeat, 
in  such  conceptions  as  these,  that  will  breathe  moral  life  into 
the  human  soul,  when  all  the  logicd  precision  of  our  cher- 
ished Athanasian  phrases  will  have  become  a  matter  of  his- 
tory, and  perhaps  of  astonishment. 

But  it  might  be  said  in  reply  to  the  above  example,  that 
the  fact  of  the  Divine  existence  is  a  doctrine  of  natural  the- 
ology, which  we  are  to  attain  prior  to  the  testimony  of  reve- 
lation. Truly  so ;  but  the  case  is  precisely  the  same  with 
regard  to  every  doctrine,  whatever  may  be  its  source,  that 
contains  in  it  an  element  of  moral  and  spiritual  truth. 
Take  the  scriptural  doctrine  that  man  is  a  sinner,  condemn- 
ed by  the  law  of  God.  In  whatever  way  this  doctrine  be 
logically  expressed,  we  cannot  call  it  a  fact,  in  the  same 
manner  as  we  might  so  designate  an  historical  event.  The 
truth  which  such  a  doctrine  expresses  can  only  be  realized 
by  the  moral  nature  of  man ;  we  may  at  all  times  assent  to 
it  formally,  with  the  mere  logical  understanding,  but  unless 
there  is  a  spiritual  perception  of  sin,  and  of  its  entire  contra- 
riety to  the  Divine  nature,  we  have  no  real  comprehension 
of  the  doctrine  itself;  while  precisely  according  to  the  na- 
ture and  intensity  of  this  spiritual  perception  will  be  the 
mode  in  which  we  express  the  doctrine,  and  the  sense  we  at- 
tach to  it.  Again,  therefore,  we  see  that  the  dogma  expresses 
the  inward  life, — that  life  alone,  in  its  intuitional  capacity, 
shows  us  the  moral  reality. 

Or  take,  again,  any  great  evangelical  statement  like  this, 
— "  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only-begotten 
Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not  perish,  but 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  221 


have  everlasting  life."  Will  any  one  contend  that  this  is  a 
simple  logical  statement,  the  full  meaning  of  which  we  may 
comprehend  by  the  natural  understanding?  Far  from  it. 
This  was  a  direct  expression  of  those  great  spiritual  ideas 
which  had  aroused  the  soul  of  the  apostle  to  intense  religious 
fervor.  He  had  been  with  Christ,  he  had  witnessed  his  mi- 
racles, life,  teaching,  death,  and  resurrection.  All  these 
scenes  mingled  up  with  his  sense  of  Divine  love  and  mercy 
to  the  world,  and  the  purposes  of  it  hereafter.  The  result 
was  a  deep  perception  that  the  Creator  of  the  human  spirit 
pitied  its  sin  and  misery,  purposed  its  recovery,  and  had  com- 
missioned Jesus  Christ  to  be  the  medium  of  human  redemp- 
tion for  tim£  and  eternity.  It  was  this  religious  experience 
which  at  once  drew  from  him  the  fact  above  stated,  and 
gave  it  all  its  significancy  ;  and  no  one,  be  his  understand- 
ing what  it  may,  can  grasp  that  fact  in  the  same  sense  that 
the  apostle  did,  until  his  own  religious  nature  is  similarly 
awakened  and  elevated.  The  very  terms  in  which  the  pro- 
position is  couched, — God,  Son  of  God,  love  of  God,  &c., 
each  and  all  require  a  spiritual  perception  for  us  to  attach 
any  definite  meaning  to  them,  to  say  nothing  of  the  whole 
complex  idea  they  embrace. 

In  brief,  the  facts  of  the  Bible,  (if  we  are  to  term 
them  so,)  such  as  those  connected  with  sin,  recovery,  the 
love  of  God,  the  person  and  work  of  Christ,  are  not  mere  lo- 
gical statements,  the  very  form  of  which  involves  a  compre- 
hension of  the  matter  ;  they  all  imply  certain  high  religious 
conceptions,  and  certain  purely  moral  ideas,  which  can 
only  be  appreciated  by  an  enlightened  state  of  the  religious 
nature,  which,  to  use  the  terms  of  Scripture,  are  inaccessi- 
ble to  the  "  natural  man,"  but  must  be  "  spiritually  dis- 
cerned." Hence,  as  the  natural  understanding  cannot  dis- 
cern these  things,  it  cannot  select  them  from  the  Scripture  as 
facts  of  which  it  is  directly  cognizant,  or  express  them  in 


222  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

positive  terms,  as  it  would  a  fact  of  history  •  it  is  the  intu- 
itional faculty  which,  according  to  its  measure  of  enlighten- 
ment, must  grasp  the  real  objective  fact,  and  then  the  dog- 
ma will  be  the  expression  of  this,  our  inward  consciousness, 
in  a  prepositional  form. 

Let  no  one  say,  therefore,  as  has  been  ignorantly  or 
falsely  asserted,  that  this  view  of  Christian  theology  denies 
either  the  historical  element  of  Christianity  or  the  objective 
validity  of  its  doctrines.  It  merely  affirms  that  dogmatic 
theology,  whether  we  view  it  in  the  whole,  or  in  its  individual 
parts,  is  an  outward  expression  of  the  inward  life,  awakened 
by  the  revelation  of  the  Gospel.  That  inward  life  itself  in- 
volves a  direct  perception  of  objective  truth  ;  alfhough  as  our 
religious  consciousness  is  not  perfect,  but  only  progressing 
towards  perfection,  its  perceptions  may  not  be  complete,  and 
our  expression  of  dogmatic  truth,  consequently,  may  be  very 
inadequate  ;  added  to  this,  even  when  to  some  available  ex- 
tent we  may  have  realized  the  truth  of  God,  yet  our  logical 
and  critical  aids  may  not  prove  so  perfect  as  they  might  be 
in  aiding  us  to  erect  our  knowledge  into  a  system.  But  not- 
withstanding all  this,  where  there  is  spiritual  life  there  is  also 
a  corresponding  spiritual  reality. 

We  are  not  able  to  say  the  same  thing  respecting  formal 
theology.  Although  it  might  have  indicated  primarily  a  real 
perception  of  objective  truth,  yet  it  is  too  often  appropriated 
and  professed  by  many  in  whom  those  perceptions  have  never 
been  awakened.  If  in  any  case,  therefore,  the  charge  of 
denying  the  objective  reality  of  Scripture  doctrine  be  well 
grounded,  it  is  in  the  case  of  those  who  resist  the  principle  of 
theology  we  have  laid  down,  and  insist  upon  the  dogmas 
themselves  being  direct  statements  at  first  hand  of  objective 
facts,  without  the  intervention  of  the  spiritual  perception.  To 
those  who  seriously  take  their  stand  upon  such  a  principle, 
we  cannot  imagine  Christian  theology  to  become  any  thing 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  223 

greatly  better  than  a  mere  system- building,  in  which  the 
form  is  allowed  to  stand  for  the  matter,  while  the  mind,  ab- 
sorbed in  dialectical  subtlety,  cheats  itself  of  the  living  spi- 
ritual truth. 

The  exposition  we  have  given  of  the  nature  and  elements 
of  Christian  theology,  offers  a  complete  solution  of  the  pheno- 
mena which  have  so  often  appeared  in  the  history  of  Christi- 
anity, when  the  moral  consciousness  of  an  age  gets  beyond 
its  recognized  theology,  so  that  the  one  can  no  longer  satisfy 
the  requirements  of  the  other.  The  theology  of  an  age 
naturally  embodies  itself  in  books,  catechisms,  or  Church 
symbols,  where  of  course  it  remains  stereotyped  and  fixed  ; — 
in  the  meantime,  however,  the  living  consciousness  of  the 
Church  ever  unfolds  as  age  after  age  rolls  on,  and  adds  new 
experiences  of  the  scope  and  the  power  of  Christian  truth. 
The  inevitabre  result  of  this  is,  that  those  who  take  their 
stand  pertinaciously  upon  the  formal  theology  of  any  given 
period,  remain  stationary,  as  it  were,  in  the  religious  con- 
sciousness of  this  period,  while  that  of  the  age  itself  goes 
so  far  beyond  them,  that  their  theology  is  no  longer  an  ade- 
quate exponent  of  the  religious  life  of  the  times,  and  can  no 
longer  satisfy  its  just  demands.  Since  the  time  of  the  Refor- 
mation, the  religious  consciousness  of  Europe,  unfolding  the 
principles  then  started,  has  been  advancing  more  and  more 
towards  the  religious  conception  of  Christianity ;  and  in  con- 
sequence of  this  we  find  the  dogmatic  theology  of  the  earlier 
portions  of  this  era  unable  to  satisfy  the  moral  and  spiritual 
requirements  of  the  present  age.  The  effect  of  this  is  seen 
in  the  struggle  which  is  manifestly  taking  place  between 
those  professed  theologians  who  insist  upon  abiding  strictly  by 
the  ideas,  and  even  the  phraseology  of  the  past,  and  between 
the  minds  which  represent  the  advancing  spirit  of  the  age, 
unchecked  as  they  too  often  are  by  a  due  reverence  for  anti- 
quity. Party  struggles  like  these  have  unhappily  the  tendency 


224  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

to  drive  both  sides  for  a  time  into  the  extreme  position  of  an- 
tagonism, so  that  the  one  falls  back  entirely  upon  ancient 
authority,  while  the  other  thoughtlessly  sets  it  at  defiance. 
The  only  consolation  we  have  is,  that  truth  always  pursues 
its  course  midway  between  such  extremes. 

The  phenomena  of  which  we  are  now  speaking  have  for 
some  time  past  engaged  the  serious  attention  of  enlightened 
men,  many  of  whom  have  not  been  slow  in  perceiving  their 
true  solution.  "  It  can  never  be  repeated  too  often,"  says 
M.  le  Chevalier  Bunsen,  "that  the  Protestant  Church,  by 
regarding  piety  and  morality  as  identical  terms,  by  assum- 
ing the  moral  and  religious  feelings  of  man  to  be  inseparably 
united  in  their  deepest  roots,  has  bound  herself  to  discover 
and  demonstrate  the  ethic  exponent  of  every  objective  ex- 
pression respecting  the  relation  of  man  to  God."*  "  And 
why,"  remarks  the  same  author  in  another  place,f  "  should 
we  be  shocked  at  the  efforts  of  speculative  minds  to  prove 
that  there  is  a  witness  of  the  conscious  spirit  of  man  answering 
to  the  witness  of  history,  and  that  there  stands  by  the  side  of 
those  facts  of  revelation  which  are  the  objects  of  our  faith, 
an  eternal  truth  and  Divine  law  which  God  has  made  man 
capable  of  recognizing  ?"  In  fact,  the  demand  that  every 
doctrinal  statement  of  Christianity  respecting  man's  relation 
to  God  should  have  a  moral  or  intuitional  exponent,  is  simply 
the  demand  that  it  should  be  recognized  as  a  living  experi- 
ence, and  become  perfectly  reconciled  to  the  universal  con- 
science of  mankind.  There  can  be  no  desirableness  in  the 
doctrines  of  Christianity  being  ever  regarded  as  propositions 
conveyed  to  us  from  heaven  in  the  aggregate,  and  altogether 
impenetrable  to  the  moral  nature  of  man.  Such  a  view  of 
the  case  gives  them  no  additional  weight  or  authority,  but 
rather  prevents  their  appealing,  as  they  were  intended  to  ap- 

*  "  Church  of  the  Future,"  p.  33.  t  Ibid.,  p.  272. 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  225 

peal,  with  their  own  native  force  to  the  intellect  and  the  con- 
science of  humanity  at  large. 

As  an  example  of  what  we  mean  by  the  penetration  of 
theological  doctrines  with  moral  idea,  we  may  refer  to  the 
great  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith.  Instead  of  this  doc- 
trine expressing  the  penal  justification  of  a  sinner  by  virtue 
of  his  assent  to  certain  defined  facts  or  propositions  uncon- 
nected with  a  moral  renewal,  we  may  recognize  in  it,  when 
duly  expounded,  a  moral  principle  which  was,  in  fact,  the 
very  life-spring  of  the  Reformation.  "  The  idea  of  faith," 
says  a  profound  theologian  from  whom  we  have  before 
quoted,  "  was  primarily  opposed  to  all  those  actions  of  ec- 
clesiastical work-righteousness  by  which  the  hierarchy  had 
been  accustomed  to  fasten  the  moral  feeling  of  the  people 
down  to  the  province  of  mere  mechanical  and  outward  duty, 
— opposed,  consequently,  to  a  system  of  works  which  (al- 
though, when  regarded  from  without,  it  might  contain  much 
that  was  praiseworthy)  yet  stifled  all  true  moral  life  by  the 
demand  of  bare  outward  legality,  and,  consequently,  de- 
stroyed all  inward  worth  by  implanting  a  false  pride  in  the 
mere  act  of  legal  obedience.  If  only  we  add  to  this,  that  the 
circuit  of  duties  enjoined  by  the  Church  as  the  price  of  sal- 
vation comprehended  a  multitude  of  purely  material  and 
pecuniary  largesses  to  the  clergy,  who  enjoined  the  most 
bitter  self-denials  to  those  who  gave  them,  and  hung  over  the 
heads  of  those  who  were  really  anxious  for  salvation  a  regu- 
lar system  of  hierarchical  rapacity;  then,  indeed,  we  can 
easily  imagine  the  power  of  a  doctrine  which  cut  at  the  root 
of  all  these  outward  doings  by  the  simple  requisition  of  faith 
alone.  No  man,  so  ran  the  doctrine,  can  gain  for  himself 
any  claim  of  merit  before  the  face  of  the  Holy  God  through 
his  works  only.  For  even  the  most  zealous  fulfilling  of  the 
law  remains  ever  defective ;  even  the  best  of  human  works 
are  defiled  with  sin,  and  leave  the  conscience  still  open  to 
11 


226  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

conviction  of  guilt.  This  guilt  is  only  removed  by  an  act  of 
our  deepest  self-consciousness,  by  which  we  acknowledge 
our  guilt  to  its  full  extent, — feel  it  with  true  sorrow, — seek 
honestly  forgiveness,  and  the  power  of  a  new  life, — find 
them  both  in  reconciliation  and  redemption  offered  by  God 
through  Christ ;  and  give  ourselves  up  to  it  with  unreserved 
confidence.  This  act  is  faith  ;  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  purely 
an  act  of  the  inward  man,  laying  the  foundation  of  a  new 
system  of  feelings,  and  communicating  a  new  principle  of 
life  in  the  fellowship  with  Christ,  moral  purity  is  here  fixed 
upon  its  own  proper  foundation ;  the  forgotten  source  of  the 
soul's  deepest  life,  from  which  every  action  should  flow,  is 
again  opened,  the  wandering  conscience  brought  into  the 
right  path,  and  Christendom,  oppressed  by  those  arbitrary 
burdens,  relieved  of  the  load.  The  believing  man  is  termed 
justified  before  God  ;  not  as  though  God  had  poured  out  upon 
him  any  foreign  righteousness,  or  by  any  act  of  magical 
transformation  made  a  righteous  man  out  of  an  unrighteous, 
&c. ;  but  the  believing  subject  is  regarded  by  God  as  right- 
eous for  the  sake  of  his  faith.  The  long-suffering  and  mer- 
ciful God  takes  the  principle  derived  from  fellowship  with 
Christ,  for  the  whole  series  of  developments  which  will  pro- 
ceed organically  from  it ;  with  his  gracious  eye  he  looks 
upon  the  power  as  though  it  was  the  whole  sum  of  the  con- 
sequent  effects, — the  germ  and  the  bud,  as  though  they  were 

the  mature  fruit On  this  personal  faith  rests, 

therefore,  as  upon  its  deepest  foundation,  that  freedom  of  con- 
science which  the  Reformation  gained  for  itself  and  the 
world.  As  a  natural  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of  justifi- 
cation may  be  regarded  the  principles  of  free  research  into 
the  Holy  Scriptures,  in  which  the  whole  Church  ought  to 
seek,  what  is  for  their  own  salvation,  alike  unfettered  by  the 
dogmas  of  priests  or  teachers."* 

*  "  Der  Deutsche  Protestantismus,"  p.  30. 


ANALYSIS    OF    POPULAR    THEOLOGY.  227 

We  do  not  intend  to  affirm,  in  advocating  the  moral  ex- 
position of  the  Christian  dogmas,  that  such  a  reflective  expo- 
sition is  at  all  necessary  in  order  that  they  may  exert  their 
power  upon  the  human  heart.  Christianity  itself,  as  we 
have  abundantly  shown,  is  not  a  science,  but  a  life  ;  it  does 
not  consist  in  any  development  of  thought,  but  in  the  flow  of 
holy  affections.  Times  there  have  been  when  this  inward 
life  found  an  adequate  expression  in  doctrinal  statements 
less  formed  to  harmonize  with  moral  conviction, — when  the 
soul  was  content  with  gazing  upon  the  objects  of  Christian 
faith,  as  though  with  the  earnest  but  unenlightened  confi- 
dence of  infancy.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  the  symbols 
of  one  age  will  satisfy  the  inward  life  of  another ;  and  as- 
suredly the  age  which  is  now  unfolding  eminently  demands 
of  us  to  exhibit  the  historical  and  dogmatic  elements  of  Chris- 
tianity as  being  a  great  realization  of  the  highest  moral  and 
religious  intuition.  In  attempting  to  do  this,  we  are  not  go- 
ing beyond  the  instructions  of  the  Bible,  but  simply  leaving 
behind  us  the  dogmatic  theology  of  a  former  age.  The  Bi- 
ble constantly  encourages  us  to  develope  the  moral  signifi- 
cance of  the  Christian  doctrines ;  it  appeals  often  to  the  light 
within  us ;  it  is  filled  with  suggestions  that  almost  necessi- 
tate us  to  penetrate  beyond  the  province  of  formal  statements 
into  the  spiritual  intensity  of  the  whole  system. 

If  any  one  brings  against  this  view  the  charge  of  Ration- 
alism, we  reply,  that  he  has  a  very  incorrect  notion  of  what 
Rationalism  really  is.  The  attempt  of  Rationalism  is,  to 
exhibit  Christianity  simply  as  a  system  of  logical  thought, 
based  upon  certain  fundamental  definitions,  and  erecting 
upon  them  a  complete  superstructure  of  doctrine.  In  this 
way  Christianity  becomes  a  body  of  purely  human  truth  :  it 
lies  entirely  within  the  limits  of  reason  ;  it  is  absolutely  sub- 
ject  to  the  laws  of  the  human  understanding ; — while  the 
historical  element  simply  designates  the  time  and  the  cir 


228  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

cumstances  in  which  it  first  began  to  be  developed  as  a 
moral  science.  To  all  this,  the  view  of  Christianity  we 
have  presented  is  diametrically  opposed.  We  have  shown 
that  it  is  a  spiritual  life ;  that  it  is  based  upon  a  direct  reve- 
lation from  God ;  that  the  office  of  the  understanding  in  it  is 
only  formal ;  and  that  the  historical  fact  is  the  actual  reali- 
zation of  Divine  and  eternal  truth. 

Revealed  truth  assuredly  is  not  deteriorated  when  we 
show  its  harmony  with  moral  law.  We  may  admire  the  or- 
der, harmony,  and  adaptation  of  nature,  although  we  con- 
template it  simply  as  the  mighty  work  of  God  ;  but  how 
much  more  do  we  admire  it,  when  we  can  comprehend  the 
mathematical  laws  by  which  the  whole  is  formed  and  gov- 
erned !  So  also  we  may  rejoice  in  Christianity  as  a  stupen- 
dous exhibition  of  Divine  goodness  and  mercy ;  but  how 
much  more  so,  when  we  see  it  all  harmonized  and  arranged 
according  to  those  eternal  principles  of  moral  truth  by  which 
the  whole  intelligent  universe  is  regulated  ! 


CHAPTER  IX. 

ON    FELLOWSHIP. 

IN  the  preceding  portions  of  this  work,  we  have  discussed 
the  essential  nature  of  religion  as  a  universal  phenomenon  of 
the  human  mind  ;  we  have  next  investigated  the  nature  of 
Christianity  as  one  particular,  and  that  the  highest  phase  of 
the  religicrus  life  ;  and  lastly,  we  have  shown  the  principles 
upon  which  religion  seeks  to  embody  itself  in  a  scientific 
theology.  In  all  this  investigation  we  have  proceeded  from 
the  more  interior  to  the  more  exterior  developments  of  the 
subject,  coming  at  every  step  farther  into  the  region  of  ob- 
jective truth  as  presented  in  a  clear  and  logical  form.  Having 
now  completed  these  portions  of  the  subject,  we  next  proceed 
to  discuss  the  manner  in  which  religion  realizes  itself  in  out- 
ward communities ;  and  this  we  shall  accomplish  by  investi- 
gating the  question  of  religious  fellowship— first,  as  to  its  in- 
terior nature  ;  and,  secondly,  as  to  its  outward  bond. 

I.  First,  then,  we  must  inquire  into  the  nature  and  de- 
sign of  Christian  fellowship. 

No  true  believer  in  Christianity  will  be  disposed  to  deny 
that  the  manifestation  of  Christ  in  the  world  forms  a  complete 
era  in  the  history  of  its  religious  development.  The  exhibi- 
tion there  made  of  moral  perfection, — the  teaching  which 
accompanied  it, — the  whole  spiritual  influence  which  was 
exerted  upon  the  minds  of  the  first  disciples, — all  com- 
bined to  awaken  in  them  a  class  of  religious  intuitions,  and 
a  body  of  religious  experience,  which  gave  at  once  a  new 


230  PHILOSOPHY   OF    RELIGION. 

direction  and  a  fresh  impulse  to  man's  spiritual  life.  In 
these  intuitions  were  embodied,  spontaneously  and  indis- 
tinctly, the  whole  of  the  subjective  elements  of  Christia- 
nity ;  for  it  was  when  the  understanding  applied  itself  to 
them,  when  it  verified  their  logical  validity,  and  reduced 
them  to  a  body  of  doctrine,  that  Christianity,  as  a  system, 
appeared  in  the  world  :  and  it  is  by  the  application  of  the 
same  intellectual  process  to  these  same  intuitions  in  their 
historical  growth,  that  Christianity  has  developed  itself  as  a 
doctrine  along  the  pathway  of  the  ages. 

Now,  this  religious  consciousness  being  generic,  not 
merely  individual  in  its  character,  and  partaking  of  that  so- 
cial nature  which  belongs  to  all  our  higher  intuitions,  could 
only  realize  itself  in  communities.  The  proofs  of  this  are  va- 
rious. We  might  argue  it,  first,  from  the  natural  tendency 
which  all  the  developments  of  the  intuitional  consciousness 
evince  to  unite  together  minds,  similarly  affected,  in  mutual 
sympathy.  This  very  tendency  indicates  that  certain  social 
conditions  are  necessary  for  our  higher  intuitions  to  develope 
themselves,  and  become  fully  realized  as  a  part  of  the  inward 
life  of  humanity.  Just  as  the  tree  sends  forth  its  roots  to 
gather  nourishment  from  every  side,  so  also  when  our  spir- 
itual emotions  are  once  awakened,  they  seek  the  aid  and  sup- 
port of  fellowship  ;  they  essay  to  strike  their  roots  deep  into 
the  common  soil  of  humanity,  and  in  this  way  to  grow  up  like 
some  vast  tree  into  full  and  perfect  proportions.  The  religious 
emotions,  indeed,  beyond  all  others,  exhibit  this  tendency. 
Their  strength,  their  tenderness,  their  whole  social  character 
is  such,  that  they  produce  the  strongest  affinities,  the  most 
deeply-rooted  friendships,  the  most  irresistible  attractions 
between  minds  which  stand  upon  the  same  stage  of  religious 
impulse  and  idea. 

Again,  secondly,  the  necessary  tendency  of  the  religious 
emotions  and  intuitions  to  form  human  fellowship  is  seen  from 


ON   FELLOWSHIP.  231 


the  fact,  that  it  is  only  by  means  of  fellowship  that  they  can 
evolve  themselves  into  a  distinct  form  of  religion  in  the  world. 
On  this  point  we  need  not  now  insist,  as  it  has  been  already 
shown  and  illustrated  in  the  chapter  on  the  essence  of  Chris- 
tianity. We  there  proved  that  isolated  religious  emotions  or 
experiences  could  only  appear  as  isolated  facts  in  human  his- 
tory ;  that  they  would  be  simply  like  transient  flashes  of  in- 
spiration, lightening  up  for  a  moment  and  dying  away  without 
originating  any  great  practical  system  of  human  faith  ;  and 
that  Christianity,  therefore,  needed  the  aid  and  co-operation 
of  the  first  communities  to  bring  the  germ  of  vitality  from  a 
potential  to  an  actual  existence, — to  make  the  truth,  which 
was  in  the  Word,  a  living  fact  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

The  necessity  of  fellowship  in  bringing  Christianity  to  an 
actual  realization,  is  seen  still  further  in  the  social  charac- 
ter of  Christian  duty.  Did  Christianity  involve  simply  a 
state  of  spiritual  contemplation,  then  we  might  imagine  it 
to  grow  up  into  full  dimensions  in  the  undisturbed  retirement 
of  the  Anchorite  or  the  devotee.  But  such  is  far  from  be- 
ing the  case.  Christianity  is  essentially  social  in  its  nature 
and  its  requisitions.  In  proof  of  this,  take  any  list  of  Chris- 
tian virtues,  such  as  that  given  by  St.  Paul  in  his  Epistle 
to  the  Galatians,  where  he  says,  "  The  fruit  of  the  Spirit  is 
love,  joy,  peace,  long-suffering,  gentleness,  goodness,  faith, 
meekness,  temperance,"  and  consider  how  far  such  virtues 
could  be  maintained  or  cultivated  except  in  a  state  of  social 
life.  Christianity  may,  indeed,  exist  apart  from  society, 
viewed  as  an  abstract  system  of  doctrine  and  precept,  but  not 
as  a  living  concrete  reality  in  the  human  consciousness. 
Whether,  therefore,  we  consider  the  nature  of  the  religious 
emotions,  whether  we  consider  their  development  into  a  vital 
system  of  human  faith,  or  whether  we  consider  the  charac- 
ter of  the  duties  which  that  system  involves,  we  see  it  to  be 
equally  impossible  for  Christianity  ever  to  have  been  realized 


232  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

or  unfolded  in  the  world,  except  through  the  medium  of  hu- 
man fellowship. 

If  these  observations  are  correct,  we  may  determine, 
without  much  difficulty,  what  is  the  interior  nature  of  reli- 
gious fellowship.  It  can  have  nothing  essentially  to  do  with 
formal  laws,  for  these  arise  out  of  the  practical  necessities 
of  communities,  after  they  have  been  created  ;  it  cannot  be 
dependent  upon  any  outward  institutions,  for  those  institu- 
tions have  all  grown  out  of  fellowship  already  cemented  by 
Christian  love ;  it  cannot  consist  in  the  common  profession 
of  any  defined  doctrines,  for  all  doctrine,  logically  considered, 
has  been  developed  out  of  the  very  life  and  consciousness 
which  fellowship  has  assisted  to  realize.  The  essential  idea 
of  Christian  fellowship  is  concentrated  in  the  hallowed  una- 
nimity of  religious  feeling,  created  by  the  common  expe- 
rience of  that  new  and  Divine  life  which  was  first  awakened 
in  man  by  Christ  and  his  apostles.  Wherever  this  Divine 
consciousness  is  so  developed  in  the  heart  as  to  predominate 
over  the  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling  common  to  the  un- 
christianized  world  and  the  unsanctified  mind,  there  is  a 
member  of  Christ's  spiritual  kingdom:  and  wherever  the 
sympathy  produced  by  this  inward  Christian  life  is  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  bring  men  into  new  relations,  based  upon 
these  new  ideas  or  emotions,  there  we  see  the  essential  germ 
qf  a  true  fellowship. 

According  to  this  view  of  the  case,  the  design  of  Christian 
fellowship  is  threefold,  namely,  to  develope,  to  preserve,  and 
to  propagate  the  Christian  life.  First,  we  say,  the  Christian 
life  has  to  be  developed  by  means  of  fellowship.  The  ob- 
ject of  an  immediate  revelation  from  God,  as  we  have  already 
shown,  is  to  impart  those  high  and  holy  religious  intuitions, 
in  the  enjoyment  of  which  personal  Christianity  must  be 
ever  grounded.  These  experiences,  however,  of  the  in- 
most soul  have  to  become  realized  as  a  great  and  divine  sys- 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  233 


tern  of  human  faith  and  practice ;  and  for  this  purpose  the 
influences  of  social  life  are  absolutely  necessary.  The 
function  of  a  religious  fellowship,  accordingly,  is  not  simply 
to  contain  the  truth  of  God  as  a  mere  depository,  neither  is 
it  intended  to  be  merely  a  mechanical  channel,  along  which 
the  truth  may  flow  down  from  one  age  to  another ;  it  possess- 
es, on  the  contrary,  an  organic  and  vital  power  by  which 
the  germs  of  divine  truth  have  to  be  evolved  into  their 
due  moral  and  practical  intensity  ;  it  is  a  body  knit  together 
by  that  which  every  joint  supplieth, — the  body  of  Christ ; 
that,  namely,  whose  soul  and  life  is  the  divine  idea  of  the  Sa- 
viour himself,  as  a  heavenly  manifestation  on  earth.  Every 
doctrine  of  Christianity  has  thus  to  be  made  replete  with 
moral  significancy ;  every  precept  to  be  spiritualized  in  its 
meaning  and  become  universal  in  its  applications  ;  every 
feature  of  human  society  has  to  be  moulded  by  Christian 
truth ;  and  the  whole  edifice  of  human  society  to  be  built  up 
in  conformity  to  that  system  which  is  righteousness,  justice, 
truth,  and  love. 

But,  secondly,  the  Christian  life,  when  developed  to  a 
given  degree  of  distinctness,  has  to  be  preserved  by  fellow- 
ship from  diminution  and  decay.  Christianity,  as  explained 
in  the  Bible,  might,  of  course,  be  handed  down  from  age  to 
age  in  its  mere  formal  and  symbolical  character  by  simply 
perpetuating  the  existence  of  a  scientific  theology,  based 
upon  the  letter  of  the  Word.  But  this  is  a  totally  different 
thing  from  preserving  the  inward  and  vital  Christian  con- 
sciousness as  a  great  practical  reality — a  system  of  living 
faith  and  duty  in  the  world.  For  this  purpose  fellowship  is 
indispensably  needful.  Were  the  Christian  ideas  which  are 
presented  in  the  Bible  to  exist  only  in  an  isolated  form  in  the 
mind  of  one  and  another,  without  the  aid  of  intercourse  or 
spiritual  sympathy,  they  would  be  entirely  wanting  in  that 
concentration  which  gives  them  a  moral  power,  before  which 
11* 


234  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  spirit  of  humanity  bows  in  obedience  and  sacred  awe. 
Under  these  circumstances,  they  would  constantly  diminish 
in  intensity  in  proportion  to  the  distance  at  which  we  so  stand 
from  the  period  of  their  primary  inspiration  ;  until,  weak- 
ened by  isolation  and  overrun  by  the  pressure  of  material 
interests,  the  whole  Christian  life  would  sink  and  perish. 
Christianity,  as  a  living  power,  must  have  an  historical  exist- 
ence and  succession  from  age  to  age ;  without  such  a  succes- 
sion in  the  consciousness  of  Christian  communities  it  would 
gradually  fade  away  and  entirely  disappear. 

Lastly,  Christianity  has  to  be  propagated  by  means  of 
human  fellowship.  The  propagation  of  Christianity  as  a 
moral  power,  is  quite  another  thing  from  gs  inculcation  as  a 
formal  doctrine.  The  latter  may  possibly  be  accomplished 
to  any  extent  by  an  individual  teacher,  who  takes  his  stand 
upon  mere  intellectual  argumentation,  appeals  only  to  the 
logical  faculty  of  his  hearers,  and  seeks  to  force  the  assent  of 
the  understanding.  With  regard  to  the  spread  of  Christiani- 
ty, however,  as  a  new  and  divine  life,  the  case  is  far  otherwise. 
Here  the  Christian  consciousness  must  be  awakened  in  the 
hearts  of  the  indifferent  or  insensible,  and  to  do  this  Chris- 
tianity must  be  witnessed  in  its  moral  operation  upon  man- 
kind. And  how  can  this  be  fairly  witnessed,  except  in  the 
phenomena  of  Christian  fellowship,  and  the  activity  of  Chris- 
tian co-operation  for  heavenly  purposes  ?  It  is  not  by  any 
means  in  proportion  to  the  number,  or  the  zeal,  or  eloquence 
of  those  who  preach  the  doctrines  of  Christianity,  that  vital 
piety  will  make  its  way  in  the  world  ;  but  it  is  precisely  in 
proportion  to  the  intensity  with  which  the  Church  universally 
exhibits  the  purity  and  elevation  of  Christianity  as  a  spiritual 
life. 

To  sum  up  these  remarks,  therefore,  we  may  say,  that 
the  office  of  fellowship  is  first  to  realize  the  Christian  life, 
and  develope  it  into  a  complete  system  of  vital  energy  ;  that 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  235 


it  has  next  to  preserve  it  from  being  lost  in  the  darkness  of 
superstition  or  crushed  under  the  power  of  gross  materialism ; 
that  it  has  finally  to  propagate  it  amongst  all  the  nations  of 
mankind — and  thus  to  prepare  the  immortal  spirits  of  this 
our  lower  world  for  the  communion  of  the  world  above. 
Such  is  the  view  we  now  propose  of  the  nature  and  design  of 
Christian  communion,  and  which  we  place  in  direct  opposi- 
tion to  the  notion,  that  spiritual  fellowships  were  intended  or 
adapted  to  investigate  truth  scientifically  ;  or  to  defend  a  cer- 
tain system  of  formal  doctrine ;  or  to  exert  any  other  than  a 
moral  influence  upon  the  world.  The  Church  and  the  school 
are  two  ideas  totally  distinct ;  just  in  proportion  as  the  former 
merges  into  the  latter,  will  it  ever  lose  its  great  power  as  an 
aid  to  the  attainment  of  spiritual  purity,  and  possess  merely 
a  speculative  interest  to  mankind  at  large. 

II.  We  now  proceed  to  consider  the  outward  bond  of 
unity  in  Christian  fellowship. 

In  the  previous  observations  we  have  been  engaged  in 
discussing  the  essential  principle  of  fellowship.  The  ques- 
tion now  raised  is  respecting  the  formal  principle.  The  real 
life  and  essence  of  fellowship  is  of  a  moral  and  spiritual,  by  no 
means  of  a  speculative  character ;  but  this  does  not  prevent 
the  necessity  of  having  fixed  and  definite  principles,  upon 
which  the  external  form  or  organization  of  communities  is  to 
be  based.  A  simple  community  of  feeling  will  not  serve  as 
the  practical  bond  of  an  outward  and  abiding  institution. 
For  this  purpose  we  need  some  firm  and  solid  principles  of  a 
purely  practical  description ;  principles  which  will  stand 
against  the  brunt  of  manifold  temptation,  and  remain  immov- 
able, though  their  base  be  washed  for  ages  and  centuries  by 
that  ever-flowing  stream  of  time,  which  undermines  all  mere 
human  things. 

The  bond  of  fellowship  may  be  of  two  kinds  ;  it  may  be, 
on  the  one  hand,  purely  outward  and  formal ;  or  it  may  in- 


236  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

volve,  on  the  other  hand,  a  certain  expression  of  religious  life 
or  opinion.  With  regard  to  the  purely  objective  theories,  it 
will  not  be  necessary  for  us  to  dwell  at  any  length  upon 
them ;  since  they  are  connected  with  other  opinions  which 
cannot  be  discussed  in  the  present  treatise.  The  two  forms, 
in  which  this  objective  view  of  the  question  has  been  brought 
forward  most  prominently,  are  seen  first  in  the  Roman  Catho- 
lic idea,  and  secondly  in  the  political  idea  of  fellowship.  We 
touch  upon  these  now,  therefore,  in  few  words,  more  for  the 
sake  of  explanation  than  of  refutation. 

The  formal  principle  of  Catholicism  rests  entirely  upon 
the  general  notion,  that  the  Church  implies  necessarily  an 
outward  and  historical  succession, — that  this  succession  is 
maintained  by  the  unbroken  chain  of  official  authorities,  sac- 
ramental observances,  &c.,  and  that  the  absolute  condition  of 
union  with  the  kingdom  of  Christ,  and  consequently  of  all 
Christian  fellowship,  depends  upon  our  connection  with  this 
historical  constitution  formally  considered.  This  view  of  the 
case  doubtlessly  had  its  origin  in  the  true  idea  of  Catholicity, 
— that  which  rests  upon  the  vital  development  of  the  Chris- 
tian life,  and  the  historical  succession  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness of  the  Church  from  age  to  age.  But  the  Catholic 
theory  of  fellowship,  instead  of  expressing  this  great  and  too 
frequently  forgotten  idea,  has  now  materialized  the  whole 
conception ;  instead  of  making  the  Church  a  living  organiza- 
tion, beyond  the  limits  of  which  there  is  nought  but  spiritual 
darkness,  it  has  set  up  an  artificial  boundary,  marked  off, 
not  by  any  moral  superiority,  but  by  the  due  performance  of 
rites  and  ceremonies.  Accordingly,  we  find  as  the  result  of 
this  theory,  multitudes  of  the  most  debased,  most  unscrupu- 
lous, most  anti-Christian  of  mankind,  standing  in  due  right 
and  order,  as  channels  of  Christian  truth  to  the  world  ;  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  find  multitudes  of  the  humble,  the  holy, 
the  self-denying,  hopelessly  thrust  out  beyond  the  pale  of 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  237 


brotherhood,  as  not  being  in  the  legitimate  succession  of  offi- 
cial validity.  If  the  fellowship  of  the  faithful  is  to  depend 
upon  such  principles  as  these,  then  to  make  it  at  all  intelligi- 
ble to  the  reason,  or  consistent  with  the  moral  sense  of  man- 
kind, we  need  altogether  a  different  interpretation  of  the 
whole  nature  and  design  of  Christianity  from  what  we  have 
in  the  life  of  Christ  and  the  writings  of  the  apostles :  and  the 
philosophy  of  religion  must  be  based  upon  principles  altogether 
different  from  those  we  have  already  advocated. 

The  other  objective  theory  of  visible  fellowship,  to  which 
we  alluded,  is  the  principle  which  makes  a  formal  union 
with  the  Church  of  Christ  to  depend  upon  compliance  with 
certain  political  regulations.  In  this  case  the  spiritual  cha- 
racter of  the  Church  is  not  merely  compromised,  as  in  the 
Catholic  system,  but  it  is  formally  relinquished  ;  she  becomes 
now  a  mere  tool  in  the  secular  schemes  of  human  politics, 
and  the  behest  of  state  authority  is  raised  above  the  sacred 
rights  of  conscience  and  the  laws  of  Christ.  For  the  State 
to  fix  the  conditions  of  Christian  fellowship,  and  regulate  the 
religious  worship  of  the  Church,  is  to  admit  the  competency 
of  merely  secular  rulers  to  decide  as  to  what  shall  be,  both 
in  the  present  and  for  the  future,  the  due  expression  of  the 
religious  life  of  the  country, — as  absurd  in  philosophy  as  it 
is  fatal  to  all  free  and  earnest  religious  development. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  real  bond  of  fellowship  must 
be  in  some  sense  a  spiritual  or  a  religious  one.  Even  where 
a  material  bond  is  practically  asserted,  yet  theoretically  it  is 
always  attempted  to  give  it  a  spiritual  character.  Roman- 
ism, although  it  would  confine  the  fellowship  of  Christ  with- 
in the  limits  of  its  own  outward  and  official  activity,  yet  con- 
sistently enough  denies  the  existence  of  true  religion  beyond 
it.  And  State-Churchmen  even  of  the  strictest  school  tacit- 
ly repudiate  the  value  of  the  political  basis,  either  by  recog- 
nizing the  equal  spiritual  rights  of  the  Nonconformist  in  the 


238  PHILOSOPHY    OF    KELIGION. 

fellowship  of  the  Gospel,  or  advocating  for  themselves  some 
peculiar  religious  claim,  beside  the  mere  fact  of  conformity. 

If,  then,  a  spiritual  basis  of  fellowship  is  admitted,  more 
or  less,  by  universal  consent  to  be  essential,  the  main  point 
we  have  to  discuss  is  the  precise  nature  of  this  spiritual  ba- 
sis,— whether  it  be  of  a  moral  or  whether  of  a  purely  theolo- 
gical character.  If  the  views  we  have  already  maintained 
upon  the  subject  be  correct,  there  cannot  be  much  difficulty 
in  determining  this  question  with  some  approximate  degree 
of  certainty.  The  whole  character  and  design  of  Christian 
fellowship,  we  have  shown,  is  essentially  moral  and  prac- 
tical. The  Church  was  never  intended  to  possess  any  scien- 
tific authority,  or  to  investigate  truth  in  the  light  of  a  formal 
theory  ;  she  was  intended  to  administer  solely  to  the  spiritual 
wants  of  mankind.  This  being  the  case  she  is  not  com- 
petent to  give  any  authoritative  decision  upon  systematic 
theology,  or  to  determine  by  the  weight  of  numbers  what 
can  only  be  really  determined  by  logical  exposition,  or  to 
decide  upon  any  definite  creed  as  the  standing  condition  of 
religious  fellowship.  To  do  this  would  be  to  step  without 
her  real  province  ;  to  assume  a  scientific  function  ;  to  be- 
come virtually  a  college,  not  simply  a  Church. 

That  an  individual  community  may  adopt  some  definite 
statement  of  Christian  doctrine  as  a  matter  of  practical  con- 
venience, in  order  to  give  a  definite  expression  to  their  par- 
ticular religious  life,  we  are  far  from  disputing ;  but  that  a 
fixed  theological  test  of  fellowship  should  be  laid  down  for  a 
whole  body  of  Christians  scattered,  perhaps,  far  and  wide 
over  the  earth  ;  and  this  not  so  much  a  matter  of  practical 
utility  as  an  authoritative  expression  of  doctrinal  truth,  this  we 
regard  as  being  contrary  to  the  whole  of  the  nature  and  the 
functions  of  the  Church  of  Christ.  Before  we  proceed  any 
further,  therefore,  with  an  exposition  of  the  true  bond  of  out- 
ward fellowship,  we  shall  state  at  large  the  grounds  upon 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  239 


which  we  reject  the  principle  of  placing  a  given  dogmatic 
theology,  authoritatively  stated  and  enforced,  at  the  threshold 
of  all  Christian  communion  with  the  visible  Church. 

1.  We  oppose  a  fixed  logical  basis,  because  there  is  no 
authority  for  it  in  the  case  of  the  apostolic  Church.  The 
bond  of  union  amongst  the  early  Churches  was,  the  powerful 
awakening  of  the  religious  consciousness,  originating  in,  and 
maintained  by,  an  intense  belief  of  the  great  facts  connected 
with  the  life,  the  death,  and  the  resurrection  of  Christ. 
That  these  Churches  possessed,  for  a  long  time,  no  formal 
theology,  is  historically  certain.  In  none  of  the  writings  of 
the  New  Testament  is  there  any  thing  approaching  to  it 
except  in  those  of  St.  Paul,  and  in  these,  the  practical  and 
intuitional  elements  immensely  preponderate  over  the  logi- 
cal.* And  even  supposing  that  the  -teaching  of  the  New 
Testament  did  contain  a  formal  body  of  divinity,  still  it  does 
not  follow  that  this  was  intended  to  be  the  basis  of  Church 
union  and  fellowship.  So  far  from  that,  the  only  Church 
symbol  we  can  find  that  has  any  probability  of  having  been 
recognized  in  apostolical  times  is  that  which  is  termed  the 
apostles'  creed — a  symbol  which  is  nought  but  a  simple 
statement  of  belief  in  certain  great  fundamental  facts,  but  in 
which  not  one  single  doctrine  of  Christianity,  as  that  term  is 
now  understood,  is  logically  stated.  If  Christian  fellowship 
really  existed  in  its  most  united,  most  active,  most  efficient 
form,  before  the  period  when  the  religious  intuitions  which 
first  drew  the  disciples  together  were  cast  into  the  mould  of 
a  theological  system ;  and  if,  when  something  approaching 


*  The  dogmatic  element  in  the  apostolic  teaching  was,  in  fact, 
almost  exclusively  Jewish  in  form  ;  their  intuitions  were  purely  Chris- 
tian. On  this  principle  alone,  much  of  the  logical  reasoning  of  St. 
Paul  is  to  be  explained.  Dr.  Hampden  denies  to  them  altogether  a 
dogmatic  intention  in  the  theological  sense  of  that  word. 


240  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

to  a  system  was  realized,  it  was  still  unemployed  as  a  neces- 
sary bond  of  visible  communion,  there  certainly  can  be  no  au- 
thority from  the  apostolical  Church,  to  advocate  a  fixed  logical 
basis,  as  the  essential  foundation  of  our  present  communities. 

2.  We  oppose  a  fixed  logical  basis,  because  the  state- 
ments it  involves  do  not  contain  any  essential  element  of 
Christianity.  Many  a  sincere  Christian,  no  doubt,  may  be 
somewhat  startled  at  this  assertion ;  but  it  is  one  we  make 
very  deliberately,  and  which  follows  indeed,  by  necessary 
consequence,  from  the  principles  we  have  already  deduced. 
The  essence  of  Christianity,  as  we  saw  (Chap.  IV.),  is  only 
cognizable  directly  by  the  power  of  the  intuitional  conscious- 
ness, for  by  it  alone  are  we  brought  into  direct  sympathy 
and  intercourse  with  divine  realities.  The  truth  which  we 
thus  acquire,  is  brought  to  us  immediately ;  it  implies  the 
spontaneous  perception  of  the  spiritual  object ;  and  although 
this  perception  may  be  dim  and  incomplete,  yet  so  far  as  it 
is  developed  at  att,  it  must  be  valid  and  real.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  moment  we  bring  these  intuitions  into  the  form  of 
logical  statements,  they  do  not  necessarily  involve  any  essen- 
tial element  of  Christianity  whatever.  It  is  true,  that,  if  the 
mind  possess  the  intuitions  fresh,  and  living  within,  and  if 
the  logical  statement  be  veritably  the  reflective  representa- 
tion of  them,  as  actually  existing,  such  a  statement  does  con- 
tain an  essential  element  within  it.  But  this  essential  ele- 
ment does  not  depend  upon  the  logical  form.  So  far  from 
that,  it  may  exist  in  all  its  intensity  without  it ;  while,  in 
spite  of  the  doctrinal  form  being  complete,  the  essence  may 
be  utterly  wanting. 

We  do  not  dispute  the  value  of  a  dogmatical  system  of 
theology,  nor  deny  that  it  answers  many  useful  ends  to  the 
Church  and  the  world  ;  but,  for  all  this,  it  cannot  itself  be 
made  the  basis,  and  the  profession  of  it  the  condition,  of  visi- 
ble fellowship,  without  involving  at  length  the  most  unhappy, 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  241 


and  perhaps  unexpected  consequences.  To  the  minds,  who 
frame  theological  statements  as  the  safeguards  and  deposita- 
ries of  their  religious  intuitions,  they  may  appear  to  be  high- 
ly conservative  of  the  truth  ;  and  so  perhaps  they  will  be,  if 
rightly  used.  But  once  raise  them  from  a  subordinate  into 
a  supreme  position  ;  once  make  them  the  test  of  true  Chris- 
tianity; once  constitute  them  the  condition  of  Christian 
union  or  co-operation — and  what  results  ?  The  form  becomes 
soon  confounded  with  the  essence,  the  logical  statement  with 
the  living  reality.  The  importance  of  mere  symbols  thus 
becomes  exaggerated,  while  that  of  a  deep  inward  expe- 
rience grows  less,  until  all  vitality  is  lost,  and  the  minds  of 
thousands  are  cheated  with  the  husk  or  the  shell,  when  per- 
haps they  imagine  that  they  possess  the  living  germ  itself. 
"  There  is  such  a  thing  as  a  cant  of  orthodoxy,  as  well 
as  a  cant  of  fanaticism  and  hypocrisy.  Persons  may  re- 
peat certain  phrases  with  a  confidence  that  they  under- 
stand them,  in  proportion  to  their  real  ignorance  of  their 
meaning,  and  without  attaching  indeed  any  distinct  mean- 
ing to  the  terms  which  they  repeat.  The  emphasis  of  their 
assertion  of  the  theological  truth  is  apt  to  become  a  snare  to 
them ;  inducing  the  delusion,  that  those  cannot  but  have  a 
firm  hold  on  what  they  profess,  who  are  so  stanch  and  so 
correct  in  making  their  profession.  Their  fluency  in  pass- 
ing the  watchwords  of  orthodoxy  and  their  exact  enunciation 
of  its  symbols,  thus  re-act  on  themselves  injuriously.  Their 
religion  unconsciously  to  them  becomes  merely  verbal. 
They  take  the  sign  for  the  thing ;  the  counter  for  the 
money."* 

In  the  above  expression,  "  that  the  emphasis  of  assertion 
of  any  theological  truth  becomes  a  snare,"  we  see  the  whole 
evil  of  making  such  formal  statements  the  actual  basis  of 

*  Hampden's  "  Bampton  Lectures,"  p.  xxvi. 


242  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

fellowship.  No  emphasis  laid  upon  any  doctrine  can*be  so 
great  as  that  which  makes  it  a  necessary  condition  of  union  ; 
and  in  no  other  instance  does  it  become  so  great  a  snare.  To 
rally  round  points,  which  do  not  by  any  means  imply  an 
essential  element  of  Christianity,  is  to  put  the  form  absolutely 
before  the  matter ;  and  the  necessary  result  in  the  long-run 
is,  that  the  matter  will  pass  away  from  the  soul,  and  leave 
the  dead  and  hollow  form  standing  alone — the  monument  of 
a  life,  which  has  been,  but  is  now,  alas !  gone  into  oblivion. 
Thus,  so  far  from  taking  a  negative  position  in  our  theory  of 
Church  fellowship,  we  are  in  fact  striving  against  it.  It  is 
the  system  that  lays  such  undue  stress  upon  logical  state- 
ments, which,  as  we  shall  soon  show,  is  apt,  nay  sure,  to 
lead  into  negations ;  it  is  the  affirmation  of  the  religious  life 
as  the  main  thing,  which  can  alone  keep  our  theology  as  well 
as  our  fellowship  pure,  practical,  and  positive. 

3.  We  oppose  a  fixed  logical  basis,  because  the  natural  re- 
sult of  the  logical  consciousness,  as  applied  to  communities, 
is  diversity,  and  not  unity.  Here  we  must  refer  our  read- 
ers to  that  portion  of  our  second  chapter,  in  which  the  con- 
trast between  the  logical  and  intuitional  faculties,  in  this  par- 
ticular respect,  is  deduced  and  illustrated.  It  will  be  there 
seen,  that  the  office  of  the  former  is  to  analyze,  to  separate, 
to  distinguish  qualities  and  attributes,  to  place  them  before  us 
as  abstract  ideas  ;  and  that  in  the  numberless  shades  of  dis- 
tinction, therefore,  which  result  from  this  process,  there  is 
the  amplest  room  for  difference  of  opinion,  without  losing 
sight  of  the  main  subject.  The  tendency  of  intuition,  on  the 
contrary,  is  always  towards  unity  ;  inasmuch  as  it  neglects 
specific  differences,  and,  whatever  the  subject  may  be,  seeks 
directly  to  reach  the  central  truth  and  the  concrete  reality. 
Now  the  specific  ground  on  which  the  use  of  logical  state- 
ments, as  the  basis  of  fellowship,  has  been  maintained  is,  that 
they  may  bring  all  men,  as  far  as  possible,  into  one  mode  of 


ON    FELLOWSHIP. 


thinking  on  religious  matters,  and  thus  advance  the  visible 
unity  of  the  Church.  Instead,  however,  of  subserving  this 
end,  it  is  demonstrable,  that  nothing  else  is  so  inevitably  cer- 
tain to  create  divisions.  Whatever  differences  there  may  be 
in  temperament,  in  the  relative  strength  of  the  faculties,  in 
the  influence  of  education,  in  national  or  social  peculiarities, 
all  these  differences  are  at  once  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
question  of  religious  belief,  the  very  moment  we  begin  to 
cast  our  intuitions  into  a  definitive  and  prepositional  form. 
Just  in  proportion  to  the  intensity  and  vigor  of  the  logical 
understanding,  in  that  proportion  it  will  always"  originate 
amongst  mankind  logical  differences ;  definition  will  follow 
definition,  proposition  will  be  added  to  proposition,  conclusion 
will  be  drawn  after  conclusion — and  never  will  it  be  possi- 
ble to  get  any  considerable  number  of  minds  fully  to  coin- 
cide in  any  one  set  of  logical  statements,  until  they  cease  to 
think  or  reason  about  the  question  altogether,  and  receive 
them  simply  on  the  ground  of  bare  authority. 

Religious  intuitions  have  just  the  contrary  effect.  They 
unite  men  in  sympathy  one  with  another ;  by  means  of  inter- 
communication, this  unity  becomes  greater  and  greater,  for 
each  one  communicates  somewhat  to  his  neighbor,  and  re- 
ceives equally  from  him  ;  so  that  here,  in  the  flow  of  holy 
feeling,  desire,  and  contemplation,  natural  differences  and 
logical  variations  are  merged,  lost,  and  forgotten.  The  more 
lively,  intense,  and  active  this  inward  religious  life  becomes, 
the  stronger  are  its  magnetic  attractions,  and  the  closer  does 
it  draw  all  to  one  common  centre.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
more  purely  logical  men  become,  the  more  they  involve 
themselves  in  endless  scholastic  disputes,  which  will  cause 
a  semblance  of  division  even  where  there  is  real  unity  at 
heart. 

But,  further,  supposing  an  agreement  should  after  all  be 
arrived  at,  respecting  the  terms  of  definition,  yet  still  that 


244  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

agreement  is  no  guarantee  for  real  unity.  Men  often  imagine, 
that  so  soon  as  they  can  profess  the  same  articles,  then  at 
length  they  are  at  one  with  each  other.  Nothing  less.  A 
thousand  chances  to  one,  but  they  have  succeeded  in  associ- 
ating each  his  own  peculiar  views,  with  the  words  in  ques- 
tion ;  so  that  with  a  verbal  unanimity  there  is  as  great  an 
actual  difference  as  ever.  Men  very  rarely  become  really 
at  one  by  means  of  logical  discussion,  they  only  become  so 
when  the  increased  religious  life,  from  which  all  the  material 
of  such  discussion  is  primarily  drawn,  blends  them  in  real 
harmony  the  one  with  the  other. 

4.  We  oppose  a  fixed  logical  basis,  because  it  tends  in- 
evitably to  the  gradual  extinction  of  all  that  is  positive  in 
Christianity.  As  this  is  a  practical  objection,  and  one  which 
admits  of  historical  verification,  we  shall  dwell  upon  it  some- 
what more  largely  than  we  have  done  upon  the  former  par- 
ticulars. To  exhibit  the  mode  in  which  a  logical  basis  of 
Church  union  operates  in  producing  the  effects  above  stated, 
we  will  suppose  a  case  for  illustration.  Imagine  a  Christian 
communion  possessing  in  a  large  and  happy  measure  the 
positive  life  of  true  religion.  The  lofty  intuitions  of  the 
New  Testament  are  vividly  realized,  the  power  of  faith  and 
love  circulates  freely  from  mind  to  mind,  the  whole  Christian 
consciousness  is  elevated  and  pure.  Imagine,  next,  the  logi- 
cal understanding  to  become  active,  the  religious  intuitions 
to  be  reduced  to  a  reflective  form,  and  a  dogmatic  theology 
to  be  completed  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  age.  Imagine, 
again,  that  some  of  the  weightiest  and  most  influential  minds, 
more  zealous  than  wise,  and  eager  to  retain  their  religious 
identity  from  age  to  age,  propose  to  fence  in  their  Christian 
fellowship  by  formal  articles  of  faith,  which  should  henceforth 
become  a  condition  of  union.  The  proposal  is  accepted,  the 
doctrinal  statements  are  accordingly  fixed,  and  fixed  perhaps 
without  any  great  degree  of  difficulty  or  disputation.  For  a 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  245 


little  time  all  seems  smooth  and  promising ;  the  inward  vi- 
tality has  been  so  great,  and  the  mutual  unanimity  in  conse- 
quence of  it  so  general,  that  it  has  well  nigh  repressed  all 
tendency  to  differ  about  verbal  statements,  however  great  the 
temptation  to  do  so.  In  lapse  of  time,  however,  the  scene 
gradually  changes ;  the  influence  of  the  world  will"  again 
make  itself  felt ;  the  infirmities  of  natural  disposition  will 
find  cause  for  disagreement ;  and,  what  is  still  more,  as  the 
age  rolls  round,  the  formal  articles,  which  expressed  so  accu- 
rately the  religious  consciousness  of  the  period  at  which  they 
were  formed,  do  not  continue  to  be  by  any  means  so  precise 
a  reflection  of  the  inward  reality.  One  mind  becomes  dis- 
satisfied with  this  definition,  another  with  that;  here  is  a 
doctrine  too  pregnantly  expressed,  there  too  loosely  ;  and  just 
in  proportion  to  the  fulness  and  comprehensiveness  of  the 
original  creed,  and  the  logical  sharpness  of  the  distinctions, 
will  there  be  the  more  probability  of  difference  and  disagree- 
ment arising. 

Under  these  circumstances,  what  course  is  to  be  pursued  ? 
Some  may  say,  retain  the  articles,  and  allow  them  to  be  sub- 
scribed with  a  mental  reservation — that  is,  in  other  words, 
sanction  hypocrisy  for  the  sake  of  your  logical  definitions  :  re- 
tain them  at  all  events,  though  it  be  at  the  expense  of  moral 
integrity.  Against  such  principles,  it  is  humiliating  to  ar. 
gue. 

If  then  this  course  is  not  pursued,  what  alternative  lies 
open  to  be  accepted  ?  Evidently  this.  The  articles  must 
be  modified  to  suit  the  case  of  the  disaffected,  for  to  thrust  them 
out  would  be  sure  to  lop  off  the  most  active,  energetic,  and 
living  members  of  the  whole  community — those  who  find 
their  religious  life  where  only  it  can  be  found,  in  spiritual 
progress.  This  attempt,  then,  at  modification,  may  serve 
the  purpose  of  producing  harmony  for  a  time  ;  but  as  sure  as 
another  age  has  rolled  round,  other  differences  will  have  ari- 


246  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

sen,  under  the  operation  of  the  same  causes  as  before  ;  and 
a  still  further  modification  will  be  required.  In  brief,  to  sat- 
isfy all  minds  alike,  the  articles  of  faith  must  become  more 
and  more  negative  ;  one  point  after  another  must  be  weaken- 
ed by  equivocal  expressions ;  and  when  the  whole  positive 
element  is  gone,  and  the  system  itself  emasculated,  then  at 
length,  and  then  only,  may  we  look  for  union  in  the  profes- 
sion of  a  logical  creed.  Thus  it  is,  that  a  community  firmly 
united  at  first  by  the  sympathy  of  positive  Christianity,  is  led 
on,  by  the  ever-pressing  necessity  of  giving  satisfaction  to  the 
speculative  understanding,  from  one  degree  of  degeneracy  to 
another,  until  nought  is  left  but  a  species  of  natural  religion, 
which,  as  it  can  give  expression  to  no  man's  religious  individu- 
ality, fails  to  serve  as  a  bond  of  fellowship  at  all,  and  thus 
leads  to  the  virtual  dissolution  of  the  Church. 

History  gives  us  abundant  verifications  of  the  truth  of  this 
whole  representation.  Without  dwelling  upon  the  case  of 
the  Eastern  Church,  which,  under  the  influence  of  metaphy- 
sical disputes  upon  theology,  degenerated  into  a  mixed  hea- 
thenism and  infidelity  ;  without  dwelling  upon  the  effects  of 
the  scholastic  spirit  in  the  middle  ages,  which  converted  re- 
ligious faith  into  dialectical  controversy  ;  we  will  refer  sim- 
ply to  those  Protestant  communities  which,  in  more  recent 
times,  have  most  strenuously  upheld  a  fixed  doctrinal  basis  of 
Church  fellowship. 

Let  us  turn,  first  of  all,  to  the  Lutheran  Church  of  Ger- 
many. This  Church  was  cradled  in  that  intense  excitement 
of  the  moral  and  spiritual  nature  which  so  remarkably  cha- 
racterized the  period  of  the  Reformation.  Luther  was  the 
noble  embodiment  of  that  new  religious  life,  and  few  men 
perhaps  were  ever  less  under  the  influence  of  formal  dogmas 
than  he.  The  more  logical  minds  of  the  age,  however,  like 
that  of  Melancthon,  impelled  by  the  influence  of  their  scholas- 
tic education,  cast  the  burning  thoughts,  which  were  sponta- 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  247 


neously  stirring  the  very  deepest  elements  of  human  nature, 
into  the  form  of  a  doctrinal  system,  which  afterwards,  more 
honestly  than  wisely,  they  placed  at  the  threshold  of  their 
new  communion.  The  process  of  religious  degeneracy  in 
the  subsequent  ages  is  well  known.  These  doctrinal  forms 
and  expressions  soon  became  the  great  points  of  interest — the 
great  centres  of  all  their  real  mental  activity ;  in  that  pro- 
portion religion  itself  lost  its  vital  power ;  so  that  while  the 
strictest  orthodoxy  was  observed  in  the  formularies,  yet  every 
thing  showed  that  the  moral  thinking  of  the  age  had  really 
no  interest  in  them.*  What  was  the  consequence  of  this 
state  of  things  ?  The  public  mind  having  ceased  to  interest 
itself  in  the  Church  theology,  soon  proved  that  its  faith  was 
simultaneously  shaken  in  Christianity  itself.  The  first  as- 
sault of  a  vigorous  philosophical  Rationalism  shattered  into 
fragments  the  brittle  texture  of  those  logical  systems  which 
the  pulpits  had  proclaimed  in  the  place  of  living  truths  and 
moral  ideas ;  and  soon  involved  the  whole  country  in  a  pro- 
fession of  Christianity  which,  from  its  purely  negative  cha- 
racter, differed  by  very  small  degrees  from  the  barest 
naturalism. 

There  is  no  more  fearful  evil  of  a  religious  kind  to  be 
dreaded  in  any  country,  than  when  the  masses  of  the  people 
lose  all  interest  and  faith  in  the  theological  teaching  of  the 
clergy.  Too  many  unhappily  only  see  in  this  fact  the  ne- 
cessity of  enjoining  a  more  unreserved  belief  in  the  whole 
teaching  of  the  Church  ;  they  do  not  see  that  such  a  state  of 
unbelief  too  surely  proves  that  the  teaching  of  the  Church 
has  lost  its  proper  power  to  influence  the  human  heart ;  and 
that  faith  will  need  no  constraint  and  no  injunction,  where 

*  For  a  picture  of  the  state  of  German  Theology  during  this  its 
dogmatic  period,  see  M.  Armand  Sainte's  "  Histoire  Critique  du  Ration- 
alisme  en  Allemagne,"  Book  I.,  chapters  7,  8, 9. 


243  PHILOSOPHV    OF    RELIGION. 

the  Church  really  proclaims  the  truth  of  Christianity  in  de- 
monstration of  the  Spirit,  and  with  a  vital  power. 

The  spirit  of  Luther  had  been  of  this  living  kind ;  his 
influence  upon  the  religion  of  his  country  was  in  conse- 
quence vast  and  enduring ;  but  the  formal  theology  which 
reached  its  climax  under  the  dry  and  abstract  teaching  of 
the  Wolfian  philosophy,  just  when  it  seemed  to  fence  in  the 
whole  circle  of  orthodoxy  by  the  very  nicest  definitions,  was 
in  truth  only  preparing  the  way  for  the  rationalistic  infidelity 
of  the  succeeding  age. 

From  the  theology  of  Germany  let  us  direct  our  attention 
to  Geneva,  the  seat  of  Calvinistic  Reformation.  Here  was 
a  Church  based  originally  upon  the  fullest  statement  of  the 
Calvinistic  creed,  and  enforcing  it  even  by  civil  penalties. 
We  all  know  its  history.  For  a  time,  the  catechism  of  that 
great  Reformer  was  strictly  adhered  to ;  but  by  degrees  it 
ceased  accurately  to  express  the  real  religious  consciousness 
of  the  Church.  Carried  on  one  step  after  another  by  dissat- 
isfaction with  the  dogmatic  statements  they  were  called  upon 
to  subscribe,  the  community  passed  through  all  the  stages  of 
modification  which  are  usual  in  such  cases,  becoming  more 
and  more  vague  at  every  step,  until  it  settled  down  in  that 
almost  negative  form  of  Christianity  which  it  retains  to  the 
present  day, — a  Christianity  alike  without  life,  and  without 
power. 

Were  it  necessary  to  do  so,  we  could  exhibit  a  similar 
course  of  events  in  the  Reformed  Churches  of  France  and 
Holland ;  but  waiving  these,  we  shall  come  at  once  to  our 
own  country,  and  trace  here  the  same  effects  as  they  flowed 
from  the  same  causes.  We  are  quite  ready  to  render  our 
heartfelt  homage  to  the  vigorous  theological  spirit  of  the  early 
Puritan  writers ;  they  did  their  work  nobly  and  completely, 
at  a  time  too  when  it  was  most  needed ;  they  penetrated  the 
mind  of  the  country,  which  had  been  lying  in  the  bosom  of 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  249 


the  grossest  ignorance,  with  genuine  and  earnest  theological 
ideas ;  but  their  immediate  successors,  instead  of  striving  to 
perpetuate  the  religious  life  of  those  holy  men,  strove  rather 
to  make  their  scholastic  system  a  perpetual  rule  of  faith,  and 
a  standing  condition  of  fellowship.  The  consequence  was 
that,  as  this  system  ceased  to  satisfy  the  religious  growth  of 
the  age,  one  point  after  another  was  relaxed,  until  it  produced 
first  a  lifeless  orthodoxy,  and  at  last  a  negative  Unitarianism, 
such  as  the  predominance  of  the  critical  element  in  the  do- 
main of  theology  invariably  superinduces. 

The  moral  firmness,  the  spiritual  fervor,  the  whole  Chris- 
tian life  of  the  English  Puritans  are  eternal ;  eternal  in  their 
sublimity,  eternal  in  their  influence ;  never  will  they  cease 
to  act  upon  the  mind  and  heart  of  our  country ;  never  will 
they  cease  to  give  us  an  example  of  the  true  basis  of  Chris- 
tian fellowship.  Would  that  in  these  respects  their  example 
had  ever  been  followed,  and  their  real  religious  life  never 
been  lost.  But,  instead  of  their  progressive  spirit  being  kept 
in  view,  it  is  their  fixed  logical  system  which  is  being  per- 
petually extolled ;  it  is  their  formal  theology  -which  so  many 
are  essaying  to  canonize ;  forgetful  of  the  fact,  that,  in  this 
respect  they  had  by  no  means  the  critical  aids  which  we  pos- 
sess, and  not  perceiving  that  in  resting  implicitly  upon  others 
we  are  robbing  ourselves  of  the  very  life  which  our  fore- 
fathers possessed — the  life,  namely,  which  only  results  from 
the  further  development  and  organization  of  Christian  ideas, 
into  a  deeper,  intenser,  and  more  comprehensive  theory  re- 
specting man,  the  universe,  and  the  Creator. 

Whatever  of  life  there  is  now  in  the.  religion  of  our  coun- 
try, we  hold  to  be  owing  to  causes  quite  distinct  from  the  en- 
forcement of  a  complete  formal  theology  in  the  Confessions  of 
our  Churches.  In  the  Church  of  England,  true  piety  has 
developed  itself  far  more  through  her  prayers  and  such-like 
appeals  to  the  deeper  religious  intuitions  of  the  people,  than 
12 


250  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

through  the  enforcement  either  of  the  Catechism  or  the  Arti- 
cles. The  Nonconformist  Churches,  it  is  well  known,  owe 
their  vitality  to  the  development  of  a  purely  spontaneous 
and  experimental  piety  coincident  with  the  rise  and  the 
spread  of  Methodism ;  and  lastly,  Scotland,  which,  under  the 
rigid  inculcation  of  a  formal  Calvinistic  theology  on  the  part 
of  the  Church,  had  sunk  into  that  dreary  state  of  religious 
lethargy,  from  which  various  circumstances  have  now  con- 
spired partially  to  arouse  it, — Scotland,  I  say,  with  its  me- 
chanical formalism  and  its  vast  under-currents  of  infidelity, 
will  soon  have  to  choose  between  the  alternative  of  opposing 
a  free  and  expansive  theology  to  the  pressing  wants  of  the 
age,  or  relapsing  deeper  than  ever  into  the  moral  death  of  a 
dialectical  dogmatism,  and  all  the  dread  results  it  ever  brings 
in  its  train. 

"  It  is  worthy  of  remark,"  says  Dr.  Hampden,  "  that 
those  Protestants  who  have  advanced  to  extremes  in  oppos- 
ing the  errors  of  Rome,  both  those  who  have  opposed  them 
on  the  ground  of  superstition,  and  those  who  have  been  un- 
reasonably jealous  in  the  cause  of  Reason,  have  adopted  more 
of  the  speculative  method,  connected  with  those  errors,  than 
the  more  moderate  reformer.  For  what  is  all  that  accuracy 
and  positiveness  with  which  some  persons  state  their  views  of 
justification,  but  the  point  and  precision  of  theory  ?  What 
is  all  the  profession  of  rational  religion,  with  which  some 
maintain  the  natural  efficacy  of  repentance,  but  a  dogmatism 
founded  on  theory  ?  We  may  learn  from  these  extremes,  that 
the  more  indistinct  our  language  is  on  this  sacred  subject  and 
the  less  of  theoretic  principle  it  embodies  in  it,  the  more  closely 
do  we  imbibe  the  true  spirit  of  Protestantism,  the  more  faith- 
fully do  we  walk  in  the  path  of  that  Holy  Sprit  whose  ways 
are  in  the  deep,  and  whose  footsteps  are  not  known." 

5.  We  oppose  a  fixed  logical  basis,  because  it  hinders  the 
free  development  of  the  Christian  life.  The  life  of  faith  in 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  251 


the  individual  depends  upon  his  spiritual  progress.  Where 
there  is  an  absolute  stagnation  of  ideas  from  year  to  year, 
there  can  be  no  great  activity  in  the  higher  religious  facul- 
ties. All  our  intuitions,  if  real  and  healthy,  will  grow  and 
expand.  It  is  so  also  with  the  life  of  faith  in  individual  com- 
munities, in  the  Universal  Church,  in  the  world.  While 
the  Church  is  thinking,  developing  truth,  framing  for  itself 
spontaneously  a  more  perfect  and  comprehensive  theology, 
we  see  at  once  that  there  is  life ;  but  when  she  is  stagnating 
as  to  her  religious  ideas  and  conceptions,  when  she  has  fixed 
herself  down  upon  a  determinate  form  of  words,  which  may 
never  be  modified  or  outgrown,  then  we  see  the  sure  marks 
of  inward  spiritual  destitution  and  death.  Now  this  unhappy 
effect  is  naturally  aided  on  by  the  inculcation  of  a  fixed 
dogmatic  theology  as  the  basis  of  Christian  communion. 
Such  a  theology  throws  a  brace  around  the  living  conscious- 
ness of  the  Church  ;  every  vital  movement  is  repressed,  and 
the  very  means  which  were  taken  to  retain  the  letter  of  the 
truth  end  in  quenching  its  spirit,  and  cramping  its  power. 
Faith,  in  its  true  religious  sense,  is  not  an  assent  to  formal 
propositions,  but  a  spiritual  life  ;  and  life  in  the  soul,  like  all 
other  life,  implies  a  progress,  the  repressing  of  which  tends 
to  decay  and  death. 

Such  are  some  of  the  principal  grounds  upon  which  we 
reject  the  idea  of  placing  a  fixed  logical  basis  at  the  thres- 
hold of  Christian  fellowship.  The  ground  of  all  true  union 
among  Christians  is  to  be  found  not  in  the  common  consent 
of  the  understanding  to  certain  theological  definitions,  but  in 
the  common  development  of  the  intuitional  consciousness  as 
regards  man's  religious  life.  Such  was  the  unity  of  the  early 
Church.  Between  the  Jew  and  the  Christian  there  could  be 
no  real  fellowship,  inasmuch  as  the  Christian  life  was  al- 
together of  a  higher  order  than  that  which  prevailed  under 
the  old  dispensation  ;  but  there  needed  no  articles  of  belief, 


252  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

and  no  confessions  of  faith  logically  propounded,  to  knit  the 
hearts  of  all  the  first  disciples  together  in  harmony  and  love. 
In  this  case  the  ground  of  fellowship  was  a  holy  unity  of 
religious  feeling,  and  such  unity  must  be  ours. 

Now,  the  objection  which  many  will  be  inclined  to  make 
to  these  principles  is  this : — that  the  profession  of  Christian- 
ity must  become  extremely  negative,  when  it  is  based  upon 
a  foundation  so  vague  as  that  we  are  now  supposing.  To 
this  objection,  however,  we  rejoin,  that  it  is  to  prevent  the 
religious  life  running  into  such  negations  that  we  advocate 
the  views  above  stated.  When  a  fixed  standard  is  set  up  as 
binding  upon  a  whole  community,  the  tendency  of  it  is  to 
repress  the  force,  the  originality,  the  spontaneous  warmth  of 
Christian  thought  and  expression  in  the  individual,  and  lead 
to  a  mere  formal  and  unimpressive  maintenance  of  the  dog- 
mas thus  imposed  upon  him.  It  is  when  the  individual  is 
left  free  from  such  formal  trammels  that  he  naturally  be- 
comes positive,  and  earnest  in  the  expression  of  his  faith  and 
hope  in  the  Gospel. 

There  is  a  very  broad  distinction  to  be  drawn  between 
a  basis  of  fellowship  viewed  as  the  condition  of  communion, 
and  the  actual  teaching  of  the  minister,  or  the  practical  ne- 
cessities of  a  single  congregation.  We  do  not  mean,  that, 
because  the  former  should  be  theologically  undefined,  there- 
fore the  latter  should  be  so  too.  We  do  not  mean  that  theol- 
ogy in  all  its  points  and  logical  consecutiveness  should  not 
be  proclaimed  from  the  pulpit,  or  that  actual  congregations 
of  Christian  worshippers  should  base  at  once  their  worship 
and  their  Christian  co-operation  upon  a  mere  undefined  for- 
mula of  Christian  feeling.  Just  as  every  true  Christian 
man  must  work  according  to  his  own  individual  type  of  the 
Christian  life,  which  will  inevitably  express  itself  in  his 
doctrinal  belief,  so  also  must  every  congregation  act  upon 
Christian  principles  which  have  assumed  some  distinctive 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  253 


type,  and  are  capable  of  some  definite  expression.  All  we 
mean  is  this,  that  Christian  fellowship,  in  the  broad  and  ex- 
tended  sense,  should  not  be  grounded  upon  a  fixed  theologi- 
cal basis,  which  is  sure,  in  time,  to  create,  and  then  to  per- 
petuate, schisms  in-  the  whole  body ;  but  that  every  large 
community  should  consent  to,  and  provide  for,  the  expres- 
sion of  many  individual  phases  of  religious  activity  and  for- 
mal theological  opinion  within  its  own  pale. 

In  saying  this,  we  are  merely  advocating  the  open  and 
honest  profession  of  that  which  all  communities  are  obliged 
more  or  less  to  admit  of  tacitly.  Where  there  is  a  very  dis- 
tinctive and  sharply-defined  theological  confession  at  the 
foundation  of  any  Christian  fellowship,  it  is  impossible  to  en- 
force complete  agreement  with  it;  or,  if  it  be  enforced,  prac- 
tical hypocrisy  is  the  too  certain  result.  How  much  more 
manly  in  spirit,  how  much  more  Christian  in  principle  is  it, 
that  each  man  who  takes  upon  him  the  vows  of  the  Lord,  should 
proclaim  openly  and  earnestly  his  own  deepest  convictions, 
than  be  perpetually  hiding  them  behind  the  phraseology  of 
some  authoritative  standard.  There  is  nothing  we  can  con- 
ceive of  more  calculated  to  sap  the  foundations  of  true  faith, 
nothing  more  certain  to  end  in  indifference  and  mere  nega- 
tive formalism,  than  the  habit  which  theological  strictness 
and  intolerance  has  superinduced  in  many  persons— of  cher- 
ishing esoteric  religious  opinions  which  are  only  feebly  and 
timidly  declared,  or  not  presented  at  all,  in  their  public  in- 
struction. Were  the  expression  of  pur  real  religious  life  left 
free  to  manifest  itself  in  the  Church  and  the  world,  we  should 
find  a  much  shorter  road  to  real  unity  than  can  ever  result 
from  the  constraints  of  authoritative  confessions. 

The  true  idea  of  fellowship  is  that  of  a  living  body, 
which  grows  up  spontaneously  from  the  smallest  commence- 
ment to  the  full  and  perfect  stature  of  a  man.  We  shall 
attempt,  therefore,  to  show  how  the  Church  can  realize  itself 


254  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

on  these  principles,  and  how  it  can  retain  its  true  catholicity 
in  connection  with  the  most  perfect  freedom  of  the  individual 
religious  life.  The  primary  movement  of  spiritual  organ- 
ization is  seen,  when  the  minds  of  two  or  three  Christian 
men  are  drawn  together  by  mutual  sympathy  so  as  to  coin- 
cide in  some  concerted  plan  of  devotion  or  pious  activity. 
That  such  a  coincidence  of  two  or  three  earnest  minds  for 
prayer  or  for  action  enjoys  the  peculiar  blessing  attached  to 
the  Christian  Church  is  evident  from  the  declaration  of  our 
Saviour,  where  he  says,  "  That  if  two  of  you  shall  agree  on 
earth  as  touching  any  thing  that  they  shall  ask,  it  shall  be 
done  for  them  of  my  Father  which  is  in  heaven.  For  where 
two  or  three  are  gathered  together  in  my  name,  there  am  I 
in  the  midst  of  them."  A  single  assembly  of  men  in  the 
name  of  Christ  (be  it  smaller  or  greater),  where  his  com- 
mands are  observed  and  his  love  prevails,  is  what  we 
may  term  the  unit  of  Church  fellowship ;  it  is  one  perfect 
stone  in  the  spiritual  temple,  one  perfect  branch  in  the  living 
vine,  one  perfect  member  in  the  mystical  body  ;  and  every 
succeeding  organic  process  is  but  a  repetition  of  this  upon  a 
wider  scale. 

Such  a  community  of  minds,  bound  together  by  the  simi- 
larity of  their  religious  intuitions,  forming,  as  they  do,  a 
perfect  unit  of  Church  fellowship,  can  sciupturally  act  for 
their  own  spiritual  welfare.  For  this  purpose  they  are 
authorized  to  select  their  own  spiritual  teachers  ;  to  decree 
rites  and  ceremonies,  not  contrary  to  the  Word  of  God ;  to 
fix  the  nature  of  their  public  services  ;  and  to  agree,  if  they 
choose  to  do  so,  upon  some  common  symbol  or  expression  of 
religious  faith,  as  was  done  by  many  of  the  early  Churches 
with  regard  to  the  Apostles'  Creed. 

This  adopted  symbol  need  not  be  a  complete  formal 
statement  of  theological  doctrine  ;  it  need  not  be  regarded 
as  a  fixed  and  unchangeable  confession  of  faith  ;  it  need  not 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  255 


be  viewed  as  an  indispensable  condition  of  fellowship  in  a 
broader  sense ;  it  may  be  simply  a  "  form  of  sound  words  " 
by  which  this  individual  community  expresses  its  own  reli- 
gious individuality.  Another  community  may  adopt  a  differ- 
ent phraseology  ;  a  third  a  different  one  still :  in  this  way  every 
Christian  man  may  find  his  own  personal  individuality  ex- 
pressed with  sufficient  accuracy  not  to  hinder  free  commu- 
nion and  worship  in  some  actual  unit  of  Christian  fellowship. 

The  perfection  of  the  Christian  character  in  a  man  is 
not  to  pare  down  his  whole  mental  and  moral  constitution  to 
some  fixed  standard,  but  to  develope  his  own  individuality, 
whatever  it  be,  on  Christian  principles ;  so  that  the  nature 
which  God  has  given  him,  instead  of  being  crushed,  is  ex- 
panded into  its  due  proportions,  the  whole  being  purified  by 
religion  and  love.  And  so  is  it  with  Christian  communities. 
Each  one  must  have  its  individuality, — and  whatever  tends 
to  crush  this  at  the  expense  of  mere  uniformity,  will  wound 
the  tenderness  of  pure  religious  affection,  and  quench  the 
smoking  flax  ere  ever  it  can  burst  forth  to  a  flame. 

If,  now,  the  real  element  of  brotherly  love  exist  in  these 
individual  communities,  they  will  not  be  content  to  live  in  a 
state  of  religious  isolation.  The  very  same  impulse  which 
leads  individuals  to  unite  together  in  a  single  Church  will 
carry  forward  the  organic  principle  still  farther ;  so  that 
these  various  units  of  Church  fellowship  will  form  them- 
selves into  a  wider  community.  Such  a  process,  indeed,  is 
necessary  to  the  perfection  of  the  Church  on  earth.  For 
although  we  may  say,  that  the  whole  essence  of  the  Church 
exists  in  the  unit,  even  as  the  whole  essence  of  humanity  in 
the  individual,  yet  man  isolated  from  his  race  forms  not  a 
more  impotent  spectacle  than  does  a  single  unit  of  Christian 
fellowship,  when  severed  from  the  whole  life  of  the  Church 
Catholic. 

A  number  of  individual  Churches  thus  united  for  reli- 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


gious  ends,  and  holding  extensive  intercourse  with  each 
other  on  fixed  principles,  will  form,  by  the  same  spontaneous 
attraction  of  Christian  sympathy,  a  larger  community  ;  and 
if  such  a  community  be  coincident  with  the  political  divi- 
sions of  the  country,  it  forms  a  National  Church.  And  this, 
in  fact,  is  the  only  sense  in  which  a  Church  can  be  truly 
national.  A  State  Church  is  of  easy  formation,  when  power 
and  wealth  exist  in  the  hands  of  a  Government  to  create  and 
endow  it ;  but  without  the  real  assent  and  religious  sympathy 
of  the  people,  what  is  it  but  a  fearful  mockery  of  their 
deepest  convictions  ?  Were  not  the  free  and  earnest  con- 
victions of  a  people  fettered  or  distracted  by  canons  and 
confessions  with  which  they  have  no  moral  sympathy,  their 
religion  would  ever  tend  to  some  unitary  expression ;  and  a 
Church1  truly  national  would  be  the  result.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  enforcement  of  fixed  logical  creeds,  rituals,  and 
dead  forms,  upon  each  community,  necessarily  gives  rise  to 
division  and  dissent,  over  which  those  who  have  produced  it 
most  unjustly  and  unreasonably  complain. 

The  bond  of  union  is  this  case  would,  of  course,  differ 
from  that  of  the  individual  Church,  being  more  general,  just 
in  proportion  to  the  less  clearly  defined  individuality  which  a 
wider  community  is  intended  to  express.  The  individual 
Church  will  find  it  practically  needful  to  adopt  some  form  of 
religious  doctrine  which  gives  due  distinctness  to  their  in- 
ward life :  but  the  wider  community  has  to  do  more  with  the 
Christian  spirit ;  to  lay  down  the  simple  elements  of  vital 
godliness  ;  to  define  the  practical  principles  upon  which  the 
whole  body  is  constituted.  It  has,  in  a  word,  to  determine 
by  its  authority  that  for  which  alone  authority  is  of  any 
value,  namely,  the  purity  of  our  great  spiritual  intuitions,  and 
the  practical  utility  of  our  plans  of  broad  Christian  activity. 

Then,  finally,  let  there  be  one  more  effort  of  the  organic 
principle  of  Christian  love,  and  these  various  communities, 


ON    FELLOWSHIP.  257 


whether  they  be  national  Churches  or  not,  will  yearn  after 
some  vast  realization  of  fellowship  with  the  whole  Christian 
world — a  fellowship  which  shall  counteract  their  individual 
evils,  and  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  true  and  a  spiritual 
catholicity.  Only  let  unchristian  assumption  of  superiority 
be  renounced  ;  only  let  the  enforcement  of  human  dogmas 
be  relinquished ;  only  let  the  Church  freely  develope  itself 
under  the  mighty  impulse  of  love,  and  what  is  to  hinder  the 
realization  of  a  pure  Catholicity — a  Catholicity  where  the  vi- 
tal essence  of  Christianity  is  in  common  retained,  while  the 
individual  forms  are  left  undetermined,  so  as  to  express  the 
peculiar  religious  life  of  every  complete  unit  in  the  Catholic 
Church  ?  The  perfection  of  unity  is  that  which  we  see  in 
nature,  and  the  universe,  where  there  is  the  most  beautiful 
harmony  of  design  with  infinite  variety  in  the  details.  Such 
should  be,  and  such  eventually  must  be,  the  unity  of  the 
Church.  The  age  of  dull  uniformity  is  already  gone  by  ; 
the  struggle  between  those  principles  which  would  bind  us 
down  to  it  afresh,  and  those  higher  principles  which  seek  for 
unity  in  freedom  of  soul,  and  in  the  development  of  each 
Christian  individuality,  is  now  going  on.  And  oh !  how 
beautiful  the  Church,  how  worthy  of  her  espousals  to  Christ, 
when,  in  the  free  and  healthy  action  of  every  mind, — in  the 
fully  evolved  individuality  of  every  Christian  man,  and  of 
every  Christian  Church,  there  shall  appear  a  new  spiritual 
creation,  which,  like  the  old  creation,  shall  reflect  in  its  one- 
ness of  design,  and  its  endless  variety  of  development,  the 
infinite  resources  of  that  one  God  from  whom  the  whole  plan 
has  emanated,  and  whose  ideas  it  strives  to  express  ! 

Thus,  then,  in  conclusion,  we  see  that  the  organization 
of  the  Church  of  Christ  resembles  closely  that  of  a  living 
body,  the  correspondence  between  which,  indeed,  we  look 
upon  as  something  more  than  a  metaphor.  The  first  product 
of  the  vital  or  organic  principle  in  the  animal  economy  is  the 
12* 


259  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

formation  of  cells  and  tissue ;  and  it  is  this  same  process  re- 
peated, which,  at  length,  builds  up  the  whole  frame  to  its 
due  proportions.  The  life  which  pervades  the  whole  is  each 
moment  created  and  each  moment  renewed ;  and  the  har- 
mony of  the  body  consists,  not  in  the  exact  uniformity  of 
each  part,  but  in  the  symmetry  of  the  completed  frame.  So 
also  in  the  true  Church,  it  is  the  life-principle  of  holy  love 
which  binds  together  two  or  more  Christian  minds  in  sympa- 
thetic union ;  and  the  construction  of  the  whole  Catholic 
Church  is  nothing  more  than  the  repetition  of  the  same  influ- 
ence, adding,  as  it  were,  cell  to  cell,  and  tissue  to  tissue, 
building  up  organ  upon  organ,  and  member  upon  member, 
until  the  "  whole  body,  fitly  joined  together  and  compacted 
by  that  which  every  joint  supplieth,  according  to  the  effec- 
tual working  in  the  measure  of  every  part,  maketh  in- 
crease of  the  body  unto  the  edifying  of  itself  in  love, — grow- 
ing up  unto  him  in  all  things  who  is  the  Head,  even  Christ" 


CHAPTER  X. 

ON     CEBTIT0DE. 

THERE  is  no  question  in  the  whole  range  of  philosophy  more 
deeply  interesting  in  itself,  and  more  widely  practical  in  its 
legitimate  consequences,  than  that  which  relates  to  the 
grounds  of  human  certitude.  This  question  viewed  in  its 
whole  extent  forms  indeed  the  central  point  of  the  highest 
metaphysical  investigations ;  nay,  so  close  a  bearing  has  it 
upon  the  real  principles  of  human  knowledge,  that  it  is  pos- 
sible to  make  a  complete  classification  of  all  the  current 
metaphysical  systems,  according  to  the  views  which  are  en- 
tertained upon  this  one  point.*  It  is  not  our  purpose,  how- 
ever, to  enter  at  present  into  the  several  philosophical  theo- 
ries which  have  been  maintained  on  the  grounds  of  human 
certitude  generally.  We  shall  simply  state  so  much  of  our 
own  theory  on  the  subject  as  may  be  necessary  to  develope 
the  true  principles  of  certitude  in  reference  specifically  to 
religious  truth. 

There  are  two  forms  of  knowing  proper  to  man,  or,  in 
other  words,  two  generic  states  or  determinations  of  the  hu- 
man consciousness,  in  which  an  actual  process  of  acquiring 
truth  is  involved  ;  these  are  denoted  by  what  we  have  termed 

*  See  Lectures,  by  the  Author,  on   the  Philosophical    Tendencies 
of  the  Age. 


260  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  logical  and  the  intuitional  faculties.  Knowledge  must 
be  mediate  or  immediate.  If  it  be  mediate  it  implies  some 
previous  idea  to  which  it  is  referred,  and  from  which 
evolved ;  if  it  be  immediate  it  simply  indicates  the  direct 
perception  of  some  objective  reality,  standing  at  once  face  to 
face  with  the  subject  self.  Certitude,  therefore,  as  arising 
from  the  legitimate  action  of  the  faculties,  may  be  of  three 
kinds ;  it  may  be  purely  logical,  or  purely  intuitional,  or  a 
mixed  result  of  both. 

Logical  certitude  simply  implies  the  validity  of  certain 
relations,  arising  immediately  out  of  the  laws  of  thought. 
Hence,  it  is  entirely  hypothetical  in  its  nature,  asserting  no 
reality  out  of  ourselves,  but  simply  affirming,  that,  if  such 
and  such  conditions  exist,  then  such  and  such  results  will 
follow,  according  to  the  principles  of  logic  innate  in  the 
human  mind.  To  express  an  entire  absence  of  all  matter, 
we  may  use  the  symbols  A,  B,  and  C,  as  terms  in  a  formal 
syllogism.  Then  we  can  say,  if  every  A  is  B  and  every  B  is 
C,  every  A  must  be  C  likewise.  Here  we  have  what  may  be 
termed  formal  certitude, — a  certitude  which  is  simply  the 
reflection  of  certain  laws  of  thought,  which  is  entirely  sub- 
jective in  its  whole  nature,  which  would  be  equally  true  were 
the  me  absolutely  alone  in  the  infinity  of  space  with  no  uni- 
verse around  it. 

Intuitional  certitude  is  entirely  different  from  this :  it 
involves  no  hypothesis ;  it  implies  no  forms  of  thought ;  it  has 
no  reference  to  any  thing  previously  asserted  ;  but  simply 
affirms  positively  and  categorically  an  objective  existence. 
Truth  in  this  view  of  the  case  is  not  the  logical  consistency 
between  ideas  ;  it  is  not  the  conformity  of  our  ideas  with  the 
outward  reality  ;  it  is  nothing  whatever  involving  any  com- 
parison between  an  internal  phenomenon  and  an  external  exist- 
ence ;  truth  in  the  intuitional  sense  is  being — being  manifest- 


ON    CERTITUDE.  261 


ing  itself  to  the  human  mind — being  gazed  upon  immediately 
by  the  eye  of  the  soul.* 

The  most  important  and  the  most  difficult  case  of  certi- 
tude is  that  in  which  the  testimony  of  intuition  is  blended 
with  a  logical  inference  or  definition  ;  since  there  is  here 
abundant  facility  for  error  to  creep  in  unawares  and  vitiate 
the  whole  result.  The  intuitional  faculty,  as  we  have  before 
shown,  is  not  absolutely  perfect,  otherwise  we  should  see 
truth  immediately  as  God  himself  sees  it,  in  its  whole  con- 
crete unity.  The  perception  of  it  is  affected  by  disturbing 
causes  within  ourselves,  not  so  far  indeed  generally  as  to 
prevent  the  affirmation  of  a  reality  of  some  kind,  but  so  as  to 
prevent,  in  many  instances,  the  affirmation  of  that  reality  in 
its  complete  and  unalterable  distinctness.  There  are  some 
cases  indeed  (those  which  refer  to  the  more  universal  neces- 
sities of  man  in  his  earthly  existence)  in  which  the  intuition 
we  enjoy  is  very  explicit,  in  which  a  universal  agreement  is 
at  once  perceptible,  or,  at  any  rate,  in  which  attention  only 
needs  to  be  roused  and  concentrated  upon  the  subject,  for  an 
extremely  clear  and  unwavering  consciousness  to  spring  up 
within  the  mind  of  the  percipient.  Such  are  the  intuitions  of 
time,  space,  number,  &c.,  upon  which  the  mathematical  and 
mechanical  sciences  are  grounded.  In  these  instances  there 
is  little  difficulty,  comparatively  speaking,  in  fixing  upon 
some  definitive  expression  of  the  intuitions  involved,  and  of 
course  a  corresponding  guarantee  against  error  in  the  reason- 
ings which  are  founded  upon  them. 

Intuitions,  it  should  be  observed,  can  only  exist  complete 
in  the  interior  consciousness  of  the  percipient ;  they  cannot 

*  This  idea  may  be  termed  the  "  pons  asinorum"  of  metaphysics. 
It  is  the  key  to  the  whole  question  of  perception,  as  well  as  to  the  higher 
question  of  special  realities.  In  reference  to  the  former,  vide  Hamilton's 
Reid.  Notes.  In  reference  to  the  theory  in  its  more  universal  bearing, 
consult  M.  Franke's  report,  "  De  la  Certitude." 


262  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

be  wholly  expressed  or  defined.  When,  however,  there  are 
any  which  are  realized  distinctively  and  uniformly  by  a 
number  of  thinking  men,  that  uniformity  can  be  easily  re- 
cognized in  a  variety  of  methods ;  and  a  common  sign  or 
definition  can  then  be  agreed  upon,  which  may  sufficiently 
express  them  to  those  in  whom  the  experience  has  been  cre- 
ated, though  not  by  any  means  sufficiently  to  others. 

Every  intuition  manifests  a  reality  so  far  as  it  goes  ;  but 
when  that  reality  is  only  perceived  dimly  and  uncertainly,  it 
is  impossible  to  get  such  an  expression  of  it  as  shall  satisfy 
the  requisitions  of  certitude,  or  be  adequate,  as  a  datum,  for 
logical  reasoning.  The  experience  of  other  minds  does  not, 
in  this  case,  at  once  respond  to  it ;  there  is  a  coloring  in  it,  or 
at  least  in  its  expression,  derived  from  the  idiosyncrasies  of 
the  individual ;  and  the  results  drawn  from  it  in  this  its  par- 
tial and  imperfect  form  may  depart  very  widely  from  the 
truth  itself. 

Hence  the  necessity  arises  for  our  having  certain  criteria 
by  which  we  may  judge  whether  a  given  intuition,  when  re- 
alized and  expressed,  is  so  distinct  and  adequate  as  to  be  im- 
mediately recognized  by  other  properly  developed  minds, — 
and  thus  to  serve  the  purpose  of  a  fixed  and  abiding  concep- 
tion of  the  objective  reality.  The  three  great  criteria,  which 
have  been  ofltimes  recognized  by  philosophical  thinkers,  are, 
distinctness,  uniformity,  and  universality.  When  an  intuition 
has  attained  to  such  a  state  that  its  simplest  expression  is  re- 
cognized as  conveying  an  idea  perfectly  distinct — an  idea 
which  is  invariably  the  same — an  idea,  lastly,  which  is  uni- 
versally drawn  forth  from  the  human  soul  when  placed  under 
the  proper  conditions  of  development — and  which  is  finally 
verified  by  the  consistency  of  all  its  practical  deductions, 
then  we  regard  it  as  possessing  the  marks  of  certitude,  so  far, 
indeed,  as  human  certitude  can  at  all  exist. 

These  criteria  of  certitude,  for  example,  hold  good  in  re- 


ON    CERTITUDE.  263 


gard  to  the  perceptions  of  the  senses.  We  express  ourselves 
respecting  these  perceptions  in  such  a  manner  that  every  one 
recognizes  them  as  perfectly  distinct :  we  are  conscious,  still 
further,  that  they  never  vary  while  our  organs  are  in  a  nor- 
mal state ;  and  lastly,  we  find  that  all  mankind  have  univer- 
sally the  same  experience  respecting  them,  and  deduce  the 
same  conclusions  from  them. 

It  is  in  the  case  of  those  objects,  however,  which  lie  be- 
yond the  reach  of  the  senses,  that  such  criteria  are  more  ne- 
cessary to  be  applied.  It  is  true,  that  a  given  intuition  may 
be  so  distinct  and  unvarying  to  an  individual  mind,  that  it 
carries  with  it  its  own  evidence  of  veracity  ;  but  this  will  not 
answer  as  a  ground  of  certainty  to  all  mankind.  An  objec- 
tive reality  may  be  most  perfectly  unfolded  to  the  perception 
of  some  mind  highly  wrought  and  specially  developed  for  the 
purpose,  and  that  mind  may  feel  it  impossible  to  doubt  it,  any 
more  than  we  do  the  evidence  of  sense ;  but  the  minds  of 
others  may  npt  yet  be  in  a  state  to  recognize  the  same  reality 
with  the  same  degree  of  distinctness  and  uniformity.  In 
this  case,  the  individual  thus  favored  must  enjoy  his  own  evi- 
dence ;  but  the  rest  of  mankind  must  wait  the  purification 
and  development  of  their  own  power  of  spiritual  perception, 
ere  the  intuition  can  be  so  expressed  as  to  bear  the  criteria  of 
universal  certitude. 

When  this  kind  of  validity  is  obtained, — when  an  inward 
intuition  has  been  expressed,  and  its  criteria  recognized,  then 
already  we  have  a  case  of  mixed  certitude,  a  case  in  which 
the  logical  and  intuitional  faculties  are  joined  in  the  whole 
result.  The  very  expression  of  an  inward  experience,  so  as 
to  serve  the  purpose  of  scientific  truth,  involves  a  reflective 
or  logical  process ;  and  it  is  needless  to  say,  that  every  in- 
ference drawn  from  it,  when  expressed,  must  be  drawn  logi- 
cally also.  Hence  we  may  conclude,  that  mixed  certitude 
is  attained  first  in  every  case  in  which  our  intuitions  are 


264  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

brought  to  a  reflective  expression,  containing  the  proper  cri- 
teria ;  and  secondly,  in  every  case  in  which  conclusions  are 
drawn  from  them  with  perfect  logical  accuracy,  either  by  an 
inductive  or  a  deductive  process. 

In  summing  up,  then,  our  remarks  upon  certitude,  we 
may  say,  that  it  is,  first,  formal,  or  logical;  in  which  case  it 
can  serve  no  practical  purpose  directly,  but  merely  give  us 
an  organum,  or  method,  for  the  infallible  attainment  of  results 
when  sufficient  data  are  afforded.  Secondly,  material,  or 
intuitional ;  in  which  case  there  may  be  possibly  the  most 
perfect  assurance  given  to  the  individual  percipient,  but  no 
evidence  afforded  of  truth  to  other  minds.  Thirdly,  a  mixed 
certitude  of  both  descriptions ;  in  which  there  is  a  scientific 
validity  given  to  our  conceptions,  their  due  expression  being 
tested  by  the  criteria  above  referred  to. 

Whatever  we  accept  beyond  this,  comes  under  the  head 
of  probability.  The  amount  of  probability  may,  of  course, 
be  infinitely  varied  :  it  may  come  just  within  tjie  line  which 
makes  a  statement  rather  to  be  accepted  than  altogether 
rejected  ;  or  it  may  be  so  strong  as  to  approach  indefinitely 
near  to  certitude  itself,  and  for  all  practical  purposes  may 
be  considered  as  equivalent  to  it,  like  the  asymptote  to  a 
curve,  which  is  ever  approaching  nearer  and  nearer  to  a 
given  line,  but  can  never  absolutely  coincide  with  it.  Such, 
for  example,  are  all  statements  which  rest  upon  the  evidence 
of  testimony  :  the  probability  here  may  be  as  near  the  limits 
of  actual  demonstration  as  may  well  be  conceived  ;  never 
can  it  amount,  however,  to  demonstration  itself,  —  which 
would  imply,  either  that  the  object  testified  had  been  actually 
experienced  by  us,  or  that  it  is  a  logical  conclusion  from 
certain  fixed  and  acknowledged  data. 

Having  given,  in  the  outset,  these  brief  explanations  on 
the  questions  of  certitude  generally,  we  must  now  show 
their  bearing  upon  the  particular  case  of  religious  truth. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  265 


We  have  before  seen  how  a  distinctive  form  of  the  religious 
life  is  realized  through  the  agency  of  human  fellowship, — 
that  is,  in  other  words,  how  a  given  development  of  spiritual 
intuition  is  brought  into  a  state  of  historical  actualization 
within  the  mind  or  consciousness  of  humanity.  We  have 
seen,  likewise,  the  nature  of  the  process  by  which  a  formal 
theology  is  produced, — namely,  by  reflection  upon  the 
elements  involved  in  the  religious  consciousness.  But  now 
we  find,  as  a  matter  of  undeniable  fact,  that  different  com- 
munities within  the  range  of  Christianity  actually  evolve 
different  shades  or  phases  of  the  religious  life,  and  express 
their  consciousness  of  Christian  truth  in  such  a  way  as  to  give 
rise  to  different  systems  of  Christian  theology.  An  ardent 
lover  of  truth,  therefore,  who  is  sufficiently  instructed,  and 
sufficiently  free  from  educational  prejudice  to  look  calmly  and 
thoughtfully  round  him  upon  the  religious  phenomena,  and 
the  theological  science  of  the  whole  Church  on  earth,  will  be 
deeply  moved  to  the  inquiry, — Where  is  the  truth  to  be  found, 
and  how  is  it  to  be  realized  in  its  full  objective  validity  ? 
Each  eager  partisan  of  some  particular  system  claims  with 
like  tenacity  to  have  the  fulness  of  truth  on  his  own  side ; 
is  there  not,  therefore,  some  higher  process,  lying  beyond  the 
traditionary  system  of  separate  communities,  by  which  we 
can  come  to  a  more  uniform  and  intelligent  kind  of  certitude, 
— a  certitude  upon  which  the  most  morally  earnest  and  yet 
critically  reflective  minds  may  repose  with  satisfaction  and 
peace, — a  certitude  which  shall  not  be  merely  adapted  to  a 
party,  but  shall  necessarily  carry  with  it  the  suffrages  of  all 
upright  and  clear-sighted  thinkers  ?  Such  is  the  question 
which  now  claims  to  be  discussed  with  all  freedom  of  thought, 
but  with  all  earnestness  of  purpose. 

To  clear  the  way  for  a  better  solution  of  the  problem, 
we  shall  commence  by  making  a  classification  of  the  theories 


266  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

of  religious  certitude,  already  practically  acknowledged,  and 
briefly  testing  their  relative  merits. 

I.  And  first,  we  shall  notice  the  theory  which  asserts, 
that  Christianity  is  simply  a  question  of  facts ;  that  these 
facts  are  such  as  to  be  palpable  to  the  senses ;  and  that  we 
have  now  simply  to  receive  them  upon  the  ground  of  histori- 
cal testimony.  This  theory  (if  it  deserves,  indeed,  the 
name)  rests  upon  an  entire  confusion  of  thought  as  to  what 
a  fact  palpable  to  the  senses  really  is  ;  and  what,  beside  the 
fact  itself,  is  necessary  for  the  existence  of  religious  truth. 
Admitting  that  there  are  numerous  facts  connected  with  the 
institution  of  Christianity  which  the  senses  were  able  to 
attest ;  yet  these  facts,  viewed  merely  as  outward  events, 
have  no  religious  element  attached  to  them ;  they  can  only 
have  any,  even  the  slightest  reference  to  our  religious  nature, 
by  virtue  of  the  ideas  which  they  embody,  and  upon  which 
their  whole  spiritual  value  to  any  mind  is  based.  On  this 
point,  however,  we  have  already  touched  in  a  previous 
chapter,  and  may  therefore  forbear  at  present  to  pursue  it, 
any  further.  We  shall  simply  concentrate  the  argument  in 
a  few  remarks. 

We  remark,  first,  that,  to  regard  Christianity  as  a  ques- 
tion of  facts,  and  make  its  certitude  rest  upon  this  basis,  is 
eluding  the  whole  point  and  stringency  of  the  question ; 
inasmuch  as  these  facts  are  not  resolved  into  their  real 
elements,  nor  the  grounds  of  their  religious  value  exhibited. 
2dly,  That  when  an  analysis  of  these  facts  is  once  made,  we 
become  conscious,  that,  to  refer  to  the  senses  as  the  basis  of 
religious  certitude,  is  to  pass  by  the  whole  spiritual  essence 
of  Christianity  altogether,  and  deny  that  in  this  respect 
Christianity  possesses  any  evidence  at  all.  3dly,  That  this 
theory  of  religious  certitude  holds  the  same  relation  to 
Christianity  that  positivism  does  to  philosophy  ;  that  just  as 
positivism  is  not  a  philosophy,  but  the  negation  of  philosophy, 


ON    CERTITUDE.  267 


so  the  appeal  to  the  senses,  instead  of  giving  us  the  basis  of  a 
religion,  becomes  in  the  end  the  denial  of  religion  altogether. 

The  particular  case  in  which  testimony  is  made  the  basis 
of  certitude,  is  included  in  the  theory  above  refuted.  Tes- 
timony can  only  refer  to  facts,  and  can  have  no  validity  as 
evidence  beyond  the  value  of  the  facts  to  which  it  testifies. 
The  authenticity  of  a  book,  for  example,  can  be  known  by 
testimony ;  its  title  to  a  Divine  origin  must  rest  upon  grounds 
entirely  different.  Again,  the  reality  of  a  miracle  can  be 
known  by  testimony ;  the  force  of  that  miracle,  as  evidence 
of  any  doctrine,  is  another  question  altogether.  Accord- 
ingly, while  testimony  is  necessary  to  assure  us  of  the  his- 
torical genuineness  of  the  Bible,  our  reason  for  believing  it 
to  be  the  book  of  God,  on  the  other  hand,  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  mere  testimony  itself,  but  is  an  inference 
made  either  from  the  facts  recorded,  or  from  the  internal 
evidence  of  its  divinity.  The  very  most  that  testimony  can 
do  is,  to  place  us  in  the  same  position  as  the  persons  who 
witnessed  the  facts  in  question ;  and  just  as  those  persons 
accepted  the  spiritual  truth  conveyed  to  them  on  grounds 
with  which  testimony  had  nothing  to  do  (because  it  did  not  in 
their  case  intervene),  so  also  must  we  accept  the  truth,  not 
because  the  witnesses  asserted  their  belief  of  it,  but  because 
we  have  the  same  grounds  for  belief  presented  to  us,  upon 
testimony,  as  they  had  directly  presented  through  the  senses. 
This  leads  us  to  consider, — 

II.  That  theory  of  religious  certitude  which  bases  itself 
upon  the  intellect.  The  mere  presentation  of  outward  facts, 
it  is  evident  to  every  reflecting  mind,  cannot  give  us  the  en- 
tire groundwork  of  a  religion,  viewed  as  a  spiritual  system 
of  truth  and  duty ;  it  can,  at  the  very  most,  only  give  us 
phenomena  from  which  such  a  system  is  evolved,  or  in 
which  the  truth  revealed  immediately  to  the  mind  is  embodied. 
When,  in  the  ordinary  development  of  human  knowledge, 


268  PHILOSOPHY    OF    BELIGION. 

facts  are  presented  to  us  through  the  medium  of  perception, 
we  never  remain  content  with  the  bare  observation  of  them, 
or  with  the  mere  consciousness  of  their  existence  ;  we  al- 
ways bring  an  inward  faculty  into  operation,  and  seek  by  its 
means  to  have  the  perceived  phenomena  reflectively  interpret- 
ed and  explained.  Just  as  the  senses,  when  we  gaze  up- 
wards upon  the  starry  heavens,  merely  present  us  with  a 
multitude  of  twinkling  gems  of  light,  which  reason  at  length 
assures  us  to  be  suns,  worlds,  and  systems ;  so  also,  in  every 
region  of  human  pursuit  the  senses  merely  give  us  a  vague 
impression,  which  does  not  amount  to  reflective  knowledge 
at  all, — while  it  is  the  reason  within  us  which  discerns 
what  the  relation  of  things  really  is,  and  forms,  consequently, 
as  it  were,  an  inner  court  to  which  the  senses  must  ever 
appeal. 

The  necessity  of  this  appeal  is  still  further  strengthened, 
when  we  have  to  receive  the  facts  upon  the  testimony  of 
others.  In  this  case,  we  must  not  only  interpret  the  signifi- 
cancy  of  the  facts  themselves,  but  the  validity  of  the  evidence 
on  which  they  rest ;  that  is,  we  must  consider  whether  the 
witnesses  were  morally  and  intellectually  qualified  for  their 
office,  and  whether  the  things  they  testify  are  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  preclude  all  possibility  of  self-deception.  Put- 
ting,  therefore,  all  these  considerations  together,  we  see  a 
strong  case  apparently  presented  for  making  the  human  in- 
tellect, critically  considered,  the  standard  of  truth,  and 
basing  religious  certitude,  as  well  as  all  other,  upon  its  final 
decision.  This  theory  is  the  one  which  is  generally  desig- 
nated by  the  term  Rationalism,  although,  as  we  shall  soon 
perceive,  that  expression  does  not  by  any  means  bear  a  uni- 
form meaning. 

Rationalism,  in  its  most  obvious  and  superficial  ac- 
ceptation ( rational ismus  vulgaris),  is  that  mode  of  viewing  the 
nature  and  grounds  of  religious  truth,  which  accounts  no- 


ON    CERTITUDE  2fi9 


thing  to  be  valid  that  cannot  be  verified  by  the  obvious  laws 
and  processes  of  the  human  reason  :  or,  to  use  the  expression 
of  Rohr — Rationalism  indicates  "  a  mode  of  thinking  appli- 
cable to  every  province  of  thought  and  knowledge,  the  prin- 
ciple of  which  is  to  hold  nothing  as  certain  which  cannot 
really  prove  itself  to  be  so  by  the  most  clear  and  indubitable 
evidences  of  reason."  It  is  separated,  therefore,  on  the  one 
hand,  from  Supernaturalism  by  not  recognizing  any  ground 
of  certitude  distinct  from  rational  evidence  ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  from  Naturalism,  by  admitting  a  divine  revela- 
tion, but  one  which  must  be  entirely  judged  of  by  the  laws 
of  the  human  understanding. 

The  arguments  by  which  the  Rationalist  maintains  his 
position  are  many  and  various.  He  argues  that,  as  reason  is 
the  supreme  organ  of  truth,  whose  claims  are  recognized 
universally  by  the  other  faculties,  it  is  unreasonable  to 
allow  it  to  be  crushed  under  any  supposed  authority  which  it 
can  itself  alone  verify :  that  the  very  laws  of  the  under- 
standing require  us  to  suppose  a  natural  cause  for  every  phe- 
nomenon, and,  consequently,  to  reject  any  such  phenomenon 
as  authentic,  for  which  no  natural  cause  can  be  assigned : 
that  as  many  religions  lay  claim  to  possessing  a  revelation, 
reason  must  be  our  last  appeal  to  decide  which  of  those 
claims  are  correct :  that  since  all  revelation  rests  upon  histo- 
rical testimony,  wrapped  in  the  clouds  of  distant  antiquity,  it 
cannot  possibly  bring  complete  certitude  to  the  understand- 
ing :  that  what  lies  above  the  reason,  so  that  we  cannot  in 
any  way  penetrate  it,  is  either  contrary  to  reason,  or  at  least 
totally  void  of  significancy :  that  to  constitute  revelation  a 
last  appeal  is  a  vicious  circle,  for  we  make  the  Scriptures 
historically  prove  the  inspiration,  while  their  own  credibility 
rests  upon  the  fact  of  their  being  inspired  :  that  science  in  its 
progress  has  resolved  many  of  the  miracles  into  effects  from 
natural  causes,  and  that  in  due  time  all  will  be  explained  in 


270  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  same  way  :  that  the  most  complete  knowledge  of  nature 
can  alone  affirm  that  any  given  fact  does  not  flow  from  its 
proper  laws  ;  consequently,  it  is  impossible  that  the  divine 
wisdom  should  offer  any  thing  upon  supernatural  grounds, 
the  validity  of  which  we  can  never  fully  prove  :  and,  lastly, 
that  as  the  whole  genius  of  Christianity  is  in  strict  accord- 
ance with  reason,  it  is  useless  to  bring  supernatural  evi- 
dences to  bear  upon  it,  while  the  actual  introduction  of  them, 
to  the  detriment  of  reason,  has  ever  been  followed  by  fanati- 
cism, and  superstitious  fears.* 

Now  this  whole  course  of  reasoning  most  evidently  rests 
upon  a  defective  analysis  of  what  is  meant  by  reason,  and, 
consequently,  upon  an  equally  deficient  statement  of  the  laws 
and  principles  of  human  certitude.  Reason  is  here  taken  in- 
definitely as  the  faculty  of  judging  between  the  true  and  the 
false.  There  is  a  kind  of  natural  power  supposed  to  exist 
within  it  of  comprehending  and  testing  the  fitness  of  things ; 
and  every  pretension  to  authority,  of  whatever  kind,  is  to  be 
brought  before  this  inward  tribunal,  that  its  claims  may  be 
decided.  The  natural  and  unanswerable  reply  to  all  these 
and  similar  arguments  of  the  rationalist  is — how  do  you 
know  that  the  principles  upon  which  your  judgments  are 
grounded  are  valid  ?  on  what  grounds  do  you  arrogate  to 
yourself  the  power  of  testing  the  fitness  of  things  ?  what  fixed 
standard  is  there  within  your  own  minds  to  which  they  can  all 
be  summoned,  and  their  agreement  with  truth  itself  decided  ? 
Nay,  we  may  further  add,  is  not  the  plea  of  human  igno- 
rance, which  you  raise  against  the  necessity  of  the  Christian 
miracles,  a  tacit  acknowledgment  that  your  own  standard  of 
reason  may  be  very  imperfect,  and  that  it  is  very  unfit, 
therefore,  to  set  itself  up  as  the  supreme  judge  of  truth  ? 

The  standard  within  the  mind  of  any  given   individual 

*  On  these  objections,  see  Hase,  "  Dogmatisches  Repertorium," 
sec.  35. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  271 


must,  in  fact,  depend  entirely  upon  the  mode  in  which  he 
views  truth  as  a  whole — upon  the  character  of  his  philosophy 
— upon  his  own  peculiar  theory  of  the  universe.  That  this 
is  the  case  is  not  only  evident  from  reflection,  but  is  equally 
verified  by  facts.  Every  system  of  philosophy  which  arises, 
gives  a  different  statement  of  the  principles  and  the  scope  of 
what  is  indefinitely  termed  reason  ;  one  is  sensational  in  its 
tendency,  another  transcendental :  one  would  reject  a  fact  as 
totally  beyond  the  laws  of  nature,  which  another  would  ac- 
cept as  perfectly  consonant  with  them.  Accordingly,  we 
find  that  when  once  the  question  of  certitude  in  religion  is 
set  afloat  upon  the  ever-changing  tide  of  human  reason,  in 
this  its  individual  character,  theory  after  theory  springs  up, 
and  system  after  system,  each  proposing  its  own  standard  of 
what  is  rational,  but  never  giving  any  final  resting-place,  or 
a  definite  basis  of  certitude  to  the  human  mind. 

This  process  has  been  historically  realized  in  the  theolo- 
gical phenomena  of  Germany.  The  early  Rationalism  of 
that  country  was  precisely  of  the  indefinite  kind  we  have  al- 
ready described.  Allied  on  the  one  hand  with  the  sensational- 
ism of  the  French  school,  on  the  other  hand  with  the  dogma- 
tism of  the  Leibnizian- Wolfian,  it  evolved  results  as  contra- 
dictory as  the  spirit  of  these  two  systems  was  opposite. 
When  the  gigantic  mind  of  Kant  arose,  and  threw  its  influ- 
ence into  the  discordant  philosophical  elements  of  his  coun- 
try, the  whole  view  of  the  power  and  scope  of  the  human 
mind  was  speedily  changed.  The  speculative  reason  which 
had  assumed  the  highest  place  as  the  great  organ  of  truth  to 
man,  was  startled  by  the  paradoxes  in  which  it  saw  itself  in- 
volved ;  and  Rationalism,  which  hitherto  proceeded  securely 
and  confidently  in  pronouncing  its  critical  decisions,  was 
driven  away  from  the  province  of  speculation,  as  incapable  of 
affording  certitude,  into  the  region  of  moral  law,  the  sphere  of 
the  practical  reason. 


272  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

That  the  moral  theology  of  Kant  contained  noble  ele- 
ments of  truth,  none  can  deny ;  that  it  produced  a  highly 
beneficial  effect  in  curbing  the  extravagance  of  shallow  spec- 
ulation, and  bringing  the  mind  of  his  country  to  the  earnest 
contemplation  of  the  great  moral  elements  of  man's  exist- 
ence, is  a  matter  of  historical  fact ;  but,  with  all  this,  the 
theoretical  portion  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  contained  the 
elements  of  speculative  skepticism,  which  were  sure  to  have 
their  effect  upon  scientific  theology.  Whilst,  therefore,  the 
purely  moral  truth  to  which  Christianity  itself  ever  appeals, 
was  maintained  with  unanswerable  power  in  the  Kantian 
philosophy,  yet,  Christianity  itself,  as  a  fact  of  history,  and  a 
phenomenon  of  the  human  mind,  was  exposed  to  all  the  criti- 
cism of  the  speculative  reason,  and  to  all  the  uncertainties 
in  which,  according  to  Kant,  that  speculative  reason,  when 
applied  to  questions  of  objective  reality,  involves  us.  Here, 
there  was  no  fixed  principle  of  certitude  pointed  out ;  but, 
instead  of  this,  a  principle  of  skepticism  very  distinctly  in- 
volved. 

The  historical  results  of  Kant's  philosophy  prove  to  us 
most  unquestionably  the  truth  of  this  representation.  Whilst 
its  practical  side,  as  we  just  remarked,  subserved  greatly  the 
interests  of  true  morality,  its  speculative  side  evolved  those 
sweeping  systems  of  subjective  idealism,  which  drew  the 
truths  of  Christianity,  along  with  every  thing  else,  into  one 
vast  chain  of  a  priori  reasoning,  and  stripped  it  at  once  of  all 
its  objective  validity.  In  Hegel,  Christianity  became  entirely 
sublimated  into  a  dialectical  development  of  ideas ;  so  that  his 
philosophy  of  religion,  as  applied  to  theology  by  Marheineke, 
is  no  other  than  the  doctrine  of  the  Church  made  one  with 
the  scientific  development  of  the  logical  consciousness 
through  the  perfect  realization  of  the  laws  of  thought.  It 
needed  only  the  speculative  keenness  of  a  Strauss  and  a 
Feuerbach  to  cut  off  the  objective  reality  from  religion  alto- 


ON    CERTITUDE.  273 


gether,  and  to  make  the  whole  but  the  natural  striving  of  hu- 
manity to  realize  its  own  dignity,  and  pay  its  adoration  to  a 
shrine,  of  which  itself  is  at  once  the  deity  and  the  worship- 
per. Ruge  and  Stirner  may  be  considered  as  the  extremes 
of  this  school.  They  have  at  length  turned  the  weapons  of 
the  critic  against  himself,  and  declared  that  criticism  itself 
belongs  to  that  class  of  follies  which  have  been  now  over- 
come. What,  then,  is  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  ? 
Live,  and  let  live.  Enjoy  yourself  while  you  can ;  consider 
pleasure  the  summum  bonum  of  human  existence.  Thus  the 
cycle  has  gone  round,  until  we  find  that  the  morale  of  ex- 
treme idealism  coincides  perfectly  with  that  of  the  material- 
istic school  of  Helvetius  and  Volney. 

Now  all  these  systems  of  Rationalism,  though  differing 
widely  in  many  other  respects,  yet  agree  in  throwing  the 
question  of  religious  certitude  upon  the  individual  reason. 
This  individual  reason,  as  we  saw  in  our  second  chapter,  is 
identical  with  the  logical  faculty ;  and  however  unerring  it 
may  be  in  its  judgments  upon  the  form  and  relative  con- 
sistency of  our  knowledge,  yet  it  entirely  fails  in  supplying 
us  with  primary  data.  Hegel,  as  we  before  remarked,  has 
shown  to  the  very  uttermost  what  the  logical  reason  can  do 
in  the  search  for  fundamental  truth ;  but  he  has  also  shown 
with  equal  clearness  what  it  cannot.  Rest  upon  this,  and 
we  must  either  tacitly  assume  certain  data  to  start  with, 
leaving  their  accuracy  to  mere  chance ;  or  we  shall  build 
up  a  whole  system  of  mere  logical  forms,  and  sublimate  the 
entire  range  of  human  knowledge  into  a  dialectical  method. 

If  we  only  apply  the  principles  of  certitude,  laid  down  at 
the  commencement  of  the  present  chapter,  to  the  forms  of 
Rationalism  already  cited,  we  see  at  once  the  entire  incom- 
petency  of  their  pretensions.  Certitude,  we  there  saw,  must 
be  either  intuitional  or  logical,  for  if  it  be  mixed,  still  the  ele- 
ments must  be  mediated  by  processes  of  one  or  other  of  these 
13 


274  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

two  kinds.  But  in  these  different  rationalistic  systems,  cer- 
titude, as  we  saw,  is  based  upon  the  most  discordant  princi- 
ples ;  formal  certitude  being  ofttimes  confounded  with  mate- 
rial, and  no  distinction  being  maintained  between  the  process 
by  which  we  come  in  contact  with  objective  realities,  and  that 
by  which  we  judge  of  logical  consistency.  In  the  "vulgar 
Rationalism"  of  Germany,  for  example,  (a  species  of  Ra- 
tionalism, indeed,  which  is  common,  more  or  less,  to  all  coun- 
tries,) there  was  never  any  distinct  idea  attached  to  the  term 
reason  at  all ;  intuitional  and  logical  elements  were  thrown 
together  in  utter  confusion,  and  the  indefinite  result,  termed 
by  them  "  Common  sense"  was  made  the  supreme  judge  of 
all  truth.  What  guarantee  had  these  all-confident  critics, 
that  there  may  not  be  whole  regions  of  objective  truth  laid 
open  to  the  eye  of  a  soul  more  highly  spiritualized  than  their 
own  ?  That  reason  on  which  they  relied  was,  in  fact,  but  a 
poor  and  narrow  individualism,  to  which  no  final  certitude  can 
be  ever  attached  beyond  the  mere  processes  of  logical  infer- 
ence. 

The  Rationalism  of  Kant  differed  in  many  respects  from 
this.  That  great  thinker  saw  keenly  enough  through  all  the 
hollow  pretensions  of  "  enlightened  reason"  in  the  vulgar  ac- 
ceptation of  that  term ;  and  in  one  department  of  his  philosophy 
at  least,  pointed  to  the  real  and  immovable  principles  of  hu- 
man certitude.  From  the  region  of  moral  truth,  he  sepa- 
rated altogether  the  action  of  the  mere  speculative  under- 
standing, and  grounded  the  majesty  of  moral  law  upon 
those  immediate  intuitions  of  the  human  soul,  the  direct  evi- 
dence of  which  is  seen  in  the  whole  practical  constitution  of 
human  life.  But  here  he  stopped  short :  he  appeared  not  to 
have  seen  that  the  phenomena  of  the  religious  life  are  as 
real  a  part  of  the  actual  experience  of  mankind,  as  are 
those  of  his  moral  life  ;  and  that  to  an  awakened  mind,  their 
evidence  becomes  at  length  equally  valid  and  distinct. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  275 


With  regard  to  the  Rationalism,  which  has  sprung  out  of 
the  idealistic  philosophy  of  Germany,  it  has  merged  the  Intu- 
itional entirely  into  the  Logical,  until  it  has  ended  by  pro- 
nouncing religion,  yea,  and  God  himself,  nought  but  the  pro- 
jected shadow  of  our  own  forms  of  thought.  And  such  are 
ever  the  negative  results  to  which  mere  criticism  incessantly 
tends.  The  more  the  grounds  of  religious  certitude  are  re- 
moved from  our  intuitional  consciousness  and  thrown  entirely 
upon  the  logical,  the  more  does  the  whole  of  our  theology 
become  a  mere  formal  construction  of  hollow  terms  and 
symbols,  to  which  nought  but  a  logical  or  hypothetical  certi- 
tude can  ever  be  attached.  We  may  gain  in  this  way  indeed 
a  scientific  method  for  theology,  but  we  lose  all  the  concrete 
essence  of  our  religion. 

In  fine,  the  great  and  decisive  defect  in  all  Rationalism, 
viewed  as  a  basis  of  religious  certitude,  is  its  perpetual 
variability.  The  whole  history  of  its  progress  is  a  history 
of  clashing  differences  and  endless  disagreements.  Even 
those  who  are  least  able  to  enter  critically  into  its  nature 
are  perfectly  able  to  appreciate  this  palpable  objection ; 
whilst  the  moral  limit  to  which  it  ever  tends  in  the  popular 
mind  is  the  notion  that  every  man  is  right  who  acts  on  his 
own  convictions ;  that  the  standard  of  the  individual  judg- 
ment is  to  every  man  the  final  standard  of  truth ;  and  that 
truth,  objectively  considered,  is  a  mere  fiction  after  which  it 
is  a  delusion  to  strive.  This  principle,  when  clearly  rea- 
lized, is  identical  with  absolute  skepticism  ;  truth  and  opinion 
here  become  one ;  and  all  moral  as  well  as  religious  earn- 
estness is  utterly  sunk  in  that  perfect  indifference  which  is 
the  sure  result  of  such  a  confusion. 

In  the  view  we  have  taken  of  the  real  principles  of  cer- 
titude, this  tendency  of  Rationalism  to  interminable  varia- 
tion is  made  apparent,  and  the  grounds  of  it  clearly  explain- 
ed. The  data  of  all  our  knowledge  are  revealed  to  us  in 


276  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  intuitional  consciousness  ;  this  revelation  being  entirely 
neglected  by  the  Rationalist,  no  means  being  employed  to 
realize  it  in  its  fulness,  no  appeal  being  made  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  others  to  correct  or  verify  the  possible  distor- 
tions of  his  own,  no  stress,  in  fine,  being  laid  upon  the  moral 
or  spiritual  development  of  the  mind  as  an  absolute  condi- 
tion to  the  appreciation  of  moral  or  spiritual  truth ;  what 
result  could  we  anticipate  but  an  endless  diversity  ?  The 
actual  data  on  which  the  individual  judgment  has  here  to 
act  are  perfectly  at  variance  ;  they  are  either  assumed  by 
every  man  according  to  his  own  perceptions,  without  any 
consideration  as  to  their  validity,  as  in  the  common  Ration- 
alism ;  or  else  they  are  laid  down  in  the  most  abstract  and 
formal  manner,  and  a  succession  of  inferences  involved, 
which  have  a  mere  logical  connection,  but  all  alike  wanting 
in  moral  life  or  spiritual  reality.  In  a  word,  Rationalism 
rejects  a  Divine  revelation,  as  the  basis  of  religious  certitude, 
and  then  can  never  raise  itself  beyond  the  cavils  and  conten- 
tions of  mere  individual  opinion. 

III.  We  come  now  to  a  third  hypothesis  concerning  cer- 
titude, in  the  domain  of  religious  truth,  and  that  is  the  prin- 
ciple of  tradition. 

This  principle  stands  at  precisely  the  opposite  extreme 
from  the  one  we  last  considered.  Logical  Rationalism  tends 
to  view  all  certitude  as  vested  entirely  in  the  individual ; 
the  theory  of  tradition,  on  the  other  hand,  reduces  the  autho- 
rity of  the  individual  reason  to  a  virtual  nonentity,  and  re- 
gards the  whole  of  the  elements  of  man's  religious  life  as 
something  brought  to  him  entire  from  an  objective  source. 
To  analyze  fully  the  theory  of  tradition,  we  must  commence 
by  looking  at  it  in  its  simplest  form,  and  then  trace  it  up, 
step  by  step,  to  its  highest  expression.  In  this  way  we  shall 
test  its  validity  in  every  way,  and  see  whether  or  not  it 
merges  finally  into  some  higher  principle. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  277 


The  simplest  form  of  tradition  is  that  of  the  child  imbib- 
ing its  first  ideas  from  the  words  of  the  parent.  Here  we 
see  the  most  perfect  trust  in  authority ;  for  the  natural  ten- 
dency of  the  infant  mind  is  to  regard  the  knowledge  of  the 
parent  as  absolutely  complete  and  infallible.  What,  then, 
we  inquire,  is  the  positive  value  of  parental  tradition  as  a 
source  of  truth  and  of  certitude  ?  The  answer  to  this  is 
almost  self-evident.  As  far  as  the  child  is  concerned,  it 
must  be  looked  upon  as  highly  valuable;  valuable,  indeed, 
just  in  proportion  to  the  superiority  of  parental  knowledge, 
as  at  once  prompted  and  corrected  by  much  experience  in 
the  world,  over  the  first  crude  and  fantastic  conceptions  of 
childhood.  On  the  other  hand,  as  a  ground  of  certitude, 
absolutely  and  philosophically  considered,  parental  tradition 
must  be  entirely  worthless.  The  parent  can  convey  no 
more  to  the  child  than  exists  in  himself,  and  in  ninety-nine 
cases  out  of  a  hundred  his  instructions  will  be  merely  the 
echo  of  some  prevailing  form  of  dogmatism,  seasoned  and 
perchance  still  further  distorted  by  his  own  idiosyncrasies. 
The  value  of  this  primary  form  of  tradition,  therefore,  is 
purely  relative  ;  it  is  a  value  which  arises  not  from  its  own 
intrinsic  trustworthiness,  but  from  the  character  of  the  recip- 
ient, for  whose  utter  ignorance  it  is  intended  to  compensate. 

As  the  child  advances  in  maturity,  the  idea  of  parental 
infallibility  gradually  declines.  The  parent,  to  support  his 
own  opinion,  appeals  to  the  authority  of  others,  variously 
expressed  ;  so  that  the  pupil  can  now  feel  himself  placed 
virtually'on  a  level  with  his  first  instructor,  and  having  ex- 
hausted his  authority  proceeds  in  company  with  him  to  some 
higher  authority  still.  The  tradition  which  is  generally 
accepted  next  after  that  of  the  parent  is  the  tradition  of  some 
religious  community,  most  probably  of  that  to  which  the  pa- 
rent himself  belongs.  By  many  it  is  asserted,  that  this  liv- 
ing voice  of  the  Church  is  a  valid  principle  of  religious  cer- 


278  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

titude,  coming  down  as  it  does  with  echoes  from  an  Apostolic 
antiquity.  Against  the  tradition  of  separate  communities, 
however,  being  regarded  as  a  final  appeal,  there  lies  this 
most  fatal  objection — that  every  separate  community  gives 
us,  in  many  respects,  different  results,  for  each  of  which 
they  equally  plead  the  highest  authority.  It  would  be  ne- 
cessary, therefore,  in  seeking  a  final  appeal,  to  determine 
which,  out  of  all  these  communities,  is  right ;  and  to  deter- 
mine this  there  must  be  some  oilier  and  higher  principle  of 
certitude — some  imperium  in  imperio — which  would  evi- 
dently supersede  the  finality  of  the  tradition  itself.  But  to 
this  it  might  be  rejoined,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a 
Catholic  tradition,  and  that  if  we  strip  away  the  points  in 
which  communities  differ,  and  just  grasp  hold  upon  those  to 
which  we  can  apply  the  test,  "  quod  semper,  quod  ubique, 
quod  ab  omnibus,"  then  we  rise  above  the  necessity  of  any 
other  court  of  appeal,  and  retain  that  which  rests  upon  the 
universal  testimony  of  the  Church.  "  Now  there  can  be  no 
doubt  but  that  in  proportion  as  large  masses  of  minds,  placed 
moreover  in  different  circumstances,  and  educated  under 
varying  influences,  have  agreed,  as  by  common  consent,  in 
the  maintenance  of  any  particular  sentiments,  in  that  pro- 
portion there  is  a  prestige  of  veracity  in  their  favor ;  but  to 
make  this  common,  or,  as  it  is  called,  catholic  tradition,  a 
final  appeal,  is  a  procedure  which  will  by  no  means  stand  the 
test  of  a  close  examination,  for — 

"  I.  Amidst  the  whole  mass  of  floating  tradition,  who  is 
to  decide  what  part  of  it  is  really  catholic,  and  what  is  partial, 
and  consequently  untrustworthy  ?  Here  we  must  do  one  of 
two  things, — either  we  must  throw  ourselves  upon  the 
decision  of  the  individual  reason  to  settle  this  point,  or  we 
must  look  for  some  other  authority  to  do  so ;  in  either  of 
which  cases  we  relinquish  tradition  itself,  although  it  be 
catholic,  as  our  highest  appeal,  and  introduce  some  other 


ON    CERTITUDE.  279 


principle  of  certitude,  which  we  place  distinctly  above  it. 
But— 

"2.  Even  supposing  we  were  to  succeed  in  educing 
a  whole  body  of  truth  from  the  mass  of  tradition  we  have 
before  referred  to, — what,  I  ask,  would  even  in  this  case  be 
the  ground  of  certainty, — what  the  precise  reason  for  which 
we  should  fully  yield  to  it  our  firm  assent  ?  The  ground  of 
certitude  would  evidently  lie  in  the  number  of  minds  which 
had  yielded  to  this  system  their  common  assent ;  not  in  the 
mere  fact  of  its  being  a  tradition.  It  is  the  assent  of  these 
minds  that  makes  the  particular  opinions  we  are  supposing 
so  veracious ;  it  is  the  assent  of  these  minds  which  dis- 
tinguishes those  opinions  from  all  others  as  being  absolutely 
universal  and  true  ;  it  is  the  assent  of  these  minds,  in  a  word, 
which  gives  them  the  very  property  of  being  regarded  as  of 
Divine  authority.  Accordingly,  the  ground  of  certitude, 
after  all,  even  on  the  principle  of  catholicity,  lies  not  in  the 
tradition  a*  tradition,  but  in  the  spirit  of  humanity,  which 
alone  decides  upon  its  genuine  character,  and  separates  the 
true  from  the  false.  Here,  then,  the  very  principle  of  tradi- 
tion virtually  breaks  down  ;  the  ground  of  belief,  instead  of 
being  purely  objective,  becomes  really  subjective  ;  instead 
of  lying  beyond  humanity,  it  is  actually  vested  in  the  very 
consciousness  and  soul  of  humanity.  Tradition  may  give 
the  material  of  truth  (and  all  the  matter  of  our  knowledge, 
we  admit,  must  be  presented  to  us  from  without,)  but  it  is 
the  consent  of  the  universal  human  mind  alone  ;  it  is  the 
sympathy  which  it  has  with  the  truth  itself;  it  is  the  affinity 
it  feels  for  what  is  valid,  in  opposition  to  what  is  hollow  and 
false ;  it  is  this,  and  this  alone,  which  gives  us  (in  the  case 
before  us)  the  ultimate  appeal,  and  furnishes  our  firmest 
basis  of  certitude.  It  is  little  imagined  by  those  who  are 
holding  up  the  principle  '  quod  semper,  quod  ubique,  quod 
ab  omnibus,'  as  the  basis  of  all  religious  belief,  that  this 


280  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

very  principle,  instead  of  maintaining  the  validity  of  tradition 
as  a  final  source  of  human  certitude,  is,  virtually  speaking, 
a  direct  appeal  to  the  authority  of  the  human  reason,  and 
derives  from  this  very  authority,  which  they  essay  to  despise, 
all  its  point  and  all  its  power."* 

There  is  yet  one  resource  left  to  which  the  principle  of 
tradition  may  betake  itself.  Dislodged  from  its  lower  and 
more  partial  positions,  it  has  from  time  to  time  assumed 
a  more  universal  form,  and  attempted  to  assert  for  itself  a 
philosophical  foundation.  To  accomplish  this  end,  it  is 
affirmed  that  a  primitive  revelation  was  granted  to  man  at 
his  first  creation ;  that  this  revelation  was  embodied  in  the 
Divine  gift  of  language  ;  and  that  all  truth  which  exists  in 
the  world  has  come  down  in  regular  succession  from  these 
primary  and  divinely  imparted  elements.  The  theory  of 
tradition  when  put  into  this  shape  evidently  brings  us  to  this 
fundamental  question — Whether  was  the  most  primitive  evi- 
dence of  spiritual  truth  to  man  a  subjective  or  an  objective 
manifestation  ?  Whether  must  our  final  appeal  for  certitude 
in  these  matters  be  to  the  inward  experience  of  humanity,  as 
regards  the  direct  intuitions  granted  to  the  religious  con- 
sciousness ;  or  must  that  appeal  be  to  an  outward  gift  of 
facts  and  ideas  proffered  through  a  mechanical  and  verbal 
impartation,  which  has  come  down  by  tradition  from  age  to 
age  along  the  stream  of  time  ?  Upon  this  latter  hypothesis 
we  make  the  following  remarks  : — 

1.  Admitting  that,  at  his  creation,  man  was  furnished 
with  a  primitive  and  verbal  revelation,  yet  the  value  of  it 
must  have  been  long  destroyed  by  the  channel  through 
which  it  has  flowed.  Experience  shows  us  that  we  can 
never  depend  upon  the  accurate  transmission  of  ideas 
orally  from  one  age  to  another ;  that  they  are  sure  to  become 

*  See  Lectures  on  the  Philosophical  Tendencies  of  the  Age,  Lecture 

ra. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  281 


colored  by  the  subjective  channels  through  which  they  pass ; 
and  that  the  greater  the  number  of  minds  which  receive 
them,  the  less  probable  it  is  that  we  shall  have  a  correct 
statement  of  the  case  in  the  end.  Surely  it  cannot  be  a  very 
satisfactory  hypothesis  to  suppose,  that,  amidst  all  the  con- 
fusion of  thought  and  opinion  which  has  ever  characterized 
the  immature  ages  of  human  history,  the  whole  sum  of  truth, 
to  which  we  can  trust,  is  to  be  found  amidst  the  scattered 
fragments  of  a  primitive  tradition,  the  very  existence  of 
which  is  itself  hypothetical. 

2.  If  we  admitted  that  such  a  traditionary  element  really 
does  exist ;  yet  it  is  undeniable  that  it  must  be   mixed   up 
with  a  vast  deal  of  error  and  absurdity.     Now  what  we  here 
affirm  is  this:  that  any  imaginable  test,  by  which  the  true 
can  be  separated  from  the  false,  implies  a  subjective  princi- 
ple of  certitude  within  the  human  reason  itself.     If  we  are  to 
decide  upon  what  is  valid  for  ourselves,  then  the  final  test  is 
to  be  found  in  the  individual  reason ;  if  it  is  to  be  decided  by 
common  consent,  then  the  final  test  is  the  universal  reason, 
or  common  sense  of  mankind. 

3.  The  very  existence  -of  a  primary  revelation   implies 
something  more  than  an  objective  impartation  of  truth  ;  for 
what  effect  could  words  produce  upon  any  mind,  supposing 
that  mind   to  exist  in  a   state   of  blank   unsusceptibility  ? 
When  truth  is   conveyed  in   words,   it    presupposes   some 
internal    preparation,    some    subjective    power   or   suscep- 
tibility ;  something  in  the  man  that  can  seize  upon  the  word, 
and  appropriate  its  meaning.     Accordingly,  we  are  forced  to 
come  to  this  admission,  that  to  a  mind  in  such  a  state  as  we 
have  described,  no  verbal  revelation    could   possibly    have 
been  made  ;  the  words  would  have  fallen  dead  upon  the  ear ; 
truth  never  could  have  taken  its  abode  in  a  soul,  where  there 
was  no  soil  to  receive  it,  no  previous  light  by  which  it  could 
be  beheld.     To  make  the  hypothesis,  therefore,  of  a  primitive 

13* 


282  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

revelation  at  all  feasible,  it  would  be  necessary  to  frame  it 
upon  a  model  quite  different  from  this  mechanical  idea.  We 
must  suppose  that,  if  the  Creator  would  communicate  truth  to 
his  creatures,  he  gave  them  minds  originally  capable  of  feel- 
ing it,  and  originally  capable  of  sympathizing  with  it.  In 
one  word,  the  first  revelation  of  God  to  man  must  have  been 
an  inward  revelation.  Here,  accordingly,  the  principle  of  tra- 
dition, if  logically  and  consistently  carried  out,  again  breaks 
down  in  its  very  last  resource,  and  in  the  moment  of  its  sup- 
posed triumph.  It  says,  all  our  real  knowledge  is  divine  ; 
it  comes  from  God  ;  it  is  received  by  direct  communication 
from  his  hands.  Truly  so,  we  reply :  our  knowledge  is 
divine  ;  but  it  is  so  just  because  humanity  itself  is  divine  ;  it 
comes  from  God,  because  we  came  forth  from  God  ;  it  flows 
to  us  from  Heaven,  because  man  ever  received  all  his  inspi- 
ration, all  his  mental  life,  a!l  his  inward  experience  of 
spiritual  realities  direct  form  Heaven.  Here,  therefore,  the 
mechanical  principle  necessarily  gives  way  to  the  dynami- 
cal ;  the  truth  that  knowledge  is  divine  remains ;  but  it  re- 
mains not  to  bear  witness  to  the  delusiveness  of  the  human 
faculties,  as  though  they  could  sever  have  perceived  truth 
had  it  not  been  imparted  to  them  objectively,  but  rather  to 
show  that  our  spiritual  knowledge  is  divine  just  for  this  rea- 
son, that  man  who  realizes  it  is  himself  a  child  of  the  divinity, 
and  is  permitted  to  gaze  upon  that  world  from  which  he 
derived  his  source.  Thus,  then,  the  theory  of  tradition, 
when  consistently  carried  out,  and  followed  up  through  all 
its  progressive  phases,  merges  at  length  into  the  great  idea 
of  intuition,  as  we  have  already  presented  it.* 

IV.  We  come  now  to  consider  the  theory  of  religious  cer- 
titude, which  is  based  upon  the  letter  of  the  Bible. 

This  theory  has  been  reviewed  by  implication  in  some 

*  See  Lectures  on  the  Philosophical  Tendencies  of  the  Age,  p.  136. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  '283 

of  our  previous  remarks,  as  in  those  upon  revelation,  upon 
theology,  and  upon  tradition ;  all  we  require  to  do,  therefore, 
in  the  present  case,  is  to  compress  the  argument  into  a  short 
compass,  and  give  the  general  conclusion.  The  Bible,  as 
we  now  have  it,  consists  of  a  collection  of  writings,  composed 
at  different  periods,  by  men  of  exceedingly  different  mind 
and  character,  containing  history,  politics,  precept,  devotion, 
doctrine,  and  prophecy.  No  one  can  pretend  that  these 
writings  give  us  a  connected  system  of  truth  scientifically  de- 
veloped ;  but  every  one,  we  apprehend,  must  grant  the  ex- 
traordinary nature  of  the  moral  and  spiritual  ideas  which  it 
every  where  unfolds.  These  writings,  then,  are  placed  before 
us,  resting  upon  the  most  unquestionable  historical  evidence, 
and  bearing  all  the  marks  they  well  can  bear  of  being  just 
what  they  profess  to  be — namely,  a  manifestation  of  the 
mind  and  will  of  God,  as  made  known  to  the  consciousness 
of  the  writers.  All  this  we  take  for  granted  in  the  outset, 
and  shall  proceed  to  construct  our  argument  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  whole  is  fully  admitted  by  the  reader. 

This  book,  then,  consisting  of  these  varied  materials,  be- 
ing put  into  our  hands,  the  sentiments  conveyed  will  require, 
of  course,  to  be  properly  understood,  in  order  that  it  may  be- 
come to  us  either  a  source  of  truth,  or  a  basis  of  certitude. 
The  main  question,  therefore,  for  us  to  consider  is  this : 
What  is  necessary  to  the  due  comprehension  of  the  Bible,  so 
that  it  may  be  in  any  sense  an  authoritative  intellectual  appeal  ? 
Place  it  before  a  mere  animal,  and  it  conveys  nothing  what- 
ever to  his  understanding  ;  place  it  before  an  intelligent  man, 
and  he  immediately  receives  some  of  the  ideas  which  it  was 
intended  to  convey.  A  human  understanding,  therefore,  is 
necessary  at  once  to  grasp  and  interpret  the  written  word, 
before  it  can  become  in  any  manner,  or  to  any  degree,  a  ba- 
sis of  religious  certitude. 

The  term  understanding,  however,  thus  popularly  used, 


284  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

is  extremely  indefinite.  Admitting  that  reason,  or  under- 
standing, is  necessary  to  interpret  the  word,  we  have  to  in- 
quire, how  much  reason,  or  how  much  understanding,  is  ne- 
cessary in  order  to  give  us  a  right  to  view  the  Bible  as  a 
fixed  basis  of  certitude  ?  A  thoroughly  ignorant  man,  teem- 
ing with  prejudice,  and  having  his  views  confined  within 
some  narrow  traditionary  channel,  cannot  surely  be  said  to 
derive  any  great  degree  of  theological  certainty  from  his  pe- 
rusal of  the  Scriptures,  since  he  interprets  every  thing  accord- 
ing to  his  own  notions.  Let  us,  then,  go  a  step  further.  Let 
us  suppose  that  the  truth-seeker  is  not  beset  with  all  these 
prejudices  ;  that  he  is  honest  and  intelligent  in  his  research  ; 
that  his  heart  and  mind  are  alike  cultivated ;  what,  we  ask, 
will  be,  in  this  case,  the  result  ?  No  doubt  such  an  inquirer 
would  feel  himself  at  once  enlightened  and  strengthened  by 
the  study  of  the  Scriptures ;  but  does  he  find  it  an  easy  mat- 
ter to  construct  a  complete  system  of  religious  knowledge  out 
of  the  data  presented  to  him  :  nay,  does  he  find  it  easy  to 
come  to  anything  like  a  final  and  conclusive  certitude  upon  the 
exact  import  of  the  separate  and  individual  doctrines,  which 
the  formation  of  such  a  system  involves  ?  Even  when  he  has 
done  his  best,  there  is  the  consciousness  left  behind,  lhat  as 
good  men  in  former  times  have  ever  brought  their  own  pe- 
culiar views  and  conceptions  to  the  task  of  interpretation, 
and  have  thus  been  led  into  very  opposite  conclusions  ;  so  he, 
also,  must  himself  have  brought  his  own  habits  and  tenden- 
cies of  mind,  his  own  national  feelings,  his  own  educational 
bias  to  the  work  of  interpretation,  and  thus  arrived  at  a  result 
which  must  really  have  been  produced  by  a  great  variety  of 
internal,  as  well  as  external  influences. 

We  are  driven,  therefore,  in  our  search  after  certitude, 
as  arising  from  the  letter  of  the  word,  to  professed  critics  and 
theologians,  who  are  supposed  to  have  got  beyond  the  reach 
of  any  partial  bias,  and  to  proceed  upon  purely  scientific 


ON    CERTITUDE.  285 

principles  of  interpretation.  What  course,  then,  have  they 
to  pursue,  in  order  to  reach  the  proposed  end  ?  First  of  all, 
they  must  settle  the  text  and  the  canon  of  Scripture  with  per- 
fect accuracy,  and  on  the  most  unquestionable  evidence  ;  next, 
they  must  determine  in  what  sense  the  Scriptures,  when  the 
canon  is  decided  on,  are  inspired,  since  this  point  will  make 
an  essential  difference  in  the  whole  mode  of  procedure  em- 
ployed to  elicit  the  truth  ;  thirdly,  they  must  determine  what 
are  the  true  principles  of  biblical  interpretation — how  far  it 
is  literal,  how  far  allegorical,  how  far  analogical,  how  far  the 
sentiments  conveyed  are  mingled  up  with  the  philosophical  and 
religious  ideas  of  the  times,  how  far  the  phraseology  is  that  of 
the  Hebrew  worship  and  literature.  And  even  when  this  is 
accomplished,  still  but  small  progress  is  yet  made  in  coming  to 
fixed  results  ;  for  the  truth  conveyed  implicitly  through  the 
history,  devotion,  prophecy,  precept,  and  epistle  of  the  Bible, 
has  to  be  brought  into  a  systematic  whole ;  and  to  do  this, 
some  logical  organum  is  absolutely  necessary,  whether  the 
Aristotelian,  whether  the  Baconian,  or  whether  some  yet  dif- 
ferent method  of  philosophical  analysis. 

In  brief,  let  it  only  be  considered  that  the  method  and 
principles,  both  of  criticism  and  interpretation,  are  neces- 
sarily thrown  upon  the  human  reason,  and  on  the  hypothesis 
now  before  us,  that  reason  becomes  unavoidably  the  ultimate 
test  for  distinguishing  the  true  from  the  false.  For  what  is 
it  that  guides  us  in  the  determination  of  the  method  we 
employ,  but  the  nature  of  the  results  ?  Apply  a  method  of 
interpretation  to  the  Scriptures,  which  evolves  conclusions 
contradictory  to  our  reason,  or  repulsive  to  our  moral  nature, 
and  we  at  once  reject  it.  Apply  another  method,  which 
draws  forth  results  perfectly  consonant  with  our  highest  ideas 
of  truth  or  duty,  and  we  accept  that  method  as  the  right  one  ; 
so  that,  admitting  the  Scriptures  to  bring  to  us  ideas  and 
sentiments  on  divine  and  spiritual  things,  yet  if  we  proceed 


286  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

upon  the  hypothesis,  that  the  mode  of  obtaining  certitude  is 
by  interpreting  the  letter  by  the  aid  of  the  individual  reason, 
it  is  impossible  to  avoid  the  conclusion,  that  the  test  of  truth 
lies  in  that  principle  of  intelligence  which  decides  upon  the 
mode  of  interpretation,  i.e.,  in  the  reason  itself. 

We  find,  therefore,  as  a  matter  of  logical  necessity,  that 
the  theory  of  religious  certitude  which  throws  the  whole 
decision  upon  the  interpretation  of  the  letter  of  Scripture, 
insensibly  merges  into  the  very  foundation-principle  of  Ra- 
tionalism ;  for  in  one  case,  as  in  the  other,  the  individual 
reason  is  the  final  appeal.  And  this  result,  be  it  observed, 
perfectly  coincides  with  the  facts  of  history ;  for  nearly  all 
the  Rationalism  of  modern  times  has  based  itself  upon 
biblical  interpretation,  and  appeals  even  to  the  Scriptures 
themselves  as  a  verification  of  its  conclusions.  "  Is,  then, 
the  Bible  so  indefinite,"  it  might  be  said,  "  that  we  cannot 
arrive  at  any  certitude  as  to  what  it  really  contains  ? 
Surely  it  is  all  very  simple,  and  he  who  runs  may  read." 
But,  alas !  so  says  the  very  next  theorist  we  meet  with1;  and 
so  says  a  third  ;  and  so  they  say  each  and  all.  The  term 
simplicity,  as  applied  to  truth,  is  very  indefinite  and  very 
deceptive.  Every  man's  system  imbibed  in  infancy  and 
moulded  to  all  his  habits  of  thought,  seems  to  him  the  pleni- 
tude of  simplicity  ;  it  is  only  when  we  have  broken  the  spell 
of  such  habits  and  associations,  that  we  begin  to  see  what  an 
abyss  there  is  in  ideas  which  we  looked  upon  as  the  most 
elementary  truths ;  only  then  that  we  begin  to  find  out,  that 
some  human  system  has  really  moulded  the  Bible  to  our 
understandings,  far  more  than  the  Bible  has  ever  served 
as  data  for  us  to  construct  our  system.  As  a  moral  agency, 
indeed,  nothing  can  be  more  definite,  nothing  more  simple 
than  the  Bible ;  and  nothing  will  lead  the  sincere  student  by 
a  shorter  course  to  a  satisfactory  result ;  but  viewed  as  a 
frasis  of  scientific  truth,  the  case  is  very  far  otherwise. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  287 


Little  do  they  consider  who  proclaim  so  loudly  the  doctrine 
of  private  judgment  or  private  interpretation  as  an  intel- 
lectual principle,  what  lies  concealed  in  it  now,  and  what 
may  come  forth  from  it  hereafter.  Once  give  the  individual 
principle  full  play,  and  whatever  be  the  result  of  a  man's 
speculations  on  the  Bible,  you  have  not  a  word  wherewith  to 
resist  him.  His  individual  judgment  is  theoretically  as  good 
as  your  own,  and  if  he  be  a  keener  logician  than  yourself,  a 
thousand  to  one  but  he  will  beat  you  utterly  out  of  the  field, 
and  set  up  his  logical  Rationalism  completely  over  the  head 
of  your  logical  orthodoxy. 

The  conclusion,  therefore,  to  which  we  come  is  this, — 
that  the  letter  of  the  Bible  cannot  be  the  basis  of  religious 
certitude  ;  and  that  even  if  we  did  arrive  at  certitude 
through  its  mere  verbal  interpretation,  the  actual  test  would 
still  be  the  reason  of  the  interpreter. 

If  religious  certitude,  then,  is  to  be  derived  from  the 
Scriptures  at  all,  it  cannot  be  derived  from  them  in  the  way 
of  verbal  criticism.  All  criticism  is  negative  ;  it  brings  no 
real  perceptions  of  truth,  hitherto  unexperienced,  to  the 
mind  ;  it  does  not  raise  our  spiritual  faculties  up  to  the 
proper  intensity  for  seeing  truth  in  its  reality  and  its 
unity.  The  reason  why  so  many  and  varied  results  flow 
from  the  criticism  of  this  very  same  book  is,  simply  because 
that  book  treats  of  matters  which,  to  the  speculative  reason 
merely,  are  quite  inaccessible  ;  because  it  takes  us  into  a 
region  of  thought  that  can  only  be  appreciated  by  the  spirit- 
ual eye — by  the  power  of  intuition.  Accordingly,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  whole  intensity  of  the  religious  nature  in  man 
is  developed,  and  the  power  of  spiritual  perception  increased, 
in  that  proportion  will  the  words  of  Scripture  assume  a  more 
pregnant  signification,  the  data  on  which  logical  criticism 
bases  itself  become  varied,  and  the  whole  result  vary  in  the 
same,  degree. 


288  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

The  absolute  condition  for  attaining  scientific  certitude  in 
connection  with  Christian  truth,  lies  in  the  possibility  of  our 
possessing  clear  and  decisive  intuitions  of  such  spiritual 
realities  as  are  presented  by  the  Christian  revelation,  of 
stating  them  in  distinct  terms,  and  applying  to  them  the 
criteria  we  have  before  referred  to.  To  attain  such  intuitions 
by  verbal  criticism,  or  mere  grammatical  interpretation,  is 
evidently  impossible ;  the  results  of  these,  and  all  other 
mere  logical  principles,  when  applied  to  the  construction  of  a 
theology,  are  always  divergent,  leading  to  differences  far 
more  than  promoting  unity  :  on  the  other  hand,  the  results 
of  the  moral  influences  exerted  by  the  Scriptures  on  the 
human  heart  are  always  convergent :  they  tend  to  bring  all 
men  into  the  same  spiritual  state,  and  thus  to  give  them 
similar  conceptions  or  intuitions  of  Divine  things.  The  only 
way,  accordingly,  in  which  the  Scriptures  become  a  ground 
of  religious  certitude  is,  by  awakening  the  religious  con- 
sciousness of  humanity ;  by  presenting  scenes  and  ideas 
which  lead  the  minds  of  men,  thus  awakened,  to  the  clear 
recognition  of  spiritual  realities ;  and  by  giving  us  such 
examples  of  moral  perfection  that  the  eye  of  the  soul,  instead 
of  ranging  over  the  universe  in  search  of  its  highest 
longings,  finds  them  fully  satisfied  and  perfectly  realized  in 
the  life  and  person  of  Christ,  and  the  effects  he  wrought  in 
the  first  disciples.  In  this  point  of  view,  however,  we  see  at 
once  that  the  Scriptures  themselves  are  a  moral  agency,  not 
a  scientific  appeal ;  the  basis  of  certitude  lies  in  the  essential 
characteristics  of  the  intuitions  themselves — in  their  distinct- 
ness, in  their  uniformity,  and,  under  due  influences,  in  their 
universality ;  not  in  their  symbolical  representation  upon 
the  sacred  page. 

This  view  of  the  matter,  instead  of  detracting  aught  from 
the  idea  of  revelation,  is  far  more  consonant  with  human  ex- 
perience, and  more  consistent  with  the  scientific  principles  of 


ON    CERTITUDE.  289 


human  knowledge ;  and  gives  even  a  higher  value  to  the 
worth  and  power  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  than  is  done  by  any 
of  the  mere  mechanical  theories  of  inspiration.  With  regard 
to  experience,  we  daily  see  that  men  do  not  obtain  uniformity 
or  certitude  by  verbal  criticism ;  while  they  do  obtain  at 
once  conviction  and  unity  by  the  moral  power  of  the  Word. 
With  regard  to  the  principles  of  human  knowledge,  we  have 
seen  that  all  revelation  is  made  to  the  interior  being  of  man ; 
and  that  the  Scriptures,  therefore,  cannot  be  an  actual  reve- 
lation to  any  one  until  they  have  awakened  within  him  the 
power  of  spiritual  discernment.  And  lastly,  with  regard  to 
the  dignity  with  which  the  Word  of  God  is  to  be  invested  ; — 
surely  it  is  assigning  the  very  highest  place  at  once  to  its  value 
and  its  power,  to  ascribe  to  it  a  perpetual  moral  influence 
over  the  human  heart ;  to  estimate  it  as  the  great  means  of 
awakening  the  soul  of  man  to  the  spiritual  world  which  lies 
around  us  on  every  side ;  to  show  how  it  can  educate  our 
minds  to  the  clear  intuition  of  the  Divine  realities  there  pre- 
sented ;  and  finally,  to  recognize  in  it  a  perpetual  canon,  with 
which  our  own  fluctuating  religious  life  can  ever  be  com- 
pared, by  which  our  low  attainments  are  ever  chided,  and 
from  whose  hallowed  incentives  we  may  ever  derive  new  in- 
spiration and  new  motives  to  faith,  to  resignation,  and  to  ac- 
tive duty.  In  fine,  profess  what  we  may  as  a  matter  of  the- 
ory, yet  we  never  do  obtain  a  fixed  and  confiding  certitude  in 
regard  to  any  religious  truth,  until  it  has  entered  the  heart  as 
a  spiritual  principle  ;  until  it  has  verified  its  proper  validity 
by  producing  a  similar  influence  upon  others ;  and  until  we 
can  apply  to  it  the  very  same  criteria  by  which  we  acknow- 
ledge the  certitude  of  any  truth  whatever  within  the  whole 
range  of  human  knowledge. 

V.  This  brings  us,  then,  last  of  all,  to  give  a  brief  ex- 
pi  anation  of  what  we  consider  to  be  the  true  principles  of  cer- 
titude as  regards  religious  truth. 


290  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

And  before  we  pronounce  a  distinct  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion, we  must  make  one  or  two  preliminary  observations. 
First  of  all,  then,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  confound  mere 
logical  order  and  consecutiveness  with  material  certitude. 
There  may  be  logical  certitude,  as  we  before  showed,  where 
there  are  no  ideas  whatever  involved  in  the  terms  employed, 
and  equally  so  where  the  ideas  are  absolutely  false.  The 
logic  of  a  system  refers  simply  to  its  consecutive  development, 
and  the  dependence  of  one  part  upon  another ;  it  does  not  take 
any  direct  cognizance  of  the  validity  of  the  conceptions  them- 
selves, from  which  the  whole  train  of  thinking  is  originated. 
This  is  indeed  a  matter  almost  self-evident,  and  might  well 
have  been  passed  over  unnoticed,  were  it  not  unfortunately 
the  case  that  there  are  many  who  look  for  nothing  else  in  a 
theological  system  but  logical  accuracy  as  to  its  development. 
The  definitions  and  axioms  with  which  they  start  have  come 
by  habit  to  be  regarded  by  them  as  so  indubitable  and  self- 
evident  that  they  cannot  imagine  even  the  very  possibility  of 
any  error  existing  there.  Accordingly,  the  regular  formal 
and  logically-consistent  development  of  these  fundamental 
ideas  into  a  connected  body  of  Christian  doctrine  appears  to 
them  to  be  a  process  which  cannot  fail  to  be  valid ;  a  process, 
moreover,  on  which  the  private  reason  is  perfectly  competent 
to  decide.  Hence  arises  the  trust  which  such  minds  natu- 
rally repose  in  the  individual  principle,  little  thinking,  per- 
haps, that  in  so  doing  they  are  maintaining  all  that  is  essen- 
tial to  the  defence  of  the  most  complete  Rationalism.  As  far 
as  the  formal  consistency,  indeed,  of  any  body  of  divinity  is 
concerned,  the  individual  reason  and  the  laws  of  logic  may 
be  rightly  employed  as  a  final  appeal ;  but  we  must  not  for- 
get that  all  our  logical  reasonings,  so  far  as  they  touch  at  all 
the  essence  or  matter  of  the  truth,  have  to  be  grounded  in 
immediate  conceptions  ;  and  the  great  question  now  before  us 
is  this, — How  are  these  conceptions  to  be  verified  ?  or, — what 


ON    CERTITUDE.  291 


principle  of  certitude  have  we  by  which  to  test  their  fulness 
and  their  validity  ? 

This  leads  us  to  another  preliminary  remark,  namely, 
that,  in  seeking  a  test  for  the  accuracy  of  our  fundamental 
religious  conceptions,  we  must  not  look  for  any  principle  of 
certitude  like  the  laws  of  logical  reasoning,  which  will  de- 
cide our  difficulties  categorically,  and  pronounce  a  direct  ver- 
dict that  this  conception  is  right  and  that  conception  is  wrong. 
Such  a  decision  would  presuppose  that  we  had  already  arrived 
at  the  full  development  of  the  idea,  whereas  it  generally 
turns  out  that  long  disputes  upon  fundamental  questions  are 
mere  delusions  arising  from  imperfect  vision.  The  paradox 
they  appear  to  involve,  and  the  struggle  to  which  they  give 
rise,  generally  originate  in  the  fact,  that  the  question  is  re- 
garded by  both  parties  from  a  low  and  altogether  incompetent 
point  of  view.  To  decide  categorically  between  them,  there- 
fore, would  be  certain  to  give  a  wrong  decision  after  all,  and 
the  only  thing  which  a  valid  criterion  could  do  is  to  point  the 
combatants  to  some  higher  principle,  in  which  their  doubts 
and  differences  may  alike  disappear.  What  we  require  in  a 
criterion  is  some  great  directory,  by  which  we  may  get  the 
clearest  view  of  fundamental  principles  that  the  present  state 
of  human  development  can  afford  ;  some  appeal  which  will 
tell  us  clearly  in  what  we  are  wrong,  and  point  out  to  us  the 
direction  in  which  we  may  ever  be  approaching  nearer  to  the 
right ;  some  method,  in  a  word,  by  which  we  can  ascend  in- 
tellectually to  the  full  elevation  of  the  age  in  which  we  live. 
This  is  the  only  criterion  which  is  at  all  adapted  to  human 
nature ;  the  only  one  which  could  be  of  any  service  to  us ; 
the  only  one  which  would  bring  us  from  the  darkness  of 
spiritual  ignorance,  more  and  more  into  the  clearest  sunlight 
of  truth. 

The  certitude  we  look  for  in  religious  questions,  as  in  all 
other  cases  of  reflective  truth,  is  intuitional  and  logical  com- 


292  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

bined.  Logical  certitude  only  would  merely  relate  to  the 
form  of  our  theological  system ;  intuitional  certitude  only 
could  bring,  perchance,  the  highest  conviction  to  an  indi- 
vidual mind  if  raised  to  a  highly  developed  state  of  spiritual 
perception,  but  could  not  afford  scientific  or  reflective  con- 
viction to  others.  What  we  require  is  a  religious  certitude, 
which  wRl  bear  the  proper  criteria  of  validity  to  mankind  at 
large,  in  the  same  sense  as  any  other  branch  of  moral  truth 
will  bear  them. 

The  real  principles  of  religious  certitude  can  be  deduced 
without  much  difficulty  from  the  very  nature  of  intuition. 
Intuition,  as  we  have  before  explained,  implies  a  direct  gaz- 
ing upon  truth  in  its  concrete  unity.  Were  the  power  of 
doing  so  perfect,  such  as  we  may  suppose  to  be  the  case 
with  angelic  minds,  no  further  certitude  would  be  required  ; 
for  the  objective  reality  thus  perfectly  depicted  would  be  its 
own  evidence,  as  it  is  with  us  in  the  case  of  our  sense-per- 
ceptions. The  power  of  spiritual  vision,  however,  in  man  is 
dim  and  inconstant ;  the  spiritual  object,  if  perceived  at 
all,  is  apt  to  be  distorted  by  the  incompetency  of  our  inward 
eye  ;  and  consequently  we  grasp  at  every  method  open  to 
us,  by  which  the  error  may  be  compensated  or  corrected. 
All  logical  analysis  and  the  reflective  reconstruction  of  our 
knowledge  originate  in  this  desire  to  verify  and  complete 
our  intuitions  ;  but  such  methods  are  manifestly  insufficient. 
Logical  reasoning  may  have  a  great  negative  value  in  this 
respect ;  it  may  detect  error,  and  may  exhibit  the  interior 
consistency  of  our  ideas  of  truth  with  the  fixed  laws  of 
thought,  where  such  consistency  really  exists ;  but  it  cannot 
directly  extend  our  experience,  or  carry  us  into  the  higher 
regions  of  spiritual  idea.  In  all  logical  processes  we  are 
only  engaged  with  conceptions  already  realized, — with  in- 
tuitions already  acquired  and  expressed;  but  it  is  abundant- 
ly evident  that  these  very  conceptions  and  these  very  intu- 


ON    CERTITUDE.  293 


itions  may  be  in  themselves  extremely  inadequate ;  that 
there  may  be  whole  regions  of  spiritual  truth  which  range 
beyond  our  present  ken ;  and  that  we  need,  therefore,  some 
other  method  besides  that  of  logical  analysis,  for  coming  to  a 
clear  understanding  upon  these  points. 

Now  the  most  natural  procedure  we  can  follow,  one,  too, 
into  which  we  almost  instinctively  fall,  is  to  appeal  to  other 
minds  circumstanced  in  the  same  manner,  or  perhaps  still 
more  favorably  than  ourselves.  When  our  intuitions  of 
spiritual  things  (those  I  mean  which  we  have  gained  in  con- 
nection with  our  whole  Christian  education  and  our  know- 
ledge of  the  Scriptures)  prove  to  be  ideas  very  partially  ex- 
perienced,— when  they  do  not  excite  any  strong  sympathy 
in  other  minds, — when  they  fail  to  establish  their  claims  by 
the  readiness  with  which  they  are  grasped,  approved,  and 
appropriated  by  men  earnest  for  the  truth,  and  placed  under 
the  proper  conditions  for  becoming  awakened  to  its  reality, 
there  is  good  reason  for  us  to  believe  that  they  are  intuitions 
of  a  very  dim  and  imperfect  character.  On  the  contrary,  in 
proportion  as  different  minds  placed  under  different  circum- 
stances bear  a  concurring  testimony  to  the  distinct  realiza- 
tion of  any  great  conception,  and  fully  agree  in  the  mode  of 
its  expression — in  that  proportion  we  feel  the  chance  of  dis- 
tortion and  imperfection  in  our  own  vision  to  be  diminished, 
and  a  basis  of  certitude  to  be  laid  in  the  very  fact  of  such  a 
universal  consent. 

We  are  thus  brought,  in  fact,  to  the  very  same  great 
criteria  which  we  laid  down  as  applicable  generally  to  the 
verification  of  human  knowledge  in  its  fundamental  princi- 
ples ;  for  we  require  in  Christian  conceptions,  as  well  as  all 
other,  that  they  should  possess  clearness,  uniformity,  and,  in 
a  certain  sense,  universality,  to  substantiate  their  full  claim 
to  be  regarded  as  sure  and  certain.  Clearness  they  must  pos- 
sess, or  we  have  no  idea  of  what  the  conceptions  themselves 


294  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

would  indicate,  and  are  in  the  position  of  those  persons 
above  referred  to,  who,  from  the  incompetency  of  their  whole 
point  of  view,  require  to  be  absolutely  enlightened,  rather 
than  simply  directed.  Uniformity  there  must  be,  or  we  are 
tossed  about  from  one  side  of  the  question  to  another,  uncer- 
tain where  to  rest  as  in  the  right  centre.  And  universality 
there  must  also  be  in  a  certain  sense  of  that  word.  To  re- 
quire, indeed,  absolute  universality,  as  a  test  of  certitude,  is 
manifestly  absurd.  To  demand  that  every  human  being 
should  possess  a  given  intuition,  and  agree  in  the  outward 
expression  of  it  ere  it  can  be  regarded  as  duly  certified, 
would  be  to  demand  an  impossibility.  Humanity  was  form- 
ed for  development  and  progress ;  and  all  we  can  justly  de- 
mand, under  the  idea  of  universality,  is  that  the  conception 
we  would  verify,  be  clearly  shown  to  be  one  towards  which 
humanity  in  its  development  necessarily  tends,  and  which  is 
universally  testified  to  by  minds  sufficiently  elevated  in  their 
whole  moral  being  to  realize  it.  Such  is  the  real  principle 
of  Catholicity,  as  applied  to  the  verification  of  Christian 
truth.  Christian  ideas  have  incontestably  proved  themselves 
to  pertain  to  the  highest  form  of  man's  religious  conscious- 
ness. Humanity  itself  has  paid  homage  to  them  by  relin- 
quishing all  other  forms  of  worship,  just  as  it  has  advanced 
in  intelligence  and  civilization  ;  and  amongst  all  the  concep- 
tions which  have  sprung  up  in  the  Christian  world,  those 
bear  the  undoubted  marks  of  certitude,  which  live  on 
through  every  era,  which,  instead  of  appearing  for  a  little 
and  then  dying  away,  develope  themselves  in  one  steady 
course  through  the  march  of  the  ages,  and  which  always, 
by  their  depth,  intensity,  and  inherent  splendor,  cast  their 
shadows  before  them,  and  point  out  the  religious  course  of 
the  future.  Thus,  when  we  see  the  world  tending  in  its 
spiritual  development  to  Christianity ;  when,  further,  we 
see  the  dim  and  imperfect  conceptions,  which  have  attached 


ON    CERTITUDE.  295 


themselves  to  Christianity,  dropping  away,  or  becoming  pen- 
etrated with  moral  idea ;  and  when,  lastly,  we  can  single 
out  certain  great  principles  of  truth,  which  appear  to  be  the 
foci  of  Christian  light,  which  have  unfolded  themselves  to  a 
brighter  realization  from  age  to  age,  and  towards  which  the 
whole  Christian  world  is  still  gazing,  as  the  great  points 
around  which  their  spiritual  life  revolves ;  these,  assuredly, 
are  the  very  principles  which  bear  upon  them  the  marks  of 
true  universality,  because  they  are  those  to  which  humanity 
entire  incessantly  tends. 

Let  us  then,  in  conclusion,  show  the  application  of  this 
doctrine  of  religious  certitude  to  the  resolution  of  disputed 
questions  within  the  range  of  Christianity  itself.  It  will 
be  generally  admitted,  that  the  person,  teaching,  life,  death, 
and  resurrection  of  Christ,  viewed  as  one  great  and  divine 
manifestation,  were  the  means  of  introducing  what  we  may 
term  the  peculiar  Christian  element  into  the  religious  con- 
sciousness of  mankind.  The  Christian  ideas  and  affections 
thus  produced,  spread  themselves  from  mind  to  mind,  and 
from  heart  to  heart,  and  were  represented  to  the  world,  after 
the  first  disciples  had  passed  away,  by  the  writings  they  left 
behind  them.  Out  of  these  writings,  the  most  important  and 
indubitably  authentic  were  selected  by  the  Church  as  being 
the  clearest  manifestation  of  apostolical  Christianity  in  its 
spirit  and  doctrine  ;  for  rightly  did  the  Christians  of  the 
second  century  consider,  that  the  utterances  of  those  who 
lived  so  near  to  Christ,  and  who  had  such  vivid  intuitions 
granted  to  them  of  divine  realities,  possessed,  and  ever  must 
possess,  to  the  Church,  a  canonical  authority,  breathing  as 
they  did  a  spirit,  after  which  we  have  ever  to  aspire.  This 
Christian  element,  thus  infused  into  the  living  consciousness 
of  the  Church,  and  explained  according  to  the  individuality 
of  the  sacred  writers,  was  not  so  much  a  complete  and 
scientific  system  of  truth,  as  a  new  germ  of  spiritual  life, 


290  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

which  was  to  strike  its  roots  deep  into  the  soil  of  human 
nature,  and  become  more  and  more  a  practical  reality,  un- 
folding itself  in  the  world.  Each  individual  man,  by  the 
teaching  of  the  Church,  and  by  the  study  of  the  word,  was 
to  have  his  entire  religious  consciousness  impregnated  and 
irradiated  with  Christian  truth  ;  and  thus  the  whole  Christian 
system  was  to  develope  its  moral  energies  in  the  course  of 
human  history,  until  the  final  glory  of  the  Church  should 
arrive,  and  the  restoration  of  man  be  complete. 

We  will  suppose,  now,  that  this  process  of  religious 
development  has  gone  on  for  a  hundred  years.  In  the  mean- 
time oppositions  have  been  raised,  controversies  have  sprung 
up,  heresies  have  made  their  appearance  ;  and  now  the  in- 
quiring spirit  of  some  earnest  thinker,  or  of  some  pious  com- 
munity, perplexed  by  these  controversies  and  disputes,  de- 
mands to  know  what  may  be  really  relied  upon  as  being 
veritably  Christian  truth.  The  canon  of  Scripture,  it  is 
true,  may  be  complete,  and  it  may  be  in  their  hands ;  but 
this  does  not  relieve  the  difficulty.  Scripture  must  be  in- 
terpreted ;  and  on  the  principles  of  interpretation  there  is  a 
vast  diversity  of  opinion,  giving  rise  to  an  equal,  or  even  a 
greater  diversity  in  the  results  ;  for  each  man  and  each 
party  views  the  letter  of  the  word  through  the  medium  of 
their  own  religious  conceptions,  and  finds  in  it  a  greater  or 
a  less  intensity  of  meaning  according  to  the  development  of 
their  intuitional  consciousness. 

What  appeal,  then,  can  there  be  for  the  validity  of  these 
intuitions, — what  principle  of  certitude  applicable  to  the 
nature  and  tendencies  of  that  whole  Christian  life  out  of 
which  the  main  conceptions  of  Christian  doctrine  are 
evolved  ?  The  history  and  spontaneous  practice  of  the  early 
Church  give  us  a  reply.  The  appeal  was  always  made  to 
the  Catholic  feeling  and  thinking  of  the  whole  Christian  com- 
munity. And  rightly  so.  We  do  not  mean  to  say,  that  the 


ON    CERTITUDE.  297 


Catholic  consciousness  of  the  Christian  Church,  either  as  it 
was  then  or  as  it  is  now,  could  give  us  a  result  absolutely 
true  and  perfect ;  but  we  mean  to  affirm,  that  the  best  mode 
of  correcting  the  indistinctness  or  the  distortions  of  our  own 
religious  conceptions  is,  to  compare  them  with  the  religious 
experience  of  the  greatest  number  of  earnest  minds  to  which 
we  can  have  access ;  that  we  may  thus  find  in  what  we 
most  deviate  from  the  general  law  of  man's  religious  develop- 
ment. 

The  individual  reason  adopting  certain  definitions  as  in- 
dubitable,  is  ever  in  danger  of  being  hurried  away,  by  the 
flow  of  its  logical  ardor,  into  false  conclusions,  and  some- 
times even  into  the  wildest  extremes  ;  while  the  very  eager- 
ness of  party  strife  naturally  leads  us  to  lose  sight  of  the 
entire  side  of  a  question,  and  to  rush  forward  to  the  most 
partial  results.  But  amidst  all  these  minor  perturbations, 
and  partly  by  their  very  means,  the  Catholic  consciousness 
of  the  universal  Church  has  gone  forward  in  its  develop- 
ment ;  one  point  after  another  has  been  cleared  up,  one 
principle  after  another  brought  to  light ;  and  the  calm,  un- 
biassed, heaven-aspiring  mind,  standing  aloof  from  the  din 
and  passion  of  controversy,  sees  the  central  course  through 
which  God  is  guiding  his  ark,  and  falls  back  upon  the  great 
Catholic  hopes,  convictions,  and  aspirations  of  the  Christian 
mind  in  its  upward  progress,  as  its  safest  guide,  its  surest 
resource. 

All  this,  be  it  observed,  is  in  perfect  consistency  with  the 
philosophical  principles  we  have  already  deduced.  The  re- 
ligious intuitions  of  the  human  mind,  in  accordance  with 
their  very  nature,  grow  up  to  an  ever-increasing  perfection 
in  humanity  at  large,  when  it  is  brought  under  the  influence 
of  Christian  ideas  and  principles;  the  theology  of  every  age 
is  the  formal  statement  of  the  truth  which  these  intuitions  in- 
volve or  convey ;  and  consequently,  the  highest  appeal  for 
14 


298  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  truth  of  our  theological  sentiments  must  be  the  Catholic 
expression  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  purified  humanity 
in  its  eternal  progress  heavenward.  This,  we  say,  must  in- 
evitably be  our  highest  appeal  next  to  God  himself.  Every 
partial  system  contains  a  greater  or  less  amount  of  mere  hu- 
man individuality ;  it  is  that  element  which  runs  through 
all  systems  alike,  which  all  are  seeking  to  realize,  all  striv- 
ing more  fully  to  express,  which  we  must  look  upon  as  the 
Divine  teaching  of  Christ  himself,  drawn  forth  from  Holy 
Scripture  by  the  perpetual  operation  of  Povidence  in  human 
history,  and  the  perpetual  outpouring  of  his  Spirit  upon  the 
Church. 

One  word,  in  fine,  respecting  the  relation  which  the  prin- 
ciple of  certitude,  now  expounded,  bears  to  those  above  re- 
ferred to.  Place  this  principle  by  the  side  of  that  which 
rests  upon  the  individual  reason,  and  it  gives  us  at  once  an 
objective  centre  around  which  our  individual  speculations 
may  securely  revolve.  It  is  an  anchor  to  the  soul,  which, 
while  it  allows  the  individual  to  toss  about  at  pleasure  upon 
the  surface  of  mere  logical  argumentation,  yet  permits  him 
not  to  drift  away  from  the  proper  track,  or  suffer  shipwreck 
of  his  faith  in  all  that  is  eternal  and  Divine.  Place,  again, 
the  same  principle  by  the  side  of  tradition,  and  it  exhibits  an 
equal  power  to  curb  its  errors  and  extract  its  real  advan- 
tages. The  principle  of  tradition  looks  upon  the  truth  as 
something  already  perfect  and  fixed,  and  then  gropes  its  way 
backwards  amongst  the  gloom  and  uncertainty  of  past  ages 
in  order  to  find  it.  Alas  !  what  can  result  from  such  a  pro- 
cess but  an  interminable  uncertainty  as  to  what  we  are  to 
select  and  what  to  refuse  ?  And  even  if  we  did  succeed  in 
grasping  just  that  which  we  searched  for,  what  would  it  be 
but  the  dead  and  withered  skeleton  of  a  truth,  which  once, 
indeed,  possessed  vitality,  but  which  now,  drawn  forth  from 
the  sepulchres  of  the  past,  has  no  life  in  the  present  con. 


ON    CERTITUDE.  299 


sciousness  of  humanity, — no  power  either  to  subdue  the 
world,  or  to  complete  the  organism  of  the  Church  to  the  full 
and  perfect  stature  of  Christ.  We  look  to  the  past,  not  as 
an  authority,  but  as  an  aid  to  interpret  the  present.  Con- 
vinced that  truth  to  man  is  progressive,  we  gaze  with  intense 
interest  upon  the  course  it  has  already  run,  and  delight  to 
trace  its  bright  and  glorious  pathway  down  to  its  present 
stage  of  development.  But  why  do  we  do  this  ?  Not  be- 
cause the  realized  truth  of  any  past  age  will  satisfy  the  pre- 
sent, but  because  we  can  the  better  understand,  by  the  light 
of  history,  what  is  the  most  advanced  thinking  of  this  our 
age,  and  what  is  the  true  elevation  to  which  our  religious 
consciousness  has  now  arrived.  We  trust  not  to  the  Catho- 
lic thinking  of  the  past ;  we  trust  rather  to  that  of  the  pre- 
sent, which  contains  in  its  embrace  the  fruits  of  the  past  to- 
gether with  the  seeds  of  the  future.  Assuredly,  if  there  be  a 
rhythmic  development  of  ideas  in  the  world,  it  were  worse 
than  vain  to  read  the  course  of  history  backwards,  and  be 
always  looking  to  the  vestments  of  worn-out  ideas,  instead  of 
interpreting  the  living  voice  of  God  as  it  speaks  to  us  in  the 
phenomena  of  the  present  hour.  Against  the  sickly  senti- 
mentalism  that  sees  nothing  but  glory  in  antiquity,  nothing 
but  vulgarity  in  the  present  age,  we  earnestly  protest,  as  be- 
ing inhuman  in  its  nature,  a  libel  against  Providence,  and 
faithless  to  the  real  spirit  and  power  of  Christian  truth. 

We  honor  the  wisdom  of  the  early  ages  which  summoned 
those  memorable  oecumenical  Councils,  whose  deliberations 
even  now  have  a  certain  weight  and  authority  resting  upon 
them ;  but  we  should  have  still  greater  confidence  in  an 
oecumenical  Council  of  the  present  day,  were  it  only  formed 
upon  the  same  principles  of  a  true  spiritual  Catholicism. 
Could  we  but  once  again  see  the  selfishness,  the  pride,  the 
low  and  little-mindedness  of  party  spirit  laid  aside, — could 
we  but  once  again  see  a  body  of  real  men,  earnest,  truth- 


300  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

loving,  self-sacrificing  minds  from  every  quarter  of  the  uni- 
versal Church,  meeting  in  solemn  conclave  to  hold  forth  to 
each  other  the  real  life  of  Christian  faith,  and  in  the  compa- 
rison of  their  inward  experiences  and  renunciations  of  their 
poor  artificial  pretensions,  seeking  to  grasp  the  central  prin- 
pies  in  which  their  hearts  can  alike  blend,  we  should  behold 
a  practical  application  of  the  great  test  we  have  asserted, 
which  would  do  more  to  fix  the  faith  of  the  doubting,  and 
heal  the  wounds  of  the  Church,  than  all  the  logical  contests 
of  the  past  have  done  to  shake  our  belief  in  Christianity,  and 
sever  our  affections  from  each  other. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST. 

THOUGH  far  from  agreeing  generally  with  the  Hegelian  phi- 
losophy, either  in  its  spirit  or  its  results,  yet  I  have  long  felt 
that  the  dialectic  method,  as  propounded  and  employed  in 
that  system,  contains  some  few  precious  germs  of  abiding 
truth.  On  this  supposition  alone,  can  its  unprecedented  in- 
fluence over  thousands  of  deep  and  earnest  minds  be  ac- 
counted for.  That  there  is  a  law  of  progress,  indeed,  by 
which  ideas  and  intuitions  develope  themselves  in  the  humaj| 
mind,  forming  a  kind  of  real  and  primeval  logic,  is  a  theory 
which  is  not  only  in  itself  probable,  but  one  which  may  be 
carefully  verified  by  actual  experience. 

We  have  already  seen  that  intuitions,  unlike  the  fixed 
laws  of  thought,  grow  up  from  a  very  incomplete  to  an  in- 
creasingly intense  and  perfected  form,  both  in  the  individual 
and  in  the  common  consciousness  of  humanity.  The  actual 
history  of  any  of  our  great  moral  conceptions  will  show  us 
this  fact  in  a  very  decided  manner,  whether  we  regard  that 
history  as  it  has  existed  in  our  own  minds,  or  in  the  common 
reason  of  mankind.  Moreover,  a  somewhat  closer  attention 
to  the  subject  proves  to  us  that  these  and  all  similar  concep- 
tions are  evolved  into  higher  and  more  pregnant  forms  by 
the  united  process  of  analysis  and  synthesis.  An  idea,  we 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


suppose  for  the  sake  of  example,  is  now  presented  to  our  con- 
templation ;  —  what  course,  then,  should  we  instinctively  take, 
in  order  fully  to  comprehend  and  unfold  it  ?  The  first  thing  we 
do  is  to  analyze  it  into  its  component  parts,  so  as  to  place  those 
parts  before  us  in  every  possible  point  of  view.  Every  fun- 
damental conception,  we  possess,  may  be  presented  in  at 
least  two  distinct  aspects.  Thus,  the  notions  of  matter  and 
spirit  have  their  realistic,  and  their  idealistic  poles  ;  the  no- 
tion of  beauty  hovers  between  the  actual  and  the  ideal  ;  and 
the  notion  of  God  has  ever  tended,  either  on  the  one  hand  to 
the  form  of  a  human  personality,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
that  of  the  absolute  essence  of  all  things,  as  maintained  in  the 
various  systems  of  pantheism.  In  every  case  there  are  op- 
posite poles,  towards  which  our  intuitions  tend,  giving  rise 
(as  Kant  showed)  to  antinomies,  or  contradictions,  when  we 
attempt  to  reason  logically  upon  them,  and  yet  affording  us  a 
deeper  insight  into  the  real  inward  intensity  of  the  idea  it- 
self. Most  persons  imagine,  that,  when  contests  arise  from 
seeing  things  in  these  opposite  points  of  view,  it  is  necessary 
|p  fight  out  the  battle  by  all  the  armory  of  logic,  until  one 
party  is  beaten,  the  other  victorious.  But  such  is  not  the 
order  of  nature,  and  such  is  but  seldom  the  result  in  the  ac- 
tual history  of  the  human  mind.  These  opposites,  as  the 
whole  subject  is  better  understood,  are  seen  not  to  be  altoge- 
ther unreconcilable  ;  in  proportion  as  they  emerge  more  and 
more  into  the  full  light  of  truth,  their  course  becomes  increas- 
ingly convergent,  until  they  meet  together  in  some  higher 
unity,  and  lose  their  antagonism  in  some  broader  principle. 
After  a  time,  however,  this  higher  principle  is  itself  subject- 
ed to  analysis,  when  another  opposition  appears,  and  another 
antagonism  ensues,  which  is  in  its  turn  destined  to  go  on  un- 
til it  also  disappears  in  a  unity  still  higher  and  broader  than 
the  last.  Thus  our  great  intuitions  roll  onwards  in  their 
course,  thus  our  ideas  evolve  themselves  :  and  the  life  or 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  303 

rhythm  of  their  being  is  that  which  has  become  moulded  in 
the  hands  of  Hegel  into  a  philosophical,  or,  as  he  himself 
terms  it,  a  dialectical  METHOD. 

If  such  a  rhythmic  process  be  observable  in  the  develop- 
ment of  all  moral  and  philosophical  ideas  in  human  history ; 
if  we  find,  moreover,  that  different  schools,  maintaining  the 
opposite  poles  of  any  great  idea,  form  the  very  pulsation  of 
its  onward  movement,  then  we  may  expect  to  find  the  same 
phenomenon  presented,  in  reference  to  the  historical  life  of 
Christianity.  It  is  no  valid  objection  against  this  to  say  that 
Christianity,  being  of  Divine  origin,  and  coming  to  us  as  a  di- 
rect revelation,  ought  to  be  excepted  from  the  law  of  mere 
human  ideas.  The  fact  is,  that  all  primeval  truth,  of  what- 
ever kind,  all  the  elementary  ideas  we  receive  through  the 
intuitional  consciousness,  are  primarily  of  divine  origin,  and 
all  come  to  us  by  a  direct  revelation.  Whatever  ideas  are 
to  become  a  part  of  the  inward  subjective  life  of  humanity, 
(it  matters  little  respecting  their  origin,  or  their  mode  of 
communication,)  all  must  alike  conform  to  the  necessary 
laws  of  human  nature,  and  human  progress.  Christian  ideas, 
like  all  others,  must  live  in  the  soul  of  man ;  they  must 
form  a  portion  of  his  real  consciousness ;  they  must  develope 
their  power  and  their  resources  by  time  and  labor.  If  such, 
accordingly,  be  the  case,  they  must  follow  the  same  law  of 
progress  which  we  see  to  hold  good  in  other  cases ;  and  the 
past  history  of  Christianity  must  have  a  significancy  about  it, 
which  we  can  only  fully  appreciate  by  means  of  the  law, 
under  the  guidance  of  which  it  has  unceasingly  unfolded  it- 
self in  the  world. 

In  order  to  comprehend  somewhat  of  the  process  we  are 
now  considering,  with  reference  to  Christianity,  let  us  carry 
back  our  minds  to  the  apostolic  age,  and  fix  our  attention 
upon  the  period-  immediately  succeeding  the  resurrection  of 
Christ.  What  may  we  imagine  Christianity  to  have  been  in 


304  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  minds  who  embraced  it  on  the  Day  of  Pentecost  ?  What 
was  it  as  a  system  of  truth,  of  doctrine,  of  duty  ?  No  one,  we 
should  think,  could  for  a  moment  suppose  that,  as  a  formal 
body  of  truth  and  doctrine,  Christianity  was  then,  subjective- 
ly speaking,  in  any  way  so  complete  as  it  is  now  ;  or  that  it 
had  brought  indeed  any  considerable  portion  of  religious 
idea,  consciously  and  reflectively,  home  to  the  human  mind. 
Christianity  was  then  a  mighty  spontaneous  impulse. 
Through  the  person,  the  life,  the  discourse  of  Christ,  it  had 
wakened  up  in  the  minds  of  the  devout  great  and  living  con- 
ceptions of  God,  of  man,  of  truth,  of  duty,  of  sin,  of  holiness, 
and  of  immortality  to  come,  which  rushed  in  one  united  mass 
of  moral  power  upon  their  affections  and  their  will.  Chris- 
tianity, indeed,  was  then  as  veritably  a  system  as  now  ;  but 
it  was  a  system  undeveloped, — a  unity  as  yet  unanalyzed, 
— a  religion  never  yet  invested  by  the  understanding  with 
the  forms  of  theology. 

That  Christianity  should  continue  in  this  its  primitive 
form  was  a  moral  impossibility.  While  the  period  of  wonder 
lasted — while  the  soul,  overwhelmed  with  the  new  and 
celestial  light  which  burst  in  upon  it,  was  elevated  contin- 
ually to  the  high  tension  of  adoration  and  love,  there  could 
be  little  room  for  calm  contemplation,  much  less  for  logical 
analysis.  But  once  let  this  wonder  subside  ;  once  let  the 
supernatural  light,  which  was  shed  around  the  cradle  of  the 
faith,  fade  away  ;  once  let  the  understanding  gain  its  natural 
ascendency  in  the  economy  of  the  man,  and  it  became  in- 
evitable that  the  primary  moral  unity,  in  which  the  Christian 
ideas  were  at  once  enfolded  and  conveyed,  should  be  subject- 
ed to  analysis,  to  separation,  and  at  length  to  a  formal  and 
logical  exposition.  This  process  began  in  the  lifetime  of  the 
Apostles,  and  even  through  their  own  instrumentality. 
Each  of  those  inspired  minds,  although  they  received  the 
truth  by  direct  intuitions  granted  from  above,  yet  grasped  it, 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  305 

and  taught  it,  through  the  medium  of  their  own  individuality. 
Christianity,  though  in  itself  a  perfect  unity,  yet  was  regard- 
ed even  by  them  from  different  points  of  view.  The  mind  of 
Paul,  for  example,  was  strictly  of  the  severe  and  logical 
order  ;  it  ever  tended  to  definitions — to  distinctive  statements 
— to  logical  argumentation  ;  and,  although  we  should  hardly 
say  that  in  his  Epistles  Christianity  as  yet  assumes  the  com- 
plete aspect  of  a  formal  and  systematic  theology,  yet  the  path 
was  at  least  opened  to  it,  and  that  peculiar  method  of  think- 
ing exhibited,  from  which  such  a  theology  was  sure,  sooner 
or  later,  to  result.  The  writings  of  John  are  of  a  totally  dif- 
ferent cast.  There  we  see  the  intuitional  element  preponder- 
ating over  the  logical — the  religious  life  brought  into  more 
direct  prominence  than  theological  lore.  In  James,  again, 
we  see  purely  the  practical  side  of  Christianity.  The  first 
says,  "  Believe  in  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  thou  shalt  be 
saved."  The  second  says,  "  He  that  loveth  is  born  of  God." 
The  third  affirms,  that  "  pure  and  undefiled  religion  before 
God,  even  the  Father,  is  to  visit  the  fatherless  and  widow  in 
their  afflictions,  and  keep  ourselves  unspotted  from  the 
world." 

Whilst,  however,  we  find  differences  as  to  the  mode  in 
which  Christianity  was  grasped  by  its  first  teachers,  yet  still 
they  were  all  so  deeply  imbued  with  the  same  spirit,  that 
such  differences  hardly  disturbed  in  any  degree  the  religious 
unity  of  the  Apostolic  Church.  We  gain  our  idea  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  it  then  existed,  from  all  these  apostolic  writings 
combined  ;  and  thus  by  the  action  of  our  own  minds  upon 
the  sentiments  there  contained,  we  construct  a  unitary  con- 
ception of  the  whole  religious  life,  which  then  flowed  through 
the  consciousness  of  the  faithful.  In  fact,  the  first  great 
pulsation  of  that  inevitable  process,  by  which,  Christianity 
was  to  be  developed  in  the  world,  had  taken  place ;  the  first 
historic  period  of  that  long  succeeding  series  had  rolled 
14* 


306  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

round  ;  the  first  effort  at  separation  and  analysis  had  been 
made  ;  and  the  first  attempt  at  gaining  a  conscious  and  re- 
flective idea  of  the  Doctrine  of  Christ  had  been  successfully 
put  forth. 

In  order  to  follow  up  this  historical  process,  we  must  pass 
onwards  from  the  apostolic  period,  to  about  the  middle  or 
even  close  of  the  second  century.  A  very  different  scene 
now  opens  upon  our  view.  The  comparative  unity,  which 
reigned  during  that  former  period,  is  now  no  more  :  schisms, 
heresies,  strifes,  and  contentions  have  begun  to  manifest 
themselves  in  very  decided  forms :  the  variations  which 
were  visible  in  so  gentle  and  natural  a  form,  in  the  different 
points  of  view  from  which  Christianity  was  regarded  by  the 
Apostles  themselves,  are  now  exaggerated  into  sects  and  par- 
ties, each  claiming  for  itself  the  superiority  over  all  the  rest. 
The  data  upon  which  these  parties  proceeded  were  virtually 
the  same.  They  all  had  the  Old  Testament,  and  the  Jewish 
life  to  appeal  to :  they  all  had  the  apostolic  writings,  more  or 
less,  in  their  hands ;  they  all  had  the  living  voice,  and  the 
now  fresh  and  distinctive  tradition  of  the  Church.  From 
what,  then,  did  the  differences  arise  ?  The  sole  answer  we 
can  give  is,  that  they  arose  from  the  different  exercise  of 
reason,  in  the  several  cases,  upon  the  data  which  lay  open 
before  it. 

Here,  then,  for  the  first  time,  dawned  the  great  problem 
upon  the  Church ;  namely,  to  reconcile  and  apportion  the 
respective  claims  of  reason  and  authority  in  the  sphere  of 
religious  truth.  Little  did  those  early  Christian  philosophers 
know  all  the  contention  which  lay  concealed  in  this  problem ; 
little  did  they  think  how  long  it  would  take  to  work  out  any 
thing  approaching  to  a  full  resolution  of  it ;  still  less,  did  they 
imagine  that  it  would  be,  for  centuries  upon  centuries,  the 
very  impulse  which  should  excite  the  whole  Church  to  un- 
wearied intellectual  progress.  Yet,  such  has  been,  and  still 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF   THE    PAST.  307 

is,  the  case.  These  two  ideas — authority  and  reason — have 
been  the  great  poles  of  all  religious  inquiry,  of  all  theological 
controversy.  On  the  side  of  authority,  we  may  enumerate 
all  the  attempts  the  world  has  witnessed  to  repress  criticism 
— to  govern  the  reason — to  set  up  a  central  doctrine,  reared 
upon  some  divine  pedestal,  which  no  human  mind  was  sup- 
posed competent  to  analyze  or  to  question — and  to  form  in 
this  way  a  Catholic  Christian  unity.  On  the  side  of  reason, 
we  have  had  a  perpetual  struggle  to  analyze — to  test — and 
to  realize  in  the  natural  consciousness  the  truth  of  revelation ; 
and  the  inevitable  results  of  this  struggle  have  always  been 
differences  of  opinion,  antagonistic  conclusions,  variations  of 
judgment,  (according  to  the  keenness  and  breadth  of  the  in- 
dividual reason  which  judges,)  and  a  consequent  tendency 
away  from  unity,  to  separation,  division,  and  disagreement. 

Here,  accordingly,  in  the  terms  authority  and  reason,  we 
have  involved  the  two  opposite  poles  of  the  dialectic  process, 
by  which  the  idea  of  Christianity  has  been  perpetually  evolv- 
ing along  the  pathway  of  human  history.  Whenever  the 
Church  has  rested  entirely  on  authority,  the  result  has  been, 
first,  a  stagnation  of  religious  vitality,  and  then  a  theology, 
which  appears  rather  as  an  excrescence  affixed  to  man's  real 
life,  than  one  which  lives  and  works  in  the  natural  and  daily 
play  of  the  human  consciousness.  On  the  other  hand,  when- 
ever the  Church  has  thrown  herself  entirely  upon  the  indivi- 
dual reason,  the  consequence  has  been  a  loosening  of  all  the 
bands  of  spiritual  unity  ;  a  religion  of  logic  and  bare  proposi- 
tions, rather  than  that  of  an  awakened  Christian  conscious- 
ness ;  and  a  process  of  pulverization  into  sects  and  parties, 
which  if  unchecked  would  never  stop  short  of  an  utter  isola- 
tion of  each  individual  from  the  soft  and  nurturing  bosom  of 
the  Church  Catholic,  in  its  organic  life  and  power. 

In  pointing  out  the  persistency  of  the  struggle  to  adjust 
the  claims  of  reason  and  authority,  and  in  referring  to  this  as 


308  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  central  point  of  the  great  controversies  of  Christianity  in 
the  centuries  which  are  past,  we  are  simply  keeping  within 
the  precincts  of  historical  fact.  And,  be  it  remembered,  his- 
torical fact  is  not  to  be  trifled  with ;  nor  is  it  our  place  to  la- 
ment over  it,  as  though  just  because  it  does  not  satisfy  our 
ideas  of  what  the  course  of  religious  truth  ought  to  have 
been,  that  course  is  all  a  sad  picture  of  time  lost,  and  talents 
squandered.  History  is  diviner  than  we  are  apt  to  think  it ; 
the  wanderings  of  the  human  spirit  after  truth  are  not  all  de- 
lusion and  loss ;  extremes,  however  terrible,  have  instruction 
in  them,  which  could  never  otherwise  be  realized  j  and  an- 
tagonisms of  opinion  have  displayed  or  called  forth  a  mental 
tension,  with  which  the  world  could  ill  dispense.  It  has 
been  the  providential  mission  of  one  party,  to  maintain  the 
validity  of  divine  authority  in  religion ;  it  has  been  the 
mission  of  another  to  advocate  the  claims  of  reason,  and 
the  light  that  is  within  us ;  it  has  ofttimes  been  the  aim  of  a 
third,  to  reconcile  the  claims  of  the  two,  and  bring  the  Chris- 
tian world  into  harmony  and  peace.  By  few,  comparatively, 
has  it  been  seen,  that  we  should  purchase  the  ascendency 
either  of  authority  or  of  reason  at  a  dear  rate  ;  yea,  that  it 
were  an  unfruitful  repose  to  consummate  a  perfect  reconcilia- 
tion of  the  two,  before  the  fulness  of  the  time  has  come  ;  but 
that,  in  their  very  antagonism,  we  have  the  secret  spring  of 
real  progress ;  and  that  in  the  continual  separation  effected 
by  the  reason,  we  are  marching  onwards  to  an  ever  higher, 
broader,  and  more  catholic  unity  in  the  clear  comprehension 
of  all  that  is  truly  implied  in  divine  authority. 

With  these  principles  to  guide  us,  let  us  cast  a  rapid 
glance  over  the  past,  and  attempt  to  read  its  significancy. 
When  first  the  question  of  reason  and  authority  dawned  upon 
the  Church  in  the  second  century,  the  problem  appeared  a 
very  simple  one  to  resolve.  The  apostles  themselves  were 
naturally  regarded  as  the  source  of  authority  ;  the  distinctive 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  309 

notions  and  speculations  of  different  Churches,  or  individuals, 
were  set  down  to  the  side  of  mere  fallible  human  reason. 
The  point,  therefore,  now  aimed  at,  was  this — to  select  out  of 
all  the  religious  writings  and  teachings,  which  the  Church 
reverenced  and  employed,  just  those  which  undoubtedly  came 
from  the  pen  or  the  lips  of  the  Apostles,  and  to  give  these 
forth  as  the  rule  or  canon  by  which  private  judgment  should 
be  henceforth  exercised  in  religious  matters.  To  this  lauda- 
ble attempt  we  owe  the  New  Testament  in  its  present  form ; 
for  those  writings  were  made  the  written  canon,  which  the 
Church  of  that  period  decided  upon  as  being  distinctly  and 
unquestionably  of  apostolic  origin  and  authority. 

The  canon,  therefore,  being  fixed  upon  by  general  con- 
sent, the  problem,  it  was  supposed,  might  be  considered  as 
solved,  and  the  grounds  of  dispute  for  ever  set  at  rest.  A 
very  short  time,  however,  was  required  to  elapse  ere  it  be- 
came abundantly  evident  that  the  question  was  any  thing  but 
settled  by  the  determination  of  the  canon  of  Scripture,  yea, 
that  the  same  dispute  between  reason  and  authority  was  des- 
tined to  revive  under  a  new  form,  and  with  far  deeper  bear- 
ings than  before.  In  proportion  as  the  human  reason  began 
to  exercise  itself  upon  the  ideas  spontaneously  involved  in  the 
religious  life  of  the  age,  it  became  clearer  and  clearer  that 
the  Scriptures  did  not  contain,  nor  were  designed  to  set  forth, 
any  formal  statement,  or  logical  system  of  truth  ;  that  they 
comprehended  the  elements  of  thinking  rather  than  the  re- 
sults ;  that,  admitting  the  canon,  therefore,  to  be  fixed  and 
certain,  yet  still  we  require  the  aid  of  reason  to  interpret  it, 
to  evolve  it  into  a  formal  theology,  to  create  a  whole  system 
of  truth  on  the  basis  of  its  illumination. 

The  continuous  disputes  which  took  place  between  the 
different  branches  of  the  Gnostics  and  the  orthodox,  from  the 
middle  of  the  second  century  down  to  the  Council  of  Nice, 
represent  the  strong  antagonism  which  then  existed  between 


310  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  principle  of  reason  and  of  authority.  The  Gnostics,  as 
their  name  imports,  not  content  with  the  bare  reception  of 
certain  undeveloped  religious  doctrines  on  the  plea  of  a  direct 
revelation,  wanted  to  transform  their  faith  into  knowledge. 
Philosophy,  which  they  had  studied  from  the  lips  or  writings 
of  Oriental,  Grecian,  or  Hebrew  sages,  showed  them  by  a 
light  which  could  not  be  mistaken,  that  the  ordinary  belief  of 
the  Christian  Churches,  however  pure,  sublime,  and  elevated 
in  its  nature,  still  left  all  the  great  speculative  questions  re- 
specting creation  and  destifcy,  in  abeyance.  Adapted  more 
especially  for  moral  influence,  that  belief  had  not  intruded 
upon  the  domain  of  philosophic  statements,  nor  had  as  yet 
dreamed  of  constructing  a  whole  system  of  metaphysical  doc- 
trine. Without  designing,  therefore,  to  impugn  the  truth  of 
Christianity,  these  Christian  speculators  sought  to  expound  it, 
— to  make  it  satisfactory  to  the  understanding  as  a  philosophy, 
as  well  as  purifying  to  the  conscience  as  a  moral  influence 
and  a  Divine  faith.  Hence  their  discussions  on  the  nature  of 
the  Trinity  ;  the  person  of  Christ ;  the  creation  of  the  world  ; 
the  essence  of  virtue,  and  the  origin  of  evil ;  and  hence  also 
the  different  modes  of  interpretation  by  which  they  sought  at 
once  to  reconcile  the  Scriptures  to  their  philosophy,  and  phi- 
losophy to  the  Scriptures.  Little  as  we  can  now  sympathize 
in  the  reveries  of  Gnosticism,  yet  it  is  impossible  to  overlook 
the  fact,  that  theological  science  owes  its  rise,  its  first  develop- 
ment, and  not  a  little  of  its  phraseology  as  used  in  the  present 
day,  to  this  source.  Some  of  the  most  learned  and  laborious 
fathers  of  the  Church  avowedly  owed  their  conversion  to 
Christianity  to  the  superiority  its  advocates  showed  in  dealing 
with  philosophical  questions  ;  and  the  apologies  which  form 
so  great  a  share  of  the  early  patristic  literature,  owe  well 
nigh  the  whole  of  their  interest  to  the  philosophical  discus- 
sions contained  in  them — discussions  in  which  they  either 
overthrow  the  heathen  dogmas,  or  demonstrate  the  superior 
reasonableness  of  their  own. 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  311 


Against  the  rliystic  Rationalism  of  the  Gnostics,  the  more 
orthodox  party  opposed  the  weight  of  scriptural  and  Catholic 
authority.  Placed,  however,  upon  their  defence,  that  party 
were  obliged,  in  their  turn,  to  bend  the  whole  energy  of  their 
reason  upon  the  clear  explication  of  the  Christian  doctrines 
ordinarily  acknowledged  by  the  age.  Instead  of  leaving 
them  in  that  undefined  and  indistinct  form  in  which  they  had 
been  held  by  the  primitive  Churches,  they  were  now  obliged 
to  oppose  logic  to  logic,  philosophy  to  philosophy,  definition 
to  definition.  Theology  began  to  mould  itself  into  a  scientific 
form,  and  although  the  principle  of  authority  firmly  main- 
tained its  ground  against  those  who  would  tear  themselves 
altogether  away  from  it,  yet  the  dictates  of  authority  itself 
were  now  expressed  in  a  guarded  and  logical  phraseology, 
which  bespoke  the  keenness  of  the  controversy  through  which 
they  had  passed,  and  the  necessity  of  sheltering  themselves 
from  future  aggressions  of  a  like  nature.  The  Nicene 
Council  was  the  triumph  of  Catholic  authority  over  the 
Gnostic  Rationalism ;  but  it  was  a  triumph  which  could 
only  be  gained  by  adopting  on  the  side  of  authority  itself  the 
theological  formularies  to  which  the  whole  philosophical  dis- 
cussion had  given  rise.  We  may  call  the  profession  of  the 
Nicene  Council,  therefore,  a  point  of  unity  or  agreement  to 
which  the  theology  of  the  age  attained ;  but  yet  it  was  a 
unity  much  more  pregnant  with  reflective  idea,  and  much 
more  developed  in  the  whole  tone  of  its  scientific  thinking, 
than  had  been  that  of  the  primitive  Church  itself. 

In  denominating  the  Nicene  period  as  a  point  of  agree- 
ment, we  do  not  mean  that  it  put  an  end  to  the  theological 
controversies  of  the  age.  We  regard  it  simply  as  the  virtual 
termination  of  the  purely  Gnostic  heresies — not  certainly  of 
the  questions  which  arose  out  of  them.  It  is  to  be  remarked, 
however,  that  from  this  period  the  whole  tone  of  religious 
controversy  became  greatly  altered.  Christian  ideas  had 


312  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

now  gained  a  decided  triumph  over  the  tenets  of  the  heathen 
philosophies;  the  bold  affirmation  of  theosophic  and  other 
heathen  doctrines,  and  the  attempt  to  reconcile  them  with 
Christianity,  gradually  died  away,  and  the  claims  of  reason 
over  the  dictates  of  authority  were  circumscribed  within  a 
much  smaller  and  more  intelligible  sphere.  In  fact,  the 
affirmations  of  reason,  and  the.  decisions  of  authority,  began 
now  to  approach  far  nearer  to  each  other,  just  in  proportion 
as  reason  became  Christianized,  and  Christianity  reduced  to 
logical  and  systematic  terms.  Accordingly,  the  next  great 
controversy — that  between  Pelagius  and  Augustine — was  al- 
most entirely  separated  from  any  direct  community  with  the 
dogmas  of  oriental,  or  even  of  Grecian  philosophy,  aiming 
rather  at  the  correct  logical  exposition  and  statement  of  the 
already  established  points  of  Christian  theology. 

Pelagius  may  be  regarded  as  the  representative  of  the 
philosophic,  or  critical  spirit,  as  then  employed  in  the  domain 
of  religious  truth  ;  Augustine,  though  making  an  unsparing 
use  of  Aristotelian  aids  in  the  discussions  he  undertook,  yet 
represented  the  principle  of  authority  as  then  accepted  by  the 
Church.  It  did  not  long  remain  doubtful  to  which  side  the 
preponderance  would  be  given.  The  character  of  the  age 
was  one  singularly  deficient  in  all  independence  of  mind. 
The  philosophers  of  the  age  were  no  longer  thinkers  for 
themselves,  but  merely  commentators  upon  the  thoughts  of 
others ;  the  politicians  were  more  apt  at  making  digests  of 
laws  already  propounded,  than  at  originating  any  broader 
ideas  upon  the  questions  of  jurisprudence  and  government ; 
the  religious  writers  were,  in  like  manner,  employed  in  ex- 
pounding the  meaning  of  their  authorities  far  more  than  in 
any  independent  researches  into  the  real  moral  signification 
of  the  Christian  doctrines.  The  reign  of  authority  thus  be- 
came established  against  the  more  independent  efforts  of  the 
critical  spirit,  which  now  bade  a  long  farewell  to  the  world, 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  313 


and  withdrew  itself  almost  entirely  from  its  more  prominent 
place  on  the  stage  of  human  development. 

Under  these  partial  influences,  the  purer  theology  of  the 
Church  disappeared,  amid  the  darkness  and  barbarism  which 
overspread  like  a  cloud  the  whole  of  the  western  empire ; 
the  most  entire  and  servile  dependence  upon  authority,  alike 
in  ecclesiastical,  theological,  and  philosophical  questions,  en- 
sued ;  and  European  thought  only  showed  any  symptoms  of 
awaking  anew  when  the  last  relics  of  the  ancient  civiliza- 
tion had  died  away,  and  the  first  symptoms  of  the  world's 
new  life  appeared. 

To  see  the  continuation  of  the  antagonism,  therefore, 
between  reason  and  authority,  and  to  trace  it  onwards  in  its 
course  towards  a  fuller  development  of  the  question,  we  must 
pass  onwards  to  the  commencement  of  the  scholastic  philoso- 
phy— a  philosophy  which  stands  in  direct  co-ordination  with 
the  writings  of  Augustine.  It  has  been  usual  amongst  philo- 
sophical writers  to  divide  the  whole  scholastic  periods  into 
three  eras.  1.  That  which  is  marked  by  the  absolute 
subordination  of  philosophy  to  theology,  i.  e.,  in  the  sense 
then  employed,  to  authority.  2.  That  which  marks  the 
friendly  alliance  of  philosophy  with  dogmatic  theology  ;  and, 
3.  That  which  marks  the  commencement  of  a  separation 
between  the  two,  and  the  dawn  of  the  entire  independence  of 
philosophical  inquiry.  If  we  adopt  this  division  of  the 
scholastic  ages — a  division  which,  in  the  main,  will,  I  think, 
be  found  perfectly  coincident  with  historical  fact, — it  gives 
us  a  good  clue  by  which  to  trace  onwards  the  antagonism 
we  are  now  considering,  and  to  estimate  the  development  of 
the  great  idea  of  Christianity  under  its  constantly  impelling 
influence. 

The  sixth,  seventh,  and  eighth  centuries,  we  may  con- 
sider, were  marked  by  the  entire  preponderance  of  the  spirit 
of  authority,  and  by  that  utter  decline  of  all  intellectual  and 


314  fHlLOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

religious  vitality  which  is  its  inevitable  result.  The  ninth 
century  witnessed  in  the  person  of  Joannes  Scotus  Erigena 
the  first  feeble  attempts  of  the  human  reason  to  reassert  its 
legitimate  influence  and  rightful  power  in  the  world.  That 
he  admitted  the  entire  subordination  of  philosophy  to  authori- 
ty is,  indeed,  perfectly  true ;  but  yet,  within  the  limits  which 
authority  assigns,  he  maintained  the  power  and  the  right  of 
the  human  understanding  to  demand  a  rational  account  of  its 
own  belief.  He  advocated,  indeed,  the  necessity  of  faith  in 
order  to  arrive  at  knowledge  ;  but  he  affirmed  that  our  faith 
must  endeavor  to  complete  itself  by  means  of  science, — so 
that  the  principle  on  which  he  took  his  stand  was,  faith 
raised  to  reflective  intelligence,  that  which  Anselm  afterwards 
termed,  "fides  quarens  intellectum"  Such  was  the  new 
position  with  which  he  startled  the  death-like  repose  of  his 
age. 

Between  the  death  of  Scotus  Erigena  and  the  birth  of 
Abelard,  a  period  of  200  years  (within  a  little)  intervened  ; 
the  one  representing  the  commencement  of  scholasticism, 
and  the  other  marking  well-nigh  the  close  of  its  first  era. 
The  progress  of  the  struggle  within  these  200  years  was 
very  decided,  and  the  minds  of  the  more  thoughtful  were, 
accordingly,  drawn  increasingly  away  from  a  blind  trust 
in  authority  towards  the  opposite  pole.  Abelard  brought 
out  the  office  of  reason  in  theological  investigation  into 
clearer  light  than  any  other  man  of  his  age.  He  condemned 
the  habit  of  mind,  so  common  in  his  day,  of  receiving  any 
dogma,  which  might  be  presented,  without  examination ;  and 
although  he  yielded  the  prime  decision  of  the  limits  of  human 
knowledge  to  authority,  yet  he  did  not  hesitate  to  affirm,  "  In 
omnibus  his,  quse  ratione  discuti  possunt,  non  est  necessarium 
Auctoritatis  judicium." 

The    second    era   of   scholasticism    was    that    which    is 
designated  by  the  writings  of  Albertus  Magnus,   Thomas 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  315 

Aquinas,  and  Dun  Scotus.  This  era  forms  the  very  central 
point  of  the  scholastic  philosophy  properly  so  called,  and 
gives  us  the  most  complete  view  we  can  possibly  attain  of 
the  relation  between  reason  and  authority,  as  it  existed  in 
the  middle  ages.  Human  knowledge,  on  all  the  higher 
questions,  was  still  considered  to  have  iisfoundation  in  a  direct 
and  objective  revelation  ;  but  entirely  separate  from  this, 
there  was  supposed  to  exist  a  philosophical  organum,  (that, 
namely,  which  was  first  propounded  by  Aristotle,)  through 
the  instrumentality  of  which  theological  truth  was  to  be 
carried  back  to  its  first  principles,  to  be  tested  as  to  its 
validity,  to  be  established  on  reflective  or  intellectual 
grounds,  and  to  be  developed  in  one  chain  of  logical  order, 
into  a  complete  system.  Between  dogmatic  theology,  there- 
fore, and  philosophy,  viewed  in  the  light  of  a  logical  method, 
there  was  now  established  a  perfect  unanimity.  It  could 
not  be  said,  that  the  one  was  above  the  other  ;  for  they  were 
both  blended  in  unison.  The  dogmatic  limits  being  fixed 
by  authority,  it  was  for  scholastic  science  to  enter  the  stakes, 
to  bid  defiance  to  every  opponent,  to  gird  itself  to  the  work 
of  endless  disputation,  and  maintain  the  dogmas  of  the 
Church,  whatever  they  might  happen  to  be,  with  all  the 
subtlety  which  logical  acumen  could  supply.  The  Church 
gave  the  matter,  Aristotle  supplied  the  form  ;  and  as  matter 
and  form  are  equally  necessary  for  a  dogmatic  system,  the 
validity  of  each  of  these  was  regarded  as  being,  in  its  own 
department,  equally  unquestionable  and  equally  supreme. 

Raymond  Lully  and  Roger  Bacon,  followed  up  by  Occam 
and  the  Nominalists,  represent  the  illuminati  of  their  age, 
under  the  third  and  declining  era  of  the  scholastic  philosophy. 
Here  we  find  the  first  attempts  at  rendering  philosophical 
inquiry  independent  of  the  absolute  authority  of  the  Church. 
The  soul  of  Europe,  so  long  buried  under  the  dead  weight 
of  ecclesiastical  domination  and  Aristotelian  forms,  now 


31<3  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

began  to  struggle  for  freedom  and  life.  The  rise  of  a  native 
literature,  especially  in  Italy  and  France ;  the  invention  of 
printing,  which  soon  after  ensued  ;  the  general  disgust  and 
dissatisfaction  which  began  to  be  felt  against  the  practices 
and  superstitions  of  the  Church ;  the  struggles  for  a  new 
philosophy  and  an  improved  logic ; — all  helped  to  pave  the 
way  for  a  brighter  and  happier  era.  That  era  was  ushered 
in  by  the  Protestant  Reformation. 

The  Reformation  was  essentially  a  revolt  against  autho- 
rity. It  was  so  equally  in  Church,  and  in  State,  in  law,  in 
philosophy,  in  religion.  It  presented  the  aspect  of  reason 
and  humanity  asserting  their  right,  and  protesting  against 
being  any  longer  held  in  unlawful  bondage.  Waiving,  how- 
ever, all  consideration  of  this  revolt  in  other  points  of  view, 
we  have  now  only  to  consider  it  as  it  affected  the  develop- 
ment of  Christian  ideas.  That  the  first  Reformers  should 
comprehend  the  question  of  religious  liberty  in  all  its  length 
and  breadth,  was  not  to  be  expected.  They  had  seen  the 
spirit  of  man  crushed  under  the  domination  of  a  pretended 
outward  infallibility  ;  they  had  seen  the  Church  assuming 
the  part  of  a  mediator  between  heaven  and  earth  ;  they  had 
seen  the  devastation  which  was  thus  made  of  the  noblest 
moral  energies  of  mankind  ;  and  now  they  came  forwards, 
not  as  casting  away  all  authority  in  matters  of  religion,  but 
as  protesting  against  the  inordinate  claims  of  the  Papal  Hie- 
rarchy. With  this  intent  they  maintained  the  sufficiency  of 
the  Scriptures,  as  a  rule  of  faith,  in  contradistinction  to  the 
dictates  of  tradition  or  the  decisions  of  Councils ;  and  then 
asserted  the  right  of  private  judgment  in  opposition  to,  the 
mediation  of  a  priesthood,  and  the  consequent  responsibility 
of  the  individual  to  God  alone,  as  regards  his  religious  belief 
and  practice. 

The  affirmation  of  the  right  of  private  judgment  in  all  mat- 
ters of  duty  and  dictates  of  conscience,  is  one  of  the  strong- 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  317 

est  claims  which  Protestantism  has  upon  the  eternal  grati- 
tude of  mankind ;  but  we  are  far  from  thinking  that  it  has 
dealt  as  yet  so  successfully  with  the  question  of  the  possibi- 
lity of  private  judgment,  or  of  the  individual  reason,  in  the 
search  after  truth.  The  confusion  that  has  existed  between 
these  two  doctrines  (so  dissimilar  in  themselves)  has  perpe- 
tually hindered  the  advocates  of  Protestantism  from  looking 
the  question  of  reason  and  authority  clearly  in  the  face. 
The  consequence  has  been,  that  for  three  hundred  years  the 
most  indefinite  and  ofttimes  contradictory  notions  have  been 
asserted,  more  or  less,  by  all  the  different  Protestant 
Churches  upon  the  doctrine  of  private  judgment — a  doctrine 
which  they  have  all  alike  professedly  held,  and  all  attempt- 
ed in  their  different  methods  to  explain.  These  attempts  to 
explain  a  doctrine  involving  the  most  momentous  questions 
in  the  philosophy  of  human  nature,  have  given  rise  through 
the  whole  history  of  Protestantism  to  a  perpetual  struggle 
between  the  two  principles  of  reason  and  authority.  Here, 
for  example,  we  see  the  appeal  to  authority,  as  residing  in 
different  communities,  rendered  paramount  over  the  decisions 
of  the  individual  judgment,  and  calling  down  upon  the  head 
of  the  dissentient  no  very  light  and  endurable  penalties. 
There,  again,  we  find  the  individual  reason  boldly  asserting 
its  validity  against  all  the  catholic  religious  thinking  of  the 
past  and  the  present.  One  Protestant  Church  or  party 
grounds  its  right  to  coerce  private  opinion  upon  the  decision 
of  a  King  or  a  Parliament ;  another  grounds  it  upon  a  pure- 
ly imaginary  outward  continuity  of  apostolical  succession  ; 
a  third  grounds  it  upon  some  conclave  of  worthy  men  who 
sat  in  solemn  decision  upon  the  doctrines  of  Scripture  some 
one  or  two  centuries  ago,  in  Westminster,  Holland,  or  Ge- 
neva ;  while  a  fourth  grounds  it  upon  the  sharp-sighted  in- 
dividual who  was  fortunate  enough  to  perpetuate  his  memory 
by  creating  a  new  sect,  and  bestowing  his  name  upon  it. 


318  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Against  all  these  various  assertions  of  authority,  on  the 
other  hand,  there  has  ever  been  in  the  precincts  of  Protes- 
tantism a  struggle  in  behalf  of  the  perfect  competency  of  the 
individual  to  shape  his  belief  as  he  will,  upon  the  data  which 
God  has  furnished  us  in  nature  and  revelation.  Nay,  what 
is  more,  this  species  of  individualism  is  pretty  evidently  the 
natural  tendency  of  a  great  part  of  the  Protestantism  which 
has  hitherto  existed, — or,  we  should  perhaps  rather  say,  the 
natural  tendency  of  the  doctrine  of  private  judgment,  as  fre- 
quently professed  by  Protestant  Churches.  This  doctrine  as- 
serts, that  the  data  of  Christian  theology  lie  before  us,  fixed 
and  complete  in  the  Bible  ;  that  theology  itself  results  from 
an  inductive  process,  that,  namely,  of  gathering  out,  compar- 
ing, and  arranging  Scripture  passages,  so  as  to  form  a  con- 
nected body  of  doctrine ;  that,  as  every  man  has  the  Bible 
in  his  hands,  and  is  furnished  with  an  understanding  capable 
of  carrying  on  the  process  of  induction,  so  every  man  of  suf- 
ficient learning  has  in  possession  the  complete  apparatus  for 
constructing  a  perfect  theology.  This  view  of  the  case, 
however  simple  at  first  sight,  is  soon  found,  as  we  have  be- 
fore seen,  to  be  encompassed  with  unnumbered  difficulties. 
It  entirely  overlooks  the  fact,  that  our  induction  will  be  alto- 
gether different,  according  to  the  conception  we  attach  to  the 
terms  employed  in  Scripture  ;  according  to  the  intuitions  we 
may  happen  to  possess  of  spiritual  things ;  according  to  the 
whole  state  of  our  inward  religious  life.  This  inward  reli- 
gious life,  let  it  be  observed,  is  due  mainly  to  the  religious 
consciousness  of  the  age  in  which  we  live, — to  the  present 
development  of  Christian  ideas  in  the  flow  of  human  history ; 
so  that  the  theory  of  private  judgment,  and  the  mode  of  con- 
structing a  theology  grounded  upon  it,  cuts  us  off  entirely  as 
individuals  from  the  whole  growth  of  the  universal  Christian 
consciousness  of  mankind,  and  throws  the  validity  of  our 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF   THE    PAST.  319 

whole  theology  back  upon  a  mere  formal  process  of  logical 
induction. 

To  contravene  the  authorized  license,  which  the  indivi- 
dual may,  on  these  principles,  indulge  in,  (since  every  one 
can  say  that  the  results  of  his  inductions  are  as  valid  as  those 
of  any  one  else,)  the  majority  of  Protestants  have  brought  in 
the  weight  of  their  several  communities,  and  attempted  by 
the  "  argumentum  ad  verecundiam"  to  circumscribe  the  un- 
fettered exercise  of  private  judgment.  But  this  attempt  is 
ever  hampered  with  two  objections  :  first,  that  it  is  not  very 
consistent  with  the  professed  right  of  individual  interpretation 
at  all ;  and,  secondly,  that  out  of  all  the  different  communi- 
ties to  whose  authority  appeal  is  made,  the  really  honest  and 
unprejudiced  inquirer  does  not  know  which  is  most  worthy  of 
his  confidence  ;  while,  if  he  admit  them  all,  he  finds  the  doc- 
trine of  one  to  be,  for  the  most  part,  neutralized  by  that  of 
others.  On  the  whole,  therefore,  it  must  be  admitted,  that, 
since  the  confidence  of  mankind  has  been  shaken  in  the 
fixed  infallibility  of  the  Papal  Church,  no  perfectly  clear 
and  intelligible  principle  of  appeal  has  been  put  into  its 
place.  The  age  in  which  we  now  live,  an  age  univer- 
sally fruitful  in  independent  thinking,  is  fast  driving  the 
question  of  reason  and  authority  as  held  by  the  Protes- 
tant world  to  a  point.  Multitudes,  fully  conscious  of  the 
logical  untenableness  of  their  ordinary  profession,  have  been 
impelled  to  one  or  the  other  extreme.  Some,  following  out 
the  principle  of  individualism,  have  seen  it  land  them  in  the 
lowest  abyss  of  Rationalism  ;  while  others,  naturally  shrink- 
ing from  such  a  result,  have  thrown  themselves  into  the  arms 
of  absolute  authority.  On  this  spectacle  the  Christian  world 
is  now  gazing,  and  many  is  the  throbbing  heart  which  is  ask- 
ing, at  the  hands  of  the  Protestant  Church,  in  which  its  faith 
has  been  nurtured,  an  intelligible  solution  of  this  all-import- 
ant question. 


320  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


Are  we,  then,  at  present  in  a  fair  way  for  obtaining  such 
a  solution  ;  or  must  we  relinquish  all  hope  of  seeing  the 
question  of  reason  and  authority  placed  upon  a  more  intelli- 
gible basis  ?  The  history  of  the  past,  I  think,  indicates  to 
us  most  plainly  that,  although  we  are  not  to  look  for  an  ab- 
solute and  final  settlement  of  the  question,  yet  there  is  every 
reason  for  us  to  hope  that  it  may  be  thrown  into  yet  new  re- 
lations, or  merged  into  yet  higher  principles,  and  that  it  will 
in  this  way  lead  to  a  temporary  resting-place  and  a  yet  fuller 
development  of  Christian  ideas  in  the  world. 

In  examining  the  controversies  of  past  ages  we  see  that 
every  fresh  statement  of  the  relations  between  reason  and 
authority  has  been  accompanied  with,  and  superinduced  by, 
the  growth  of  some  peculiar  system  of  philosophy.  The 
Gnostic  controversy  on  the  subject  was  occasioned  and  kept 
alive  by  the  influence  of  Oriental  and  Platonic  doctrines. 
So  soon  as  these  died  away,  the  controversy,  as  then  carried 
on,  died  away  with  them.  From  the  age  of  Augustine  down 
to  the  close  of  the  scholastic  period,  the  philosophy  of  Aris- 
totle held  the  supreme  rule  over  the  intelligence  of  mankind, 
and  the  struggle  between  reason  and  authority  was  carried 
on  solely  by  the  aid  of  the  Aristotelian  organum.  When 
the  philosophical  technology  of  the  scholastic  age  disappear- 
ed, the  whole  of  the  grounds  on  which  that  struggle  had 
been  kept  up  disappeared  with  it,  and  the  question  was 
merged  into  a  still  higher  form.  To  the  Aristotelian  orga- 
num succeeded  the  Baconian  ;  and  just  in  proportion  as  it 
gained  general  acknowledgment  as  a  philosophical  method, 
the  process  of  theological  inquiry  assumed  the  form  of  an 
induction  from  scriptural  data. 

The  era  of  induction  has,  without  doubt,  played  a  splen- 
did part  in  the  development  of  humanity ;  and  where  its 
application  is  legitimate  is  still  destined  to  make  noble 
achievements.  But  the  dawn  of  another  philosophical  era 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  321 

is  even  now  at  hand.  It  has  already  been  abundantly 
proved,  that  purely  inductive  processes  are  not  the  sole  me- 
thod we  have  to  employ ;  that  induction  itself,  indeed,  rests 
upon  a  priori,  or  transcendental  principles  ;  and  that  in  all 
the  higher  branches  of  philosophical  inquiry, — those,  namely, 
which  lie  beyond  the  region  of  empirical  facts, — we  must 
appeal  to  some  standard  higher  than  that  which  results  from 
a  mere  inductive  procedure,  and  employ  a  method  of  re- 
search very  different  from  the  Baconian  organum.  The 
inductive  method  of  inquiry  has  argued  the  question  of  rea- 
son and  authority  upon  principles  which  are  utterly  incapa- 
ble of  grappling  with  its  real  difficulties, — principles  which 
must  consequently  for  ever  fail  of  bringing  it  to  any  satis- 
factory termination.  The  imposing  appearance  of  induction, 
as  applied  to  theology,  has,  it  is  true,  sufficed  to  carry  away 
many  with  the  hope  of  finding  there  a  final  repose,  and  of 
reaping  fruits  in  theological  research  akin  to  the  noble  re- 
sults of  physical  investigation.  But  the  hollowness  of  this 
expectation  has  become  already  visible  to  the  foremost  think- 
ers of  our  age.  Already  is  it  seen  that  the  true  advance- 
ment of  theology  does  not  depend  so  much  upon  any  logical 
or  purely  inductive  processes  applied  to  the  scriptural  data, 
as  upon  the  clearing  of  our  religious  intuitions,  and  the 
higher  development  of  our  whole  religious  consciousness. 
Thus,  as  a  higher  and  more  spiritual  philosophy  advances, 
the  arena  of  theological  research  will  be  removed  more  and 
more  from  the  region  of  these  mere  mechanical  and  induc- 
tive principles,  and  the  main  efforts  of  theologians  be  directed 
to  the  development  of  those  lofty  spiritual  intuitions,  in 
which  Christianity,  as  a  religion,  essentially  consists,  and  by 
the  light  of  which  alone  we  can  interpret  the  language 
either  of  nature  or  revelation. 

We  affirm  it,  therefore,  as  an  expectation  which,  if  there 
15 


322  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

be  any  truth  in  the  significancy  of  the  past,  must  inevitably 
be  realized:  that  the  scattered  and  disjointed  elements  of 
Protestantism,  those  pulverized  fragments  of  our  religious 
life,  which  have  been  isolated  by  the  asserted  supremacy  of 
the  individual  judgment,  and  the  all-sufficiency  of  logical 
processes,  must  ere  long  seek  for  a  new  and  a  higher  unity 
in  the  intuitional  consciousness.  We  regard  it  as  a  moral 
certainty,  that  with  the  development  of  a  new  philosophy  a 
new  method  will  be  introduced  into  theological  inquiry  ;  and 
the  antagonism  between  reason  and  authority  will  find,  at 
least,  a  temporat-y  resting-place  in  a  more  perfect  critique  of 
the  essential  elements  of  reason,  and  the  essential  nature  of 
a  Divine  inspiration. 

Under  these  influences  we  look  for  a  broader  and  purer 
development  of  the  religious  life.  The  worship  of  images 
which  the  Iconoclasts  of  the  middle  ages  failed  to  extin- 
guish, and  which  it  was  left  for  Protestantism  to  destroy, 
has  long  passed  away  from  the  minds  of  the  enlightened  ; 
but  the  worship  of  propositions  has  been  too  often  substituted 
in  its  place.  In  the  next  great  historical  era  of  the  Christian 
life,  we  shall  get  beyond  the  worship  of  dogmas,  and  find 
that  the  Church  has  been  unrighteously  placing  those  pro- 
ductions of  human  reason  on  a  level  with  the  Divine  life  in 
its  immediate  emanation  from  the  Most  High. 

We  are  not  ignorant  or  thoughtless  enough  to  look  even 
then  for  a  cessation  from  all  antagonism  in  the  Christian 
Church.  All  we  look  for  is  a  continuous  progress  towards 
light  and  towards  love.  Were  antagonism  entirely  to  cease, 
the  life  of  Christianity  would  be  paralyzed ;  but  still  that 
antagonism  may  become  more  pure,  more  intelligent,  and,  if 
we  may  so  say,  more  peaceful.  Antagonism  once  led  the 
vanquished  to  the  Inquisition,  the  fagot,  the  stake.  It  now 
confines  its  penalties  to  social  contempt  and  well-rounded 


THE    SIGNIFICANCY    OF    THE    PAST.  323 

abuse.  We,  or  our  immediate  posterity,  may  yet  live  to  see 
religious  antagonism  performing  its  office,  without  carrying 
with  it  either  a  penalty  or  a  sting.  Were  the  significancy  of 
the  past  but  rightly  understood,  it  must  materially  help  for- 
wards that  great  and  much  longed-for  result. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ON    THE    RELATION    BETWEEN    PHILOSOPHY    AND   THEOLOGY. 

THE  end  of  one  philosophical  book  ought  to  be  the  beginning 
of  another.  So  unceasing  is  the  flow  of  human  thought, 
that,  whatever  conclusions  we  arrive  at,  they  are  but  the 
starting-points  of  new  analyses  and  fresh  investigations.  In 
the  foregoing  discussions  upon  the  philosophy  of  religion,  we 
are  far  from  imagining  that  we  have  exhausted  the  subject, 
or  brought  the  questions  that  have  been  raised  and  mooted  to 
their  last  analysis.  So  far  from  that,  the  most  we  can  expect 
to  have  accomplished  is,  to  have  cleared  away  a  few  errors, 
to  have  put  the  subject  in  a  somewhat  more  philosophical 
point  of  view  than  that  in  which  it  is  popularly  regarded, 
and  thus  to  have  brought  it  into  the  track  of  further  elucida- 
tion for  the  future.  The  object  of  this  concluding  chapter, 
then,  is  to  sum  up  the  points  we  have  gained  in  the  foregoing 
considerations,  and  to  leave  the  question  concerning  the 
philosophy  of  religion  in  such  a  state,  that  it  may  the  more 
easily  lie  open  to  renewed  investigations. 

That  there  is  some  connection  between  philosophy  and 
religion  is  manifest  from  the  very  slightest  consideration, 
since  all  those  mental  processes,  which  are  the  object-matter 
of  psychological  research,  are  indissolubly  blended  with  the 
subjective  phases  of  the  religious  life.  The  great  point  to 
be  determined  is,  how  far  that  connection  extends.  However 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  325 

"X 

closely  the  two  may  seem  to  unite  in  the  region  where  the 
respective  subjects  insensibly  shade  off  into  each  other,  yet  it 
is  by  no  means  so  easy  to  realize  a  connection  between  their 
more  extreme  points ;  and  it  is  just  in  this  respect,  accord- 
ingly, that  fresh  light  requires  to  be  shed  upon  the  whole 
subject. 

Now  the  question  of  religion  merges,  in  the  present  day, 
into  that  of  Christianity ;  and  Christianity,  when  reflectively 
realized,  becomes  a  formal  system  of  theology.  We  see, 
therefore,  at  the  one  extreme  of  the  two  subjects  now  before 
us,  pure  philosophical  thinking,  developed  according  to  the 
fixed  laws  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  at  the  other  extreme,  a 
complete  system  of  Christian  theology,  with  all  its  super- 
natural elements  interwoven  into  it.  The  philosophy  of 
religion  takes  these  two  points  as  data  ;  it  sees  them  existing 
as  facts  in  the  human  consciousness  ;  and  the  problem  it  has 
to  solve  is,  to  connect  them  in  such  a  manner  that  their  true 
relationship  becomes  manifest,  and  their  respective  grounds 
of  certitude  clearly  determined. 

That  the  relationship  existing  between  philosophy  and 
theology  should  be  very  indistinctly  realized,  is  not,  in  truth, 
to  be  wondered  at,  when  we  consider  how  indistinct  has  been 
the  notion  attached  to  the  very  terms  themselves.  The  idea 
of  philosophy  we  well  know  has  been,  and  still  is,  frequently 
so  indefinitely  understood,  that  many  regard  it  as  being  alto- 
gether limited  to  the  analysis  and  classification  of  the  powers 
and  faculties  of  the  human  mind ;  and  apply  it  even  to  these 
in  very  different  acceptations.  The  idea  of  theology  in  like 
manner  has  been  equally  vague ;  so  much  so,  that  many 
indeed  have  imagined  it  to  consist  in  a  simple  classification 
of  Scripture  passages,  utterly  unconscious  how  impossible  it 
is  to  make  any  such  classification  at  all,  without  involving 
human  principles  both  of  analysis  and  interpretation. 

Accordingly,  the  relationship,  supposed  to  exist  between 


326  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  two,  has  necessarily  varied  with  the  scope  that  has  been 
respectively  assigned  to  them  ;  nay,  further,  we  may  expect 
it  still  to  vary,  for  in  proportion  as  the  conceptions  of  philoso- 
phy and  theology  become  more  developed,  we  shall  find  that 
their  respective  spheres  stand  very  differently  related  to- 
wards each  other.  The  most  accurate  way,  therefore,  in 
which  we  can  regard  this  relationship  is,  to  view  it  in  the 
light  of  a  fluent,  rather  than  a  constant  expression.  As  an- 
alysis becomes  closer,  and  what  appeared  to  be  original  ele- 
ments become  perhaps  resolved  into  their  constituent  parts, 
we  shall  ever  find  that  our  philosophy  requires  a  different 
expression  in  relation  to  our  theology,  while  our  theology 
perpetually  requires  a  different  statement  in  relation  to  phi- 
losophical research.  Without  further  preliminaries,  how- 
ever, let  us  come  to  the  question  itself. 

And,  first  of  all,  let  it  be  remarked,  that  there  are  two 
extremes  into  which  mankind  have  very  generally  run  in 
reference  to  the  relationship  we  are  now  considering.  Some 
have  regarded  Christian  theology  as  a  system  of  truth,  which 
has  come  down  to  us  entire,  in  precise  and  reflective  terms 
from  God  himself.  Others,  again,  have  regarded  it  as  being 
wholly  based  upon  the  laws  and  principles  of  human  reason. 
Many,  indeed,  have  occupied  a  position  intermediate  be- 
tween these  extremes,  inasmuch  as  they  have  endeavored  to 
divaricate  the  whole  body  of  Christian  theology,  and  show 
what  portion  has  come  from  the  human  reason,  and  what  is 
a  direct  impartation  from  Heaven.  .  But  still  the  two  great 
tendencies  in  the  views  which  have  been  taken  upon  this 
subject,  are  those  which  point  to  the  extremes  above  indi- 
cated; extremes  which  have  pervaded,  more  or  less,  the 
whole  history  of  the  Christian  Church. 

In  those  ages  which  were  characterized  by  an  almost  en- 
tire subserviency  to  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  the  prevail- 
ing notion  (cherished,  moreover,  by  that  Church  in  its  high- 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY. 


est  functionaries,)  was, — that  theology  was  entirely  a  gift 
imparted  by  God  to  those  who  were  specially  appointed  to 
be  administrators  of  divine  truth,  and  that  humanity  had  no- 
thing whatever  to  do  with  its  formal  construction,  and  no 
power  to  judge  of  its  real  validity.  The  opposite  tendency, 
which  developed  itself,  distinctly  though  somewhat  feebly,  in 
the  more  philosophical  thinkers  of  those  ages,  was  seen  in 
the  struggle  they  manifested  to  find  a  reasonable  ground  for 
their  faith.  The  blind  faith  of  the  multitude,  unconscious  of 
any  subjective  process,  by  which  the  doctrines  inculcated 
could  have  been  formed,  attributed  the  whole  system  to 
the  direct  agency  of  God,  operating  through  his  appointed 
ministers ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  the  "Jides  quarens  intel- 
lectum,"  which  manifested  the  desire  to  possess  a  more  ra- 
tional basis  for  theological  truth.  Hence  the  vast  admixture 
of  philosophical  speculation  which  we  find  in  the  theology  of 
the  middle  ages ;  an  admixture  which  has  been  absorbed 
into  the  theology  of  the  present  day,  without  our  being  con- 
scious often  of  its  real  origin. 

The  Reformation  introduced  a  new  order  of  things  into  the 
whole  intellectual  life  of  Europe.  Luther  abjured  the  autho- 
rity of  the  Church, — and  with  this  abjuration  threw  the  whole 
of  the  fundamental  questions,  upon  the  relationship  of  theo- 
logy to  philosophical  thinking,  into  a  new  form.  Having 
thoroughly  loosed  his  hold  from  the  great  self-created  autho- 
rity of  the  Papal  See,  he  had  naturally  to  consider,  what 
could  now  be  put  in  its  place  as  a  guide  to  the  restless  ac- 
tivity of  the  human  reason.  Accordingly,  in  place  of  the 
authority  of  the  Church,  he  held  up  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures — pointing  to  these  and  these  alone  as  possessing 
an  all-sufficiency,  for  the  guidance  of  the  human  soul  to 
purity  and  to  God. 

The  true  doctrines  of  the  Reformation  can  only  be  ap- 
preciated, when  viewed  in  connection  with  the  system  to 


328  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

which  they  were  directly  opposed.  Luther's  notion  of  the 
sufficiency  of  Scripture,  as  a  guide  to  human  faith,  was  a 
very  different  thing  from  that  which  it  is  now  popularly 
imagined  to  have  been.  The  mind  of  that  great  Reformer 
was  strictly  of  the  intuitional,  almost  indeed  of  the  mystical 
order.  No  man  perceived  clearer  than  he,  the  vast  distinc- 
tion between  a  pure  living  faith,  as  a  spontaneous  principle 
leading  the  soul  to  the  direct  perception  of  heavenly  things, 
and  a  mere  intellectual  assent  to  doctrines  logically  pro- 
pounded. The  Church  had  hitherto  professed  herself  the 
sole  administrator  of  divine  grace,  through  whose  agency 
alone,  pa'rdon,  and  peace,  and  piety,  were  to  be  communicated 
to  mankind.  It  was  in  opposition  to  these  pretensions  that  Lu- 
ther set  up  the  doctrines  of  the  sufficiency  of  Scripture,  and 
justification  by  faith.  The  visible  Church,  he  affirmed,  is 
not  the  sole  channel  of  the  Christian  life.  Man  cannot  be 
justified  and  accepted  of  God  by  her  mediating  agency.  This 
is  a  matter  which  lies  entirely  between  the  conscience  of  the 
individual,  and  the  great  Judge  of  all.  Man  is  to  be  accept- 
ed, not  by  virtue  of  his  conformity  to  any  outward  authority, 
but  by  virtue  of  the  interior  principle  of  faith — personal  faith 
in  God,  and  his  revealed  mercy  to  the  world.  For  the  pro- 
duction, and  the  nurturing  of  such  a  faith,  the  Scriptures, 
he  declared,  are  all-sufficient.  They  contain  the  history  and 
teaching  of  Christ — they  manifest  the  spiritual  life  of  the 
apostles — they  have  a  mighty  power  to  affect  the  human 
heart — they  are  the  promised  channels  through  which  the 
influences  of  the  spirit  of  Christ  are  conveyed  to  the  inmost 
soul  of  the  believer. 

Now  this  doctrine  of  the  sufficiency  of  Scripture  is  mani- 
festly opposed  to  two  other  principles ;  it  is  opposed,  on  the 
one  hand,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the  pretensions  of  the  Church ; 
but  it  is  equally  opposed,  on  the  other  hand,  to  the  preten- 
sions of  human  reason,  to  be  the  source  and  guide  of  our 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  329 

faith.  Luther,  as  is  well  known,  declaimed  with  all  his  ac- 
customed point  and  energy  against  the  notion  that  philosophy 
or  human  reason  could  be  a  principle  of  spiritual  faith  in 
man.*  His  intention  in  so  doing  was  to  make  religion — that 
vital,  active,  spontaneous  principle  of  truth  and  holiness — 
independent  of  reason  or  philosophy ;  he  never  thought  to 
make  theology  independent  of  it.  He  affirmed  : — "  the  grace 
of  God  which  we  have  declared  to  us  in  the  Bible  is  enough 
for  every  man.  By  this  grace  the  soul  can  be  transformed 
and  the  man  saved.  Without  it  the  efforts  of  the  natural 
reason  are  poor,  weak,  and  inefficient  for  any  real  spiritual 
good."  But  he  never  supposed  that  reason  could  be  dis- 
pensed with  in  the  construction  of  a  theology,  and  never  af- 
firmed its  blindness  or  inefficiency  in  this  point  of  view. 
Nay,  he  says,  "  that  this  light  of  reason  is  a  portion  of  the 
true  light — that  God  himself  has  implanted  it  for  our  guid- 
ance— that  it  can  never  be  extinguished."  All  these  and 
similar  expressions  show  us  the  twofold  view,  which  ever 
presented  itself  to  the  mind  of  Luther,  namely,  that  human 
reason  as  a  guide  to  living  faith  was  worthless ;  that,  as  a 
guide  to  a  logical  and  scientific  theology,  it  could  never  be 
dispensed  with.  Had  these  two  points  been  kept  distinct,  as 
they  were  in  the  mind  of  the  great  Reformer,  there  would 

*  We  give  the  following  specimens  of  Luther's  declamation  on  this 
subject : — Nun  hilft  das  alles  nicht  bei  der  eigensinnigen  Vernunft ;  sie 
horet  weder  Wort,  Schrift,  noch  Erleuchtung,  wie  es  Gott  mit  ihr  ver- 
suchet.  Die  Shrift  and  Biicher  unterdrucket  und  verbrennet  Sie,  wie 
der  Konig  Johakim  that  Jeremia  Buchern.  Again  he  says — Was  ist  es 
denn  fur  eine  Thorheit,  das  wir  uns  unterstehen  wollen,  in  Himmel 
hinauf  zu  steigen,  und  die  Gottheit  nach  unserer  tolien,  verblendeten, 
und  verderbten  Vernunft  zu  richten.  Again,  Es  ist  kein  Ding,  das  dem 
Glauben  mehr  entgegen  ist,  als  das  Gesetz  und  die  Vernupft : — Sie  ist 
Gottes  argste  Feindinn.  Once  again  still  more  racily  he  says — Des 
Teufels  Braut,  Ratio — die  Schone  Meze,  was  sie  sagt  meinet  sie,  es 
sei  der  Heilige  Geist, — aber  es  ist  die  hochste  Hure,  die  der  Teufel  hat. 
15 


330  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

have  been  in  the  Protestantism  of  succeeding  ages  at  once  a 
check  against  the  pretensions  of  rationalism,  and  a  principle 
of  spiritual  life  and  progress,  such  as  would  have  prevented 
the  reappearance  of  that  mere  mechanical  supernaturalism, 
which,  while  it  renounced  one  infallibility,  hesitated  not  to 
erect  and  establish  another  almost  equally  oppressive. 

In  Melancthon,  again,  and  still  more  in  Calvin  and 
Zuinglius,  we  see  a  most  free  and  unhesitating  employment 
of  the  critical  reason  in  the  construction  of  their  several 
theological  systems.  Accordingly  the  notions  and  the  phra- 
seology of  the  scholastic  philosophy  (the  great  logical  orga- 
num  of  that  day),  notwithstanding  their  being  so  decidedly 
repudiated  by  Luther,  and  the  other  Reformers,  as  having 
nothing  to  do  with  Christian  faith  as  a  living  principle,  yet 
came  naturally  over  into  the  body  of  Protestant  theology  as 
a  thing  which  appeared  absolutely  inevitable.  In  fact,  the 
real  question  between  reason  and  authority  was  left  very 
much  where  it  was  before ;  it  was  thrown,  indeed,  into  new 
relations,  but  its  solution  appeared  almost  as  distant  as  ever. 

Throughout  the  whole  history  of  Protestantism,  indeed, 
the  two  opposing  tendencies  we  have  described  have  con- 
stantly reappeared  in  the  views  entertained  respecting  the 
mutual  relationship  of  philosophy  and  theology.  In  the  po- 
pular mind,  where  but  slight  opportunity  can  naturally  exist 
for  tracing  the  historical  growth  of  our  theological  ideas,  the 
prevailing  tendency  has  been  that  of  dissevering  theology 
altogether  from  philosophical  thinking,  and  regarding  it  as  a 
Divine  gift  mechanically  imparted.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
difficulties  which  beset  this  theory  have  driven  many  to  the 
opposite  extreme  of  making  philosophy  the  sole  basis  of  the- 
ology. Each  party  sees  the  other  involved  in  absolute  para- 
dox. The  advocates  of  a  mechanical  supernaturalism  point 
tauntingly  to  the  endless  diversities  and  hopeless  uncertainty 
of  Rationalism,  and  show  that  absolute  Skepticism  is  its  only 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  331 


ultimate  refuge.  The  advocates  of  Reason  as  the  basis  of 
theology  in  their  turn  show  the  extreme  Supernaturalist  to 
be  involved  in  a  vicious  circle ;  for  while  he  declaims  against 
Reason  as  leading  to  no  certain  conclusion  whatever,  yet  he 
is  obliged  to  trust  to  it  entirely  in  discerning  a  true  revelation 
from  what  is  false,  and  interpreting  it  when  decided  upon. 
In  fact,  they  show,  and  that  quite  correctly,  that  the  common 
supernaturalism  which  accepts  the  Bible  as  a  verbal  revela- 
tion, and  trusts  to  the  individual  reason  as  its  expounder,  is 
involved  in  the  very  same  difficulties,  leads  to  the  very  same 
diversities,  and  is  based  upon  the  very  same  principles  as 
open  Rationalism  itself.  The  attempts  to  mediate  between 
these  two  extremes  have  generally  confined  themselves  almost 
entirely  to  a  separation  of  the  elements  of  theology  into  the 
Divine  and  the  human.  In  this  way  a  portion  of  truth  has 
been  conceded  to  both  parties ;  but  in  such  a  way  as  to  give 
but  little  rest  or  satis/action  to  either.  The  question  ever 
and  anon  returned — which  portion  is  human,  and  which  is 
Divine  ?  The  decision  of  this  point  being  still  left  to  the 
reason  of  the  inquirer,  the  same  disputes  naturally  reap- 
peared, and  the  solution  was  still  as  far  as  ever  in  the  dis- 
tance. 

The  honor  of  throwing  fresh  light  upon  this  perplexed 
subject  was  due  to  the  genius  of  Schleiermacher.  Schleier- 
macher  possessed  advantages  and  qualifications  rarely  en- 
joyed, even  by  the  most  favored,  .for  penetrating  into  the 
grounds  of  Christian  theology.  His  early  education  amongst 
the  Moravians  had  imbued  his  mind  with  that  deep  tone  of 
fervid  piety  which  so  strikingly  characterized  it,  especially 
at  the  two  extremes  of  his  life  ;  on  the  other  hand,  his  devo- 
tion to  literature  and  vast  attainments  in  philosophy  placed 
him  in  the  very  highest  position  for  testing  the  claims  of  his- 
torical criticism  and  metaphysical  analysis.  Schleiermacher, 
in  fact,  had  united,  in  his  own  personality,  both  the  extremes 


OO4 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


we  have  above  indicated  :  in  this  way  he  possessed  means  of 
comparing  their  respective  claims  and  perceiving  their  re- 
spective  relationships,  such  as  could  only  occur  to  a  mind  in 
which  both  sides  of  the  question  had,  as  it  were,  realized 
themselves  simultaneously.  He  was  conscious  on  the  one 
hand  that  the  deep  inward  piety  in  which  his  own  life  had 
been  nurtured  could  in  no  sense  be  based  upon  speculative 
or  rationalistic  grounds.  Its  whole  complexion  he  saw  to  be 
entirely  distinct  from  mere  reason,  borrowing  from  it  neither 
its  light  nor  its  certitude,  and  springing  up  in  the  bosom  of 
the  holy,  quite  irrespective  of  any  logical  proofs  by  which  its 
validity  could  be  urged.  On  the  other  hand,  he  saw  with 
equal  clearness  that  theology  could  not  be  an  immediate  im- 
partation  from  Heaven ;  that,  in  fact,  it  is  purely  human  in 
its  form  ;  and  that  it  necessarily  involves  a  portion  of  human 
imperfection.  In  this  way  three  things  became  abundantly 
evident ; — first,  that  the  religious  life  is  a  fact  in  human  na- 
ture in  no  sense  evolved  from  any  kind  of  speculative  reason- 
ing ;  secondly,  that,  notwithstanding  this,  it  is  a  fact  the  evi- 
dence of  whose  validity  must  be  centred  no*  in  the  letter  of 
a  book,  but  in  the  depths  of  human  experience  ;  and,  thirdly, 
that  theology  is  the  product  of  two  factors — being  evolved  out 
of  the  living  consciousness  of  the  pious,  by  the  attempt  of 
their  reflective  understanding  to  render  an  account  of  their 
inward  spiritual  life.  The  paradoxes  before  involved  in  the 
controversy  thus  became  merged  into  a  higher  unity.  The 
Rationalist  was  answered  on  the  one  side,  the  mechanical 
Supernaturalist  on  the  other  ;  the  dependence  of  Christian 
theology  upon  human  philosophy  was  refuted,  but  its  emana- 
tion from  the  interior  consciousness  of  humanity  as  enlight- 
ened and  purified  by  the  Gospel  of  Christ  was  maintained. 

The  position  then,  we  have  now  to  illustrate  is  this,  tiiat 
Christian  theology  is  not  dependent  upon  human  reason  abso- 
'lutely  considered  on  the  one  side,  nor  upon  the  letter  of  Scrip- 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY. 


lure  on  the  other,  either  in  respect  to  its  source  or  to  its  cer- 
titude ;  but  that  it  is  dependent  in  both  ways  upon  the  actual 
experiences  of  the  human  consciousness.  This  position,  it 
will  be  seen,  occupies  a  ground  which,  while  it  avoids  the 
paradoxes  in  which  the  other  principles  we  have  noticed  are 
involved,  yet  lays  hold  of  the  strong  points  belonging  to  both. 
With  the  Rationalist  it  concedes  the  point  in  which  he  is  so 
impregnably  intrenched  :  namely,  that  there  cannot  be,  with- 
out  involving  a  paradox,  a  basis  of  certitude  out  of  humanity 
itself.  With  the  Supernaturalist  it  maintains,  that  the  spirit- 
ual is  not  to  be  judged  of  by  the  natural  reason,  but  that 
Christianity  brings  with  it  its  own  evidence,  and  rests  upon 
its  own  foundation. 

With  regard  to  the  former  of  these  positions — that,  namely, 
which  denies  the  right  and  the  possibility  of  Christianity  being 
judged  by  the  absolute  reason,  we  make  the  following  re- 
marks : — 

1.  That  either  to  comprehend  or  to  judge  of  the  truth 
involved  in  Christianity,  requires  a  special  range  of  inward 
experience,  to  which  human  reason,  absolutely  considered, 
does  not  reach.  We  do  not  at  all  deny  but  that  the  authenti- 
city of  the  facts  connected  with  the  establishment  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  of  the  sacred  writings  themselves,  have  to  be 
judged  of  on  those  ordinary  principles  of  human  testimony  to 
which  every  thing  of  an  historical  nature  must  positively  ap- 
peal. But  the  authenticity  of  these  facts  is  one  thing,  while 
the  whole  system  of  truth  which  is  taught  in  connection  with 
them  is  another.  A  man  may  grant  the  whole  of  the  histori- 
cal fact  of  the  New  Testament,  and  yet  be  utterly  ignorant 
of  Christianity  itself,  and  even  consciously  reject  its  veracity. 
The  grounds  on  which  the  truth  of  Christ  reposes  are  not 
those  of  testimony ;  testimony  can  only  assure  us  of  things 
which  took  place  outwardly,  visibly,  palpably  to  the  senses, 
in  the  actual  region  of  human  history ;  it  is  a  far  higher  and 


334  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

surer  witness  which  convinces  us  of  those  Divine  realities 
which  eye  hath  not  seen,  nor  ear  heard,  nor  the  heart  of  man 
ever  before  conceived.  Sucli  a  witness  may  partly  take  its 
start  from  the  historical  fact,  and  partly  be  superinduced  as 
a  portion  of  human  experience,  by  its  agency ;  but  just  as 
the  writings  of  some  ancient  book  on  mathematics  may  con- 
vince us  of  the  truth  of  certain  theorems,  not  by  virtue  of  its 
historical  authenticity,  but  by  virtue  of  the  rational  evidence 
it  brings  home  to  our  minds ;  so  also  do  the  Scriptures,  and 
the  facts  of  their  early  history,  convince  us  of  the  veracity  of 
Christianity  as  a  Divine  system  of  truth  and  duty,  not  simply 
because  they  are  authentic,  but  because  of  the  irresistible 
appeals  they  make  to  the  reason,  the  conscience,  and  the 
whole  spiritual  nature  of  man. 

Now,  what  we  mean  by  affirming  that  the  power  of  judg- 
ing respecting  Christian  truth  supposes  a  special  range  of 
inward  experience,  is  this, — that,  even  admitting  a  man  to 
know  all  that  can  be  known  respecting  the  historical  authen- 
ticity of  the  New  Testament,  yet,  until  he  has  realized  the 
vastness,  the  sublimity,  the  moral  power  of  the  truth  itself,  he 
cannot  appreciate  its  real  character  or  its  strongest  evidences. 
He  judges  every  thing,  accordingly,  by  a  lower  standard, 
brings  the  spiritual  grandeur  of  heavenly  truth  down  to  the 
laws  and  level'  of  mere  natural  reason,  and  instead  of  per- 
ceiving its  harmony  with  the  soul,  with  nature,  and  with 
God,  enstamps  it,  perhaps,  as  unreasonable,  because  his  own 
reason  has  not  yet  grasped  its  ideas.  We  need  not  enter  into 
any  particular  portions  of  Christian  doctrine  to  prove  the 
truth  of  what  we  now  assert.  But  let  any  one  consider 
whether  a  man,  unawakened  to  the  sense  of  sin,  can  compre- 
hend the  Christian  idea  of  human  depravity ;  whether  any 
one  who  has  no  lofty  idea  of  holiness  can  comprehend  the 
Christian  idea  of  God,  or  the  Christian  scale  of  human  duty  ; 
whether  any  one  who  has  had  no  deep  stirrings  of  the  im- 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  335 

mortal  within  him  can  estimate  the  reality  of  spiritual  agency 
here,  or  eternal  life  hereafter.  Exactly  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  ethics  of  the  human  conscience,  absolutely  considered, 
differ  vastly  from  the  ethics  of  true  Christianity,  just  because 
under  its  influence  the  conscience  itself  takes  a  wider  range, 
and  has  a  deeper  insight  into  man's  moral  responsibility  ;  so 
also  will  the  results  and  conclusions  of  the  religious  senti- 
ment in  man,  regarded  only  in  its  broad,  generic,  or  absolute 
character,  be  immeasurably  inferior  to  the  conclusions  it  will 
draw  when  illumined  and  impregnated  with  the  fire  and  force 
of  the  Christian  revelation.  The  spiritual  must  be  judged  of 
by  the  spiritual,  and  by  them  alone. 

2.  The  conclusion  we  have  thus  arrived  at  harmonizes 
perfectly  with  the  laws  of  intuition  as  we  have  before  de- 
veloped them.     Were  the  power  of  religious  intuition  per- 
fect, by  virtue  of  an  entire  harmony  of  our  interior  being 

with  moral  and  spiritual  truth,  then,  indeed,  as  has  been  be- 
fore shown,  we  should  see  every  thing  in  its  true  light,  and 
judge  of  it  by  its  own  immediate  evidence.  Consequently,  just 
in  proportion  as  this  power  of  intuition  is  restored,  by  the  in- 
ward harmonizing  of  our  whole  nature  with  what  is  holy,  just, 
and  true,  will  our  capacity  of  seeing,  grasping,  and  appreci- 
ating the  highest  Christian  ideas  become  so  much  the  greater. 
To  place  a  man  whose  religious  nature  has  not  been  awaken- 
ed, whose  mind  has  never  been  brought  into  the  least  har- 
mony with  Divine  things,  whose  intuitions  are  contracted  and 
distorted, — to  place  such  a  man  in  the  same  position  for 
testing  what  is  divinely  true,  with  the  man  whose  whole 
nature  has  been  elevated  and  purified,  is  fearfully  absurd. 
The  former  may  possess  reason  enough  in  its  general  ac- 
ceptation ;  but  it  is  the  latter  alone  to  whom  the  true  relations 
of  Divine  things  are  fully  open,  and  who  possesses  the  light 
by  which  they  can  be  read  and  interpreted. 

3.  That  reason,  in  its  absolute  sense,  does  not  and  cannot 


336  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

form  the  basis  of  Christian  truth,  is  proved  by  facts.  If  the 
light  of  nature  (which  we  may  use  as  being  synonymous 
with  the  term  reason  in  this  its  general  signification,)  were 
sufficient  to  lead  any  mind  into  the  full  brightness  of  Christian 
truth  and  purity,  then  we  should  surely  have  some  instances 
to  cite  in  which  it  had  performed  this  inestimable  work  of  hu- 
man restoration.  But  what  is  the  fact  ?  Mere  natural  re- 
ligion, which  is  the  only  proper  expression  or  product  of  the 
light  of  nature,  has  ever  been  the  most  impotent  of  all  things, 
as  it  regards  the  direct  influencing  of  human  character.  It 
is  always  too  general  to  give  any  distinctive  type  to  man's 
spiritual  emotions  or  religious  aspirations.  It  points  out  to 
us,  indeed,  certain  fundamental  truths  which  we  must  all  &d-^ 
mit ;  but  in  so  doing,  it  points  out  only  with  a  dim  generality 
the  very  same  things  which  the  Christian  consciousness,  when 
once  awakened,  brings  before  us  in  the  most  living  forms 
and  the  most  distinctive  colors.  To  make  Christianity  en- 
tirely  dependent  upon  this  natural  light,  would  involve  its 
virtual  extinction  ;  for  one  element  after  another,  when  found 
to  be  incapable  of  deduction  from  these  general  grounds, 
must  be  lopped  off,  until  the  dead  trunk  only  would  be  left 
— a  monitory  pillar,  like  Lot's  wife,  to  remind  us  of  the 
folly  (when  once  within  the  region  of  a  new  creation)  of 
looking  back  upon  the  "  beggarly  elements  "  of  this  world. 

4.  That  Christian  truth  has  a  basis  independent  of  the 
light  of  nature,  is  affirmed  by  the  whole  spirit  of  our'Lord's 
teaching,  and  that  of  the  apostles. 

"  The  light  of  the  body  is  the  eye  :  if  thine  eye  be  single, 
thy  whole  body  shall  be  full  of  light ;  but  if  thine  eye  be  evil, 
thy  whole  body  shall  be  full  of  darkness."  In  this  passage, 
the  perception  of  truth  is  clearly  shown  to  depend  upon  the 
state  of  the  interior  moral  consciousness,  on  the  power  of 
spiritual  intuition.  "  Blessed  are  the  pure  in  heart,  for  they 
shall  see  (have  a  clear  intuition  of)  God."  "  If  any  man 


PHILOSOPHY   AND    THEOLOGY.  337 


will  do  my  will,  he  shall  know  of  the  doctrine  whether  it  be 
of  God,  or  whether  I  speak  of  myself."  So  also  in  the 
writings  of  the  apostles :  "  The  natural  man  receiveth  not 
the  things  of  the  Spirit  of  God,  for  they  are  foolishness  unto 
him,  neither  can  he  know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually 
discerned.  But  he  that  is  spiritual  judgeth  all  things,  yet 
he  himself  is  judged  of  no  man." 

From  all  these  considerations,  then,  we  conclude,  that, 
while  the  authenticity  of  the  historical  facts  connected  with 
the  origin  of  Christianity  is  to  be  judged  of  by  the  ordinary 
laws  of  evidence  ;  yet  the  truths  of  Christianity  themselves 
must  rest,  not  upon  any  absolute  laws  of  inference  or  reason, 
but  upon  their  own  evidence  as  presented  to  the  mind  of 
humanity,  when  enlightened  and  purified  by  their  own 
proper  agency. 

But  now  the  mechanical  Supernaturalist  steps  in  and 
says — true,  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  do  not  rest  upon  the 
natural  reason ;  but  is  not  their  real  and  authoritative  basis 
found  in  the  fact  of  their  being  conveyed  to  us  definitively  in 
the  Bible  ? 

Against  this  theory  it  will  not  be  needful  for  us  to  repeat 
the  arguments  already  urged.  We  merely  remind  the 
reader  that  it  is  a  theory,  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  his- 
torical facts  connected  with  the  rise  and  growth  of  theology 
in  the  bosom  of  religious  communities — that  it  is  altogether 

o  o 

incompatible  with  the  whole  character  of  the  Bible,  which  is 
moral  in  its  entire  construction  and  not  scientific ;  that  it  is 
contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  apostles,  who  appealed,  not  to 
the  letter,  but  to  the  intrinsic  power  of  Christian  truth  ;  that 
it  will  not  in  any  way  cohere  with  that  spirit  of  perpetual 
progress  which  is  the  very  life  of  the  Christian  Church  ;  and, 
finally,  that,  if  duly  carried  out,  it  will  throw  the  determina- 
tion of  every  truth  at  last  upon  the  individual  reason,  and 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


drive  us  into  the  very  central  principle  of  the  old  Ration- 
alism. 

We  see,  then,  that  Christianity  does  not  base  itself  either 
upon  the  absolute  reason  or  light  of  nature  on  the  one  side, 
nor  upon  the  letter  of  revelation  on  the  other.  Just  as  it  was 
established  in  the  world,  and  its  certitude  made  manifest  long 
before  a  single- line  of  the  New  Testament  was  penned,  and 
two  centuries  before  the  canon  was  complete,  so  also  must  it 
be  established  now,  upon  grounds  quite  distinct  from  mere 
verbal  authority — upon  grounds,  in  fact,  which  appeal  to  the 
inmost  consciousness  of  mankind. 

Here,  then,  the  principle  asserted  comes  to  our  relief,  and 
shows  us  how  we  may  find  a  resting-place  in  human  expe- 
rience itself.  Man  was  created  holy  ;  his  entire  nature  was 
formed  upon  a  plan  to  sympathize  with  every  thing  great, 
pure,  and  Divine ;  his  reason  was  constructed  in  harmony 
with  eternal  truth  ;  his  conscience  with  eternal  right.  While 
under  the  power  of  evil,  this  pristine  nobility  and  purity  of 
nature  is  marred,  and  in  a  certain  degree  suspended  ;  he  per- 
ceives not  the  truth  in  its  living  unity  ;  he  feels  not  the  sub- 
limity and  sanctity  of  the  highest  virtue  ;  but  once  clear 
away  the  mist  and  miasma  of  his  depravity  from  the  heart, 
and  exactly  in  the  same  proportion  there  is  developed  within 
him  a  moral  and  a  spiritual  sensibility,  which  can  at  once 
feel  and  pronounce  what  it  is  that  is  just,  holy,  and  true. 
This  spiritual  sensibility,  thus  newly  awakened  and  nurtured 
under  the  moral  power  of  Christianity,  becomes  gradually 
consolidated  and  outwardly  realized,  through  the  medium  of 
fellowship.  It  comes  thus  to  constitute  the  religious  life  or 
consciousness  of  a  community ;  and  this  religious  life  gives 
reflective  expression  to  the  great  elements  of  Divine  truth, 
which  it  realizes  and  loves,  in  those  general  affirmations 
respecting  God  and  man,  respecting  sin  and  holiness,  re- 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  839 

specting  human  danger  and  human  recovery,  which  form  the 
foundation  of  its  doctrinal  profession. 

The  evidence  of  the  validity  of  these  fervent  experiences 
lies  in  their  clearness,  their  uniformity,  their  perpetual  pro- 
gress to  universality.  This  it  is  which  forms  the  great  moral 
foundation  on  which  they  are  based,  by  virtue  of  which  they 
appeal  at  once  to  the  deepest  convictions  of  the  human  heart, 
and  acquire  a  verity  which  no  process  of  historical  proof 
could  ever  give  them.  Such  experiences,  however,  when 
once  awakened,  will  soon  be  recognized  as  identical  with 
those  which  appear  in  the  whole  spirit  of  the  apostolic  labors 
and  teaching  ;  so  that  they  can  be  readily  compared  with 
those  great  typical  examples  of  Christian  perfection  which  we 
have  in  the  inspired  disciples  themselves.  And  thus  all  the 
outward  testimony  to  their  Divine  commission  adds  itself  to 
the  witness  of  the  spirit  within,  so  as  to  form  a  basis  of  moral 
evidence,  which  no  human  subtlety  will  ever  be  able  to 
shake.  In  this  view  of  Christian  theology,  we  see  it  invested 
with  a  character  purely  historical,  infinitely  more  so  indeed 
than  when  it  is  regarded  as  a  fixed  logical  result  from  the 
letter  of  the  word  ;  we  see  it  is  a  great  living  reality  in  the 
deepest  consciousness  of  sanctified  humanity,  not  a  stereo- 
typed system  of  dry  propositions ;  we  see  it,  finally,  as  a 
progressive  principle,  giving  vitality  by  its  very  progress, 
and  exciting  the  unwearied  hopes  of  the  faithful  in  a  future 
age  of  moral  and  intellectual  elevation,  lying  dimly,  yet 
surely,  before  us. 

The  relationship  of  philosophy  to  theology  becomes,  upon 
these  grounds,  far  more  definite  and  intelligible  than  upon 
any  other.  If  philosophy  is  to  be  put  in  opposition  solely  to 
a  verbal  revelation,  and  to  include  every  thing  which  springs 
from  the  actual  consciousness  of  man  under  whatever  cir- 
cumstances, then,  indeed,  we  see  not  that  there  is  any  possi- 
bility of  making  the  grounds  of  philosophy  and  those  of  the- 


340  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

ology  in  any  way  distinct ;  but  if  philosophy  be  regarded,  as 
it  ought  to  be,  as  the  mere  product  of  the  absolute  reason,  or 
the  light  of  nature  in  its  general  ^acceptation,  then,  indeed,  we 
vindicate  for  Christianity  a  basis  which  lies  entirely  without 
its  province,  a  basis  which  first  brings  with  it  its  own  light, 
and  then  furnishes  its  own  evidence  to  the  enlightened  mind. 
We  do  not  pretend,  indeed,  when  we  have  established 
our  point  thus  far,  that  our  analysis  is  perfect,  or  that  our 
conclusions  have  reached  their  furthest  goal.  All  we  can 
hope  to  have  accomplished  is  to  have  taken  one  step  in  the 
process  of  elucidation,  to  have  cleared  away  some  few  of  the 
clouds  which  hung  about  the  question,  and  to  have  pointed 
out  the  direction  in  which  we  may  enter  upon  future  investi- 
gations, and  realize  from  them  still  further  and  brighter 
results. 


POSTSCRIPT  TO  CHAPTER  XH. 

Since  this  last  chapter  has  been  completed,  I  have  been  fortu- 
nate enough  to  procure  a  copy  of  an  elaborate  work,  entitled,  "  The- 
ologische  Ethik,"  by  Dr.  Richard  Rothe,  Professor  of  Theology  at 
Heidelberg,  and  Director  of  the  Protestant  Seminary  there.  In  the 
Introduction  to  that  work,  the  author  has  developed  with  great 
perspicuity  the  Idea  of  Speculative  Theology,  and  its  relation  to 
philosophy  generally.  The  conclusions  to  which  he  has  arrived  I 
find  to  be  so  strikingly  consonant  with  my  own,  that  I  have  thought 
it  right  to  translate  and  append  nearly  the  whole  section ;  making 
only  some  few  unimportant  abbreviations,  owing  to  the  diffuseness 
of  the  style  in  the  original. 


5  1.  Speculative  thinking  is  to  be  regarded  as  distinct  from  that 
which  is  barely  reflective  and  discursive.  They  are  distinguished 
in  this  respect — that  the  latter  is  d  posteriori,  the  former  d  priori ; 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  341 

the  one,  observing  and  critical,  the  other,  constructive.  Reflective 
thinking  must  have  its  object  given,  whether  that  object  be  barely 
perceived,  or  whether  it  be  the  duly-formed  notion  of  a  thing ; — 
speculative  thinking  originates  its  own  thoughts;  it  evolves  them 
out  of  itself  by  an  inward  logical  necessity,  and  constructs  an  entire 
system  of  such  a  nature,  that  each  single  thought  implicitly  supposes 
the  whole.  This  system  of  d  priori  thought,  to  be  successful  as  a 
speculation,  must  be  an  absolutely  corresponding  and  consistent 
image  of  the  reality ;  but  the  speculative  process  itself  takes  no 
thought  whether  there  be  such  a  reality  existing,  or  how  the  ideas, 
which  it  constructs,  are  related  to  it ;  but,  without  looking  either  to 
the  right  hand  or  the  left,  it  follows  barely  the  course  of  logical 
necessity,  until  it  has  accomplished  the  whole  circle  of  its  ideas,  and 
constructed  a  complete  system.  Then*,  first,  the  speculative  thinker 
looks  out  of  himself,  in  order  to  compare  the  system  of  thought, 
which  he  has  independently  constructed,  with  the  objective  reality, 
and  to  assure  himself  of  his  correctness  by  such  a  comparison ;  but 
in  so  doing  he  is  stepping  out  of  the  region  of  speculative  into  that 
of  reflectite  thinking.  The  necessity  of  such  a  verification,  indeed, 
he  acknowledges  unconditionally ;  but  he  distinguishes  clearly  be^ 
tween  the  speculation  itself  and  that  reflective,  critical  process  by 
which  alone  such  a  verification  can  be  realized.  With  reference  to 
the  empirical  reality  around  him, — he  acknowledges  that  his  specu- 
lation is  incorrect  if  his  system  of  thought  is  not  there  reproduced, 
but  he  still  persists  that  he  has  to  complete  his  speculative  labor 
without  any  direct  reference  to  it  He  concludes  rather  from  a 
clear  want  of  correspondency,  that  he  has  speculated  incorrectly ; 
and  can  look  for  his  error  in  nothing  else  than  in  his  departure  from 
a  strict  obedience  to  the  laws  of  logic.  Forthwith,  then,  he  destroys 
his  laboriously-constructed  system ;  but,  if  he  again  proceed  to  con- 
struct another,  he  must  proceed  upon  the  very  same  principle  as 
before — i.  e.,  by  looking  solely  into  his  own  thoughts,  as  though 
there  were  no  world  around  him.  He  is  far  removed  from  that 
foolish  pride  which  undervalues  reflective  thinking,  for  he  knows 
that  it  is  the  only  school  in  which  the  ability  to  speculate  can  be 
attained :  but  he  maintains,  none  the  less,  that  both  kinds  of  think- 
ing— the  reflective  and  the  speculative — are  essentially  different,  in 
order  that  he  may  assert  the  indispensableness  of  both. 


342  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

Moreover,  he  knows  well  that  they  cannot  remain  so  far  apart, 
that  reflection  is  not  constrained  to  mingle  itself  up  with  specula- 
tion. To  the  reajly  speculative  thinker  this  can  never  be  imagina- 
ble ;  (since  every  dialectical  process,  without  which  speculation 
cannot  move  one  step  forward,  is  a  reflective  process ;)  but  in  this 
combination  of  the  reflective  with  the  speculative  procedure,  he 
is  conscious  of  speculation  being  purposely  interrupted  by  reflec- 
tion ;  yet,  however  necessary  this  may  be,  he  demands  that  the 
thinker  should  have  a  clear  consciousness  of  his  transition  from  one 
mode  of  mental  activity  to  another,  and  protests  against  an  entire 
blending  of  the  two  processes.  No  sound  speculative  head,  assu- 
redly, will  fall  into  the  delusion,  that  he  can  succeed  by  means  of  his 
speculation  fully  and  correctly  to  reconstruct  the  universe  in  his 
ideas.  He  must  not  only  thfnk  ridiculously  much  of  himself,  but 
lamentably  little  of  the  universe,  who  can  befool  himself  with  such 
a  childish  expectation.  The  clear  and  lively  consciousness  of  the 
incommensurability  of  the  great  problem  of  philosophy  with  his 
own  individual  speculative  capacity,  is  the  only  natural  state  of 
mind  to  any  intelligent  man,  who  goes  forth  seriously  to  the  work 
of  speculation.  But  this  incommensurability  with  his  own  individ- 
ual thinking  does  not  imply  an  incommensurability  with  the  think- 
ing of  humanity  generally.  This  he  unconditionally  denies.  The 
individual  man,  he  affirms,  can  never  satisfactorily  solve  the  problem 
of  speculation :  but  humanity  can — must,  and  will  satisfactorily 
solve  it.  He  knows,  with  unconditional  certainty,  that  he  will  not 
himself  really  succeed  with  it, — that  its  product  will  not  be  a  fully 
satisfactory  one ;  nay,  that  it  will  not  be  so  satisfactory  even  to 
himself,  that  he  could  remain  by  it  unconditionally.  But  this  does 
not  diminish  either  his  courage  or  his  enthusiasm.  What  he  cannot 
perform  himself,  he  knows  others  will  perform  after  him  ;  and  feels 
that  patience  will  at  length  conduct  us  to  the  goal. 

The  loftier  the  range  of  the  matter,  so  much  the  more  worthy 
is  it  of  his  most  self-sacrificing  and  most  unreserved  devotion. 
Though  he  succeed  not  in  satisfying  himself,  yet  he  will  satisfy  his 
calling.  The  progress,  indeed,  which  the  knowledge  of  truth  will 
make  through  instrumentality  will,  at  the  very  best,  be  an  infinitely 
small  one;  but  he  despises  not  the  smallest  progress,  knowing  well 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  34M 

that  the  greatest  advances  are  only  composed  of  many  small  ones  > 
and  he  does  not  think  himself  too  good  to  take  upon  himself  the  toil 
of  his  own  duty.  Deeply  convinced  that  all  our  knowledge  is  gra- 
dual, he  bends  his  whole  energy  upon  its  advancement ;  he  knows 
that  he  has  to  think  of  nothing  more  than  of  a  small  approximation 
to  the  full  and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  truth ;  but  he  doubts  not, 
that,  by  this  method  of  slow  and  scarce  perceptible  approximation, 
the  end  can  be  really  attained,  however  late,  and  thus  holds  himself 
alike  far  from  a  childish  confidence  in  the  infallibility  of  his  own 
knowledge,  and  from  the  idle  and  unmanly  despair  of  the  possibility 
of  a  real  knowledge  at  all — two  extremes  into  which  the  thinking 
minds  of  all  epochs  have  commonly  divided  themselves,  and  which 
are  both  alike  destructive  to  true  science. 

5  2.  It  is  a  common  notion  that  speculation  starts  from  nothing, 
without  any  pre-supposition ;  and  the  foregoing  exposition  of  the 
idea  might  seem  to  confirm  this  view.  Were  this  the  case,  no  dis- 
tinction could  then  be  conceivable  between  theological  and  philoso- 
phical specnlation.  But  we  deny  confidently  that  such  a  baseless- 
ness lies  hi  the  idea  of  speculation.  Where  could  there  be,  or  ever 
have  been,  on  such  conditions,  a  speculator  ?  Out  of  nothing,  in 
the  hands  of  a  creature,  nothing  will  proceed  to  all  eternity.  It  is 
the  prerogative  of  God  alone  to  make  something  out  of  nothing. 
But  even  if  this  were  the  true  idea  of  speculation,  where  could  we 
find  a  man,  such  as  would  be  demanded  for  the  work  of  speculating, 
— where  amongst  us  all,  who  are  not  the  commencers  of  an  abso- 
lutely new  work,  but  only  the  continuers  of  one,  that  is  come  down 
to  us  from  a  long  antiquity.  The  man  who  is  absolutely  void  of  a 
pre-supposition,  would  be  absolutely  empty.  But  such  a  man  there 
cannot  be,  for  every  person  capable  of  thought  has  a  history  behind 
him,  (as  the  foundation  upon  which  alone  he  can  rest, — and  upon 
which  alone  he  can  find  a  starting-place  for  his  thoughts,)  namely, 
his  own  personal  history,  and  that  vast  history  of  our  race,  into 
which  his  own  is  organically  interwoven.  The  more  indissolubly 
his  self-consciousness  rests  upon  this  double  history,  and  the  more 
perfectly  it  is  borne  up  by  it,  so  much  the  more  vigorous  is  the  hu- 
man individual,  both  for  thought  and  for  speculation  ;  but  with  so 
much  the  fuller  data  does  his  speculation  start.  We  should  say, 


344 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


therefore,  that  with  how  much  more  speculation  begins,  so  much 
the  more  comes  out  of  it.  Experience  here  is  evidently  on  our 
side ;  whether  we  consider  the  speculation  of  an  individual,  of  a 
generation,  of  a  whole  people,  or  an  entire  era.  If,  however,  specu- 
lation cannot  start  with  nothing,  neither,  on  the  other  hand,  can  it 
assume  the  totality  of  what  is  given, — but  it  must  commence  only 
with  one  single  datum,  in  which  the  whole  is  implicitly  involved. 
It  must  abstract,  and  lay  aside  much,  from  the  immediate  certainty 
that  is  directly  presented ;  but  if  nothing  remains  over  as  immediately 
certain,  it  can  have  no  commencement  whatever ;  because  it  entirely 
fails  of  a  <Jd?  pot  nov  arw.  It  must  absolutely  possess  some  capital 
which  it  can  apply,  and  with  which  carry  on  its  intellectual  business ; 
it  must,  therefore,  have  something  which  is  absolutely  and  immedi- 
ately certain,  and  from  this  one  thing  will  deduce  all  the  rest,  other- 
wise it  would  fail  in  the  unity  of  its  knowledge. 

Accordingly,  the  position  which  the  speculator  takes  is  essen- 
tially this : — he  falls  back  upon  the  datum  of  his  consciousness, 
which  has  for  him  the  most  immediate  certitude ;  and  leaving  all 
other  possible  data  irr  abeyance,  construes  the  universe  out  of  that 
alone,  purely  by  virtue  of  the  Dialectic  residing  in  it.  This  pri- 
mary datum  too  for  our  thinking  must  contain  in  it  the  logical  ne- 
cessity of  not  remaining  fixed  in  it  alone,  as  immediately  given,  but 
of  going  forth  beyond  it ;  it  must,  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  Dialec- 
tic, draw  forth  from  itself  a  connected  chain  of  ideas,  which  does 
not  break  off  before  it  comes  back  again  to  its  starting-point,  but 
forms  itself  into  a  veritable  system,  in  which  the  universe  lies  ideally 
included.  The  act  from  which  speculation  takes  its  start  i?,  there- 
fore, not  speculative,  but  an  act  of  reflection. 

}  3.  It  is  then  indifferent  which  one,  out  of  the  whole  of  the 
data  of  consciousness,  the  speculator  chooses,  as  his  primary  stand- 
point ? — is  the  choice  of  it  absolutely  capricious?  Certainly  not. 
It  must  be  some  one  of  the  real  primary  data  of  self-consciousness, 
one  to  him  immediately  certain,  and  that  too  not  only  accidentally  but 
necessarily,  not  only  subjectively  viewed,  but  objectively.  Specu- 
lation, therefore,  must  absolutely  go  back  to  that  primary  datum  of 
the  human  consciousness,  the  immediate  unconditional  certitude  of 
which  is,  for  us,  the  absolute  condition  of  thinking  generally.  But 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  345 

this  is  no  other  than  the  human  consciousness  itself  in  its  absolute 
purity,  and  after  the  fullest  abstraction  of  every  determinate  object — 
otherwise  termed  pure  subjective  self-consciousness.  If,  as  we 
said,  the  essential  problem  of  speculation  is  to  bring  home  the  uni- 
verse, generally,  to  our  self-consciousness,  this  self-consciousness 
must  be  something  for  us  immediately  certain ;  and,  as  we  know, 
this  alone  can  be  immediately  certain  to  us,  and  no  other  firm 
ground  whatever  have  we  as  a  starting-point  under  our  feet.  It  is, 
therefore,  self-consciousness,  and  this  only,  from  which  speculation 
can  take  its  start.  In  fact,  speculative  philosophy,  since  it  has  es- 
tablished itself  in  its  purity,  has  always  proceeded  in  this  way  in  all 
the  different  schools.  It  has  always  been  a  sheer  piece  of  preten- 
sion, whenever  it  has  professed  not  to  pre-suppose  self-consciousness ; 
neither  has  that  which  it  has  always  put  forth  as  the  last  anchorage 
of  all  certitude,  ever  been  any  other  than  pure  self-consciousness. 
The  "  cogito  ergo  sum  "  forms  the  foundation  of  all  modern  philoso- 
phical speculation. 

§  4.  Here,  accordingly,  it  would  at  first  appear,  from  a  new 
point  of  view,  that  the  possibility  of  any  distinction  between  theo- 
logical and  philosophical  speculation  is  cut  off.  For  since  such  a 
distinction  is  impossible,  in  respect  of  their  method,  yea  since  the  spec- 
ulative method  is  speculative  only  on  this  very  ground,  that  it  is  one, 
no  prospect  could  lie  open  for  a  distinction  being  drawn  between 
them,  except  a  distinction  in  those  immediate  primary  data  of  con- 
sciousness, from  which  both  should  take  their  start.  But  this  possi- 
bility seems  now  also  to  have  disappeared,  since  it  is  only  pure 
subjective  self-consciousness  upon  which  speculation  can  from  the 
first  plant  itself.  Nevertheless  our  point  is  not  yet  to  be  given  up  as 
hopeless.  Perfectly  true  is  it,  that  it  is  subjective  self-conscious- 
ness alone,  that  is  given  to  us  with  absolute  and  immediate  certi- 
tude; but  this  is  not  necessarily  bare  self-consciousness  as  such, 
but  also  religious  self-consciousness  ;  or,  in  other  words,  conscious- 
ness of  the  Divine.  The  religious  subject  feels  in  his  experience 
that  his  self-consciousness  is  not  absolutely  pure,  or  purely  subjec- 
tive, but  it  is  constructed  at  the  same  time  with  an  .immediate  ob. 
jective  determination,  namely,  with  the  religious.  He  is  in  no  other 
way  conscious  of  himself  than  in  such  wise  that  he  is  conscious  at 

16 


346  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  same  time  of  his  relation  to  God,  and  his  self-consciousness  is, 
therefore,  equally  certain  when  viewed  as  a  consciousness  of  the 
Divine,  as  it  is  immediately  certain,  in  the  form  of  pure  subjective 
self-consciousness.  This  may  perhaps  appear  to  be  an  arbitrary 
supposition :  but  within  our  province,  that  of  theology,  and  within 
the  sphere  of  the  religious  life,  it  is  no  arbitrary  supposition.  We 
allow  it  to  no  one  to  call  the  reality  of  piety  itself  in  question,  or  to 
denominate  it  a  bare  self-deception.  We  freely  confess  our  ina- 
bility indeed  to  confute  skepticism  as  directed  against  piety  itself. 
A  theology  can  only  exist  under  the  pre-supposition  of  piety,  and 
the  acknowledgment  of  its  legitimacy.  That  no  theological  specu- 
lation whatever  can  exist  for  those  who  deny  the  phenomenon  of 
piety,  as  a  peculiar  and  self-evident  determination  of  human  life,  is 
so  manifest,  that  we  do  not  for  a  moment  imagine  that  our  reason- 
ings can  appear  tenable  to  them. 

Moreover,  we  must  ourselves  have  a  very  bad  idea  of  what 
piejy  is,  if  we  would  pretend  to  demonstrate  it  to  them.  Unques- 
tionably there  are  persons  to  whom  piety  is  an  absolutely  certain,  and 
that  an  immediately  certain  fact;  and  to  these  alone  we  now  speak. 
The  reality  of  piety  is  immediately  certain  to  them,  on  the  very 
same  principle  from  which  all  unconditionally  and  immediate  cer- 
tainty flows — namely,  from  their  own  immediate  experience.  They 
live  in  actual  fellowship  with  God,  and  experience  immediately  the 
peculiar  distinction  between  this  religious  tendency  of  their  inward 
life,  and  all  other  tendencies  of  it ;  and  so  it  becomes  as  immedi- 
ately certain,  that  piety  really  exists,  as  that  their  very  sensations 
exist  as  parts  of  their  direct  consciousness.  Piety  has  already  es- 
sentially ceased  to  be  piety,  so  soon  as  it  needs  for  its  certitude  a 
proof  eiiher  of  its  own  reality  or  that  of  its  object.  The  confession 
of  the  pious  is  this  : — God  is  as  immediately  certain  to  me  as  my- 
self, because  I  cannot  feel  or  conceive  of  the  consciousness  and  the 
thought  of  myself  in  any  other  way,  than  as  immediately  connected 
with  the  feeling  and  the  thought  of  God  ;  self-consciousness  cannot 
complete  itself  within  me  without  the  Divine  consciousness :  or 
rather,  God  is  to  me  more  immediately  certain  than  myself,  for  in 
the  light  of  my  Divine  consciousness  my  self-consciousness  first 
truly  realizes  itself:  God  is  to  me  the  absolutely  and  immediately 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  347 

certain,  and  I  become  first  truly  certain  of  myself  by  means  of  my 
certainty  of  God.  If,  therefore,  to  the  pious  the  consciousness  of  the 
Divine  is  the  most  immediately  certain  of  all  things,  then  he  can 
find  there  a  datum,  which  he  is  justified  in  making  a  primary  datum, 
and  a  starting-point  for  speculative  thinking,  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  man  who  abstracts  his  inward  life  from  the  phenomena  of 
piety  proceeds  simply  with  his  self-consciousness  as  such.  Both 
start  in  their  speculation  from  self-consciousness ;  but  this  self-con- 
sciousness is  twofold,  according  as  it  is  taken  in  that  essential  de- 
termination, which  it  receives  by  reason  of  the  reflection  of  God 
within  it,  or  abstracted  altogether  from  such  determination.  Just 
as  the  universe  must  be  construed  d  priori  from  our  bare  subjective 
self-consciousness  when  a  general  speculation  is  required,  so  also 
can  it  be  construed  out  of  our  consciousness  of  the  Divine.  If, 
then,  there  are  two  perfect — equally  perfect  and  equally  valid  points 
from  which  one  and  the  same  speculative  procedure  can  start,  there 
must  also  be  a  twofold  kind  of  speculation.  The  one  proceeds  from 
the  human  consciousness  as  such,  the  other  from  consciousness  as 
Divine  consciousness  ;  accordingly,  the  latter  is  what  we  term  reli- 
gious, or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  theological  speculation;  while 
the  former  can  be  no  other  than  that  which  we  term  philosophical. 
However  nearly  they  may  be  related  to  each  other,  yet,  in  form, 
they  must  ever  be  perfectly  distinct ;  for,  though  proceeding  by  one 
and  the  same  law,  yet  they  go  two  different  roads,  because  they 
start  from  two  different  points.  Both  construe  the  universe  a  priori: 
philosophical  speculation  thinks  and  comprehends  it  by  virtue  of 
the  idea  of  self;  theological  speculation  by  virtue  of  the  idea 
of  God, — on  which  account  it  is  called  Theosophy.  Theologi- 
cal speculation  can  only  begin  with  the  idea  of  God  ;  philosophical 
speculation,  which  apparently  cannot  begin  with  it,  will  be  obliged 
to  end  by  it,  when  every  thing  else  is  brought  into  order  and 
harmony.  The  evidence,  also,  in  both  cases,  is  identical.  If  the 
philosopher  will  shake  his  head  in  the  view  of  theological  specula- 
tion, the  theologian  will  not  unfrequently  do  the  same  in  the  view 
of  the  philosophical.  Only  for  him  to  whom  the  supposition  of  one 
or  the  other  is  equally  valid,  can  the  results,  even  with  the  utmost 
strictness  in  the  speculative  process,  be  equally  convincing. 


348  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

J  5.  For  the  pious,  then,  there  exists  the  possibility  of  a  reli- 
gious, or,  more  properly  speaking,  a  theological  speculation.  Let 
us,  therefore,  first  of  all,  make  its  relation  to  piety  perfectly  clear. 
And  in  the  outset,  let  it  be  understood — that  piety  has  no  need  of 
speculation  as  the  condition  of  its  inward  certitude.  To  itself  it  is 
immediately  certain,  and  that,  too,  in  an  absolute  manner,  but  only 
in  the  concrete,  and  exactly  in  the  same  measure  in  which  the 
quality  really  exists.  In  order  to  believe  confidently  in  itself,  it 
needs  no  proof  of  its  own  reality,  and  seeks  after  none ;  yea.  even  if 
such  proof  were  offered  as  the  foundation  of  its  faith,  it  would  in- 
dignantly spurn  it.  It  were  humiliating  if  any  one  were  to  imagine 
it  to  give  up  its  lofty  independence,  and  to  make  its  existence  de- 
pendent upon  any  demonstration,  or  upon  the  skill  of  the  logical  un- 
derstanding :  and,  consequently,  it  must  appear  a  foolish  undertak- 
ing, to  deduce  its  certainty  from  any  thing  else,  which,  to  the  pious 
man,  could  be  more  certain  than  the  truth  of  his  piety, — whilst,  in 
fact,  this  is  precisely  to  him  the  most  certain  thing  of  all.  yea,  and 
the  light  in  which  he  first  clearly  perceives  every  thing  else.  Nev- 
ertheless piety  needs  speculation  in  order  truly  to  satisfy  itself;  that 
is,  in  order  truly  to  comprehend  itself,  in  order  to  be  entirely  piety 
in  the  view  of  the  understanding  and  of  reflective  thought.  Piety 
(and  that  of  a  Christian  character)  is  essentially  an  affair  of  the 
whole  man :  he  only  is  truly  pious  who  is  so,  or  wishes  to  be  so, 
with  his  whole  being ;  not  only  with  all  his  feelings  and  impulses, 
but  with  all  the  faculties  of  the  understanding  and  powers  of  the 
will.  On  the  side  of  the  self-consciousness  piety  is,  primitively 
speaking,  an  affair  of  feeling,  as  on  the  side  of  activity  an  affair  of 
impulse ;  but  by  virtue  of  an  inward  necessity  it  cannot  remain  so. 
Without  destroying  itself,  as  religious  feeling,  it  marches  onwards 
by  virtue  of  its  own  inward  vital  energy,  to  religious  thinking,  first  of 
all  to  mere  reflection,  but  then  afterwards  to  religious  speculation. 
In  this  way  it  makes  good  to  the  understanding  its  original,  imme- 
diate, and  (on  the  side  of  feeling)  absolute  certitude  ;  and,  however 
superfluously,  furnishes  a  proof  for  its  own  truth.  For  all  proof 
can  consist  in  nothing  else,  than  in  the  pointing  out  of  a  perfect 
consistency  between  the  single  conception  to  be  proved,  and  all 
others,  and  of  its  perfect  unity  with  them  in  an  organic  whole.  But 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY. 


piety  adduces  this  proof,  not  in  order  to  demonstrate  to  itself  its 
own  certitude,  but  in  order  formally  to  expound  the  foundation  of 
the  same.  Theological  speculation  thus  springs  out  of  an  imme- 
diate religious  life  ;*  out  of  the  immediate  desire  of  piety  itself 
clearly  to  understand  all  that  it  possesses, — to  know  what  infinite 
riches  lie  hidden  in  its  spontaneous  fulness,  while  yet  in  its  im- 
mediate and  unreflective  form.  (Compare  1  Corinthians  ii.  12.) 
Thinking,  and  that  speculative  thinking,  is,  therefore,  to  it  an  abso- 
lute necessity,  in  exactly  the  same  proportion  in  which  the  function 
of  thought  generally  is  developed  in  the  religious  individual.  Reli- 
gious speculation  has,  therefore,  its  motive  and  occasion,  not  by  any 
means  in  religious  skepticism,  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  an  uncondi- 
tioned religious  vitality.  In  the  plenitude  of  its  absolute  certainty, 
it  is  bold  enough  to  consider  even  speculation  as  a  province  spring- 
ing out  of  itself,  and  to  address  itself  to  its  conquest.  In  the  inspi- 
ration of  this  most  joyous  self-confidence,  it  trusts  itself  fearlessly 
upon  the  ocean  of  thought,  well  assured  that  it  will  not  be  overwhelm- 
ed in  it.  That  it  must  be  ultimately  successful  in  speculating  upon 
itself,  it  is  well  assured  from  the  immediate  unconditioned  certainty 
of  its  own  absolute  reality ;  but  even  in  the  feeling  of  its  own  exu- 
berance, it  says  freely  to  itself  that  it  can  only  succeed  by  a  slow 
process,  and  by  the  concentration  of  all  its  powers. 

There  is  another  point  of  view,  however,  from  which  the  ne- 
cessity of  religious  speculation  presses  itself  immediately  upon  the 
pious.  Piety  requires  essentially  and  unconditionally  the  aid  of  an 
unlimited  fellowship  ;  a  fellowship,  however,  of  the  pious  is,  in  the 
long-run  and  on  the  side  of  self-consciousness  (about  which  we 
now  more  immediately  treat),  by  no  means  possible,  upon  the  sole 
basis  of  feeling.  There  requires  to  be  a  clear  understanding  be- 
tween those  who  are  associated  with  each  other  respecting  the  pe- 
culiar nature  of  the  piety  conmon  to  them  all ;  and  this  can  only  be 
gained  on  condition  of  its  being  brought  to  a  reflective  expression — 
a  result  which  can  only  be  satisfactorily  obtained  through  the  means 
of  speculation. 

§  6.  According  to  the  relation  now  described  between  piety  and 

*  The  consciousness  of  this  formed  the  peculiar  excellence  of  the 
yvvcif  of  Clemens  of  Alexandria. 


850  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

theological  speculation,  the  former  clearly  stands  with  an  unques- 
tionable authority  over  the  latter.  Theological  speculation  should, 
and  will,  be  essentially  nothing  else  than  the  expression,  on  the  part 
of  the  pious,  of  the  immediate  and  absolute  certain  content,  of  his 
religious  consciousness  in  reflective  form.  Of  this  content,  which 
it  cannot  create,  but  only  elaborate  into  thought,  it  can  alter  noth- 
ing ;  and  the  pious  man  must  have  ceased  to  be  immediately 
certain  of  the  truth  of  his  piety, — that  is,  to  be  pious  at  all,  if  he 
could  allow  such  an  office  to  it.  Theological  speculation  should, 
and  will,  only  make  the  form  of  the  religious  cousciousness  trans- 
parent for  the  expression  of  the  matter.  Its  proof,  therefore,  lies 
necessarily  here :  that  the  immediate  religious  consciousness  from 
which  it  starts  should  recognize  itself  complete  in  its  operations,  but 
in  such  a  manner  that  it  now  finds  itself  to  have  come  to  a  clear 
understanding  respecting  itself.  The  peculiar  religious  conceptions 
with  which  piety  found  itself  before  surrounded,  in  the  fellowship  to 
which  it  belongs,  may  indeed  have  been  broken  and  destroyed  in 
the  hands  of  theological  speculation,  but  the  religious  feeling,  out 
of  which  those  conceptions  themselves  first  sprang,  must  have  re- 
mained unmoved,  under  the  speculative  process.  Nay,  much  rather 
by  its  means  must  it  have  gained  unlimited  room  to  breathe  freshly 
and  freely,  and  to  pour  itself  forth  in  its  whole  developed  fulness 
with  an  unembarrassed  certitude.  If  the  opposite  case  occur,  this 
is  proof  enough  to  the  speculative  theologian,  that  his  speculative 
labor  must  have  miscarried,  and  he  hesitates  not  for  one  moment  to 
pull  it  down  to  the  ground,  however  much  trouble  it  may  have  cost 
him.  He  cannot  err,  through  any  speculation,  as  to  the  truth  of 
his  piety ;  but  neither  can  he  err,  through  the  latter,  as  to  his  specu- 
lation. In  case  of  error,  some  fault  must  have  slipped  into  his  spec- 
ulative process ;  but  never  can  the  problem  itself  appear  unresolva- 
ble  by  speculation  altogether.  For  in  his  daily  immediate  experi- 
ence of  the  inward  consistency  and  unity  of  his  own  peculiar  reli- 
gious consciousness,  he  must  feel  it  to  be  absolutely  capable  of  be- 
ing translated  into  the  language  of  pure  idea  ;  and  he  must  uncondi- 
tionally believe  the  possibility,  that  its  contents  may  then  be  given 
back  unaltered  in  reflective  form.  Accordingly  he  searches  for  the 
error  in  his  speculative  process ;  and  even  if  he  cannot  discover  it, 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  851 

yet  he  is  perfectly  convinced  of  its  existence.  But  still,  notwith- 
standing the  sovereign  authority  of  religion  over  theological  specula- 
tion, yet  it  must  be  nothing  the  less  insisted  upon,  that  this  specula- 
tive process  holds  itself  absolutely  independent  of  religion.  So 
long  as  it  is  in  process  of  completion,  and  not  yet  fully  terminated, 
no  glance  whatever  must  be  cast  upon  religious  feeling,  in  order  to 
anticipate  the  proof,  which  we  shall  at  length  demand  upon  the 
whole,  in  reference  to  individual  points.  By  such  a  procedure  the 
strictness  of  the  speculative  process  is  altogether  destroyed,  and 
can  only  give  forth  imperfect  results  on  both  sides. 

5  7.  If,  therefore,  the  unconditional  independence  of  theological 
speculation  upon  philosophy  must  be  maintained  and  demanded,  yet 
the  necessity  of  an  express  and  close  relation  between  them  should 
by  no  means  be  denied.  On  the  contrary,  the  labor  of  theological 
speculation  can  only  succeed  in  proportion  as  it  engages  in  the  same 
with  speculative  skill  (which,  however,  can  only  be  learned  by 
means  of  the  philosophy  that  has  hitherto  alone  labored  in  its  de- 
velopment), so  also  will  no  one  venture  to  deny  any  further  result 
as  arising  from  theological  speculation,  who  has  not  thoroughly  gone 
through  all  schools  of  philosophy  with  the  utmost  completeness  and 
yet  continues  fixed  in  them.  And  surely  it  should  not  be  difficult 
for  the  pious,  and  especially  for  Christians,  to  retain  undimmed  their 
religious  sobriety  in  this  philosophical  auditorium ;  to  retain  also  in 
connection  with  it  the  original  freshness  of  their  pious  feelings,  the 
glow  and  the  sacredness  of  their  first  religious  love,  the  clearness 
and  simplicity  of  their  devotion  and  their  faith. 

§  8.  Speculative  theology  must  be  something  essentially  different 
for  every  peculiar  form  of  piety,  notwithstanding  the  strictness  of 
the  speculative  method  which  is  equally  inexorable  in  every  case. 
For  in  each  form  of  it  the  starting-point  of  theological  speculation, 
namely,  the  peculiar  determination  of  the  religious  consciousness,  is 
essentially  different.  There  must  be,  therefore,  a  speculative  the- 
ology peculiarly  Christian.  But  for  the  same  reason,  also,  within 
the  limits  of  Christianity,  there  must  be  an  essentially  distinct  spec- 
ulative theology  for  every  peculiar  Christian  fellowship,  since  we 
must  suppose  that  their  doctrinal  variations  rest  upon  essentially 
peculiar  modifications  of  the  universal  Christian  consciousness. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 


Accordingly  there  must  be  a  peculiarly  evangelical  speculative 
theology.  Moreover,  the  more  fixedly  the  religious  consciousness 
of  the  individual  is  bound  down  to  the  reflective  expression  of  the 
same,  as  determined  by  his  Church — that  is,  to  dogmas,  and  the 
more  honestly  he  binds  himself  subjectively  to  these  dogmas,  the 
less  room  is  there  for  a  speculative  theology,  and  the  less  necessity 
for  it.  Therefore  it  is  that  a  Christian  speculative  theology  in  dis- 
tinction from  a  dogmatic,  and  really  independent  of  it,  has  only  made 
its  appearance,  strictly  speaking,  in  the  Protestant  Church;  and 
finds  there  only  a  firm  ground  upon  which  it  can  really  flourish. 
But  even  in  the  Evangelical  Church  it  is  but  recently  that  it  has 
been  able  to  exist.  So  long  as  the  Church  dogmas  in  each  particu- 
lar fellowship  really  satisfy  its  religious  thinking,  and  the  members 
really  find  in  them  a  complete,  consistent,  and  reflective  expression 
of  their  pious  feeling  in  that  peculiar  form  in  which  it  exists  in  the 
Church ;  so  long  they  possess,  in  the  scientific  statement  of  their 
Church  dogmas,  or  system  of  dogmas  (that  is,  in  a  word,  in  their 
dogmatic),  the  speculative  theology  which  would  be  otherwise 
separately  required.  It  is  when  the  dogmas  and  the  dogmatic  of 
the  Church  can  no  longer  satisfy  scientifically  the  more  thinking  of 
its  members  (which  is  always  the  case  when  a  particular  Church 
has  already  entered  upon  a  process  of  metamorphosis  or  dissolution), 
that  the  necessity  of  a  speculative  theology  by  the  side  of  the  dogma- 
tic arises.  But  since  a  speculative  theology  becomes  visible  in  no 
other  way  than  by  the  side  of  a  dogmatic,  therefore,  its  appearance 
is  ever  a  sign  that  the  particular  church  to  which  it  belongs  is 
already  in  process  of  change  or  dissolution.  And,  generally  speak- 
ing, the  more  the  whole  Church-peculiarity  falls  back  upon  Chris- 
tian piety  itself,  and  the  Church  gradually  dissolves,  so  much  the 
more  pregnancy  must  its  speculative  theology  contain,  and  so  much 
the  more  must  it  place  itself  in  the  foreground,  above  every  other 
theological  discipline. 

{  9.  We  see,  then,  that  speculative  theology  cannot  be  bound  fast 
to  the  dogmas  of  the  Church.  It  feels  itself  to  be  connate  with 
them  ;  yea,  it  knows  that  it  is  one  determinate  branch  of  its  own  of- 
fice to  develope  them  still  further.  Since  its  very  necessity  arises 
from  the  fact  that  the  understanding  no  longer  finds  in  these  dogmas 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  353 

a  satisfactory  expression  for  the  peculiar  religious  life  of  the  Church, 
its  conclusions,  if  they  have  any  worth,  must  stand  relatively  apart 
from  them.  Speculative  theology  must,  according  to  its  very  idea, 
be  heterodox;  but  heterodox,  indeed,  in  the  right  sense — in  that, 
narrely,  which  Schleiermacher  has  so  excellently  distinguished 
from  a  false  heterodoxy.  The  departure  of  the  conclusions  of  specu- 
lative theology  from  the  Church  dogmas  can  only  consist  in  this ; — 
that  the  one  find  their  completion  in  the  other,  and  can  only  in  this 
way  be  fully  explained.  The  peculiar  and  fundamental  religious 
feeling  must  find  in  speculative  theology  the  real  correspondent  ex- 
pression which,  at  first,  it  thought  to  possess,  but  sought  for  in  vain 
in  its  dogmas — an  expression  in  which  it  finds  its  own  pure  and  en- 
tire reflective  representation,  and  through  which  it  now  first  truly 
understands  itself.  But  in  the  fact  of  its  now  learning  to  understand 
itself  fully,  it  becomes  conscious  that  hitherto  it  has  never  under- 
stood itself  correctly — that  that  peculiarly  new  historical  impulse  in 
the  development  of  the  kingdom  of  the  Saviour,  by  which  it  was  ori- 
ginally kindled,  had  not  been  able  immediately  to  unfold  its  full  power, 
and,  consequently,  was  not  able  to  give  to  the  new  fellowship  which 
it  created  that  precise  tendency  which  was  designed  by  it.  Accord- 
ingly, the  determinate  Church,  in  coming  really  to  itself  by  means  of 
speculative  theology,  is  at  the  same  time  raised  above  itself.  Its  pe- 
culiar religious  life,  by  beholding  itself  in  the  mirror  of  pure  idea, 
transforms  itself  into  a  new  form,  and  constructs  for  itself  a  new 
world  in  place  of  that  which  has  now  become  foreign  to  it.  Since 
no  peculiar  Christian  Church  can  regard  itself  as  a  finality,  and  no 
existing  one  is  the  completed  form  of  Christian  fellowship,  the  fact 
that  its  development  is  at  the  same  time  a  gradual  dissolution,  is  in 
perfect  consistency  with  the  idea  of  its  normal  state. 

§  10.  Quite  different,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  relation  of  speculative 
theology  to  the  Holy  Scriptures  in  the  Evangelical  Church.  For  it, 
and,  indeed,  for  all  theological  systems  generally,  the  Holy  Scrip- 
tures are  an  indispensable  canon,  as  being  the  authentic  expression 
of  the  Christian  consciousness  in  its  original  fulness  and  purity. 
With  them  its  results  can  never  be  in  contradiction ;  in  them  it  must 
be  able  expressly  to  point  out  the  determinate  germ  of  all  its  ideas 
and  relations.  Accordingly,  the  necessary  difference  between  that 


354  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

spontaneous  expression  of  the  Christian  consciousness  that  prevails 
in  the  Bible,  and  that  reflective  expression  of  it  which  alone  holds 
good  in  speculative  theology  cannot  naturally  be  regarded  as  being 
in  any  way  a  contradiction.  Wherever  a  real  contradiction  of  spec- 
ulative theology  with  Holy  Scripture  is  manifest,  the  former  must 
immediately  acknowledge  the  error  to  be  on  its  own  side,  and  must 
confess  its  results  to  be  abortive.  It  must  have  speculated  erro- 
neously ;  otherwise,  such  a  dissent  were  impossible.  Yea,  a  posi- 
tive defence  of  the  Scriptures  is  to  be  looked  for  in  this  respect  from 
theological  speculation.  The  system  of  ideas  which  it  affords  must 
prove  itself  to  be  a  key  peculiarly  adapted  for  opening  the  full  sense 
of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  In  this  way  there  must  be  gained,  if  not  an 
absolutely  adequate  comprehension  of  them,  yet  adequate  to  a  degree 
which  was  not  attainable  by  any  former  theological  apparatus — a 
comprehension  of  that  which,  in  the  eyes  of  a  mere  traditional  ex- 
egesis, remained  ever  irrational.  But,  if  speculative  theology  must 
submit  itself  unconditionally  to  the  judgment  of  Holy  Scripture,  so 
much  the  more  inexorably  must  we  require  of  it,  that  in  the  specula- 
tive process  it  hold  itself  free  from  the  influence  of  its  authority,  and 
never  allow  its  procedure  in  individual  cases  to  be  guided  by  any 
side  glance  upon  the  Bible,  or  by  any  desire  of  aiming  at  a  result 
correspondent  with  the  Biblical  doctrine.  In  its  procedure  it  must 
consider  absolutely  nothing  but  the  requisitions  of  thought,  and 
know  no  other  authority  than  that  of  logic  and  dialectics.  When, 
however,  it  has  ended  its  labor  with  perfect  independence,  then,  con- 
scious of  its  own  weakness,  it  comes  before  the  tribunal  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  awaits  submissively  their  uncorrupted  judgment. 

5  11.  Speculative  theology,  according  to  the  idea  of  it  now  given, 
is  only  an  individual  production ;  its  starting-point  is  the  individual 
religious  consciousness  of  the  speculator.  But  this  mere  individual 
character  soon  disappears,  inasmuch  as  on  the  one  side  it  regulates 
itself  expressly  by  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  places  itself  in  relation 
to  the  doctrines  of  the  Church ;  while,  on  the  other  side,  it  necessa- 
rily supposes  a  religious  consciousness  of  such  a  nature  that  the 
common  religious  consciousness  of  the  Church  clearly  reflects  itself 
in  it.  We  say  necessarily,  for  unless  the  theologian  participated 
really  in  the  universal,  spiritual,  and  even  philosophical  conscious- 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  355 

ness  of  his  age,  no  need  whatever  could  arise  in  him  to  speculate ; 
and,  unless  the  spirit  which  inspires  him  were  not  predominantly  a 
religious  one,  he  would  not  turn  to  theological  but  rather  to  the  side 
of  philosophical  speculation.  Consequently,  every  theological  spec- 
ulation, in  proportion  as  it  becomes  successful,  will  have  this  result, 
— that  its  conclusions  gradually  pass  over  into  the  universal  convic- 
tion of  the  fellowship  to  which  it  belongs.  An  individual  character, 
however,  still  unavoidably  attaches  to  it,  inasmuch  as  it  demands  a 
relative  tendency  to  the  dissolution  of  the  Church  as  the  condition  of 
its  existence.  This  being  the  case,  we  cannot  come  forward  with 
any  new  attempt  at  theological  specuktion  without  the  painful  con- 
sciousness of  giving  an  appearance  of  immodesty  and  assumption, 
and  we  might  almost  wish  in  doing  so  to  fall  under  the  suspicion  of 
light-mindedness,  as  though  we  were  ignorant  what  we  were  doing 
and  what  claim  we  were  setting  up. 

^  12.  A  speculative  theology,  in  the  sense  now  developed,  we  hold 
to  be  a  real  necessity  for  the  Church,  and,  in  its  present  state,  a  very 
pressing  one.  Speculation,  as  we  before  remarked,  is  an  inward 
and  indelible  necessity  of  man,  and,  therefore,  of  the  Christian.  The 
pious  Christian  well  knows  that  the  immediate  and  spontaneous 
form  of  his  religious  consciousness  is  partly  veiled  in  obscurity ;  and 
the  more  valuable  he  holds  it  to  be,  of  so  much  the  more  importance 
is  it  to  lift  the  veil  away.  He  knows  also  that  mere  reflective  think- 
ing cannot  perfectly  accomplish  this  end ;  that  its  completion  can 
only  be  attained  by  means  of  speculation.  Still  more  immediately 
does  the  necessity  of  speculative  theology  become  apparent,  when 
we  consider  the  relation  of  the  Church  to  the.  other  spheres  of  hu- 
man life.  Philosophy  speculates  on,  without  asking  previously  the 
permission  of  the  Church.  It  does  not  start  from  the  Christian,  or, 
indeed,  from  any  form  of  the  religious  consciousness.  Accordingly, 
it  cannot  fail  to  come  into  frequent  conflict  with  the  peculiar  Chris- 
tian consciousness.  The  question,  therefore,  arises,  what  should 
Christian  piety  do  in  relation  to  philosophy  ?  Should  it  ignore  the 
contradictions  of  philosophy  against  that  which,  to  it,  is  the  most 
certain  and  sacred  of  all  things,  and  have  nothing  fundamentally  to 
do  with  philosophy  at  all  ?  That  would  be  accounted  as  mere  cow- 
ardice, and  could  not  at  all  succeed,  so  long  as  we  aim  at  a  theology 


356  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

which  shall  not  stand  isolated  from  the  universal  science  and  culti- 
vation of  the  age.  The- Church  unavoidably  stands  in  the  midst  of 
this  universal  cultivation  and  science,  and  all  the  problems  which 
they  moot  present  themselves  necessarily  to  all  the  members  of  the 
Church,  who  are  scientifically  instructed,  and  necessitate  them  to 
seek  a  solution  from  the  stand-point  of  their  religious  consciousness. 
In  a  word,  the  Church  must  come  to  a  clear  explanation  with  the 
science  of  each  age,  and,  still  more,  with  the  philosophy  in  which  all 
other  human  disciplines  are  concentrated,  if  she  would  have  a  pros- 
perous existence  within  her  own  sphere.  But  this  can  only  be 
gained  by  a  strictly  scientific  procedure,  and  by  the  application,  too, 
of  a  proper  theological  procedure — that  is,  of  speculation  starting 
from  its  own  point  of  view,  as  based  upon  the  Christian  conscious- 
ness. It  is  only  by  such  a  resolution  that  a  mutual  understanding, 
not  to  say  a  unanimity,  can  be  established  between  Christian  piety 
and  philosophy ;  and  a  mutnal  acknowledgment  of  what  they  owe  to 
each  other.  At  no  time  has  it  been  so  important  to  feel  the  indis- 
pensableness  of  speculative  theology  as  in  our  own.  A  full  half  of 
the  evils  which  at  present  oppress  the  Christian  life  come  simply 
from  the  fact  that  our  Churches  have  not  been  mindful  at  the  rigli 
hour  of  arming  themselves  with  a  speculative  theology.  There  was 
a  time  when  philosophy  and  the  doctrines  of  the  Church  reckoned 
with  ideas  of  precisely  the  same  magnitude  (since  both  employed  the 
same  alphabet  of  ideas),  and,  on  that  account,  understood  each  other 
mutually.  But  this  time,  for  Germany  at  least,  has  for  more  than  a 
century  gone  by.  As,  generally,  the  business  of  philosophy  consists 
essentially  in  laboring  onwards  in  the  perfection  of  the  ideas  always 
current  in  science,  and  in  defining  each  with  greater  completeness, 
so  that  they  may  be  worked  together  into  an  entire  system  ;  as  also, 
peculiarly  since  the  rise  of  the  so-called  modern  philosophy,  a  vast 
activity  in  this  respect  has  prevailed,  through  which  the  whole  al- 
phabet of  ideas  has  more  than  once  experienced  a  great  transforma- 
tion. This  has  taken  place  naturally  from  a  purely  philosophical 
point  of  view,  independent  of  the  interests  of  Christian  piety.  It 
should  now  be  the  problem,  therefore,  of  theology  to  undertake  on  its 
side,  and  with  equal  zeal,  the  same  labor  from  its  own  peculiar  point 
of  view.  Hitherto  this  has  been  inconvenient  to  it,  and  it  has,  alas  ! 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  357 

almost  entirely  neglected  the  duty.  The  consequence  is,  that  the  ap- 
paratus of  ideas  which  it  received  from  an  earlier  age  is  antiquated  in 
relation  to  science  generally,  and  appears  out  of  course  ;  so  that  the 
language  sanctioned  by  the  Church,  to  philosophically  educated  minds, 
is  ofttimes  unmeaning ;  and  when  the  attempt  is  really  made  to  come 
to  an  understanding  with  them  in  their  own  language,  the  appropri- 
ate words  and  symbols  are  entirely  wanting.  It  possesses,  at  pre- 
sent, no  specific  alphabet  of  ideas  drawn  from  the  elements  of  mod- 
ern thought  which  is  adapted  to  express  with  proper  logical  consist- 
ency the  Christian  consciousness  of  the  age.  There  remains,  there- 
fore, only  this  alternative, — either  to  use  barbarous  language  without 
any  really  consistent  apparatus  of  ideas,  or  to  adopt  that  system  of 
ideas  which  philosophy  has  established  from  its  own  point  of  view 
for  scientific  communication.  In  the  latter  case,  it  cannot,  on  the 
one  side,  express  purely,  clearly  and  intelligently  what  it  has  to  say, 
because  the  form  in  which  it  clothes  the  matter  of  its  own  conscious- 
ness has.  not  grown  to  it  naturally,  as  exactly  adapted  for  its  own 
body ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  since  it  reckons  with  ideas  which  of 
themselves  express  something  different  from  what  it  wants  to  desig- 
nate by  them,  it  must  necessarily  become  confused.  Inevitably, 
therefore,  it  has  resigned  the  victory  into  the  hands  of  secular  science, 
so  far  as  it  really  disagrees  with  it,  inasmuch  as  it  adopts  its  pre- 
mises in  order  to  argue  against  it.  In  the  former  case,  however,  it 
must  necessarily  sink,  by  how  much  the  longer  so  much  the  more,  in 
the  estimation  of  all  scientific  communities.  The  philosophy  of  the 
present  period  possesses  a  network  of  definite  and  strictly  systema- 
tic ideas ;  and,  since  the  present  theology  is  entirely  wanting  in  any 
thing  of  the  kind,  the  former  catches  for  itself,  without  any  difficulty, 
the  better  heads,  wherever  other  and  deeper  interests  do  not  prepon- 
derate over  that  of  thinking  itself. 

§  13.  In  the  system  of  theological  disciplines,  speculative  theology 
must  take  the  first  place  (the  head).  After  this  follows  historical 
theology  (the  trunk)  ;  and  lastly,  practical  theology  (the  hands  and 
feet).  Speculative  theology  must  stand  before  the  other  two  parts, 
because  it  forms  the  pre-supposition  for  both.  In  the  case  of  prac- 
tical theology,  this  is  peculiarly  obvious,  for  its  essential  problem 
consists  in  this, — that  it  fixes  the  formula  for  such  a  treatment 


358  PHILOSOPHY    OF    RELIGION. 

the  present  condition  of  the  Church,  by  virtue  of  which  it  can  ap- 
proach by  a  steady  march  to  its  full  development.  This  problem, 
however,  it  cannot  solve,  so  long  as.  on  the  one  side,  it  does  not 
rightly  understand  the  peculiar  position  of  the  Church  at  the  pre- 
sent moment,  and,  on  the  other  side,  does  not  possess  a  clear  per- 
ception of  its  perfect  state ;  neither  of  which  is  possible  without  the 
real  idea  of  the  Christian  Church  and  its  relation  to  Christianity — an 
idea  which  can  only  be  found  in  a  speculative  manner.  Without 
this  idea,  the  whole  historical  phenomenon  of  Christianity  generally 
cannot  be  truly  understood,  and,  therefore,  historical  theology  pre- 
supposes speculative  theology.  We  should  not.  however,  any  the 
more  deny  that,  in  other  points  of  view,  speculative  theology  may 
have  both  the  others  as  its  pre-supposition,  particularly  the  histo- 
rical. For  in  every  complete  system,  such  as  theology  should  be, 
the  individual  parts  are  mutually  the  absolute  conditions  of  each 
other.  Least  of  all  is  it  our  meaning  that  theological  studies  should 
commence  with  speculative  theology. 

{14.  We  have  already  hinted  that  our  theology  does  not  yot 
possess  a  complete  speculative  discipline.  Attempts  at  it  were  be- 
gun, indeed,  very  early,  and  have  been  repeated  at  all  times  by  the 
so-called  Theosophists,  at  the  head  of  whom  stand  the  Gnostics ; 
but  these  attempts  have  partly  failed  in  a  proper  comprehension  of 
their  real  aim,  and  partly  have  found  no  acknowledgment  in  the 
Church,  having  been  thrust  out  more  or  less  among  the  heresies. 
In  the  Church  itself,  indeed,  the  necessity  of  theological  speculation 
could  not  be  denied.  It  is  grounded  so  deeply  in  the  inmost  es- 
sence of  the  Christian  life,  that  men  have  been  constrained  at  all 
times  to  give  their  minds  to  it.  But  they  have  done  so  without  any 
clear  consciousness  of  the  specific  distinction  between  theological 
and  philosophical  speculation ;  so  that  no  really  independent  the- 
ological_speculation  could  be  produced,  but  only  an  intolerable  mis- 
placement of  philosophy,  with  all  kinds  of  religious  and  theological 
elements  pressing  into  it.  On  the  one  side,  men  have  not  kept 
strictly  within  the  theological  stand-point :  on  the  other  side,  they 
have  carried  no  real  and  organically  connected  system  of  theologi- 
cal speculation  to  a  completion.  They  have  ever  remained  content 
with  mere  aphoristic  attempts  at  the  construction  of  individual  doc- 


PHILOSOPHY    AND    THEOLOGY.  359 

trines,  and  the  like.  Most  frequently  they  have  applied  such  a  spec- 
ulative theologizing  to  a  dogmatic  treatment  of  Christian  doctrine* 
consequently  to  an  entirely  false  purpose.  From  hence  has  sprung 
a  confusion  alike  destructive  for  dogmatics  on  the  one  side  and 
theological  speculation  on  the  other.  Nevertheless,  amongst  the 
dogmatic  theologians,  a  very  considerable  amount  of  theological 
speculation  has  been  produced,  only  in  the  loosest  possible  manner. 
So  also  in  that  philosophical  discipline  which  has  hitherto  borne  the 
name  of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  This  has  been,  in  fact,  for  the 
most  part  nothing  else  than  theological  speculation,  particularly  in 
its  earlier  forms  :  only  the  consciousness  of  this  its  theological  char- 
acter was  entirely  wanting,  so  that  it  held  itself  to  be  unobjection- 
able for  philosophy.  Such  a  self-deception,  however,  in  relation  to 
its  scientific  character,  could  not  but  be  followed  by  the  most  inju- 
rious consequences. 


THE   END. 


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